Theory and Practice:

Essays Presented to Gene Weltfish

Studies in Anthropology 7

Frontispiece: Gene Weltfish.

Theory and Practice:

Essays Presented to Gene Weltfish

Edited by

STANLEY DIAMOND

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Preface

In April, 1976, most of the contributors to this volume, together with a number of other friends, gathered to honor Gene Weltfish on an occasion graciously supported by Lita Osmundsen and the Wenner-Gren Foundation. In the general opinion of the participants, the affair turned out to be the most spontaneous and relaxed they had ever attended in the company of professional colleagues. There was no agenda and hardly any procedure. People simply rose to their feet, one after another, as the spirit moved them, and spoke directly to Gene about the perspectives and experiences they shared with her, and of how she had touched their lives as anthropologists. No effort was made to chair the meeting. We spoke around a circle, from table to table, directly, simply, without sentimentality, in the best words of which we were capable. The cumulative effect was impressive and lasting: thirty-odd anthropologists behaving as if they were, for a few moments, so many Pawnee. In the candor and commonality of that atmosphere, negative tensions evaporated; professional suspicions were abandoned; sibling and not so sibling rivalries were sublimated. An unconscious community of survivors was created in the face of the bureaucratization of a discipline that most of us had chosen not so many years ago as a way of life, as marginal men and women seeking a perspective (and perhaps a shelter) from which to understand ourselves and our inhuman society.

I have frequently reflected since then on the unpredictable temper of such gatherings; why was this one so easy and exhilerating? Was it because all of us (now well past any technical definition of middle age) had demystified anthropology as an academic subject, and were freeing ourselves from the illusion of strictly professional accomplishment? Were we recapturing the spirit of marginality that had engaged us in the first place? Did Gene's passionate, nonopportunistic survival as an anti-academic scholar and activist, her immediate presence, embody the

perspective that we all honored: a scrupulous regard for, and celebration of, the rituals, the work, and preoccupations of everyday life, the basis for all human cultures worthy of the name. And did we recognize that this was probably the last gathering of its kind that could possibly occur—a reflection of the great, formative period of American anthropology at Columbia under Boas, which had shaped us all, mediated by the one student of his who understood, and had never broken, the unity of theory and practice?

Finally, most importantly, did we recognize, as mortality became more tangible for us and we developed the sense of an ending, that Gene Weltfish had mastered the art of growing old, with all that that implies, and was becoming our teacher in a way we had not anticipated? In a civilization that turns away from aging, and thus denies dignity and wisdom to the aged, forcing them to dissimulate a merely biological youth if they are to be recognized at all, she has insisted on the integrity of her own life cycle. In a sense, she has created her own life cycle—against the flat backdrop of American culture—transforming her unceasing physical vigor into a this-wordly spiritual dynamism that anthropologists will recognize as a normal stage on what the Winnebago call the road of life and death.

Gene has refused to be determined by the limitations of her culture, or the routine expectations of her contemporaries. She has learned, through disciplined self-examination and reflection (merging the personal and professional dimensions of the anthropological identity), what a human life in our time must be about, if it is to be more than a social reflex.

In the course of this classic journey she has abandoned the possessions which misrepresent reality in the bourgeois milieu, and surrendered any concern with status. She hardly speaks any longer in the possessive mode, and has scaled down her material needs to an efficient and attractive minimum. Money means literally nothing to Gene, she does not work for reward, and she spends it freely and joyfully in the service of others, keeping very little for herself.

Her surroundings reflect her concerns: a single book-lined studio, a tiny refrigerator, a hot-plate, a telephone—not as an obsession but as a means of communication with those she needs and the many who need her—work in progress everywhere, the atmosphere vibrant with ideas, the city to whose life she is dedicated, spread out beneath her window: her drawing-room. At the same time, Gene's room is also a retreat, honest in its functions. There are no masking decorations or hypocritical objects, no aggressive signs of status. It is a habitation so transparently itself that one can relax there, because one is no longer in flight; and experience loses its terror, whatever the outcome, because in that place it is being confronted by a mature spirit.

The achievement of this complex stage on life's way has not, and could not, have been easy for Gene Weltfish. She was a woman growing up and studying in a patriarchal society, routinely exploited even by those men she respected most, both within and outside the academy. She was an overworked and underpaid single parent, committed to a singularly demanding vocation. She was a premature feminist and a premature antifascist who fought a solitary, losing battle to maintain the position that Boas had originally bequeathed her at Columbia, only to find that students and colleagues alike (almost without exception) found ways to avoid supporting her. And there was a time when exiled, bitter, sick and tired of an existence to which reciprocity in any human meaning of the term seemed utterly alien—Gene, that most social of beings, finally became self-isolating. She attended to her own soul, and like the advanced Winnebago initiate in the final phases of the medicine rite, responded no longer to public provocations and demands. She let her conscious grow without coercion from any quarter whatsoever. She was able to demystify the power of society reified, and made her life her own during her time of troubles, but only after having lived to middle age through the most exhausting of social imperatives.

This kind of reconceptualization, the product of society, but beyond society's reach, is almost beyond the modern western imagination. One's biography, in a certain sense, becomes irrelevant; one's life as mere chronology and occurence is transcended; it is no longer determinative, it is no longer an objectified, dissociated series of events that are worth looking into, or which make this or that person 'interesting' or 'accomplished'. In Gene's instance what is critical, then, in the achievement of identity, is not the detail of biography. It is informative, but not decisive, that she came from a bourgeois German-Jewish background respectful of formal learning, that she graduated from Barnard College, that she had an early training in philosophy with Morris Cohen and John Dewey, (a broken marriage), an illuminating experience among the Pawnee, a unique association with Boas, whose comprehensive definition of anthropology she was perhaps the only faculty member at Columbia to maintain; and that she continues to teach and write with astonishing vigor and impact as she approaches eighty. But what is decisive is what she has done with her life, emancipating herself from its fatality, emerging as a being who can no longer be situated in a particular social niche, or defined by a given cultural background. A fusion has taken place—under very high spiritual pressure—between experience and ego, the person emerges as an immediate presence, a realized self, the subject returns to the subject, having been reunited with its object. Having given itself to the world, the world is now contained in the self.

Hence, impressive as Gene's achievements are, it is not, I think, those achievements which we have honored in this book, but herself.

The spell of the evening, the source of these reflections, was broken, at least for me, when one of those present, innocently asked if the remarks about, and addressed to Gene, had been recorded, since they were, by self-conscious implication, so very good. Here was that inescapable anthropological mediation, that doubling of consciousness and flight from experience at the moment of experiencing, that denial of the possibility of immediate presence which signifies the conventional anthropological state of mind, and links our marginality to the alienation of the time in which we live. From then on we spoke about how marvelous the evening had been, but the experience had already eluded our grasp. But we had learned, I think, why Gene was important to us, who she was, and what she represented.

In West Africa, on the celebration of a Chief, it is the Chief who dances. In this festschrift, we members of the clan have executed a few reciprocal steps in the direction of a modern chieftainess.

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The First Snake Song

DAVID P. McALLESTER

The First Snake Song is a ceremonial gesture which has been enacted again and again for purposes of prime importance in the Navajo culture. I hope to show how the analysis of a song and the song text may reveal some of the categories of thought, the cognitive matrix, from which the song arises.[1] In the course of the exposition I will sketch the place of this song in its sequence with seven others, in the ceremonial as a whole and in the myth of Shootingway, one of the most important of the long and complex Navajo ceremonials.

To give the story, briefly, Holy Young Man, in search of supernatural power, visited the Snake People, the Buffalo People, then, in two avatars, as Holy Young Man and Holy Boy, the Sky People and Fish People simultaneously. He received instructions on these journeys that made him immune to the danger of snakes, lightning, floods, and certain other threats that encompass humankind. In a prototypical ceremony in the sky, he learned the Shootingway ceremonial which made his knowledge into operative power by means of songs, prayers and ceremonial procedures. These he brought back to this world for the use of the Earth People.

His adventures started in the underworld where he married four Snake Girls. However, he came into conflict with his father-in-law, whom he had to kill in self-defense. He received snake power in return for restoring the old man to life. The Snake Songs record these events, obliquely and in part, and function to recreate snake power when it is needed today.

The Snake Song studied here is the first in a series of eight in a total of 454 songs recorded by Ray Winnie, Shootingway singer of Lukachukai, Arizona, in the fall of 1957. My recording sessions were, first, a private exposition, away from the reservation, in which Ray Winnie recounted each step in the ceremonial procedures, singing the songs and reciting the

prayers in their appropriate places. The recital of this material, on 30 hours of tape, and the replaying and translation, with the help of Ray Winnie and Albert G. Sandoval, Jr., required three weeks of intensive work. I then was fortunate enough to be able to record an actual performance of almost the same, nine-night version of Shootingway (House Chant—*kin behatáál*) sung over Albert G. Sandoval, Sr. at Lukachukai by Denet Tsosie and his brother Red Moustache, assisted by Ray Winnie and his wife, Fanny, and also, again, by Albert G. Sandoval, Jr.

I give the song here with the text as it was sung, the Navajo as it would be spoken, and English translations, interlinear and free. The Navajo, as sung, is presented without indications of vowel length or tone since these are shown in the melodic transcription and are almost always different from their prosodic form.

First Snake Song

♩ = 95 MM
Transposed a
half-tone down.

Ray Winnie
Lukachukai, 1957



ya- ha 'eye neya ŋeye ŋa,

ya- ha 'eye neya ŋeye naŋa

Repeat 4 times, then end with Chorus (A A B B C C')

K'a-ch'ikę baŋatso yo'ałigo baŋatso yołbąso-go yo-ya- ye,

Last chorus, ending phrase: yaha 'eye neya ŋe-- ya-

Text of the First Snake Song

Introd.: ***'eye neye yaŋa naŋa***

Chorus: ***'eya heya ŋeya ŋa,***
'eya heya neya nahe

yeya 'e-ye-yeya 'eya heya
ŋeya na-ho- 'e-ya 'ehe

yaha 'eye yeya 'eye na,
yaha 'eye neya neye naŋa

1. ***K'a dine dighini-ye, k'a dine dighini-ye nohani- yoya- yeye***
K'ad dinéé́h dighiní nohaanííyá
Now man holy to us has come

Tɬ'iyitso yołteɬigo nohani yo-he yaha 'eye neya ŋeye ŋa,
Tɬ'iistsoh yołtéeɬgo nohaanííyá
Snake big holding to us has come
while ***yaha 'eye neya ŋeye naŋa***

2. ***K'a ch'ikę dighini-ye, k'a ch'ikę dighini-ye nohani- yoya-yeye***
K'ad ch'ikę́ę́h dighiní nohaanííyá
Now young woman holy to us has come

Tɬ'iyitso	*yoleɬigo*	***nohani yo-he***	***yaha 'eye neya ŋeye ŋa,***
Tɬ'iistsoh	*yooléeɬgo*	***nohaanííyá***	
Snake big	**dangling**		
	while		***yaha 'eye neya ŋeye naŋa***

3. ***K'a kiyę dighini-ye, k'a kiye dighini-ye*** ***nohani- yoya-yeye***
K'ad kiiyę́ ***dighini*** ***nohaanííyá***
Now boy holy to us has come

Baŋas tso	*yo'aɬigo*	***nohani yo-he***	***yaha 'eye neya neye ŋa,***
Bąąs tsoh	*yoo'áaɬgo*	***nohaanííyá***	
Hoop big	lugging	to us has come	
	while		***yaha 'eye neya neye naŋa***

4. ***K'at'at'ed dighini-ye, k'at'ated dighini-ye*** ***nohani- yoya ye,***
K'ad 'atéé́d dighiní ***nohaanííyá***
Now girl holy to us has come

Baŋas tso	*yoɬbaso-go*	***nohani yo-he***	***yaha 'eye neya ŋeye ŋa,***
Bąąs tsoh	*yoɬbaasgo*	***nohaanííyá***	
Hoop big	trundling	to us has come	
	while		***yaha 'eye neya ŋeye naŋa***

Chorus: ***'eya heya ŋeya ŋa,***
'eya neya neya nahe

yeya 'e-ye- yeya 'eya heya
ŋeya na-ho- 'eya 'ehe

yaha 'eye yeya 'eye na,
yaha 'eye neya ŋe— ya-.

First Snake Song: free translation

Introd: ***'eye neye yaŋa naŋa***

Chorus: ***'eya heya ŋeya ŋa,***
'eya heya neya nahe

yeya 'e-ye- yeya 'eya heya
ŋeya na-ho- 'eya 'ehe

yaha 'eye yeya 'eye na,
yaha 'eye neya neye naŋa

1. Now Holy Young Man, *ye*, now Holy Young Man, *ye,* came to us, *yeye*
   While holding the big snake, he came to us, *he*
   Yaha 'eye neya ŋeye ŋa,
   Yaha 'eye neya ŋeye naŋa

2. Now Holy Young Woman, *ye*, now Holy Young Woman, *ye*, came to us, *yeye*
   While dangling the big snake, she came to us, *he*
   Yaha 'eye neya ŋeye ŋa,
   Yaha 'eye neya ŋeye naŋa

3. Now Holy Boy, *ye*, now Holy Boy, *ye*, came to us, *yeye*
   While lugging the big hoop, he came to us, *he*
   Yaha 'eye neya ŋeye ŋa,
   Yaha 'eye neya ŋeye naŋa

4. Now Holy Girl, *ye*, now Holy Girl, *ye*, came to us, *ye*,
   While trundling the big hoop, she came to us, *he*
   Yaha 'eye neya ŋeya ŋa,
   Yaha 'eye neya ŋeye naŋa

Chorus: *'eya heya ŋeya ŋa,*
'eya neya neya nahe

yeya 'e-ye- yeya 'eya heya
ŋeya na-ho 'eya 'ehe

yaha 'eye yeya 'eye na,
yaha 'eye neya ŋe--ya-.

The Interpretation Implied in a Transcription

The way any sound communication is transferred from the aural to the visual is inevitably a work of analysis as well as transcription. In the melody, as written here, the use of Western notation, the presence of bar lines, the implications of a 'tonic' or base note of the melody, all indicate assumptions about the song that may have distorted it into a form more Euro-American than Native-American, or, especially, Navajo. Similarly, in writing down a text as a poem, one creates a context that may be un-Navajo. I took my license for identifying poetic lines by the patterns of repetition and by the rhythmic endings indicated in the song melody. The musical structure seems to apply also to the vocabalic chorus and, with

variations, to the lexically meaningful verses and their vocabalic burdens.

It is especially in poetry that the old saying *traduttore, trahitore* (translator, betrayer) is most poignantly true. How much more so in the case of a poetry that is heavily intermixed with vocables. The only other published rendition of this song (Haile, 1947:131) dispenses with the vocables entirely, nor is there any indication of the phonetic variations in which the lexically meaningful words were sung. Considerations of space are often overriding in publishing. The inclusion of all the vocables would have doubled the number of Fr. Berard's many hundreds of pages of Navajo song texts. We can be grateful for his meticulous record of the Navajo as it would be spoken and assume that he considered the vocables to be 'nonsense syllables' and therefore relatively nonessential.

There are several reasons for disagreeing with this point of view. Dell Hymes has indicated how a vocable refrain may be of 'fundamental importance' in the structure of an Indian poem (1965:322) and shows how it may indicate in microcosm the structure of the poem as a whole (ibid.:326, 330). I have shown how vocabalic introductions and key phrases may be indicators of the genre of several kinds of Navajo songs (1954:30, 41–42, 48, 52, 55–56) and Frisbie has made the same point for Navajo corn-grinding songs (Johnson, 1964:105) and has discussed the relations of vocables to lexical words (1967:117–118). Reichard raises the question whether there are *any* 'meaningless syllables' in Navajo song texts, citing Adolph Bittany (1950:281–282).

If we accept the importance of including all vocabalic material with song translations, there is still an inherent incongruity in using the native vocables with the translation. Jerome Rothenberg has tried to deal with this problem by inventing new vocables in what he calls 'total translation' (1969:292–305). He is the first to address this engrossing challenge to the translator seriously, but the process requires so much insight into what the symbolism of word-sounds may be in the mind of the native speaker, and also such poetic skill in English, that I will not attempt it here. My free translation is ethnographic, in that it attempts to convey maximum information concerning the original text rather than create a fully sensitive English one (McAllester, 1969:306–315).

In the First Snake Song, what strikes the ear immediately is the music: a series of double phrases, AA BB CC, most of which consist largely of even numbers of binary figures (*'eya, heye, dine, naho,* etc.). The tone system is based on three principal pitches, 1, 3, and 5, with occasional drops to the lower octave of 5. There are two metrical note values, shown in the transcription as eighth and sixteenth notes. On superficial hearing this seems to be a repetitious song and it would seem to have the makings of a monotonous one. But close examination reveals a lively, vital melody, ornamented with many variations.

The text begins with an introduction and then a chorus of double syllables without apparent lexical meaning. There are three pairs of similar lines, fitting the AA BB CC structure discernable in the music. The C phrases are similar to the introduction (X), though longer, and with a different vocabalic text. Next follows a verse of meaningful text which, however, ends with a repeat of the vocabalic CC found in the chorus. This is followed by three more verses, all containing the same idea as the first, but in three variations. Each verse has the CC vocabalic ending. Finally, the vocable chorus is repeated and the song ends on the only long note in the piece, followed by a strong downward glissando.

One's first observation on taking all of this in, is likely to be a structural one: the song is created with marked economy of architectonic means, but there is a great deal going on in it, nevertheless. The discussion will begin with *repetition*, which is so strong a feature, and will then go on to the *variations* by which the musical and textual interest are heightened.

Repetition

> Repetition is one of the major devices of Navajo rituals . . . multiplication of events is believed to strengthen power. (Reichard, 1950:241)

As indicated by its redundancy of expression, the principle of repetition is one of the strongest messages in the First Snake Song. The constant iteration of double syllabic units, the six repetitions of the basic structure of the song, the heavy use of only two note values (repetition implies reduction of means) all create the same impression. If the reader could hear the song as rendered by Ray Winnie or by Dinet Tsosie and his helpers, the uniformity of vocal dynamics would add yet another element of repetitiveness to the overall impression.

The idea of repetition can be extended to the whole range of Navajo ceremonial singing as well. The introductory phrase, *'eye, neye yaŋa naŋa'*, usually sung entirely on the tonic, is a melodic and textual formula that is present in one variation or another all through the many great chants of the Navajos. The limitations in tone system as well as in the durational values of notes are unusual in the musics of the world and are characteristic of the Navajos, Apaches and perhaps the Northern Athabascans as well. The formula, chorus-verses-chorus is well-nigh universal in Navajo and Apache ceremonial music. Even the rather quick tempo of the song is similar to the rest of Navajo ceremonial music—there are few notably slow songs and almost no songs that vary markedly in tempo within themselves.

To turn to the text, the binary vocabalic units give a repetitive feeling from the start. In the chorus, a majority of these employ the vowel sequence, e–a. Another strongly repetitive element in the vocables is the conclusion of both choruses and also each of the four verses on the CC phrases. The fact that C is analogous to X in both text (being vocabalic) and music, adds still another element to the iterative force of the piece. We start with it, it returns again and again, and we end with it. The repetitiveness of the meaningful text is plain enough, though the element of variation, to be considered below, is an equally important aspect of its structure and meaning.

When we compare the First Snake Song textually with the other songs of Shootingway and in Navajo ceremonialism generally, it is among the simpler songs but still shares its structural features with the great majority. The chorus–verses–chorus form, the division into four verses, the introductory and closing formulae are all features heard again and again in Navajo ceremonialism. Even in this brief text we have basically one action repeated four times by the four protagonists. The sequence of forms this action takes recalls the sequences found widely in the ritual poetry: donning a series of garments, visiting a sequence of mountains, consecrating a series of body-parts or of locations outside and inside the ceremonial hogan.

Much support can be found for Reichard's interpretation of the meaning of repetition in Navajo life. In Kluckhohn and Leighton's widely cited principles of Navajo philosophy, the first of the five formulas for safety in a very dangerous world is,

> *Maintain orderliness in those sectors of life which are little subject to human control.* . . . This is achieved by the compulsive force of order and reiteration in ritual words and acts. The essence of even ceremonial drama is not sharp climax (as whites have it) so much as fixed rhythms. The keynote of all ritual poetry is compulsion through orderly repetition. . . . To white people it (an illustrative song) has a monotonous quality, but infinite repetitions in an expected sequence seems to lull the Navaho into a sense of security. (1946:224–225).

Repetitiveness is a motif all through Navajo life. It is evident in conversation (Dyk, 1938:257), in the arts (e.g. the insistent iteration of a concho belt, the constant theme of horses in modern painting), but nowhere more consistently than in ceremonial music, poetry, and ritual acts. Witherspoon has discussed the Navajo concept of ceremonial language as the '. . . means by which substance is organized and transformed' (1975:86) and the '. . . tremendous emphasis upon repetitions, continuations, and revolutions found in Navajo language' (1974:50).

Samuel D. Gill has found, in an examination of some 15,000 lines of the published texts of Navajo prayers, that all this material encompasses only twenty-two different themes or 'constituent units' (1974:27–106, see p. 34 for list).

I feel that Reichard's interpretations and those of Kluckhohn and Leighton lay undue stress on the compulsive power of the word. It is true that pleading and supplication, though present, are not dominant motifs in the songs and prayers, but neither is a *demand* for power. The assumption of power, as the authors cited above and many others have observed, is achieved by identification which I take to be a matter of mutuality and reciprocity. Often the identification is expressed in terms of family relationship (see discussion of identification below), a homely phrasing for a mystical transformation. From evidence in the myths and prayers, Gill (1974: 47–48, 85–86, 537) found reciprocity a dominant motif and questioned the notion of compulsion in Navajo religious thought. His is probably the first demurrer of this 'received' opinion.

If we are to consider repetition and the values associated with it as a cognitive theme running through Navajo life and exemplified in the First Snake Song, this is not to say that this song, or Navajo music in general, is simple, childlike, or boring. Navajos do not find it so, nor would any outsider who penetrates far enough into the material, either stylistically or ideationally, to see the subtle and constant variations. The next several sections will deal with such modes of variation as interruption, alternation, return, pairing, progression, transection, and ambiguity. These may be seen as contrapuntal to the theme of repetition. They seem to be formal and ideational expressions of principles of Navajo thought and may serve, at least, as starting points for the extensive discussions with knowledgeable Navajos that will be required to test their validity (Witherspoon, n.d. III:12–18).

Interruption

Though any of the modes of variation to be discussed below constitutes some sort of interruption of what would otherwise be straight repetition, the kind of interruption I am concerned with here is that produced by an extra beat introduced into an otherwise steady rhythmic flow. I have pointed out this feature in Navajo music in an earlier publication (n.d.:36). It was one of my first observations when I began to study Navajo music in 1950. A basically duple metric organization is close to the rule in most ceremonial music. However, there is hardly a song in which the rule is not stretched by the insertion of an occasional 'extra'

beat. In the First Snake Song this occurs when the lexically meaningful verses begin. Before this there is an uninterrupted duple flow of AA BB CC in the introduction. But in the verses, the words cut across the duple meter from the start, and the second A drops one beat altogether. The first B phrase is another 7/8 and then there is a major interruption on the word '*Tɬ'iyitso*', in a three-beat phrase called 'y' here. As I feel it, 'y' does not really belong on the end of the first B or at the beginning of the second one.

If we were listening only to the melody, the bar lines could be applied differently and this song might be understood as not containing the 'interrupted duple' at all. One could fill out the second A with the first note of the following B, to which the three notes of the 'y' phrase and the first note of the second B could be added as a coda. Then the verses could be seen as structured almost exactly like the choruses. However, my feeling is that the words have to be considered along with, and as an inseparable part of, the melody in a study of the music as a whole.

It is interesting, then, that the triple melodic figures introduced here in my interpretation of the melody, are not necessitated by semantic considerations. The interrupted double is a variation textually as well as melodically; the words themselves have been altered to require three beats instead of two. Albert G. Sandoval, Jr. observed that the '*K'ad*' in the phrase '*K'ad dine . . .*' only happens to be meaningful incidentally. It is a word often introduced at the beginning of a verse, and sometimes a phrase, when you want an extra beat, and could be considered to be a vocable. He was dubious about translating it at all in the English rendition of the text. Similarly the '*yi*' in '*Tɬ'iyitso*' is a vocable introduced into the word '*Tɬ'ii'tso*'. It could be textual variation of the long ii, but we can see in such words as '*ch'ikééh*', and '*yooleeɬgo*', that other long vowels are not treated this way.

Some observations of similar interruptions in other areas of Navajo behavior may be appropriate here. In ordinary speech and in public announcements I have noticed a stammer which occasionally breaks the even flow of the speech. The speaker seems to get stuck, often on the syllable '*doo*' as in: '*Tsʃ́ɬgo ná'iidoo-do-do-dodliɬɣ́ɣ́*,' (I wish [the snow] would hurry and melt). I have been struck by the lack of embarrassment of the speaker, or even notice paid by the listeners, at this event which I at first expected would provoke a little mild merriment. Other kinds of mispronunciation are prime subjects for Navajo humor (Wilson, 1970).

I have noticed a readiness and ease with which somebody singing a song may lapse into '*ne-ne-ne*', or '*na-na-na*' and keep right on singing when they have forgotten the words. This has usually been in a ceremonial singing situation and refers to the lay participants, not the

practitioners. Here again, I had expected careful attention to every word of text but saw no signs of anxiety.

In another kind of interruption, it is not uncommon for a singer to stop for a moment, or for several moments, to give directions to a helper who is performing ritual acts as the song goes along. If they are brief enough, these instructions may be delivered quickly and intoned enough so that they constitute no more than an 'interrupted double' in the song performance. If there are rather detailed instructions, they are still given quickly and the song is picked up again as though nothing had happened.

These interruptions are extensions, a kind of stylistic flourish that may be utilitarian, but in many cases seem to arise out of a virtuosic skill in handling the material for dynamic effect. In the graphic arts one could relate them to the avoidance of closure or completion. The break in the constant flow of duple figures reminds one of the break in design in the protective rainbow or lightning figures around a sandpainting, or the odd warp thread that may break the border in a rug.

Alternation

A further kind of relief introduced into the overall repetitiveness of Navajo music and poetry is through several varieties of alternation. In the First Snake Song there is alternation in the *kind* of melodic activity, between level sections based entirely or largely on the tonic, and active sections that conform to Helen Roberts' characterization: '. . . rapid, pulsing, bounding movement . . .' (1936:33). This contrast can be seen between the X and C phrases and the more active A and B phrases and it can also be seen *within* most of the A and B phrases. This is the quality in Navajo 'chanting' that makes the term a misnomer. There is, indeed, chantlike material where the melodic action is restricted, but it is contrasted with sections full of melodic acrobatics and invention.

The use of two note values creates another kind of alternation, or contrast, in microcosm. The whole song has one steady duple pulse, but here and there, almost always on a downward movement, the speed may double in a striking break with the rhythmic expectation that is otherwise solidly built into the melody.

Textual alternations in Navajo poetry have been widely remarked (Reichard, 1944). In the First Snake Song it can be seen first of all in the vocables. In the vocable figures defined by the duple sets in the melody, the largest number alternate the vowels e and a: *'eya, heya, yeya*. The reversals and variations of this figure can be shown most readily on a chart:

Introd.: *ee ee aa aa*

Chorus: *ea ea ea a,*
ea ea ea ae
ea ee ea ea ea
ea ao ea ee

aa ee ea ee a,
aa ee ea ee aa

Verses: ———*a*———*e*———*ea*
———*he* *aa ee ea ee a,*
aa ee ea ee aa

In the verses the alternation is plain enough: male–female, adult–immature, snake–hoop. This principle is greatly extended in the longer ceremonial songs and in the series of songs. There is alternation in colors, sex, directions, and jewels. It is one way of presenting pairs of related objects and I will delay my attempt to relate the principle to the larger view of Navajo culture until the discussion of *pairing*.

The Return

Another form of alternation is an extension of the idea of AB, AB, AB, etc. to ABA, ABA, ABA, etc. well known in European musical stylistic usage and sometimes referred to as ternary, or sonata form. This principle has already been demonstrated as an overall organizing concept in the First Snake Song. There are excellent grounds for considering the C phrases to be essentially the same as those labeled X. In that case we could speak of the ABA principle in operation *within* each chorus and even within each verse.

In the vocables one can see there is a sense in which the chorus is an anticipation of the song as a whole. Overall, the song contains the textual communication which is set off by the vocabalic choruses at beginning and end. In the chorus, similarly, if we take the vowel alternation, e–a, to be the main communication, the song does not come to it at once but sets it off with the X and C phrases. A kind of reversal is at work and in the C phrases it is a *mirror* reversal:

aa ee ea ee a,
aa ee ea ee aa

It is as though the end frame of *ee aa* were itself a framing of *e–a*.

In such Navajo arts as weaving and sandpainting this concept of framing the central message is strongly expressed. The bold and powerful rug designs make much use of alternation, reversal, mirror image and also the avoidance of closure mentioned above. It is as though there were a kind of open-ended (or open-sided) framing, as suggested by the ABA formula. Mills in a remarkable summary chapter, 'Dialectic of heroes', in his book on Navajo art, discusses the tension between inner, native space and outer, alien space. In the former, within the family, the ceremonial hogan, inside the boundaries of the four sacred mountains, there is safety and protection. But by stepping over boundaries great power is released. The almost invariable mythic movement is outside the native boundaries to the underworld, the sky, foreign countries, and a return with acquired power to the inner space, again (1959:182–203).

Pairing

The reader is by now well aware that the First Snake Song is abundantly structured in pairs of elements, variously arranged, from very small melodic and rhythmic figures to the larger, overall constituents of the song.

The text reinforces the concept so persistently stated by musical means. Four sacred personages are involved in this brief poem, carrying a big snake that becomes a big hoop. There are two male protagonists and two who are female. Transecting this complementarity is another: maturity and immaturity. A special aspect of this duality is a shifting back and forth between the sexes, an expression of their complementarity. This is stated mythically in the reconciliation that was necessary after the separation of the sexes. It is also stated in the constant care exercised to include both sexes in ritual acts and to see to it that the male and female sides of the various entities are represented as in Changing Woman's other side, represented by White Shell Woman, and Enemy Slayer's other side, represented by Child Born for Water. In the Holy Family in Shootingway, the idea is carried even further: a 'Quaternity' is represented of four persons in one, and even four sexes, two adult and two immature. Reichard identifies this as the 'principle of multiple selves' (1939:15).

In the First Snake Song, and in most of the others that follow in the sequence of eight, the characteristics of each of the four sexes are subtly delineated. Adult male deals with snake power with circumspection, in a careful ceremonial way. Adult female is not as careful, perhaps not as deeply versed in ceremonial punctilio, perhaps more inclined to treat the

snake skins as garments than as symbols of power, she 'dangles' the properties that have been won from the Snake Woman. Holy Boy is even more careless, he merely lugs around a bulky object, already designated as a hoop. Holy Girl rolls hers as though it were a toy, or at least something that could be manipulated completely at the discretion of the user.

Navajo duality is no simple concept but has ramifications we have barely suggested here. The complementarity of male–female, earth–sky, night–day, guardian pairs, deity twins, double and quadruple names, runs through the whole cognitive fabric. In Kluckhohn and Leighton's outline of Navajo philosophy cited above, premise five is

> Everything exists in two parts, the male and the female, which belong together and complete each other. . . . There are male rains and female rains, the one hard and sudden, the other gentle; there are male and female chants; male and female plants are distinguished on the basis of appearance, the male always being the larger. The supernaturals, as seen in the sandpaintings or mentioned in the songs and prayers, are nearly always paired, so that if Corn Boy appears, one can be sure that Corn Girl will soon follow. (1946:230)

Progression

Musically, the First Snake Song is symmetrical rather than 'progressive' in structure. The form is strophic and framed. However, in one respect the musical performance is progressive in that the pitch of the singing tends to rise, gradually, from one song to the next. There is no dramatic change of 'keys' in the course of an all-night singing, but the rise is sometimes pronounced. I have heard it move up when a strong singer who has been resting for a while, or who has just arrived on the scene, joins in the chorus. Sometimes the competing groups in Squaw Dance singing force the pitch up quite rapidly. I have seen it get so high this way that everyone was uncomfortable. A moratorium had to be declared and a lower pitch adopted by common consent. Frisbie has documented an occasion in Blessingway singing where competition developed between an elderly singer and a group of young men led by his son-in-law. The competition was expressed in increased speed and a rising pitch in the songs (Frisbie, 1967:180, 225, 278). In the course of the eight Snake Songs, recorded in private, Ray Winnie's pitch rose only a half-tone, from D-flat to D. When these songs were being sung publicly in a situation of considerably more tension and excitement, in Denet Tsosie's performance, the pitch began at F and rose to A.

The verses in the First Snake Song contain a progression of ideas even though it is simpler, textually, than most ceremonial songs. The ideas move from mature male to immature female, from animate snake to inanimate hoop, and from holding, through dangling and lugging to trundling. In order the verbs are:

yooltéełgo — while handling an animate being
yooléełgo — while handling a flexible slender object
yoo'áałgo — while handling a round bulky object
yołbąsgo — while handling a rolling object

In free translation, I have rendered the progression: 'holding', 'dangling', 'lugging', and 'trundling'. Albert G. Sandoval, Jr. suggested a distinction between the first and second verbs that could be conveyed by 'holding with both hands', and 'holding with one hand'. This is another way of conveying the progression in casualness. Fr. Berard translates these verbs: 'carrying', 'carries', 'carries', and 'rolls', and makes the distinctions between animate object, rope-like object, round object and hoop-like object in parentheses and a footnote (Haile, 1947:130–131). The idea of progression is subtly expressed in this sequence of verbs and seems to imply the increasing assumption and control of snake power.

The mythic explanation given by Ray Winnie follows:

When Holy Young Man went around with the Male Monster Snake, they traveled over the world in the four directions. The snake had the evil thought in his mind to destroy Holy Young Man and tried in every possible way. Each failed. One day, when Holy Young Man was out walking, he came on the snake with its mouth open, ready to swallow him. He was frightened and managed to tell the snake in time who he was. The snake said, 'Oh, I'm sorry, Son-in-law, I didn't know it was you'.

The snake invited Holy Young Man to go home with him for a smoke. He had poisoned tobacco there. But the Little Wind warned Holy Young Man. 'Get him off guard, and then switch the tobacco!' Holy Young Man did this. The snake said, 'Haven't you started smoking?' and gave him the tobacco Holy Young Man had slipped into his pouch. Holy Young Man started smoking and the snake said, 'Do you have some tobacco of your own?' 'Yes, have some', said Holy Young Man, and handed over some of the snake's own poison tobacco. This is how he poisoned the snake instead of being poisoned himself.

The female snakes, his wives and daughters, and all the others, offered the only valuable things they had, their various beautiful skins, to Holy Young Man if he would bring the Monster Snake back to life. The gift of these valuable garments is the power that lies under the whole Shootingway ceremonial. There were black, white, bluish and striped (from the racer snake) skins. These

represent all the different kinds of snakes. Some are dark, some bluish, some whitish, and some are striped.

The Snake Woman said, 'From now on, you are going to use these in ceremonials and we will help the Earth People with our power'. (McAllester, Field Notes, 1957:28)

There is abundant evidence that a 'fixed orderliness' of sequence and progression is a strong element in Navajo thinking. Washington Matthews noted this in the first major publication on Navajo ceremonialism (1887:455–456). He devoted an article to sequence in ritual acts in 1892 and one to the progression of ideas in songs, two years later. The ancestors of the Navajos came up to this world through a series of underworlds (Wheelwright, 1942:39–55). Ceremonial acts, sacred colors, prayers, songs are all in fixed sequence. A change in the order of progression can nullify the function of the ceremony or even create the risk of sickness or death. In my own experience, recordings, even outside the ceremonial context, had to be in the right sequence. On the one occasion when I was able to film a ceremony, there was no problem about stopping the action while tape or film were being reloaded, but it was not possible to alter the order of events and go back for a retake.

Song series are often highly repetitive. There may be a dozen songs in a sequence in which the only change is a key verb indicating progression in the action. Other slight changes may be the alternation of deities, sex, colors and other symbolic attributes alluded to already. Though the progression in the Snake Song series in Shootingway is more complex than this, taking the story through several episodes in the Snake country, the changes within the First Snake Song, alone, are enough to have provided four separate songs. Indeed, the version recorded by Gray Man (Haile, 1947:130–136) contains four more songs than Ray Winnie's series of eight. Gray Man's sixth song is an extension of the fifth in just this way.

Transection

In any activity as complex as the performance of song series, other ritual acts, the enactment by formal means of such principles as repetition, alternation, interruption, and the others being discussed here, may all be going on at the same time. A repetition of duple rhythmic figures may be interrupted by a sequence in threes and at the same time a tension between prosodic and poetic text may be underway. A male–female alternation may be proceeding at one speed and a mature–immature alternation

may transect this sequence, so to speak, at another speed. A simple diagram may help portray these simultaneous movements of idea:



Simultaneous variations in melody and text occur in the B phrases of the verses. Both convey the message '*nohaanííyá*', but with richly complex differences. In the first, the latter end of the phrase is a vocabalic extension. In the second, the extension comes at the beginning of the phrase and is meaningful. There are other subtleties, such as the reversal, in '*noha*' of the '*naho*' in B when it first appears in the chorus, and the possibility that the '*ya*' that begins the C phrases may be the stem of '*nohaanííyá*', delayed in its first occurrence and echoed once again at the beginning of the second C.

Another 'transection' of meaning and melody may be discernible in what becomes of vowel length and tone. The question has been raised as to what happens to speech tones when the words must be fitted into melodies (Herzog, 1934:452–466; List, 1961:16–32; Frisbie, 1967:178–179, 315–316). In the First Snake Song every meaningful word is altered in either the tone or length of its vowels and sometimes both. In the following list I give the word first as it would be spoken and then as it is sung:

dinéé́h	*dine*	*yoɬbą́ąsgo*	*yoɬbą́sóogo*
dighiní	*dighiíníi*	*k'ad*	*k'a*
tɬ'iistsoh	*tɬ'iyitsoh*	*ch'ikę́ę́h*	*ch'iíkę́h*
yoɬtéeɬgo	*yoɬteéɬigo*	*kiiyé*	*kiye*
yooɬéeɬgo	*yoɬeéɬigo*	*'at'éé́d*	*'at'ed*
yoo'áaɬgo	*yo'áɬígo*		

Ambiguity

'Ambiguity' of course, can exist only in reference to what one's musical tradition leads one to expect. It is, perhaps, daring, if not foolhardy, for an outsider to venture into any such discussion as this. Yet, in terms of itself, the First Snake Song seems to set up expectations and then confuse them.

One such expectation is that the song will flow evenly and steadily from one phrase to the next without appreciable pauses in the melodic line. The two pauses, or 'rests' that occur in the song come at the end of the first A, just after the song gets started, and at the end of the first C, just before the song enters its closing phrase.

The musical effect is to create an ambiguity as to what is introduction and what is the ending. Should we consider that the melody of the chorus ends after the first C and that the second C is introductory to the next rendition of A? Should we think of X and the first A of the chorus as the introduction, with the main melody beginning on the second A? The fact that the song ends in the last chorus with two renditions of C encourages one to see the two C phrases as a concluding pair, throughout. But that 'false ending', at the end of the first C, remains a puzzle. It is a salutory reminder that the imposition of bar lines is a device for 'making sense' of the song from the point of view of Western music. The odd lengths of the A and B phrases, when the verses begin, have already been pointed out. When considered both textually and musically the song seems to resist a Western interpretation.

The textual ambiguity in the First Snake Song is not formal but a matter of what is left unspecified. The members of the Holy Family 'came to us' carrying out their acts with the snakes/hoops. But who is meant by 'us'? The answer can only be learned from the singer. In the case of Ray Winnie we are not helped since he seemed not to be aware that '*nohaniyoya*' was a meaningful phrase. When the song was being written down from the tape, syllable by syllable, he stated that this phrase 'just carried the tune'. The same phrase occurs in the next song and here, too, Ray Winnie considered it to be meaningless, lexically. Fr. Berard, on the authority of Gray Man, found the lexical meaning given above for this phrase in both songs.

In the Third and Fourth Snake Songs both Ray Winnie and Gray Man recognized a variation, '*bane-ya*' to be '*baanííyá*' (to him/her it came). Gray Man did not inform Fr. Berard as to who was being referred to in any of the four songs by 'us' and 'to him/her'. Ray Winnie did give the following explanation for songs three and four:

A long time ago, Holy Young Man was the only person on earth. There were only Winds and Snakes on earth with him. The Winds made fun of him—they could blow on him from all directions and he could not see them. Then he came to the Snake People and he could see their tails and their scales, and that is what this song is about. Wind is singing: 'I went to Holy Young Man and he was carrying snakes, saying, "I see their tails, threatening. I see their scales, threatening"'.

Once we know the Wind People are involved we have a clue as to the identity of 'us' and 'him/her'. In the first two songs it seems reasonable to suppose that Holy Young Man came to us (the Wind People) while holding the big snake, etc. And in the next two songs the Wind is singing, 'It (the big snake) came to Holy Young Man. "It's tail is threatening, it's scales are threatening!"'. An alternative translation could be derived from Ray Winnie's comment, assuming that the Wind could be speaking of himself in the third person: 'Holy Young Man came to him (the Wind). "It's tail is threatening, its scales are threatening!"' (he was saying).

Even with Ray Winnie's comment some ambiguity remains. Fr. Berard suffered from an even greater ambiguity since Gray Man did not explain 'threatening', or that 'horsehair' was a metaphor for 'scales'. He did not attempt a free translation of songs three and four.

The point here is that in song texts as well as in ordinary conversation, the Navajos do not feel a great necessity to make all references clear. In fact a certain ambiguity is preferred. It is impolite to use names and a vague reply to a specific question is acceptable. To the universal question, 'Where are you going?' one may reply, 'I'm just going', and thus avoid having to give somebody a ride, or other complications. In musical structure as well as in lexical content ambiguity may be a device to offset simple repetition and too obvious a meaning.

In addition to the principle of repetition and some of its counter-themes, certain other cognitive motifs that seem to be exemplified in Navajo music may be seen in the one small example studied here. They are treated, briefly, below, under the headings: 'Imitation', 'Identification', 'Continuation', and, finally, 'Harmony'. This last is meant not in the Western musical sense but in a social, ecological and even cosmic meaning of the word.

Imitation

A stylistic device that seems to exist on both the musical and the lexical level is imitation, or musical metaphor. In the prototypical ceremony in

the sky, in the Shootingway myth, for example, in the Dawn Songs contributed by Coyote, the '*ya'ó*' in the chorus is prolonged by the singer, on the high notes, to sound like a coyote (McAllester, Field Notes, 1957:126). An example of onomatopoeia with the drum occurs in song 451. Holy Young Woman demands that she come first in the song, instead of Holy Young Man. This she does, and Holy Girl's name precedes that of Holy Boy. When she took the sacred arrows of Shootingway in her hands, they were quivering with power and the drum is played tremolo in imitation.

In the Snake Songs there is a striking difference melodically between the last song and all the others. For one thing, there is a shift into triple meter, throughout, and for another, the melody lies down flat. *Every* phrase is largely restricted to the base note of the song except for B. These changes make a striking difference from most Navajo music: it is tempting to think that this song is imitating the horizontal motion delineated in the text: 'crawling along, head lifted'.

Possibly in this case and certainly in the two cases cited above where there is a statement from Ray Winnie as evidence, an important element in Navajo thought is being expressed. Kluckhohn and Leighton state it in premise seven of their statement of the Navajo view of life:

> Like produces like and the part stands for the whole. These are two laws of thought almost as basic to Navajo thinking as the so-called Aristotelian laws of thought have been in European intellectual history since the Middle Ages. (1946:312)

Identification

The imitation of sounds and actions in the Shootingway myth recreate the powers they are associated with here and now in the performance of the ceremony. We saw several kinds of identification of the Holy Family in the First Snake Song. Ray Winnie's explanation indicated that Holy Young Man was married into the Snake community. Another assumption of snake identity is the acquisition of snake garments, already discussed. It is now time to take at least a brief look at the other seven songs where other modes of identification can be seen.

1. Holy Family, carrying etc. the big snakes/hoops.
2. His body is dark (white, blue, yellow) edged with white (black, yellow, blue), I am his child, it makes me holy.
3. 'It came to Holy Young Man (Woman, Boy, Girl) "It's tail/scales are threatening"'.

4. 'He came to Walks-with-his-body (Body-smooths-the-ground, See-through-his-body, Pollen-body) "It's tail/scales are threatening"'.
5. Walks-with-his-body (etc.) went here, I trace him, looking down, He is night dark (dawn light, afterglow yellow, pollen yellow). His head warns, his tail warns, tail and head give warning.
6. Now Holy Young Man, you've started singing my songs, I hear you, So I know it is true! Now Holy Young Woman (etc.).
7. Now what is Holy Young Man's sacred power? It is the gleaming black clothing, that is my sacred power. Now what is Holy Young Woman's sacred power? etc. (white, blue, striped).
8. He is gliding along, head lifted, Now Holy Young Man is gliding along, head lifted, Now the Great Dark Snake is gliding along, head lifted, traveling in the dust/dew, full of menace, trembling with danger, Life Forever, Harmony Everywhere . . .
   She is gliding along, head lifted, Now Holy Young Woman, etc.

The identification throughout is explicit enough. I will just point out that songs are an extremely important part of the assumption of sacred power. This is true of the Snake Songs that are used over and over through the performance of Shootingway. The snake-skins refer to the snake designs used as dry-paintings and body paintings in the ceremony. The names, 'Walks-with-his-body', etc. are secret names for the Snake People and so are particularly imbued with Snake Power. Life Forever, Harmony Everywhere are partial renditions of the two most potent phrases in all Navajo ceremonialism. They come at the end of each verse in song eight and are the ultimate blessing for the Holy Family, and thus with Snake Power, in the ceremony.

Ray Winnie pointed out that the 'multiselves' of the Holy Family made it possible for either a man, a woman, a boy or a girl to be the protagonist in the story of Shootingway. When there are dry-paintings with four Snake People, or four Buffalo People, one of these will be the appropriate place on which to sit depending on whether you are a man, a woman, a boy or a girl. A ritual of identification will then take place in which pigment from the dry-painting will be applied to the analogous body-parts of the protagonist, always in the same sequence from feet to head and finally tongue (voice).

Continuation

The principal verbs in this brief text of the First Snake Song are all in the progressive mode: 'holding', 'dangling', 'lugging', and 'trundling'. The Navajo language, so noted for its elaborate verb structure (Witherspoon

has made a conservative count of 356,000 distinct conjugations of the verb 'to go') focuses its discriminations on variations of continuative action (Witherspoon, n.d. III:63–69). Three of its four aspects and five of its six modes all deal with incomplete process. Much of the practical reality of the verb is the way the stem is combined with particles, enclitics, suffixes, prefixes, postpositions and the like to create subtle inflections on the action. Among those frequently used are *ná-* again, and *nááná-* again and again, and *-go*. The latter is a 'participializing enclitic' (Young and Morgan, 1958:17) which '. . . functions . . . to adverbialize nouns and particles and to participialize verbs. It is very widely used, translating such concepts as when, while, as, etc.'. These are notions which suspend finality or conclusion.

The four verbs of handling in the text before us are all rounded off with *-go*. The first one, *yołtéełgo*, has a force that might be rendered 'being in the process of holding', though in the free translation I suggest 'while holding', for the sake of poetic economy. This and the other three verbs give us the clue to one of the major Navajo perspectives: on the here and now in its various modalities, rather than the past or future.

According to the formulation cited above, 'This life is what counts.' Kluckhohn and Leighton go on to make the point that there is no concept among the Navajos of this world being a preparation for the next (op. cit:232). Not even death is final in Navajo thinking. In the myths the slain are forever being revived; in the world of humankind a large concern is with the ghosts of those who have died but are still with us.

Harmony

That 'This life is what counts' is the basic message of the sacred pair of phrases alluded to above: '*Są'ahnaaghái, Bik'e Hózhǫ́ǫ́*'. The most comprehensive discussion of the meaning of these phrases is by Witherspoon (n.d. I:1–23). The force of the first phrase is that one will live on into a good old age again and again. The second phrase states that, according to the principle of long life in the first, conditions of happiness, harmony, beauty, will obtain, everywhere.

The focus is certainly on the enjoyment of this life as is the curing function of Navajo ceremonialism. Security, peace of mind, good crops, abundant livestock—these are the tangible and intangible evidence of conditions of blessing.

The harmony, balance, blessing, happiness implicit in the term *hózhǫ́ǫ́* is especially focused on the natural world. The supernatural forces whose

power will help create conditions of *-zhǫ́ǫ́* are the Sun, the Winds, the Water (episode of the fish) Coyote, Snakes, Buffalo, and so on. It is clear enough, then, that harmony with nature is being sought here.
here.

Kluckhohn and Leighton give as their first premise of the Navajo world view that life is very, very dangerous and their second is that nature is more powerful than man (1946:225–227). My own feeling is that the ideas of harmony and identification are not as fear-ridden as these premises seem to indicate. As suggested earlier in this paper, the concept of reciprocity, of kinship with natural forces, suggests a kind of security vis à vis the cosmos that fits better with the Navajos as I find them and with the behavior of their heroes in the myths. They are not cowering behind elaborate barricades of security but building up strength there to go out into the alien world, marry its daughters and obtain its power.

The Snake Songs in Shootingway as a Whole

It remains to see the Snake Songs in the context of the Shootingway ceremonial as a whole. Wyman has pointed out that Navajo dry-painting, mythology and ceremonial, overall, are made up of limited numbers of motifs, incidents and actions used over and over in different variations (1950:358–359). Mills observes that this is the method of composition for weaving and silverwork as well (1959:143). Gill's analogous observation for the prayers was cited earlier. If we look at the whole structure of the Shootingway ceremonial we will see how the constituent elements are combined and recombined, and we will also see how many of the motifs or principles of Navajo thought suggested in this paper seem to be reflected in the ceremony as a whole.

Simplified Outline of Shootingway (Sun's House Phase of Male Shootingway Holy)

1st night	*Snake Songs*,	unravelling ritual
1st day	*Snake Songs*,	purifications; Snake prayer offerings made and set out
2nd night	*Thunder Songs*,	unravelling ritual
2nd day	*Thunder Songs*,	purifications; Thunder offerings made and set out

3rd night	*Holy Family Songs*,	unravelling ritual
3rd day	*Holy Family Songs*,	purifications; Holy Family offerings, etc.
4th night	*Sun Songs*,	unravelling ritual
4th day	*Sun Songs*,	purifications; Sun, Moon, Winds etc. offerings made and set out
5th night	All night singing:	*Enemy Slayer* and *Night People Songs*
5th day	*Snake and Holy Family Songs*,	altar outside, Sun's House and Snake Sandpainting ritual inside
6th night	*Snake Songs*,	fumigation of Protagonist at end
6th day	*Fish and Thunder Songs*,	altar; Sun's House and Fish and Thunder Sandpainting
7th night	*Fish and Thunder Songs*,	fumigation of Protagonist at end
7th day	*Buffalo Songs*,	altar outside, Sun's House and Buffalo Sandpainting ritual inside
8th night	*Buffalo Songs*,	fumigation of Protagonist at end
8th day	'Its day',	*Blessing, Body Painting, and Holy Family Songs* altar outside, washing, drying, body painting, cattail garment Holy People Sandpainting Ritual
9th night	'Its night',	Night, Snake, Thunder, Fish, Buffalo, Dawn, Blessing Songs in all-night singing. Mixed meat stew, breathe in the Dawn, disposal of cattail garment

In the outline above, a very much reduced sequence of the ceremonial is shown. If all the songs and ritual events were included even an outline would extend over several pages and would be difficult to follow. As shown here, the architecture of the ceremony is suggested and the major song groups are shown.

One may see *duality*, or balance, in the four pairs of time periods, a pivotal fifth night, and, again, four pairs of time periods. There is an *alternation* of night–day, transected by similar pairs of song sets. After the pivotal night comes a *reversal* in a series of day–night alternations, again crossed by similar sets of songs.

The first half of the ceremonial focuses on the casting out of evil by means of sweating, emetics and unravelling rituals. In the latter, knots are knitted into a long wool string which is then held at a body position such as the shoulder where evil influences might have lodged. The knots

are unravelled with a single long sweeping motion. The loose end of the string flies upward towards the smoke hole, out of which the evils fly. Each morning is devoted to making prayer offerings. These are sections of hollow reed about the size of a cigarette, decorated with the symbolic designs of the deities they are intended for. They are filled with jewels and other precious substances and taken to an appropriate place as a gift and invitation to attend the ceremonial. Offerings to the Thunder Beings, for example, might be left by a tree that had been struck by lightning.

The second half of the ceremonial, after the all-night singing on the fifth night, is devoted to the invocation of beneficent power. The big sandpaintings express the presence of the deities who were invited to be present. Their power is celebrated and actualized by actual contact with the body of the person being sung over. These are four days of rites of identification. They culminate, on the eighth day and ninth night, in a mixture of Blessingway songs with a recapitulation of most of the song groups heard before. Songs are also included here which were given by a variety of deities who were present at the prototypical ceremony in the sky. The Dawn Songs are wholly blessing in their effect and the protagonist ends his (Holy Young Man's) or her (Holy Young Woman's) quest for power by going out into the dawn for a last ritual of identification. The arms are spread wide and the cupped hands are then brought to the face four times for 'breathing in the dawn'. The potency of the last day and night are expressed in the terms, '*bijį*—it's day', and '*bitł'éé'*—it's night', meaning *the* day and night of the ceremony, above all.

In all this rich ceremonial complex, the First Snake Song is merely one brief ritual communication. Yet in that small compass of music and poetry I have suggested that some of the basic principles governing Navajo art and thought may be discerned.

Note

1. I wish to acknowledge my debt to the students of my class, Anthropology 279/Music 513, 1975. In their essays on the First Snake Song they developed so many ideas that influenced this paper that I am happy to claim them as collaborators in many of its basic premises.

   In Gene Weltfish's classes I remember laughter, give and take, and a good feeling that we were all ethnolinguists together. In this atmosphere many new horizons opened before us. We were encouraged to discover how exciting it was to explore the phonology of any language that came our way. We learned to treasure what Malinowski called the 'ipsissima verba' for what it told us of the culture behind it and

we also sought such insights in the study of a variety of arts and technologies. It was from Gene that I learned how enjoyable teaching could be. Because of her student-centered generosity of herself it seems appropriate to dedicate this study not only to her but also to my own students who, thirty years later, helped me perceive many of the interpretations presented in the analysis attempted here of an example of Navajo musical and verbal art.

My grateful appreciation also goes to the John Simon Guggenheim Foundation and Wesleyan University for the opportunity to carry out the research on which this study is based.

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Factors of Musical Style

ALAN LOMAX

Introduction

The field of ethnomusicology is founded upon the observation that music varies, drastically and as a whole, as culture varies. Moreover the variation of musical style between cultures and culture areas is clearly greater than between the styles of the individuals or groups that compose cultures. By musical style I mean the whole musical communication situation, in which an audience as well as the performers use and understand a common symbolic language and handle it in an approved fashion. The prolix styles and preference patterns in contemporary, urban society may be more easily accounted for as manifestations of subcultures — the black subculture, or the youth subculture — than in other ways. Even today, when one moves from one large culture region to another, it is clear that the main models of music making and music consumption differ from each other in far more profound ways than do styles within these regions.

Since music is a communication system that lives in and varies by culture, it must be, somehow, a communication about culture rather than about other things, and its variance must symbolize specific differences between cultures. The special task of ethnomusicology is to discover what in music varies regularly with what in society and culture. If there is no regular covariation — if all is random — there can be no science. The discovery of regular covariation of traits in music and culture (in a fair sampling of both) can have two outcomes: (1) A classification of music which puts music and culture into a sense-making geographic and historical relationship and (2) a set of hypotheses concerning the lawful relationships general to musical systems and their symbolic connections to the structures of cultures. The cantometric holistic system of rating performance style has achieved both these ends in a modest way in

approximately ten years. Since science aims to establish a set of principles that apply to a whole field, the first steps toward a scientific ethnomusicology have thus been taken. On the contrary, the traditional music notation approach, focused on the analysis of melodic, rhythmic, and harmonic sequences, culture by culture, has thus far failed to achieve this aim, although it has been intensively applied to world music by people of splendid talent for many decades.

Before I come to the specific contribution of cantometrics to these issues, I would like to touch on some of the reasons, as I see them, that cantometrics has succeeded where traditional analysis has not. In the first place cantometrics was designed for the job and music notation has been dragooned into it. The cantometric grid was constructed out of the materials of world music to characterize and make comparable the main performance models of all cultures. Music notation was invented as a way to replicate European musical compositions, and was subsequently revised to describe the rest of world music.

Thus the traditional system was 'culture bound' from the outset. For example, it assumes certain standards of 'good' vocal and ensemble practice, and it is precisely here, with its focus on the world ranges of performance standards, that cantometrics uncovered the effect of societal standards on musical behavior and dance as well. Perhaps an even more important difference is in the level or locus chosen for analysis. Musicology has mainly focused on the comparative study of melodic form without considering whether or how this was scientifically possible. The comparison of two melodies, cross-culturally, is as likely to be as meaningless as the comparison of sentences, since both are statements about particular contexts made in the different languages of those contexts and are, therefore, of significance intra- rather than extra-culturally. Moreover, melodic analysis literally gives the comparativist more information than he can handle. Melodic sequences are capable of so much variance that they are likely to be statistically unique to one culture or to a small culture area and, therefore, of little use in world comparisons. Finally since there is no theory of melodic symbolism in terms of which the direction, the units, or the patterns of melodic movement can be seen as communication about other aspects of human behavior. Thus cross-cultural comparison of the features of melody has brought musicology no nearer the scientific goals set forth earlier.

Such were the considerations that impelled Victor Grauer and myself to turn away from melodic notation, whether performed by machines or human beings, to the design of a performance-oriented system for the cross-cultural comparison of musical style. The melodic level was too fine-grained to be strategic, the more so because the framework of

comparative information about world cultures consisted of relatively gross differentiators, such as, for example, presence or absence of grain, cattle, polygymy, metalworking, patriliny, and the like. In cantometrics, I set out to match these stable measures of cultural variation with characterizers of observable performing norms, on whose relative stability we could also depend. Stabilization of data is a major problem in aesthetic studies.

Our approach was (a) to look for measures that steadily differentiated the main musical traditions, (b) to scale each of these measures in terms of its limits and its range across a world sample, (c) to define each measure narrowly, and (d) to apply a rigorously defined and economical descriptive grid to all performances without exception. Our aim was to include only the information necessary for the composition of numerical profiles that would put each recorded performance with those it most closely resembled. Rating speed was essential, since the ultimate test of the system was whether it could produce a useful view of the whole range of music making. The rule was to code the way a measure was used predominantly through most of a performance. If there was too much variation to permit a single rating, two or three codings were permitted per line. They indicated the range of variance for that trait in that item. Many of the 'errors' and coder disagreements that we and others have encountered in trying out cantometrics are actually these cases, where a trait is used variably or obscurely in a song or in a culture. The interesting fact is that lines which produce coder disagreement in one style are clearly used and easily coded in others. Thus 'error' or 'disagreement' actually helps to define the model by characterizing some traits as freely used in one style and strictly in another. In point of fact, the measures where coder error or disagreement is high in a particular performance or style fall into two classes: (a) the rating system does not provide the slot for it, (b) the way the parameter is used is unclear, per se.

The object of our predecessors had usually been to define the songs of a people. We concerned ourselves with the act, not the separate items, not with songs abstracted from the stream of vocalizing we encountered on the tapes, but with the stream itself, with 'singing'. Singing was seen not as the performance of songs, but as a highly redundant and formalized way of public vocalizing which could be characterized and compared cross-culturally. Since all culture members are capable of participating in, or as, auditors, judging the suitability of these joint public communications, we hoped to find in them a reflection of comparable cultural norms of public communication which had eluded our predecessors in their study of the statements of music.

Our effort, then, centred upon the definition and comparison of the

main models of joint sound production in which the habits of cultures were centered. In practice we have found that the performance profiles of most tribal and peasant cultures or culture regions stabilized round a fairly small number (5–12) of features. Other features might be employed in such a varied or vague way that they could be stated to be in free variation in that system.

Such modal profiles, whether of a cultural or a culture area, imply the following sort of prediction — another recorder and another such analysis would discover a similar pattern of traits on another visit to the same culture, given a certain degree of stability. We have become more and more convinced of the validity of such predictions. When we obtained new batches of material from the same culture or culture area, the familiar model generally turned up again, provided the culture had not profoundly changed. Whenever we multiplied our codings from any one terrain the style models we had sketched in the first five or ten songs grew more and more solid. In several cases we scored 20 or 25 songs, in a few others, 50 or 100 from the same culture, and always the spines of the main performance models grew more and more sharply outlined, even though peripheral song types might be discovered. Again and again the styles of contiguous, historically linked culture areas turned out to share similar style, as for example in the Plains and Plateau.

Geographic Taxonomies

Before presenting new findings on song taxonomy and musical symbolism, I shall briefly answer the main criticisms of cantometrics.[1]

1. *There is coder disagreement.* Provision for error is built into the system. The level of consensus or disagreement per line is known (more than one can say for music notation). Rater consensus for the whole system is 82%. Generally only half of the 37 lines are stable for any one song type. The others are in some degree of variation. Coder disagreement discovers this variation and defines its range. The variance of coding per line from one song tradition to another is a finding that style A uses trait A narrowly, while style B uses it broadly.
2. *Samples are too small.* Grauer and I studied only ten songs per culture because we found we were recording little new information when we coded more. In some cases we analyzed 25, 50, 100 songs and the original profiles simply grew more and more stable. The system was designed to capture the stable core of performance norms in a culture group and it does this quickly. The resultant cantometric profile is a pre-

diction that another set of ratings of performance from the same group will produce similar results.

3. *Samples are unrepresentative*. This is a matter of opinion. We used the best recordings available to ethnomusicology and followed scholarly guidance in choosing the ten songs. More importantly we were not interested in completeness or in studying a series of discrete items, abstracted from the stream of vocalizing as our colleagues had been. Our focus was upon the vocalizing stream itself, upon locating the salient traits of the act of singing as they varied cross-culturally. Singing was seen not as the performance of items but as a highly redundant and formalized way of vocalizing in public — one of many parallel behavioral modes of communication. All culture members were capable of participating in or of expertly judging these joint public communications. In them we hoped to find a reflection of the comparable cultural norms of public communication which had eluded our predecessors in their analyses of the statements of music.

The fact is that cantometrics was designed from the start to do a job that European musicology was dragooned into — to produce a world culture-oriented classification of song. Grauer and I started with the human range of song as given — on tape. The traits in the system are panhuman, that is they are used with some frequency by all cultures. It is the relative frequency or emphatic use of a particular pattern of these traits that is the signature of a style. But we had to ransack the whole range of song to find the measures and their styles which would be useful classifiers of all song styles.

I hope that these explanations have so far resolved the doubts of some of my colleagues that they will now be prepared to consider some of the new findings of cantometrics. The first of these concerns a taxonomy of song performance, derived entirely by the computer with the aid of multifactor analysis. The data bank consisted of cantometric ratings of about 4000 recorded performances from every world region. These single profiles, usually about ten per culture, were combined to form several hundred modal profiles. In order to avoid geographical bias, we worked within the Murdock standard sampling frame of 186 geographically and culturally different provinces (Murdock, October 1969), to which I added eight others so as to give better representation to European and American culture traditions. We did not have adequate recordings from 46 of the Murdock provinces and thus our experimental samples consisted of performance profiles from 148 of 194 world provinces. My purpose was to show that the distribution of song styles traces the spread of historically explicable culture patterns across the planet. The validation of this hypothesis depended upon two criteria:

1. that the 148 modal style profiles be clustered in stylistically distinctive and geographically continuous sets — each with a clear historical justification;
2. that all breaks in these styles continue to be explicable as intrusions of more powerful cultures or as gaps in the sample.

First the computer calculated scale by scale, then culture by culture similarities between each of the 148 profiles and all the others. Next, using the Berkowitz-Lomax form of adaptation of factor analysis, it factored out clusters of most similar profiles from this matrix (see Table 1).

Each of the ten giant style clusters discovered has its own distinctive characteristics. Each has a special regional base and seems to represent the diffusion of an ancient, unitary adaptive pattern. All breaks in geographic continuities, as we shall see, may be explained by the intrusion of more powerful traditions that break into or hide the traces of a weaker and older continua. This can be most easily perceived in the diagramatic world map below (Figure 1). With most of the oceans omitted, it presents the geographic song factors in cartoon style.



Figure 1. Cartoon map indicating the main geographic relationships of the large geographic style region factors produced by multi-factor analysis of 148 cantometric performance profiles. Note that traces of region 5 appear in South India and east of Indochina; traces of the Circum-Pacific appear off the Chinese coast and reappear in New Guinea and Australia. One Proto-Melanesian trace appears in South America. Oceans have been omitted in this map and the continents have been reshaped to produce the desired effect.

Table 1. *World song style taxonomy.* Ten regional factors (from M/F analysis of 148 cantometric profiles consisting of 37 variables) lumping transformation

List of world culture areas

1. *Siberia*
70 Yukaghir
68 Samoyede
58 Ona
58 Gilyak
54 Ainu
49 Yaghan
44 Lapp
43 Tungus
Chukchee (1)

2. *The Circum-Pacific*
78 Flathead
71 Toba
69 Slave
67 Nootka
67 Menomini
66 Iroquois
65 Haida
65 Teton Dakota
64 Kiowa
64 Atna
62 Alaska Esk
60 Navaho
60 Camayura
58 Taos
58 Pomo
56 Caribou
54 Carrier
52 Meskawaki
51 Creek
50 S. Paiute
49 Pawnee
48 ...Tapirape (2)
47 Hupa
47 ...Borawitoto (1,2)
46 Washo
46 ...Salish (1,2)
45 ...Chukchee (2)
45 ...Caraja (2)
44 W. Australia
42 ...Conibo (2)
39 N. Australia
36 ...Murray Torres (2)
Kualong (2)
Zuni (1,2)
Aymara (2)
Mohave (2)
Iatmul (2d)
M. Wahgi (2d)

3. *Nuclear America*
-74 Tarahumara
-70 Quechua
-64 Cuna
-60 Goajiro
-51 Jivaro
-50 Guarauno
-49 Yekuana
-46 Siriono
-45 ...Caraja (1)
-38 Oyana
-35 ...Huichol (1,2)
Araucanian (1,2)

4. *African Gatherers*
69 Bushman
54 Mbuti
39 Hadza

5. *Early Agriculture*
77 Hehe
77 Luba
75 Luvale
74 Baule
69 Toma
69 Azande
67 Bemba
66 Fut
66 Tanala
66 Carriacou
65 Malinke
60 Wolof
60 Hausa
56 Nandi
55 Fulani
54 Anaguta
54 Unguja
52 ...Shilluk (1,2)
49 Dogon
49 Afar
46 ...Zulu (1,2)

Table 1 *contd.*

45 Galla
45 Chagga
44 Dani
42 Sajek
41 ...Fon (1,2)
41 ...Samoa (2)
41 ...Georgia (2)
32 ...Abor (2)
31 Gond
Sotho (1,2)
Russia (2)
Yap (2)
Strpci (2)
Nuba (2)
Fiji (2)

6. *Proto-Melanesia*
78 Choiseul
41 Usiai
34 ...Murray Torres (1)
Conibo (1)*
Kraho (2d)*

7. *Oceania*
-66 Ulithi
-58 Iban
-57 Gilbert
-54 Maori
-53 Motu
-52 Palau
-50 Mangareva
-36 ...Temiar (2)
-33 ...Tagbanua (2)
Tikopia (2)
Strpci (2)*

8. *Old High Culture*
-78 Egypt
-73 South Korea
-72 Vietnam
-72 Japan
-71 Turkey
-71 Turkman
-70 Java
-68 Bali
-67 Thailand
-65 Burma
-64 Gondogram
-64 Pashtu
-64 Meitei
-62 Malaya
-61 Ancient Hebrews
-61 Sicily
-59 Amhara
-55 Kurds
-53 Kerala
-52 Bombay Overseas
-52 Hakka
-52 Tibet
-50 ...Ruanda (1,2)
-49 Tuareg
-43 ...Barabra (2)
-39 Mnong
-36 ...Shluh (2)
-32 ...Bedouin (2)

9. *Central Asia*
59 Buryat
49 Yakut
Barabra (1)*

10. *W. Europe*
-66 Sp. Basque
-65 Chile
-52 Kentucky
-49 Irish
-48 Sp. Extremadura

11. *Totonac* (remains unique)

12. *Miao* (remains unique)

13. *Munda* (remains unique)

14. *Pentacost* (remains unique)

Note: The number at the left of each name and of each factor represents the loading or tie of that culture to the whole factor in which it is found. Indented cultures with three dots preceding the name are those that originally appeared in two factors. Indented cultures without dots appeared as single factors or inconclusive factors. A standard set of rules (1

1. *Siberian* style rims the Arctic, from the European Lapps to the Japanese Ainu, and shows up again, in Patagonia, as the southernmost point in the Siberian-American migration. This most ancient continuum in the New World is obliterated in most of the New World by the closely related factors 2 and 3, which are based in Amerindian styles.
2. *Circum-Pacific*, with its attachments in northeastern Siberia and roots clearly in Siberia, dominates the whole Pacific basin. In the New World its hunter–fisher continuity is broken by the agriculturally-based style of the Nuclear American axis from Mexico to the Andes. In East and Southeast Asia the rise of high Chinese, Indo-Chinese, Malaysian and Polynesian high culture obscure a tradition that seems to have once stretched uninterruptedly from Siberia south to Australia. The Circum-Pacific model still shapes the performances of aboriginal Australia, much of Melanesia and parts of backwoods Malaysia (see factor 1, Table 1).
3. *Nuclear America*. This style, clearly related to Circum-Pacific but bearing signs of its origins in a more complex economy, emerges in different forms in the music of the Valley of Mexico, of the Mayas, among the descendants of the Incas and the agriculturalists of the adjacent Amazon–Orinoco basin, fading out among the peoples of the Mato Grosso.
4. *African Gatherer*. A highly distinctive pattern unites the performances of the little Bushmen of the South African desert to those of the Pigmies of Central Africa and the hunters of East Africa, with frequent traces among Nilotes and in the most conservative songs of black agriculturalists. Performances in related style, moreover, turn up in refuge areas among bands of gatherers all over the world, pointing to this as one of the most ancient cultural distributions.
5. *Early Agriculture*. This style surrounds and buries the African gatherer type, encompasses all the African blacks — Bantus, Nilotes, Cushites, most Ethiops. Its ancient continuity seems to have been broken and obscured by the more productive agricultural systems of Circum-Mediterranean. Even today it shows strong links to Middle

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or 2) fixed the assignment of these cultures. The standard procedure was devised to complete factorization and has been applied to a whole series of taxonomies: It will be noted that a number of cultures are assigned to more than one factor. Such cases, in practice, seem to be due to gaps in the sample. If there are not enough cultures of a certain style tradition to shape a simple, homogeneous factor, though some cultures may be 'borderline', they may not be definitively attached to their regional factor. The anomalous assignments in this experiment are marked with an asterisk. All, however, have a second assignment to their 'proper' regional factor.

and Eastern Europe (Old Europe), to Tribal India, and, most clearly, to Melanesia and Polynesia, strongly indicating the existence of a style-trace of pre-urban gardening cultures that once ringed the world from the Sudan to Melanesia in the warm latitudes.

6. *Proto-Melanesian*, a type related to African Gatherer style, is found in cultures scattered all the way from Formosa to the Solomons. If this, indeed, be a style, it has been buried by the more powerful Circum-Pacific (2) and Oceanic (7) style. It turns up throughout Melanesia and, in occasional cultures in South America — see Figure 2 for another confirmation of this apparent tie between Proto-Melanesian and Nuclear America.
7. *Oceanic*, with its base in the Proto-Melanesian type, with strong ties, through Malaysia, into East Asia, and to Early Agriculture now links the island world of Micronesia and Polynesia. A late influence, in the form of Protestant hymns, from related Middle Europe, strongly affected this choral style in the mid-nineteenth century.
8. *Old High Culture*, the third of the big factors and far away the most populous style region, shows the sweep of urban civilization out of the Middle East, west across North Africa and Southern Europe and East through India into Southeast Asia, Indonesia and East Asia. This learned, heavily orchestral style strongly influence the two remaining Eurasian styles.
9. *Central Asian*. The performances of solo-singing balladeer herdsmen of Central Asia show many ties to the horseman cultures of the whole of Europe — from Tartars into the West.
10. *West Europe*, a rootedly solo-unaccompanied, strophic song style, that once had a narrow base along the coast of Europe, now, through North America, threatens to obliterate all the other nine styles.

The world map which emerges from this factor analysis of song style — even when 46 provinces are lacking from the sample — strongly confirms the hypothesis that the distribution of song styles traces some of the main distributions of human cultures across the planet. Indeed, the ten factors discovered seem to outline, in broad terms, what might be called human subspeciation, in cultural terms. This conclusion is supported by the results of the next operation of computer analysis. The residual similarity of each of the ten independent geographic factors is calculated and then the two highest of these residual bonds of each factor are used to connect each factor to its most similar. This creates the network of linked factors shown in Figure 2. By ranking the factors on a vertical scale of level of socio-economic development — from African Gatherers at 1.1 to Old High Culture at 8.8 — this network becomes a tree of style.



Figure 2. A tree of regional song styles.
The main regional factors in the multifactor analysis of performance style. (Thick lines: primary bonds; thin lines: secondary bonds.)

This tree of performance style appears to have two roots: (1) in Siberia and (2) among African Gatherers. The Siberian root has two branches: one into the Circum-Pacific and Nuclear America, thence into Oceania through Melanesia and into East Africa, the second branch to Central Asia and thence into Europe and Asian High Culture. This whole continuum is strongly characterized by male dominated solos or rough unison choralizing, by free or irregular rhythms, and by a steadily increasing information load in various parameters — in glottal, then other ornaments, in long phrases and complex melodic forms, in increasingly explicit texts and in complexly organized orchestral accompaniment.

The African Gatherer continuum into Early Agriculture is, by contrast, and on the whole, feminized, polyvoiced, regular in rhythm,

repetitious, melodically brief, cohesive, well-integrated, with rhythmically oriented orchestras. Models composed of these traits show up more frequently in the performances and the social structures of the gardeners of Africa, India, and the Pacific, and the agriculturalists of Central and East Europe than they do in the Siberian continuum. Thus it appears that the main facts of style evolution may be accounted for by the elaboration of two contrastive traditions — one with its origins among Arctic hunters and fishers where males were the principal producers, and the other with its roots among tropical gatherers where women were the principal producers and, on the whole, kept the center of the expressive stage, as they went on to domesticate plants and lay the base for agriculture.[2] As their cultural base became more complex, these two root traditions became more specialized: the Siberian producing the virtuosic solo, highly articulated, elaborated, and alienated style of Eurasian high culture, the Early Agriculture tradition developing more and more cohesive and complexly integrated choruses and orchestras. West Europe and Oceania, flowering late on the borders of these two ancient specializations, show kinship to both.

It may well be asked whether an equally interesting taxonomy may be achieved at a less general level. Although the presentation of the full cantometric areal taxonomy must be postponed to a succeeding article for lack of space, a brief discussion of one of the six regional taxonomies will indicate what has been achieved. Factor analysis of 42 song profiles from North American and Mexican Indian cultures grouped them into the eight clusters exhibited in the labeled boxes displayed in Figure 3. The connecting lines mark the principal residual similarities between the style areas. On the whole each of the clusters is a historic–geographic continuum, strongly supported by what is known of the history of the North American Indian (Erickson, 1969). Main cultural continua of the continent are represented by the linked clusters: (1) the Desert from North Mexico to the Paiute; (2) Northwest Coast from the Washo to the Atna of Alaska; (3) the Arctic continuum of Central Eskimo linked to Carrier, Greenland and Maritime Indians; (4) the ancient tie between agricultural S. Woodlands and the Peublos. (This might have been a continuum if we had obtained songs of the Mississippi Valley and Texas Indians.) (5) Finally, the largest factor represents the dominance of Plains culture and its sources in Plateau (Flathead), Southwest (Taos and Apache), East Woodland (Iroquois) and Prairies (Menomini).

What is striking in the comparison of these distinctive profiles is that, so far as North America is concerned, Plains and Desert share so few traits. Both favor unison performances of strophes and considerable repetition of text. There is much in Plains style that makes for indi-



Figure 3. Residual bonds among North American areas.
Note: Broken bonds fall below mean level.
Full analysis of this summary factor map will appear in a later publication.

vidualized choral blend — irregular rhythm, complex strophes, some embellishment, melisma, tremolo, glottal shake, narrow voice, and rasp. The Desert, with a more cohesive choral style, is less loaded with information and noise — being more repetitious, melodically briefer, using wider intervals and little embellishment of any kind. Plains style is very aggressive (loud, forceful and high in register) in contrast to milder performance manner of the Desert peoples (soft, relaxed and low register).

In a third step in our taxonomic program the computer calculates and prints out the traits per parameter which are statistically distinctive for

each cluster, when that cluster is compared to the rest of the world. For example, the distinctive feature list derived for Plains style is here compared to the distinctive list for the Desert. In what follows the line of pluses (+ + + + + + + + +) link shared distinctive traits; lines of minuses (- - - - - - - - -) link contrastive distinctive traits. Unconnected traits in either column point to a distinctive trait in one area that does not appear in the other areal style. Underlining points to a high level of distinctiveness. What is not shown is a multitude of underlying, lower-level similarities between the two styles that link them in a regional profile.

Plains		Desert
Social unison	+ + + + + + + + +	Social unison
		Solo orchestra
Individualized choral blend	- - -	Good to maximum rhythmic choral blend
Maximal orchestral rhythmic blend		
Much repetition (67%)	+ + + + +	Moderate repetition of text
Irregular vocal rhythm		
Complex + simple strophes	+ + + +	Simple strophes
		No variation
Medium phrase length		
Asymmetrical		3–4 phrases
Very low final note	- - - - - - -	Medium to high final note
10+ melodic range	- - - - - - -	5–8 melodic range
		Wide intervals
Mid embellishment	- - - - - - - -	Little embellishment
Loud volume	- - - - - - - - - -	Soft volume
Some Melisma		
Much to some tremolo	- - - - - -	Little tremolo
Much to some glottal	- - - - - -	Little glottal shake
High register	- - - - - - - - - -	Low register
Narrow voice		
Extreme to great rasp		
Forceful emphasis	- - - - - - - -	Relaxed emphasis

Enough has been said to show that the profiles are highly contrastive. All this will be quite familiar to regional specialists. What is new, however, is first, that these characterizations are statistically comparable and, second, that the variance between them can be given social as well as musical significance. Elsewhere (Lomax 1968: chapters 3, 4) strong correlations were established between cantometric and cultural traits. Using these correlations as guides, contrastive cultural profiles can be derived from cantometric differences as follows . . . Both Plains and Desert are tribally organized (social unison) simple economies (considerable repetition). The Plains profile, however, points to the following cultural features: less cohesiveness (individualized blend), some stratification (embellishment), sexual restrictions (narrow voiced), hunting (irregular rhythm plus glottal shake), larger polity (louder), more available protein (more forceful), training males for independence (raspy). The strong characteristics of Desert style point to a contrastive set of societal traits: solidary (good rhythmic concert), simpler economy (more repetitive), small, decentralized, simple economy (wide intervals), low stratification (little embellishment), small and decentralized (soft volume and low register), little available protein (relaxed emphasis).

Distinctive style profiles of this kind, each with its own predictable cultural pattern, have been factored out for a system of culture areas in the main world regions. The whole set of song style areas fulfills, in a pleasing way, the demand for homogeneity and geographic continuity. Space forbids its publication in this essay, but, suffice it to say, other canto-regions are divided up in a similar fashion. Moreover, where sufficient culture coding was available in the data bank, very interesting and pleasing subareas were factored out.

Interfactoring Style and Culture

Perhaps the foregoing remarks are sufficient to indicate the interest of the system of areal taxa now ready for publication. At a certain level a world taxonomy of song style, linked to culture, has been proved possible. But now I want to turn to the second main ethnomusicological problem — the search for lawful musical cultural relationships that can give these geographic taxa their significance. Multifactor analysis is again the tool, this time used to reduce the 37 cantometric scales to a smaller set of more general dimensions. In this operation the computer clusters together in factors the scales that produce parallel effects upon the data. The measure of the success of such an analysis is whether it

derives a set of homogeneous factors — clusters in which all members can be considered as manifestations of a single, unifying principle of style. Such clusters can be given a definitive title and can be treated as homogeneous analytic concepts in their own right. For example since factor 1 brings together sharpness of enunciation, size of intervals, degree of text repetition and amount of ornamental notes. All of these features can be viewed as aspects of one principle — the degree of differentiation present in the system. The nine clusters discovered in the factor analysis presented below have an equally satisfactory homogeneous structure (see Table 2).

The discovery that a set of nine clear and coherent factors underlies the structure of the cantometric system and runs through so many kinds of performances has much to offer the student and the thinker. First, it provides an extremely simple, universal system of musical comparison. Next, the clustering of measures in factors indicates that they are highly correlated and: (a) that the presence of one trait in a factor may bring on or imply the presence of the others in a performance or in a system; (b) that, because of the substitutability of symbols, one may be substituted for another in a performance or composition to produce a similar statement.

Knowledge of the existence and the strength of these relationships between aspects of performance structure, makes it possible to phrase many basic principles of stylistic development. Since these factors and their members are also correlated to formative aspects of social structure, one can then enunciate some general hypotheses of sociomusical evolution and begin to consider some of the general symbolic functions of the features of musical style. The elements of such a system must relate, not to specific things or feelings, but to domains of human behavior and motivation. Such domains are indicated by the tendencies we discover in factor analyses of (a) song performance and (b) cultural norms.

In order to discover the main interrelationships between the performance factors on the one hand and between performance factors and the factors of social structure on the other, correlations were run between the two sets of factors, treating them all as variables. Figure 4 presents and dramatizes the principal domains of performance and their connection to the formative aspects of culture.

All the strong correlations between song performance factors (in boxes) and the correlations between them and factors of social structure are presented in Figure 4. The social factors were obtained in the same way as the performance factors (see Lomax, 1972). Only the titles of the factors are given. The powerful factor *Productivity* tightly links measures of man's control of his biological and social environment —



Figure 4. Diagram of the intercorrelations between song performance factors (in boxes) and social structure factors.

(productive range, main type of produce, metal, community size and type, centralization and stratification, sexual generational dominance) — with indicators of the level of *Information load* — (text load, enunciation, interval size and degree of embellishment [factor 1, Table 2]). This twin factor is strong evidence for the fact that population, the superstructure and the flexibility of communication grow together. *Productivity-Information load* is the central, key variable in the system. On the one hand, it directly influences certain important style factors — *Dynamics*, *Orchestral*, *Organization* and *Ornament*. On the other hand, through its strong tie to *Sex mores* and *Team type*, it indirectly determines the input of other basic elements into the performance structure. *Cohesion-Integration* seem to be functions of the *Division of labor*. *Noise tension*, *Ornament*, *Rhythm*, *Melodic size* seem in part to be various responses to control of sexual relations.

The level of Dynamics — volume, forcefulness of accent, and register — shift positively with elements of the productivity structure. Loud singing is more frequent in large polities, soft in small. Forceful accent

Table 2. *Factor analysis*

I. *Differentiation*	
Precision (37)	1) very precise 2) precise 3) normal 4) slurred 5) very slurred
Interval Width (21)	1) predominantly and markedly narrow (2nds) 2) diatonic 3) predominantly wide (3, 4–8)
Repetition of Text (10)	1) little or none 2) ¼ repeated 3) ½ repeated 4) ¾ repeated 5) mostly repeated
. . . Embellishment (23)	1) maximal 2) much 3) medium 4) some 5) little or none
II. *Ornamentation*	
Melisma (29)	1) much 2) some 3) little or none
Glissando (28)	1) extreme 2) much 3) some 4) little or none
. . . Embellishment (23)	1) maximal 2) much 3) medium 4) some 5) little or none
Glottal Effect (31)	1) much 2) some 3) little or none
Tremolo (30)	1) much 2) some 3) little or none
III. *Orchestral organization*	
Organization Type (7)	1) monophony 2) heterophony 3) unison 4) polyphony (2 + independent parts)
Rhythmic Organization (14)	1) heterophonic 2) discoordinated 3) unison 4) accompanying/contrapuntal 5) polyrhythmic
Orchestral Group (3)	1) solo 2) discoordinated 3) social unison/simple alteration 4) overlap 5) interlock
Orchestral Rhythmic Concert (9)	1) solo/none 2) very individualized 3) individualized 4) cohesive 5) very cohesive
Orchestral/Vocal Group (2)	1) no orchestra 2) interludes 3) discoordinated 4) accompanying/subordinate 5) accompanying/dominant 6) interlock
IV. *Dynamics*	
Energy Level (25)	1) soft 2) soft and loud 3) loud
Emphasis Level (36)	1) relaxed 2) relaxed and forceful 3) forceful
Register (32)	1) low 2) mid 3) high
V. *Cohesiveness, vocal group*	
Vocal Group Rhythmic Concert (6)	1) solo/none 2) very individualized 3) individualized 4) cohesive 5) very cohesive
. . . Vocal Group Tonal Blend (5)	1) very individualized 2) individualized 3) cohesive 4) very cohesive
V.G. Rhythmic Organization (12)	1) heterophonic/discoordinated 2) unison 3) accompanying/contrapuntal/polyrhythmic
Vocal Group (1A)	1) heterogenous 2) unison 3) simple alternation 4) overlapped 5) interlock 6) het-interlock

Table 2 *contd.*

VI. *Choral organization*	
Organization Type (4)	1)monophony 2) heterophony 3) unison 4) polyphony
Solo/Group (1)	1) solo 2) solo-solo 3) leader dominated group 4) group dominated
. . . Orchestral Tonal Blend (8)	1) very individualized 2) individualized 3) cohesive 4) very cohesive
VII. *Noise and tension*	
Nasality (34)	1) extreme 2) great 3) intermittent/moderate 4) little or none
Raspiness (35)	1) extreme 2) great 3) intermittent/moderate 4) little or none
Vocal Width (33)	1) narrow, squeezed voice 3) wide and relaxed 4) yodeling
. . . Tonal Blend (5)	(see factor V above)
VIII. *Rhythm*	
Vocal Rhythm (11)	1) free 2) irregular 3) one beat 4) simple regular 5) complex regular
Orchestral Rhythm (13)	1) free 2) irregular 3) one beat 4) simple regular 5) complex regular
Tempo (24)	1) extremely slow 2) very slow 3) slow 4) medium 5) fast 6) very fast
Melodic Variation (16A)	1) no variation 2) some variation 3) much variation
. . . Phrase Length (17)	1) long (10–25 sec.) 2) medium (5–9 sec.) 3) short (1–4 sec.)
IX. *Size of the melodic statement*	
Melodic Form (16)	1) through composed 2) complex strophe 3) simple strophe 4) complex litany 5) simple lit 6) canon type litany
Number of Phrases (18)	1) 8 or more 2) 5–7 3) 4 phrase type 4) 3 phrase 5) 1–2 phrases
Symmetry (18A)	1) asymmetrical phrase lengths 2) symmetrical
X. *Melodic range* (20)	1) 10+ (a minor 9th-2 octaves) 2) 5–8 (minor 6th-octave) 3) 1–5 (monotone-perfect 5th)
XI. *Position of final note* (19)	1) very low (on lowest note) 2) lower half of range 3) midpoint to upper half of range
XII. *Polyphonic type* (22)	1) drone 2) isolated or parallel chords 3) harmony or counterpoint

Note: In order to acquaint the reader with the whole rating scheme, the full rating lines are presented for all factor members, instead of the title alone. On the right of the title for each parameter appears the number it had on the original cantometric rating scheme. Indentation marks those items that are assigned to two factors because standing on both are less than six loading points apart. Note that some lines of the original cantometric system have been dropped, split or abridged.

becomes more frequent where protein from meat or milk is freely available. On the whole, the level of dynamics increases with rising productivity, increasing assertiveness in these two ways.

A heightened dynamic level supports integrated, cohesive, multiparted orchestral structure. The tie between *Orchestra* and *Productivity* shows that complexly organized orchestras become more frequent in complex economies, as an expression of growth in power, institutional elaboration and surplus energy. This network of lawful relations interlink systems capable of delivering multimessage communications with those shaped by high levels of productivity and social control. This closely twinned cluster of factors forms a *Control-plus-Energy* set.

Where performances are heavily ornamented, they are unlikely to be *Integrated*, that is, groupy and polyphonic, whereas heavily ornamented song, more frequently than not, is solo or heterophonic or, at least, leader-dominated. Vocal noise and tension, a severe double standard, as well as irregular meter produce less integrated choralizing, whereas sexually permissive cultures, with clear and relaxed voices, using regular meters, are also most likely to sing in good rhythmic concert, in tonal unity, and with multileveled rhythmic and social organization.

These are the supportive aspects of the third part of the socio-communicative system. We now come to their positive symbolic function. The *Integration* and *Cohesive* factors are both highly correlated to *Division of labor*. In those societies where women share equally in the main food producing activity, choral performances, in both their tonal and rhythmic aspects, are likely to be more cohesive. Moreover, performances are more likely to be group than solo, polyphonic than heterophonic or unison. Both *Cohesive* and *Integrated* are tied to the *Orchestral* factor: highly cohesive choirs being commonest with highly cohesive and multiparted orchestral performance. The level of unity is a function of the type of rhythmic organization, and the equity of the sexual system.

On the one hand, face-to-face choral integration seems to be a function of the importance of the feminine role in public matters like food production. On the other hand it is limited by the load of tension that a differential sex code puts into the system. Thus another twin factor emerges combining the effect of *Sex mores* and *Division of labor* and having to do with sex role and integration of groups, in contrast to sheer productivity and information carying capacity. The variables this *Sex role* factor contains reflect the way that cultures lay out male–female relations in the family, in sex and at work. Another view of the operation of this system comes if you divide the diagram into left and right halves.

On the left appears *Information load* and its input. On the right the factors that animate and organize the productive and communicative acts — energy, integrative plans, orders of synchrony and types of rhythms.

Several general principles emerge. As the level of productivity increases, the information load also increases in a number of ways, making unified performance more difficult. However, orchestras which are linked to the superstructure become more elaborately organized. Secondly, population increase and change in team type bring on changes in sex role and in the character and level of face-to-face integration systems. One tendency is for ornament and melody and rhythmic type to become more elaborated and for performances to become solo or virtuosic. The contrary tendency is for concern with multileveled, empathetic, highly unified performance to limit the scope of meter, melodic form and the degree of ornamentation and vocal variety. The interaction of these three general principles is sufficient to identify, classify and point to the social symbolism of most vocal performances. Recent work with other expressive systems indicates that the same principles are at work in them (see Lomax, 1972).

In sum, the whole *Sex role-Integration* system shifts in far-reaching though sometimes indirect ways in response to changes in the *Production-Information system.* Figure 5 shows the operation of this relationship across a time scale of culture types.

Along the bottom axis are a row of regional cultural types, factored out of a world sample. The solid line that rises from left to right traces the steady rise of the *Prod. Inf. system* from African and Australian gatherers, to Amerindian hunters and slash-burn gardeners, to Oceanic and African gardeners, to Eurasian plough agriculturalists. The broken line traces the variance of the division of *Labor-Cohesiveness-Integration system.* It varies dependently — high among African gatherers, low among Australian gatherers and Amerindian hunter-cultivators, rising in Melanesia, reaching a peak of synchrony in Polynesia and Africa, falling off again among the more individualized agriculturalists of Europe and Asia. The covariance of these two interdependent systems — *Productivity-Control* and *Integration-Sex role* — thus give a picture of the evolution of the musical performance, as a general guide to the evolution of society itself.

This evolutionary diagram seems to stand for the basic relationship all expressive communication and symbol systems have to culture. I have found analagous factors and factor relations in studying movement style and in speaking style. Thus the way song style symbolically represents culture structure really stands for the relation of style to culture. From



Figure 5. The weighted means of the differentiative factor (solid line) and the integrative composite factor (broken line) are plotted along the evolutionary culture scale. These are the main factors from 71 measures for song performance and social structure that were factored over a sample of 148 world cultures. (From Lomax, 1967. Used with permission.)

this discovery there emerges a theoretical structure that embraces, corrects and integrates many older hypotheses.

Music is a powerful reinforcer of social and political structure, as Plato saw, but the locus of the reinforcement seems to be more in performance style than in melody or scale type. Freud was right in seeing that repressive sexual rules bias and distort all expressive behavior. Marx and Lenin were certainly correct in holding that the level of productivity and the degree of exclusive political control were a basic determinant of art and social life alike. But mechanical Marxists made a well-nigh disastrous error in treating creativity as if it were only a direct reflection of political and economic control, rather than an oblique and irreducible response under pressure of several forces. What is new in the cantometric position is the discovery, by means of an exhaustive and critical analysis of the data of anthropology and of ethnomusicology, that sex role and team organization, though functions of the economy, operate as independent and formative variables in shaping expressive behavior. The interplay of the semi-independent *Productivity* and *Integration* systems account for the major facts of culture growth, but allow for the indeterminancy and spontaneity of art. This synthesis, which explains the general relationship of music and other forms of expressive communica-

tion to society, is superior to the Platonic or Lévi-Strauss structural approach in a number of respects. It embraces the whole range of culture and music. It is based in consensable observation. The discovery that expressive behavior is fundamentally a social process endows it with a new and solid importance. Art becomes the very spine of human adaptation, when it is realized that expressive acts encode the models by means of which the members of cultures synchronize their everyday behavior. Cantometrics has succeeded in linking the performance structure of music to social continua but though it maps the distribution of melody, meter and harmony patterns to culture, has found no clear correlations to social structure. What cantometrics has done is to link the many aspects of musical performance to social structure — thus pointing to the symbolic function of performance to group organization, the use of polyphony, the degree of tonal and rhythmic cohesiveness, the function of text and enunciation, the significance of rhythmic organization, the function of various types of embellishment, the effect of volume and stress, the message of various kinds of timbre and the cultural placement of types of melodic and metrical organization. The many correlations in this web of relations between performance factors and social factors provide a social base for much sociomusical analysis. I turn now from markers of performance to the triad that has been the focus of most European musical analysis — melody, meter, and harmony. I aim now to present a series of speculative hypotheses concerning melody, meter, and harmony which will round out a general behavioral theory of musical style.

Melody, Meter, Harmony

The deep-seated intuition that, when you know a people's music, you know them profoundly, turns out to be correct. Plato was right in giving music a pre-eminent role in the training of the citizens of his *Republic*. Mistakenly, however, he tied social structure to melodic and metrical types, and this error has caused musicians no end of trouble ever since. Heads of church and state attempted to muzzle melodies and to stamp out rhythms, as harmful and hopeless an enterprise as trying to control what people say about the situations in which they find themselves. Meanwhile, musicologists vainly sought for historical principles in musical scores.

What cantometrics has discovered about melody, meter, and harmony — the subjects closest to the professional musician's interest — is mostly in the negative, that these levels of the musical statement are not directly

connected to the prime characterizers of social and cultural structures. They seem in fact to occupy a level similar to language and have a similar function — to make statements about particular events or kinds of events within a particular cultural framework. Neither sentences nor melodies can be used for cross-cultural comparisons, until one understands what order of events they stand for and how in general they symbolize them.

Ray Birdwhistell once suggested that music may be a derived rather than a primary system of communication because music is composed of reformulations of more primary systems of verbal, extraverbal, and body communication and is acquired by the child after it has learned the rules of these primary systems.[3] This may explain why music has proved to be the key to other communication systems in this study and, at the same time, why the content of music has been so hard to get at. Like mathematics, music makes statements about other systems without specifying them. In order to understand musical symbolism, one must first know the content of the other systems from which it is derived. Therefore considered as aspects of derived systems, meter, melody, and harmony might be characterized as follows:

1. Meter in song, can be looked at as danced speech;
2. Melody as a formal and playful use of speech melody;
3. Harmony as a simultaneous presentation of two or more such patterns.

The findings set forth in previous pages suggest the ways in which the differing communicative functions of these elements may be productively studied. These definitions will now be elaborated in order to round out a social theory of musical communication. The explanation now to be presented is speculative, as contrasted to those in the earlier parts of the paper, which are based on statistical findings.

1. *Meter*, in song as danced speech . . . To assert that the meters of dance and song in cultures generally coincide is virtually a truism for many traditions, where the prime function of song is to accompany dancing. Even in more sophisticated societies, where song has many functions, the most cursory survey will show that main metrical types in song are, principally, those found in the dances of that people. (Analysis of the influence of the stress patterns of language on song and the interface between dance and speech rhythms in shaping song meter will be left aside for the moment.) This discovery is helpful because it makes meter visible, as in filmed activities. Our choreometric study of movement style in films has taught us, among other things, that dance mirrors and reinforces main patterns of daily life activity such as work. More than this,

it makes clear that meter is only one element or aspect of systems of interactive synchrony. These seem to vary culturally and to depend on which parts of the body are used, how they are used, how space and dynamics are handled and, above all, what degree and kind of coordination are required in most activities of the cultural tradition. Considered in this other way, any given meter must be viewed as a part of some particular context of bodily and social behavior, intimately related to culture pattern. In musical terms, playing or singing a rhythm the culturally right way absolutely necessitates knowing and using the movement style profile of a culture.

These movement style profiles, as we have painstakingly worked them out for about 275 cultures, have the stability of the cantometric profiles discussed earlier. Each one found in culture forms the stylistic spine of its behaviors, serving to identify culture members to each other and to provide a baseline around which all their activity is coordinated. Moreover, just as with song, we found that the movement profiles of single cultures were simply local variations of regional styles that represented the spread and sometimes the mingling of the great traditions of culture. Looked at as systems of movement, limb involvement, proximity and timing — in a word, as systems of synchrony — these traditions could be then viewed as adaptive specializations.

Contrast, for example, the principle models of the Circum-Pacific tradition and the Black African traditions. Most peoples of the Pacific Basin produce the effect of synchrony by maintaining a common direction of movement, by handling the central body as a rather rigid block, by moving their limbs linearly in push-pull fashion, in patterns of simple alternating or bilateral activity, and in comparatively rough timing. This style developed in the world of stone, wood, or bone tools with fairly fragile cutting edges which must cut straight in and out of objects. It is also the world of hunting, fishing, and dibble stick agriculture where tight group coordination is not essential to the support of a large population.

In African gardening, however, another pattern emerges. The shoulders, the pelvis, the whole trunk pulsates with energy, movement flows out along the limbs from the central body, movement trajectories are curving, since metal tools make a slashing attack the most effective. Change of pace and sudden accelerations are the rule and form the baseline for a system of synchrony which, unlike our own, often neglects simple coordination of limbs to link dancers in complementary patterns as they suddenly change tempo, direction, level, and limb involvement.

In Africa ability to fall easily into synchrony with others is a valued trait, and social synchrony is constantly emerging into the foreground.

Children are encouraged to imitate their elders. In Euro-America, on the other hand, this 'monkey behavior' is rather frowned upon in children and adults alike. In fact, students of American body behavior have discovered that whites seem to conceal or restrain their interlimb synchrony, so that it becomes visible only if filmed behavior is analyzed in a very fine-grained way. Dr. Condon (Condon and Ogsten, 1966), however, found that when he studied American, then other conversation, at the microlevel of one twenty-fifth of a second or less, that all the slight movements of all present were meshed in absolutely precise synchrony with the rhythms of the person who is speaking. He found, below the level of visibility, a precision of bodily coordination between participants in conversation, one would normally expect to find only in the ballet. The metric patterns linking the individuals, however, were of the *rubato parlando*, or free rhythmic type rather than, for example, any regular pattern of heavy and light pulses. It is around a framework of such free rhythms that the flowing, frequently heterophonic music and heterogeneous rhythmic organization of Oriental art are structured.

All this confirms the findings of cantometrics detailed in earlier pages. Regular meters serve as the baseline for systems of precise coordination and multileveled patterns such as counterpoint and polyrhythm. Free or irregular meters usually occur with less precisely coordinated or heterogeneous patterns of synchrony, which achieve an extraordinary degree of subtle control in Oriental performances. This suggests the possibility that Oriental music and dance are slowed down and visible embodiments of the complex verbal rhythms which Condon discovered link auditors to speakers at the microlevel. The audience then sees and hears the subtle flow of verbal rhythms which are the subliminal core of poetry.

The two basic types of musical meter can be seen as functions of the two contrastive types of synchrony which underlie culture: the free rhythms upon which speech depends, which are explicit, elaborate, individualized, and difficult to perform in concert, and regular meters which are easy to hear and join, and which induce unified, integrated behavior, because they consist of regular successions of contrastive units.

2. *Melody* . . . is a formal and heightened use of the intonation patterns that give meaning to all spoken utterances and significance to all communications. Every language and dialect produces emphasis in the intonation patterns used in everyday interaction for voicing queries, commands, complaints, and flat statements, in weeping, laughing, groaning etc. A melodic style consists of a restricted number of these ephatic formulas and stands for the general tone of the statements

culture members habitually make about the adaptive system in which they find themselves. Thus melody can play unexpected games with words so that 'over-emphatic' highly unconventional meanings can be perceived and enjoyed subliminally. The work of melody is then sometimes like sleep — to allow the unconscious free play during waking hours, but in a manner that does not interfere with everyday, conventional interactions.

The investigation of performance style offers supporting evidence for this thesis. The tone qualities which cantometrics has studied cross-culturally all seem to carry subliminal messages about sex role or sexual outlet: nasality hinting of tears held back and fears too great to face; rasp and glottal delivery portraying the independent and aggressive masculinity desired and admired in predatory activities; tremolo the justified fears of the singer performing without support of chorus and orchestra; the squeezed, held back and narrowed voice betraying the agony of sexual frustration and of restraint enforced by punishment; the wide and ringing voice announcing the joyful ease of fulfillment and pleasure in love.

The presence or absence of these emotion-laden qualities — all strongly coloring the melody — seems to depend upon the level of male dominance. (For confirmation, see Lomax, 1968.) The balance of power between the sexes also affects the frequency of small or wide intervals, in relation to both interval size and use of embellishments and glissandi. Sheer growth of population and the resultant increase in social layering puts restraints on human interaction in everyday as well as in sexual encounters. Everything belongs to someone else. The individual is convention bound and space confined. Voices grow tighter, intervals narrower, and formalities, like ornaments, must accompany every statement. This is in contrast to the much earlier melodic style clean of fussy ornament and, in its wide intervals, portraying a spacious social and physical environment.

This is only one source for the cadential formulae which melody, as an intonation language, abstracts out of life and speech. The code for any melodic tradition lies largely hidden in the language it provides the tunes for. John Blacking independently found that the melodies of children's games among the African Venda were functions of the tones belonging to the text (Blacking, 1967). The tune of the refrains stayed constant, but melodic variations blossomed in the leader's part, where fresh text and thus new tones were introduced, in this tonal language. G. Rouget has decoded the patterns of Dahomean drumming by reference to the tonal framework of the spoken language (Rouget, 1965). Similarly cantometrics finds that melodic variation is most marked in those world areas

where tone is a part of verbal structure and thus tunes must change when new text is introduced.

I have tried this hypothesis out on folk songs in English, a language where intonation mainly fleshes out the meaning of sentences. Without having any way of exactly translating sung intervals into the intonation intervals of speech, I have intoned out loud the texts of every song I know, with their melodies as guides. The effect, if the song is notable, is speech that has the eloquence, the naked force of great oratory or acting. The refrain 'Go down Moses' thunders with authority, defiance, and scorn of an immortal splendor. 'Frankie and Albert' is laced with delicate irony that makes you giggle. 'Barbara Allen' calmly brings the loveliest girl of England on stage with the tone of an English novel. 'The Star Spangled Banner' is a pompous overstatement just as we have all suspected, but the speech cadence of the refrain of the 'Crucifixion Song' . . . 'not a word . . . not a word . . . not a word' . . . cannot be uttered without tears. Of course the full appreciation of these nuances depends upon total understanding of the affective nuances of the language.

Perhaps then the work of melody is to endow a passage of text with an unexpected or impermissible bias, to play unexpected games with words so that overemphatic or unconventional sentiments can be enunciated publicly and enjoyed subliminally by all present. Melody, like day-dreaming, allows the unconscious to play in waking hours, but without threat to everyday function, because nothing is to be taken literally — 'this is song'. If this hypothesis be correct (and much supports it), the decoding of melodic communication must proceed slowly, language by language, as the systems of spoken–sung intonation are studied in each case. In the end, of course, however, the libraries of melodies we now possess will provide the keenest insights into the emotions of cultures past and present.

3. *Harmony* . . . Multileveled statement forms such as polyphony and polyrhythm permit two or more supplementary, complementary or contrastive roles or statements to be presented at the same time. The evidence of cantometrics strongly supports this idea, since all the integrated, multileveled forms were found in sexually complementary societies, while the unison, solo forms were discovered where one — male — voice was dominant. Thus the messages of countermelody and polymeter may be interpreted as simultaneous and sometimes opposing, sometimes supplemental statements about the same experience in culture.

This is the framework of hypotheses cantometrics brings forth to

provide working tools for ethnomusicology. Two things, principally, may be said in its favor. It accounts for the many ranges of variance in the field of music. It provides a body of theory for linking societal and musical behavior, built upon the discovery that the message of the musical performance is a steady signal about the main features of some cultural tradition. Moreover, the attentive reader of this account of sociomusical correlations will be aware that one theme dominates all the others — the theme of adaptation and evolution. The symbolism of musical performance, as scored in cantometrics, is linked always to the factors essential to the survival and development of human communities — to the size of population, to the level of productivity, to the texture of social controls, to the male–female balance, to the solidarity and integration of groups and teams, and to the intensity and rhythmic form of the effort expended by the members of the culture. Indeed, the overarching discovery is that a musical performance is an enactment in public of the synchronic plan which shapes the interaction of culture members in the everyday survival activities that constitute the culture. Musical performances, since they are superredundant and supersynchronic, thus reinforce the strategic models by means of which and in terms of which cultures endure.[4]

Notes

1. See Bruno Nettl's review of *Folk Song Style and Culture* in *American Anthropologist* 72 (1970) and Barbara Krader's review in the *Anuario Yearbook* 6 (1970).
2. Correlations supporting this hypothesis are discussed at length in *Folk Song Style and Culture*. (Transaction Press, Rutgers University) and in *Cantometrics*, a training method with tapes (Extension Media Center, University of California Press, Berkeley).
3. Birdwhistell (personal communication). See, however, *Kinesics and Context*.
4. A computer taxonomy of song style areas has been completed, and is now being written up for publication. This taxonomy illustrates in detail, and in many territories, the themes discussed in this treatise. The work on this paper was done under grant no. MH 06842-12 from the National Institute of Mental Health, Behavioral Social Science Division. It was part of a general project, 'Expressive Behavior as a Social Communication Model', codirected by Alan Lomax and Conrad Arensberg in the Department of Anthropology and the Bureau of Applied Social Research, Columbia University. The Cantometric System of Musical Analysis is the coinvention of Victor Grauer and the present author. Roswell Rudd was curater of the 4000 song sample and Norman Berkowitz did the computer programming and, with counsel from Edwin Erickson, the statistical work.

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Art Motifs and Prehistory in the Middle East

RALPH S. SOLECKI

The cultural ties that bind the modern Middle East from the Atlantic in Morocco eastward across North Africa to the Asian steppes of Afghanistan are well known. The roots of this connection go far back into antiquity. Indeed, there seems to be a kind of a broad cultural substratum underlying the period of the early Holocene or post-Pleistocene, about 8000 B.C. in the central part of this area. I have chosen as one of the possible proofs of cultural ties, similarities in design elements on small portable objects, or mobiliary art, linking northwest Africa (the Maghreb), the Levant, and the Zagros Mountains region of Iraq–Iran. Nothing comparable in the same time period is evident in the prehistory of the northern side of the Mediterranean, or southern Europe.

The general resemblances among the nonceramic archaeological cultures of these areas in the immediate post-Pleistocene have been already suggested (Solecki, 1963, 1967). These cultures are the Capsian of the Maghreb, the Natufian of the Levant, and the 'Proto-Neolithic' of the Zagros Mountains. Artistic renditions exclusively on portable or mobiliary art appear for the first time in the long prehistory of these areas in this period. We are reminded that the Upper Paleolithic mural and mobiliary art traditions of western Europe are lacking in the Middle East. The mobiliary art found in the early post-Pleistocene Middle East cultures, however, exhibit strong resemblances which reinforce the basic thread of continuity and relationship linking North Africa, the Levant and the Zagros at this time. This may be likened to the concept of 'horizon' and 'style' which has proven to be eminently useful in archaeological theory in the New World (Willey, 1948).

In prehistory, as Christopher Hawkes (1954) has outlined, we can

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draw inferences from the very basic to the abstract in our classification of archaeological materials. These may be ordered in increasing complexity and degree of abstraction. The primary kind of inference may be ascribed to the techniques which produced the artifact. Thus, a hammerstone is used for pounding, which can be verified by its battered wear. The second kind of inference which may be elicited from archaeological remains deals with subsistence economics. Thus, the flint arrowhead tips the arrow, and this implies a hunting subsistence. A mortar is used to grind, break, or crush something in it, such as grain or nuts, or even nonorganic materials. The third kind of inference, considerably harder to make because of our uncertainties of judgement and evaluation than the first two, concerns the social-political institutions characteristic of peoples in antiquity. The kind of information used is obtained from grave furnishings, house forms, and similar complex features which take time to recover, and to assess. The fourth kind of inference involves even less certainty and more guesswork than the three preceding ones because the investigator's own feelings and experiences are rather necessarily involved. This last step involves abstraction as a product of the mind, and such a realm becomes difficult for us to appraise since there is no possible way for modern man to gauge the mind of prehistoric man. In examining the cultures of the three areas noted above, likenesses can be found and comparisons can be made in the four realms of archaeological classifications and their related cultural inferences. For the purpose of this paper, I have chosen the last type of inference to work with, that of ideology, specifically dealing with art designs and motifs, because it is an area which appears to have a character independent of man's immediate basic wants and needs, unaffected by environment, and thus highly relevant for the tracing of cultural connections.

While resemblances can be drawn in other artifactual types such as chipped stone tools, it appears that the nonfunctional materials, such as the decorated '*art mobilier*', can be more reflective of cultural affiliations than subsistence oriented materials. The fine sensitivity of decorated ceramics to cultural affiliations at a later period in the Neolithic and Chalcolithic Ages seems to find its precursor in the preceramic decorated *art mobilier*. Flinders Petrie (1974:3) noted that for historical interpretations, art decorated objects have an important value because they have no 'stimulus of necessity'. In other words, while man could and did evidently repeatedly invent items in his culture which fulfilled a pressing need, there was, as Petrie (ibid.) observed, no functional utility in drawing a spiral rather than a rectangle or an octopus. However, some basic art forms could be related to technology, as for

example in netting, basketry, or weaving, an observation also made by Boas (1955:15) and his students, Weltfish (1953) and Bunzel (1938:554), among others dealing with primitive art; or from beauty as in plant forms; or symbolic religious items such as the cross and swastika.

In the study presented here, we are specifically dealing with the two-dimensional art designs inscribed on prehistoric items of bone, shell, and stone, although representations could also be made for mobiliary art pieces cut or shaped in the round (three-dimensional art). The latter are, however, unevenly distributed as artifacts in the areas of our concern, and thus comparisons are not possible.

The class of objects compared in this paper include engraved or inscribed bones, pebbles, and eggshells. All of these are portable objects, and in the main made of locally derived materials. Hence, it is not the material which is of interest, but the designs or the artistic purpose to which the material has been put. Nonutilitarian materials in prehistory, such as art designs and motifs, are certainly a factor which lend themselves to dispersion over long distances. Petrie (1974:3) comments on the historic connections of design and the method by which designs are spread in time. The significance of the art designs and motifs, now lost to us, may have had a very important historical meaning to the maker. Naturally, since the human brain and hand are involved, we must not neglect the possibility of independent invention. However, if the art element is found in a context wherein other cultural linkages are found, then the argument for cultural diffusion or some other kind of dispersion from a more or less common source is strengthened. These are real and actual arguments — witness the marshalling of proof advanced by the cross-Pacific diffusionists for New World links with the Old World. In the case of the pan-Middle East cultural connections proposed in this paper, there are no hazardous geographic barriers for cultural transmission.

In our assessment of the resemblances among the art motifs from North Africa, the Levant, and the Zagros, we realize that the distances involved are not inconsequential (Figure 1). Thus, between the Levant and the Maghreb is a distance of some 2500 kilometers; and between the Levant and the Zagros there is about 900 kilometers, which even with modern day jet air travel represent considerable journeys. However, it should be remembered that point to point distance in overland situations does not of itself pose the total question in the case of cultural connections. Similarity of environment has a lot to do with the problem, and it is suspected that in fact the matter is bound up with subsistence and ecology. In brief, the period after the Pleistocene in the Middle East has seen the emergence of food production, including the domestication of



Figure 1. Map of the Middle East showing the locations of the three areas, the Maghreb, the Levant, and the Zagros Mountains.

plants and animals, whose spread seems to have been accompanied by a kind of more or less similar cultural baggage, including the art motifs and other elements discussed in this paper. Where the evidence for the early change to the mainsprings of civilization of the Middle East is lacking or not clear, we have special problems. Thus, there are breaks in the continuity of evidence between the Levant and the Zagros, but the gap is small, and certainly will be bridged as new sites are found. The big gap is between the Levant and the Maghreb, for no information is found going across westward in North Africa save for some information in Cyrenaica. There is a great blank also in the area of the Nile delta and environs.

By a trick of fate, the best preserved evidence of art motifs and elements is found in the culturally poorest of the three areas considered: the Maghreb, where the virtually indestructible ostrich egg shells bear the design elements in great numbers. These were presumably used as water containers.

Since it appears logical to start with the culturally richest area first, and to take the areas in descending order, the Levant receives priority, followed by the Zagros, and then the Maghreb.

We owe it to Dorothy Garrod (1957) for presenting the Natufian industry in the Levant, subsequently renamed the Natufian culture, to Near Eastern archaeology following her 1928 excavations at Shuqbah cave in Wadi Natuf in Palestine. She called it a 'Mesolithic culture', which has been since renamed 'Epipaleolithic'. The investigations of Neuville (1951) in the rock shelters and caves of the Judean desert resulted in additional knowledge of this culture, which provided further stimulus to the study. The time range of the Natufian is relatively short: about 2000 years, between 10,000 to 8000 B.C. (Henry, 1973; Bar-Yosef, 1975). Compared to the preceding culture horizon, the Kebaran, or Upper Paleolithic VI of Neuville (1951), the Natufian marked a virtual explosion in the variety and nature of cultural remains, including economic and luxury goods, which appear to have been part and parcel of a new subsistence strategy. The important new markers of this subsistence change include blades with 'sickle sheen', heavy stone equipment such as mortars, querns, and accompanying rubbing stones and pestles, indicating at least a partial dependence upon vegetable foods which needed preparation for use. Coupled with this is an obvious increase in sedentism, as evidenced by the presence of permanent habitations, such as house foundations ringed with stones showing care and labor in construction.

The number and variety of bone artifacts blossomed in the Natufian (Bar-Yosef and Tchernov, 1970: table 1), with a wealth of material

indicating various activities from fishing to basketry, weaving, and plaiting. Luxury goods, such as pendants and carved tablets of stone and bone, are part of the material culture of the Natufian. These are unknown in the preceding culture horizons in the Middle East. Our knowledge has been advanced with the investigations of Perrot (1967), Bar-Yosef (1975) and others in the area between the Jordan river, the Dead Sea and the Mediterranean; and Marks (1975) in the Negev area in what may be broadly called the southern Levant, while in the northern Levant we have numerous finds of related cultures in Syria and Lebanon (Perrot, 1968).

Decorated Materials in the Levant

For all of the excavation in the Natufian in the eastern Mediterranean, there is surprisingly little in the way of decorated bones, although there is a fair quantity of decorated stones. Examples of decorated ostrich egg shells have been found in the desert area to the south. It should be recalled that ostriches are mentioned in the bible, are found on Assyrian cylinder seals, and survived in this part of the world until relatively recent times (Brodrick, 1972).

Garrod (Garrod and Bate, 1937: pl. XIII, fig. 2, no. 17; pl. XII, fig. 2, no. 10) found three small bone tablets bearing incised designs at the cave site at Mugharet el Wad in Palestine. One of these, a broken specimen, bears a deeply incised crenellated design on one face. Another, not illustrated, reportedly also bears a crenellated design. These design elements fall into what Camps-Fabrer (1966: fig. 108) classified in her system as 'divers' elements. Bar-Yosef and Tchernov (1970:147), call crenellated designs by the name of 'squared meanders'. Perrot (1967: figs 10, 15) illustrates a stone bowl rim section bearing three sets of incised interlocked crenellated designs which he calls a triple band in relief. He also illustrates the rim of a limestone bowl bearing an incised decoration of closed U figures in triplicate bounded by a pair of horizontal incised lines (Perrot, 1967, fig. 23). From Mallaha in Palestine are also illustrated several incised pebbles (Perrot, 1967: fig. 21, nos. 14–16).

The stone bowls and the rest of the material from Mallaha attest to a very rich occupation so far unmatched elsewhere in this culture horizon in the eastern Mediterranean. The crenellated design appears to be a specialty of the Natufian, for it occurs not only on stones but also on bones. Van Loon (1966:215, figs 5, 6; 1968:273, 285) reports a stone bowl fragment from Mureybit (Syria) bearing what looks like a crenellated design from a ca. ninth millenium context. He mentions that a similarly decorated stone bowl rim was found at Çayönü (Turkey) by the

1964 expedition of Robert J. Braidwood of the University of Chicago.

Bar-Yosef and Tchernov (1970: figs 3, 4) illustrate bones bearing simple parallel incised lines in groups of sets, and three specimens bearing drill point marks, which are reminiscent of the drilled bones found in north Africa (Camps-Fabrer, 1966: fig. 84). These she classifies as '*Decor. pointille*'. Another bone specimen ilustrated by Bar-Yosef and Tchernov (1970: pl. 35, fig. 11) is a broken spatula which is decorated with an 'incised net pattern', and a second band of identical design below the first. A bone bearing what looks like a herringbone pattern of zig-zags was found by Garrod (1942: pl. IV, fig. 2) at Shuqbah.

Although the decorated stones and bones of the Levant bear strikingly similar designs with North Africa, a third category of decorated material occurs as a beautiful link with the latter area, namely decorated ostrich egg fragments. Decorated ostrich egg shell fragments bearing three design motifs including a series of diagonal bars, herringbone decoration, and a cross-hatch design were found at the site of Rosh Zin in the central Negev (Henry, 1973:240, fig. 30 a, b, c). Camps-Fabrer (1966: fig. 108) calls the first an oblique 'scalariforme', the second 'chevrons', and the third a 'crosshatch'. Marks (1975:356–357) mentions the finding of the decorated egg shells at Rosh Zin as well, citing dates for a nearby Natufian site of about between 8500 and 11,100 B.C.

The Zagros Mountains Proto-Neolithic

To the east, there are some half-dozen sites in the Zagros Mountains area which may be equated with the Natufian (R. L. Solecki, 1961; R. S. Solecki, 1963). These belong to the cultural horizon called 'Proto-Neolithic' by the authors (ibid.). The characteristic small tool inventory of these sites included pecked and ground stone artifacts such as querns, mortars, pestles, and rubbers. In this category are grooved chlorite pebbles which are thought to be associated with the appearance of the bow and arrow (Solecki and Solecki, 1970). Chipped stone tools include both a microlithic-sized industry (backed blades, lunates, etc.) and a standard-sized industry including notched and serrated pieces, borers, '*pièces ésquillés*' (scalar pieces), side scrapers, etc. Luxury items such as beads and pendants are found in the inventory. Worked bone tools are markedly numerous compared to the finds in the earlier prehistoric horizons at Shanidar cave.

The dates for Zawi Chemi Shanidar and Shanidar cave B1 (the Proto-Neolithic horizon in the cave) fall around 8700 B.C. (Solecki, 1963). The cultural connections between the Natufian in the Levant and the Zawi

Chemi horizon of the Zagros have been drawn up in general by R. L. Solecki (1961).

Since, of the Zagros sites, only Shanidar cave and Zawi Chemi Shanidar have reported decorated artifacts at the time of writing, I must rely solely on the findings from these two sites for comparative materials.

In this analysis, I am not concerned with artifacts bearing single cuts or pairs of cuts, which may or may not have been accidentally done, but multiple series of lines or incisions purposefully made for decoration. The designs thus inscribed range from chevrons, diagonal and parallel lines, free 'plats' and or plaits, and lozenge-shaped figures bearing internal decorations, to long-wave-like banded elements, although hachure seems to have been slightly dominant as a design feature. The marks were undoubtedly scratched on the bones with the sharp end of a flint, such as the edge of a chip, or possibly for more precise work, a burin. However, it should be observed that the latter stone tools are in a minor category in this cultural horizon when compared to the numbers found in the preceding Upper Paleolithic layer at Shanidar cave. '*Art mobilier*' pieces appear for the first time in the prehistory of the Zagros area in the Proto-Neolithic horizon, and are not known in the preceding periods of the Zagros. This phenomenon appears in the Levant and North Africa as well.

The decorated specimens from Zawi Chemi and Shanidar cave described below number nine bone artifacts and four artifacts of stone. The bone artifacts include seven spatula-like fragments and two polished fragments.

Bone Spatulas or Polished Bones

One specimen is a fragment of a highly polished bone, bearing a series of five incised lines making an off-centered chevron, bordered by three parallel lines at one side and a single line on the opposite side (Figure 2a). In the Camps-Fabrer (1966, fig. 108) classification it is a chevron design. No. 2 is part of the tip end of a highly polished spatula bearing a series of very fine lines incised in herringbone fashion (Figure 2b). According to the Camps-Fabrer (ibid.) classification, it is decorated in oblique and parallel opposed hachures. No. 3 is the tip end of a spatula bearing two triangular plats, each about seven millimeters wide, extending from one side (Figure 2c). The plats are different, one composed of seven vertical and parallel lines crossed by four parallel lines. The second is composed of seven lines converging toward a point. In the Camps-Fabrer (ibid.) classification it is called diverging elements, or hachures. No. 4 is a



Figure 2. Selected decorated bones and stones. From the Zawi Chemi Shanidar village site, decorated bones a, b, c, d, e, f. From Shanidar cave, decorated bone, g. Decorated pebbles from Shanidar cave, h, k, l. Decorated pebble from Zawi Chemi Shanidar, i. Decorated pebble from Yarmouq, j.

fragment of a spatula with one complete perforation drilled through it and the section of another (Figure 2d). The incisions are deep, and smoothed over. They are drawn in curvilinear lines, carrying about eight

lines per centimeter. In the Camps-Fabrer (ibid.) system, the style is called curved parallel line motif. No. 5 is a triangular fragment of polished bone with areas of simple design elements at opposed ends. No. 6 is a section of a polished bone bearing an incised pair of wavy bands joined at one end (Figure 2e). The bands are filled with parallel incised lines. In the Camps-Fabrer (ibid.) classification this represents a wave element. No. 7 is a polished bone fragment bearing two perforated holes. A small part of this specimen has an incised crosshatched motif. In the Camps-Fabrer (ibid.) system it is a hachured design. No. 8 is a fragment bearing two lozenge-shaped figures (Figure 2f). One of these contains five parallel lines incised at right angles to the lozenge axis. The other lozenge figure, adjacent to the first, is broken off at the edge of the specimen. Camps-Fabrer (1966: pl. X, fig. 1) illustrates a rather similar specimen from North Africa. No. 9 from Shanidar cave is a section of a polished and decorated animal bone scapula bearing some longitudinal scratches on the surfaces, with an incision in zig-zag pattern on the flat side (Figure 2g). Two of the zig-zags contain a series of parallel incisions. There are other incisions on the opposite side.

Decorated Pebbles

Of more durable nature are four stone artifacts bearing decorations which were found in the Proto-Neolithic culture horizon at both Shanidar cave and Zawi Chemi village site. The first of these is an elongate black slate pebble bearing a series of four vertical scaliform and rectilinear marks bounded at one end by a series of horizontal parallel scratches, and a single line boundary at the opposite end (Figure 2h). The second specimen is a flat sandstone pebble, bearing some 29 scratches across the face on both sides (Figure 2i). They are generally 'V' shaped cuts, and in some of the cut marks can be seen the irregularities of the hollowed tool edge, giving a double-tracked incision. This specimen is very much like the artifacts found in the much later Yarmouk culture in Palestine by Stekelis (1972) (Figure 2j).

The other two specimens bear banded curvilinear or wavy line decorations. The first (Figure 2k) is a flat, black, broken slate specimen bearing banded wavy decorations containing closely spaced crosshatched incisions like that found on one of the bone artifacts. The opposite side bears a single element — a partial curved line enclosing an area filled with finely executed crosshatched lines. This design is called *Losangées* in the Camps-Fabrer (1966, fig. 108) classification. The last specimen (Figure 2l) is a complete triangular-shaped flat black slate pebble bearing

decorations on both sides. On one side there are two wave-like bands each filled with a closely spaced series of cross-hatched incisions, called *Losangées* in the Camps-Fabrer terminology. On the opposite side near the tip end of the piece is an area of crosshatches bordered by a single enclosing line.

Included in the inventory from the Proto-Neolithic of Shanidar cave and the Zawi Chemi village site are other carved small stones and bones, shaped in various forms. These are not considered in the analysis, although analogs are to be found both in the Levant and North Africa for the time period considered in this paper.

Decorated Artifacts in North Africa

Nothing is known from the delta area in northeastern Africa for the time period discussed here, for the possible reason (aside from the need for further exploration) that the sites have been lost through the shifting and silting of the Nile river. There is no information from the adjoining areas. In the Fayum depression, where the earliest Neolithic food producing finds were made, the Fayum A horizon is dated about 4500 B.C. Fayum B, the older horizon, contained bone harpoons, grinding stones and microblades with dates between 5190 B.C. and 6150 B.C. (Wendorf and Schild, 1975). Older sites which are found higher up on the Nile are not considered here. Moreover, they do not appear to contain decorated artifacts.

Passing westward, there is an apparent lack of evidence for connecting links until Cyrenaica, where McBurney (1967) identified a variant of the Capsian culture which he calls the 'Libyco-Capsian'. Dated from about 8500 B.C., he believes that this hunting–gathering culture had its ultimate origins in southwest Asia. The major tool types of the Libyco-Capsian include backed blades, burins, and end-scrapers among the chipped stone tool category, as well as limestone plaques, ochre pallets, and large flat-worked stone slabs. Ostrich egg shells, which appear undecorated in the preceding Eastern Oranian culture at the Haua Fteah cave, were found decorated for the first time (McBurney, 1967:254–255). Although there is a paucity of examples, the illustrated specimens belong unquestionably in the tradition of the decorated egg shells of the Capsian. McBurney (1967: pl. VIII, 2) illustrates a number of ostrich egg shell fragments almost exclusively decorated with pointille lines, a common trait in the Maghreb. No decorated bones occur in the illustrated artifacts other than some bird bones bearing engraved lines (McBurney, 1967: pl. VII, 1). Presumably more excavation may turn up

more representations, but in any case, this provides a convincing intermediary link between the Levant and the Maghreb.

The last area of the analysis is the Maghreb, where the Capsian cultures are found mainly in eastern Algeria and in Tunisia. The type site for the Capsian comes from the Roman town of Capsa (modern Gafsa) in the interior of Tunisia. The culture is typified by a lithic industry of backed blades and bladelets, a fairly rich bone industry, with some ground stone tools and a high number of decorated ostrich egg shells. Radiocarbon dates give the range of the Capsian as between 8000 B.C. to 5000 B.C. (Camps, 1975; Camps et al., 1973), which chronologically places the Capsian within the range of the upper limits of the Natufian. But in contrast to the Natufian, and the Proto-Neolithic of the Zagros as well, the economy of the Capsians was based solely upon hunting and gathering, with no apparent evidence of reliance upon plant food domestication and animal tending. The most characteristic hallmark of the Capsian is the shell mounds, the '*escargotières*', which have led many prehistorians to the belief that the Capsians dieted mainly upon snails. Lubell et al. (1976) have provided evidence in a recent study that the land snails were not the major source of animal protein for the Capsians, confirming the arguments of other earlier investigators.

Art in the Maghreb

While decorations are to be found on stones and bones, it is the ostrich egg shells which constitute the bulk of the decorated materials of the Capsian in North Africa (Vaufrey, 1955: fig. 85). Camps-Fabrer's (1966) work is the best documented study of this aspect of prehistoric art. She feels that the ornamentation of shells is one of the outstanding features of the Epipaleolithic and Neolithic of North Africa (Camps-Fabrer, 1966:7). As she observes (ibid:5), the art objects from North Africa cannot be compared with the prehistoric mobiliary art of western Europe. Nothing like the well done artistic reproductions of the western European Upper Paleolithic, namely the Aurignacian, Solutrean, and Magdalenian are found in North Africa. (The same actually can be said for the eastern Mediterranean and the Zagros.) Furthermore, if we were to seek comparisons with the rather mediocre Epipaleolithic art of the Maghreb, it would have to be with the contemporary periods of western Europe, the Azilian, Sauveterrian, and Tardenoisian. Camps-Fabrer (ibid.) evidently was unaware of the parallels to be found in the Levantine and Zagros mountains' Epipaleolithic cultures with North Africa. Only a few of the many examples in the copiously illustrated

book of Camps-Fabrer (ibid.) are reproduced in this paper for comparative purposes (Figure 3).

In her analysis of the decorations on the three mediums, bone, stone and shell, Camps-Fabrer (ibid.:391), notes that: variation is practically nonexistent on the bone objects, more varied decorations are to be found on the stones, and that the most diversification of designs occurs on ostrich egg shells. It appears that the preceramic Capsian decorations

Figure 3. Fragments of decorated ostrich egg shells from Rosh Zin, a Natufian site in the Negev desert a, b, c. Redrawn from Don Henry, 1973. d to o: Selected examples of decorated ostrich egg shell fragments from the Maghreb, North Africa, illustrating resemblances with the decorated ostrich egg shell fragments from the Levant (a–c above) and with the nonshell decorated specimens from the Zagros mountains and the Levant (Figure 2, p. 67). Redrawn from Camps-Fabrer, 1966, figs 114, 115, 117, 127, 129.

continued to be used in the decoration of the ceramics in the following Capsian Neolithic periods. The plastic surface of the clay vessels lends itself to even more elaborations and intricacies of design. As Morel (1972) notes, the decorative themes appear in the Capsian Typique, multiply in the Upper Capsian, and persist in the Neolithic of Capsian tradition (see also Camps-Fabrer, 1966:338–339). It is interesting to note that the chevron design is used in great abundance as a motif element for the decoration of the Typical Capsian ostrich egg shells. Morel (1972) finds incised stones associated as palettes with ochre.

Camps-Fabrer (1966: fig. 78, 80, 81, 82, 83) illustrates bone artifacts decorated with parallel scratches across their breadths. An interestingly decorated bone has ladder (scalariforme) scratches within a lozenge shaped border and parallel curvilinear borders which looks like the Shanidar specimen (Camps-Fabrer, 1966: pl. X, fig. 1). She describes numerous artifacts of bone with single and multiple incisions, some of which may have been randomly produced, but most of them appear to have been purposefully done. Shaped bone plaques, which are to be found in the Levant and at Shanidar, have been noted in the Neolithic of North Africa (Camps-Fabrer, 1966: fig. 85). The same with bone beads and tubes.

The Unity of the Art Elements in the Three Areas

Even a cursory examination of the art elements from the three areas gives an impression of a basic similarity in design linking the Zagros, the Levant and North Africa. This unity is apparent even though the designs may not appear on the same kind of material, such as shell, stone, and bone. The North African egg shells, furthermore, appear to carry the full inventory of design elements. Comparing the art elements, it is observed that the lozenge motif is present in the Zagros as well as in the Maghreb; the hachure or chevron element is a very common one, found in all three areas, and banded, wavy elements are also found in all three areas.

Dorothy Koster Washburn, research associate of the Peabody Museum of Harvard University, who is presently working on the problem of classifying art designs in prehistory, remarked (personal communication, March 1976) that these design elements were not of the simplest pattern. She observed that the material from the three areas has many zig-zag elements arranged in a system of what she calls both a 'one-dimensional' and a 'two-dimensional' pattern. She was struck by what appears to be a 'sudden appearance of designs with similar structural symmetries over a broad area'. Washburn concluded that the most

important point about this Middle Eastern art is that at this early period the decorative art is already regularized, and drawn in a very similar way over this broad geographical area. It is hoped that when her work on prehistoric art classification is published, the art elements from these three areas can be analyzed in the new terms outlined by Washburn.

The cut pebbles from the Zagros and the Levant do not appear to have too many parallels in North Africa, although at least one example may be cited (Vaufrey, 1955: pl. XXI, fig. 5). Actually, these inscribed stones as an art style involves the simplest of symmetry forms, according to Washburn. They are simple parallel lines. However, it is possible that these specimens were inscribed with a special purpose in the minds of the makers.

Concerning the origins of the zig-zag or chevron designs, which as Washburn indicated represents an advanced stage of design art, we need not look beyond the immediate area (the Middle East). Gene Weltfish (1953:52–53, pl. XIX) has shown how the zig-zag herringbone design can be developed from twill-plaited weaving. She believes that this design originates from a particular manner of weaving, illustrating how herringbone decorations can be achieved through twilled weave in matting (Weltfish, ibid: pl. X, XI). This observation is very relevant to our problem for it eliminates the need to search for the origins of these designs outside the areas of the Middle East under discussion. Thus, the designs which were built into the matting or weaving processes would serve as models, and it would be natural for the prehistoric artisans to transcribe what they saw from one medium to another, such as bones, stones, and shells. Presumably there must have been also a wealth of decorated wooden objects and tools as well, which are now lost to us. The evidence possibly substantiating the origins of the chevron designs was found at Shanidar in the form of a charred fragment of a twilled weave matting, discovered in the Zawi Chemi cultural horizon in a Shanidar cave group burial. This exhibited a diagonal or herringbone pattern of weaving.

Investigating the literature has disclosed that in the Soviet Ukraine there are late Paleolithic sites where chevron designs on bones were found in quantity. The best of these sites, Kostenki, and Mezine (Golomshtok, 1938; Abramova, 1962; Klein, 1973), have some rather elaborate art designs and forms, especially Mezine. However, the designs include some art elements which are not found in the Middle East. Furthermore, there does not appear to be anything known between the area of these sites and the Middle East as links. Therefore this approach is by-passed in favor of the autochtonous Middle Eastern origins hypothesis for the art designs and motifs.

While the geometric design elements can be explained as possibly originating from the designs formed in twilled weaving or plaiting, several elements obviously cannot find support in this hypothesis. These are the lozenge elements, and the banded wavy line elements. There appears to be nothing preserved in the prehistory of the Middle East which will provide a good analog to use as a model for the lozenge design element. Thus until the solution presents itself, the origins of this element rests unanswered. The banded wavy lines may be likened to the form of a snake. Indeed, what looks like the head of a snake cut out of bone had been found at Zawi Chemi Shanidar. Other curvilinear design elements, like the lozenge, do not seem to have any specific analogs either in nature or man-made objects in prehistory that we know of. In retrospect, this forces us back to the fourth kind of inference, ideology, posited by Hawkes earlier in this paper. We are simply not able to read the minds of these prehistoric artisans.

Having described the character of the links in art forms among the three areas, we have to now consider the cultural significance of these links. There are two questions that should be discussed. The first is whether or not these links are true dispersal links, what is their center of dispersal or origin, and what was the agency of dispersion — was it cultural diffusion or migration of peoples.

Fortunately for our analysis, on the basis of cultural ties other than the art motifs, the Libyco-Capsian and by extension, the Capsian, have been connected with southwest Asia. Practically identical ostrich egg shell design elements are found in the Maghreb and in the Negev some 2500 kilometers apart. It is interesting to note that while the art forms and motifs received acceptance in both areas (assuming cultural transmission), for some reason, the Natufians turned earlier to food production for subsistence than did the peoples of the Maghreb. The solution to this may simply be that southwest Asia was the homeland of the potentially domesticable animals (goats, sheep, cattle, pig), whereas these were lacking in North Africa, and both plants and animals were brought into Africa at a much later date.

If we accept the available carbon 14 dates, we may note that of the three areas, North Africa, the Levant, and the Zagros, the Natufian in the Levant is the oldest (10,000 to 8000 B.C.), followed by the Zagros and North Africa (beginning ca. 8500 to 8000 B.C.). This would appear to give priority to the Levant as the possible center for the origin of the art motifs and elements discussed in this paper. Taking this as a working hypothesis, it may be inferred that these elements diffused eastward, possibly first into the Zagros, and then westward to North Africa. Since the appearance of the new subsistence economy in the mountains and

hills joining Palestine, northern Syria and Iraq–Iran took place about 9000 B.C., the diffusion may have come about by waves of peoples carrying these new ideas with them. It should be remembered that the introduction of domestic sheep at Zawi Chemi Shanidar appeared very suddenly (Perkins, 1964).

The diffusion of art elements was very likely tied in with the use of matting and basketry containers. For the storage of food grains in any quantity, large, light, dry, and tightly woven containers are best. As mentioned above, evidences for matting at least, has been found preserved in charred condition at Shanidar cave in the Zawi Chemi horizon. Hence, the chevron and hachure motifs would have been most popular as a design element in the Zagros and the Levant, since this element was present in the every day articles of the people, the mats upon which they sat, and the baskets in which storageable food was kept.

It is hypothesized that the spread of the same art elements westward across North Africa followed a similar stimulus, with some adaptations. It is certain that this was at a much later date; for instance, the cereals found at Fayum in Egypt were found in pits lined with matting of straw (Caton-Thompson and Gardner, 1934), indicating a knowledge of the act of container making of pliable materials.

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Predatory Birds and Prehistoric Man

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At the Protoneolithic site, dated at 10,870±300 years ago, of Zawi Chemi Shanidar in northern Iraq (Solecki, 1964:405–412), the senior author excavated a most interesting deposit containing goat remains and the bones of large birds. Studies of these faunal remains have shown that indeed some special event is recorded here, for only the skulls of the goats are found and virtually all the bird bones represent the wings of large predators.

The bones were found in a grand heap at the base of Layer B (the basal layer at Zawi Chemi Shanidar), in the 1.25–1.50 m level (Plate 1). The area of exposed bone concentration is ca. 90 x 100 cm, but evidence indicates that it continued beyond the limits of the excavation. The mass of bones is located just south of the only stone structure (Structure I) found at the site, but no stone allignments are associated with the bones themselves, either above or below them. There are, however, reddened earth patches mixed in with, above, and below the bones, but there is very little associated cultural material. All of this suggests something other than ordinary kitchen refuse.

Although the main focus of this paper is the bird bones and their cultural significance at the Protoneolithic site of Zawi Chemi Shanidar, a brief summary of the goat remains must also be given. The bones were studied by Dr Charles Reed, of the University of Illinois at Chicago Circle (Reed, 1959). He noted that only skulls are represented and that there are at least fifteen individuals. Species identification was difficult because of the poor state of preservation of the bones. However, they were all either sheep or goat, no other forms are represented, and in each case in which identification was possible, the diagnosis was goat not sheep. According to Dr Reed (1959) both the anatomical evidence and the age estimations of the individuals suggest a sample from a wild population. Wild goats are still native to the region today and were

present in relatively large numbers well into this century. It seems likely then that we are dealing with a group of wild goats.

The bird bones were studied by Dr Alexander Wetmore of the Smithsonian Institution who made the initial species and osteological identifications (Wetmore, n.d.). The junior author of this report provided additional osteological informaton and also made a study of the cultural data present on the bones themselves. Dr Wetmore identified four species of birds in the collection: *Gyptaeus barbatus* (the bearded vulture), *Gyps fulvus* (the griffon vulture), *Haliaetus albicilla* (the white-tailed sea eagle), and *Otis tarda* (the great bustard). There are also bones of a small eagle, of undeterminable species.

A brief description of these birds and their habits is of interest for this study. Perhaps it should first be pointed out that these are huge birds, and they must have impressed ancient man as they do modern man with a mixture of awe and admiration. Furthermore, all except the great bustard are raptorial birds, carrion feeders, and thus placed in a special relationship with dead creatures and death.

Gyptaeus barbatus (the bearded vulture and also called the Lammergeier) (Brown and Amadon, 1968:309–313, pl. 31; Meinertzhagen, 1930:419–421, pl. XIX; Meinertzhagen, 1954:360–363, pl. XI; Swann, 1930–1945: vol. II, 2–4, pl. I) is the largest of the Old World birds of prey. It is found in the high mountain ranges of Eurasia and Africa, including southern Europe, the Middle East, northern India, Afghanistan, Tibet, and northeast, northwest, eastern, and southern Africa. It is found invariably in mountainous areas, only straying into the plains. Usually lone pairs are found scattered here and there in their mountain fastnesses, ranging within a territorial area of up to eight to ten miles in diameter. The bearded vulture likes feeding alone and seldom associates with other vultures. Its usual food is an abandoned carcass and it appears to be specially fond of large bones. There are confirmed sightings of the bearded vulture carrying off and then dropping bones or tortoises (more than a single time on occasion) to get at the marrow or the meat. It is not certain, however, if this activity is all purposeful or accidental (at least in part) because of an inability to hold on to the quarry. Although mainly a carrion feeder, all manner of wild tales relating how this huge bird carries off and devours small animals or even children have a long history in the Old World.

The nests of the bearded vulture are holes or caves in cliff or rock faces, very often at altitudes of 4000 or 5000 feet or more. Normally two eggs are laid at a time in January, and they incubate five weeks through February.

The bearded vulture is a most impressive bird. It is of huge size, its

outstretched wings can measure well over nine feet. It is a great soarer and looks magnificent in flight: 'Few birds surpass the Lammergeier in powers of flight, and their great prowess as soarers is probably unrivalled' (Meinertzhagen, 1930:420). It has been observed floating over the summit of Mt Everest, the greatest recorded height for any bird. This huge bird is easily identified by its long wedge shaped tail and long wings, and the small, blackish, bristle beard on the chin. The front of the bird looks golden in the sunlight and adds to the majesty of the bird in flight. The tail and wings are uniformly gray-black in colour.

Meinertzhagen (1930:420) reports that although bearded vultures are shy birds in their own natural fastnesses, they become very tame around cantonments in the Himalayas and at Quetta (Pakistan). Here they could be seen around the barracks and slaughter houses. He notes also that when they sight food they do not swoop down to it but circle round and eventually land nearby and walk cautiously towards the food. These observations by Meinertzhagen suggest that although naturally a shy bird living in inaccessible places, it would not be too difficult to catch if properly positioned bait was laid out for it.

Gyps fulvus (the griffon vulture) (Brown and Amadon, 1968:325–328, pl. 34; Meinertzhagen, 1930:424–425, fig. 60; Meinertzhagen, 1954:382–383; Swann, 1930–1945: vol. I, 25–28, pl. 2) is found in countries bordering the Mediterranean basin, east to Turkestan and the Himalayas. This species is partly migratory in the winter, traveling as far south as Senegal, Eritrea, and the plains of north India. However, since the breeding cycle begins early (between January and March) the adults normally remain behind in the breeding range all year and many of the migrants are nonbreeding birds. The griffon vulture nests in cliffs, usually in colonies. The nests are inaccessible to man except the most hardy climbers equipped with ropes.

The griffon vultures are also great soarers. They are characterized by their large size, short tail, right angled wings, outstretched primaries, and contracted head. Also at the base of the neck is a distinctive ruff of creamy white feathers. It has been observed that 'After a heavy meal birds cannot rise, when they can often be captured' (Meinertzhagen 1930:425).

Haliaetus albicilla (the white-tailed sea eagle) (Brown and Amadon, 1968:291–296, pl. 26; Meinertzhagen, 1930:413–414; Swann, 1930–1945: vol. II, 173–176, pl. 14) has a widespread distribution from Iceland to Europe to Asia Minor, then to northern Mesopotamia and to eastern Asia. In the winter it is found south to North Africa, Indo-China, Formosa and Japan. In Asia Minor as well as in Mesopotamia it is a breeding species. In the more temperate ranges migration in the winter is

irregular and some pairs stay all year in the breeding ranges. It can be found along rugged sea coasts, in the valleys of large rivers, and around lakes. It is a fairly omniverous feeder, eating fish, birds, small game, carrion etc.

It nests in a variety of places: lofty cliffs, reed beds in marshes, or in trees. In the latter two instances, because its nests are large and conspicuous, they can be easily invaded by man. Usually there are two eggs, normally laid in February or early March.

As an adult this is a huge bird, a gray brown eagle, with a pure white, wedge-shaped tail.

Otis tarda (the great bustard) (Meinertzhagen, 1954:545) is found in the grain fields and open steppes of Europe to Asia Minor and west central Asia and Manchuria. In Iraq it is fairly common in winter, south to about Tikrit. In Syria it is a regular winter visitor to about the latitude of Damascus. The great bustard is a large bird with distinctive brick red and black barred back. It is the largest European land bird with the males (which are much larger than the females) reaching as much as 32 pounds in weight, with a four-foot length, and an eight-foot wing spread.

The great bustard is a very wary bird, difficult to approach, and running swiftly when it feels endangered. The species has distinctive and characteristic spring courtship ceremonies during which the cock's head is bent back almost touching the uplifted tail, the white quill feathers of the forearm are exposed and the throat pouch is inflated.

The great bustard is mainly a vegetable eater, although it readily takes small mammals, small reptiles, grasshoppers, etc.

A further study of the Zawi Chemi bird bone collection by the junior author has provided additional information on species distribution. It should be noted that due to the poor state of preservation of the bones when excavated and because of the daily rains that occurred during excavation, perhaps even more birds were present than the figures below indicate:

	Total identifiable bones	*Minimum number of individuals*
Bearded vulture	13	4
Griffon vulture	5	1
White-tailed sea eagle	73	7
Small eagle	15	4
Great bustard	1	1
Totals	107	17

Therefore, a minimum of 17 birds were present: four bearded vultures, one griffon vulture, seven white-tailed sea eagles, four small eagles, and

one great bustard. When we look at the numbers of individual bones in the collection we note the following interesting distribution. Out of the 107 surely identified bird bones 96 (90%) are wing bones, two are leg bones, and nine are cervical vertebrae. We are, therefore, dealing with a collection that is almost entirely composed of the wing bones of large predatory birds. It is apparent from a study of the positioning of the bones as they were found in the ground at Zawi Chemi Shanidar (Plate 1), that at least some of them were in articulation when deposited. Further proof of articulation is provided by the fact that two radius–ulna and one humerus–radius units (all small eagle) are still intact, held in place by the preservative applied during excavation.

Examination of the bird bone collection by the junior author under 10x magnification revealed a pattern of slice marks. These were apparently made by a sharp edged instrument, using light-moderate pressure, and are similar to marks produced on fresh, fleshed bone by an unretouched flint blade under experimental conditions. The slice marks clustered about the shaft and proximal end of some of the humeri, which suggests that the wings were carefully cut off, rather than being simply broken from the body, and that some attempt may have been made to skin the wings of both skin and feathers.

A study of the bird bones provided no evidence that they had been part of a meal (ordinary or ceremonial). There were no alterations from burning or cooking and no teeth marks. Although edible meat must have been present on these huge wings, they appear not to have been used for food.

In summary, the bird remains found in this special Zawi Chemi deposit are mainly from the wings of large predatory birds. Indications are that the wings were carefully cut from the bodies of the birds and were deposited still in articulation together in a heap. No evidence is present to suggest that the wings were part of a meal. We must also note that mixed in with the bird bones were a number of goat skulls.

The cultural significance of this specialized collection for the Proto-neolithic people who lived at Zawi Chemi Shanidar is, as already noted, the main focus of this paper, but we are also interested in the broader problem of the role of predatory birds in the life of prehistoric man. To this end we shall describe other finding of predatory birds associated with prehistoric man, and some later, historic occurrences will also be noted. Useful insights can also be gained by reference to ethnographic evidence. But first a number of problems remain to be discussed about the Zawi Chemi collection itself.

First, we should try to determine how the villagers were able to capture and keep (for they seem to have deposited at the same time) such a large

number of animals. Dr Reed noted in his report that '15 wild goats were probably not too difficult to hunt, capture and/or kill in a short time, but it would have required a concerted and determined effort by a number of hunters' (Reed, 1959). He further notes that 'one can conjecture that some of the 15 could have been kept around for awhile . . . but there is no necessity to conjecture thus' (Reed, 1959). So far as capturing the birds we are faced with a different sort of problem. These are very large birds, and some must have been difficult to catch. We have already suggested ways in which the vultures might have been caught, but should note that the bearded vulture is often found in solitary pairs, making capturing any number of them more difficult. Evidence suggests that the eagles may have been even more difficult to capture, and at least eleven such birds are represented here. Probably it would have been easier to catch young eagles if the nests could be reached, but all of our specimens are adult birds (it is possible, of course, that they could have been captured as eaglets and then kept until needed). The great bustard is a shy bird, and hard to approach. In any event the people of Zawi Chemi Shanidar did capture these birds somehow, and from evidence seem to have disposed of them all at about the same time. We are surely left with the impression that this deposit represented the concerted efforts of a good number of people, certainly for some special purpose.

The next problem we must face is why only goat skulls and primarily bird wings are represented. We shall concentrate first on the bird remains, but shall later suggest possible relationships between these two faunal groups in the Zawi Chemi culture. This problem is really a two-faced one; first why only certain birds were chosen and second why only certain parts of those selected birds are represented. To answer the first part we have to try to understand the role of these huge, predatory birds in Zawi Chemi culture, and to answer the second part we shall have to try to understand what the Zawi Chemi people were doing with the wings from these creatures. Dr Wetmore noted that it was the outer part of the wings that are mainly present, that is where the larger feathers are attached (Wetmore, n.d.). Perhaps they utilized the feathers for personal decoration or for ritual. It is also possible that the skin along with the wings could have been removed for some sort of costume, with which perhaps the goat skulls were associated.

A brief survey of data from other prehistoric sites relating to bird remains should shed light on our problems at Zawi Chemi Shanidar, as also should pertinent ethnographic information. Then we can return to the interpretation of the Zawi Chemi collection, and try to fit it into the larger picture of the relationship of man and predatory birds.

There are only occasional representations of birds in Upper Paleolithic art, even though it is known from studies of the contemporary debris that birds (e.g. arctic fowl) were eaten. Undoubtedly, the most famous bird representation in Paleolithic art is the one in the shaft in Lascaux Cave, where in a rare pictorial scene we see depicted a human, a bison, and a rhinoceros figure along with a bird-headed stick (Ucko and Rosenfeld, 1967:41–44, fig. 23). Breuil (1952:134–137) suggests that it may commorate a fatal accident that occurred during a hunting expedition. He interprets the scene as showing a dead man lying between a wounded bison on his right and a rhinoceros walking away on his left. Notice is also taken of the fact that the head of the human figure appears to be that of a bird with a short straight beak. Breuil (1952:137) suggests that the bird-headed stick in the picture might be a funerary post. Various other interpretations of this bird stick have been suggested: as a hunting decoy, a dart-thrower, and as a totemic emblem (Ucko and Rosenfeld, 1967:44). The man is often interpretated as wearing a bird mask. The species of the bird represented in this scene cannot be identified, but it is interesting to note the association with death.

The skeletal remains of vultures have been recorded from a few Paleolithic sites. Hooijer (1961:9–11) notes that a large bird of prey is fairly common throughout the Ksar'Akil sequence (Middle Paleolithic to Epipaleolithic). He lists 35 vulture bones for the site as follows: 14 wing bones, 13 leg bones, seven claws, and one skull fragment (identified as *Gyps fulvus*). We again seem to have a pattern of selectivity, with the main body bones absent even though some of these are quire large and sturdy.

At Oumm-Qatafa cave (Tchernov, 1962:95–131), near Bethlehem, in Lower Paleolithic deposits 55 different species of birds were recovered, including rare remains of the predators (a claw of *Aquila* sp. and dentary of *Falco* sp.). From the site of Kebara cave (Tchernov, 1962:95–131), on the Carmel, in Middle Paleolithic deposits, Tchernov again records a large number of bird species (over 50), including some birds of prey (a sternum fragment and humerus from *Aquila* sp.; a metacarpus from *Aegyptus monarchas*; a coracoid from a species of *Falco*; and a humerus fragment from *Gyps fulvus*). There is also a femur from a species of *Otis*. Tchernov summarizes the avian collections from these two caves as follows; 'Most of the material includes appendicular skeletal parts, girdles and limb bones, and in a few cases (mainly in the Oumm-Qatafa cave) also jaws' (Tchernov, 1962:99). So although many of the birds represented in these collections are much smaller than those at Zawi Chemi Shanidar, body skeletal parts are represented (especially true of coracoids and sternum fragments).

At the site of Hayonim cave (Bar-Yosef and Tchernov, 1966:104–140) in western Galilee in Israel, a large number of bird remains have been recovered from the Natufian layers (more or less coeval with Zawi Chemi). A number of bird species are present including the following predators: *Gyps fulvus*, *Aquila* sp., *Milvus migrans*, *Falco peregrinus*, and *Buteo buteo*. All the predators are represented only by limb bones except for one fragment of a furcula from a specimen that resembles *Gyps fulvus* but is much smaller. Interestingly enough, the remains from other bird species, much smaller than the predators listed above, include in addition to the wing and leg bones such bones as: coracoids, sternum fragments, jaws, and synsacrum fragments.

Good evidence showing the cultural significance of predatory birds comes from the site of Çatal Hüyük, a Neolithic town (dated at ca. 6500–5700 B.C.) located on the Anatolian plain (Mellaart, 1967). Mellaart here has excavated a series of shrines with both painted and relief decorations, three of which have representations of the griffon vulture (*Gyps fulvus*) associated with headless corpses. The actual skeletal remains of *Gyps fulvus* have been found in yet another shrine. Shrines containing vulture representations are limited to Levels VIII and VII at Çatal Hüyük (Mellaart, 1967: table 13), and the shrine with the vulture skulls incorporated in the relief decoration is from Level VI.

The earliest vulture painting is found on the east wall of Shrine VIII.8 (Mellaart, 1967:166–167, pl. 46), the predecessor of the impressive vulture shrine, Shrine VII.8, described below. This earliest vulture shrine, unfortunately badly damaged, shows two large black vulture figures swooping down on a small headless human corpse and another relatively small human figure. The latter figure seems to be vigorously fighting off the swooping birds, swinging what looks like a sling in his right hand and holding some object, perhaps a club or a mace in his left hand. Probably this scene was repeated again on the wall of the shrine, but preservation is too poor to determine this.

Shrine VII.8 (Mellaart, 1967:111–113, 167–168, pls. 45, 48, 49, figs. 25, 26, 47) characteristically had been replastered and redecorated many times. Its earliest decoration consisted of a spectacular vulture panel, 1.8 meters high, extending over much of the north wall. Mellaart reports that not less than seven vultures are represented pecking at six headless human corpses. The human figures are small in relation to the huge bird figures. These birds are huge swooping figures with outstretched wings and from the ruff depicted appear to be griffon vultures. The vultures are shown in almost X-ray renditions, for some of the internal skeletal structure seems to be represented, as well as the external features of the birds. The humans are shown outstretched or crouched or in a flexed

position on their left side as is characteristic of Çatal Hüyük burials. Mellaart (1967:168) suggests that this scene represents the burial rite of excarnation, for which there is other evidence at Çatal Hüyük. Human skeletons were found buried below the floor of this shrine, but these were complete with their skulls.

Shrine VII.21 is an elaborate shrine combining relief and painted decorations (Mellaart, 1967:84, 106–108, 167, pl. 47, figs. 14, 15). There are large relief bulls' heads with actual horns, a bold modeled clay horn, relief rams' heads with actual horns, and modeled human breasts. There are also painted niches and painted geometric panels which Mellaart (1967:108) believes represents kilim tapestries. On the north wall, painted above the lower panels, is a broad panel of huge winged vultures and headless human figures. One complete group of two vultures, face to face over the headless body of a human figure, can still be clearly seen today. Traces of a third vulture figure were found towards the western end of the wall, suggesting that the scene was probably repeated. The scene was painted fine reddish brown on a dead white background. Again the birds with their enormous outstretched wings dwarf the small headless human figure between them. This figure is in a somewhat different position from those depicted in Shrine VII.8; it is shown as if it were lying on its back with uplifted arms and widespread legs. A most interesting feature of the painting in Shrine VII.21 is that the vulture legs rather than being naturalistically portrayed as they are in Shrine VII.8 are clearly human legs. This suggests that here we have humans dressed in vulture skins, imitating the birds in some sort of funeral ritual, rather than the birds themselves represented. It is interesting to note that four human skulls were on the floor of this shrine: one in a basket below the bull's head on the west wall; one below the bull's head in the center of the east wall; and two on the corner platform below the vulture painting. Mellaart (1967:84) suggests that the skulls were used in a funerary ritual; and some sort of ancestor worship also seems indicated at Çatal Hüyük. The keeping of human skulls and even the modeling of life-like features on them is known from a number of more-or-less contemporary Pre-Pottery Neolithic B sites in the Syro-Palestine area.

Shrine VI.B.10 (Mellaart, 1967:124–126, pl. 28, fig. 38, 39) from building level B of Level VI, another elaborately decorated shrine, has the actual remains of the griffon vulture incorporated into it. The main decoration located on the west wall consists of a large figure of a goddess shown in the position of giving birth to a ram, below which is a vertical row of superimposed bulls' heads with aurochs' horns. On both sides of the figure are niches associated with a ram's head, a small bull's head and the lower jaw of a boar. A large ram's head with two pairs of actual

horns was on the north wall, and a large bull's head was on the east wall above a deep, red niche. Between the bull's head and one of the supporting posts was a pair of breasts, painted red and open at the nipple end. From the end of each breast protruded the beak of a griffon vulture, and upon excavation a complete griffon vulture skull was discovered in each breast.

At Çatal Hüyük, therefore, we are extremely fortunate in having preserved this series of magnificent shrines, with their richly symbolic murals and reliefs. Significant for us in this study are the vulture representations found in these obviously religious buildings, associated with human corpses on the one hand, and fertility goddesses and sacred bulls, rams, and other animals on the other hand. We even have strong indications of human figures (priests?) imitating the vultures in some sort of burial ritual.

In historic periods we find many references to sacred birds, birds with human features, human figures with bird appendages, etc. and today we still use birds in various crests, coats of arms, etc. This seems to be particularly true of the eagle, one of the great bird predators.

When we turn to the ancient Near East, we find along with other birds such predators as the eagle, the vulture, or the falcon regularly shown on Meopotamian monuments. These birds of prey are easy to recognize in the monuments; they are shown grabbing at or clawing on a variety of victims. In addition to the naturalistic representations of these birds, many monsters and fantastic creatures were created.

Perhaps the most vivid representation of bird predators is on the so-called Sumerian 'Stele of the Vultures', a stele commemorating the Victory of Eannatum, 'divine bailiff' of Lagash, found at Tello, and dating from ca. 2560 B.C. (Strommenger, 1964: pls. 66–69). On the front side of the broken stele, vultures are shown carrying off the heads and arms of fallen enemy soldiers. There is also a figure of the god Ningirsu holding a vulture in his left hand from which is suspended a huge net filled with naked prisoners. The back of the stele shows a battlefield scene. The stele is a vivid demonstration of the vulture in its role as a mighty, awesome creature, as well as in its role as a scavenger. Also to be noted here is the Sumerian mythical being, Im-dugud, portrayed as what has been interpreted as a lion-headed eagle (Strommenger, 1964: pl. 79). He stood for the force in a storm cloud, and became the emblem associated with the god Ningursu, patron god of Lagash. It should be noted that this is the same god portrayed on the 'Stele of the Vultures'.

A variety of winged demons and gods are also characteristic of the later Assyrian culture. Huge winged bulls or winged lions stood at the gates of Assyrian palaces, impressive and yet serene creatures. There are

carved scenes from Assyrian palaces showing winged, human-figured gods or eagle headed, winged, human-figured spirits (Strommenger, 1964: pls. 191–193, 226). The symbol of the Assyrian god Ashur, which seems also to have been a symbol of royalty, was a winged disk, closely resembling the Egyptian winged solar disk (Strommenger, 1964: pl. 191). Naturalistic representations of birds of prey are also recorded in Assyrian sculptures. An Assyrian bas-relief shows a vulture holding in its claws the entrails of vanquished enemies (Brodrick, 1972:59).

A brief reference to Dynastic Egypt will finish our survey of the ancient Near East. Many birds were represented in Egyptian art. Especially numerous were all kinds of waterfowl, ducks and geese of many kinds, pelicans, shoebills, cranes, ibises, etc., but other birds including predators were also shown. Birds were hunted for food and for recreation in ancient Egypt, and some of them were held to be sacred. The falcon was a most sacred bird in many cities. Horus was said to be a falcon and from earliest times was depicted as a bird. The Ibis was the emblem of the god of knowledge. The vulture was the emblem of the old capital of the south Nekheb, and it represented the goddess Nekhbet, known as the vulture goddess (Petrie, 1924:14). Nekhbet, the vulture of Upper Egypt, was the tutelary goddess of the shrine of Upper Egypt and two feathers, symbolizing Nekhbet are the main insignia at the coronation of the pharoah in Dynastic Egypt (Frankfort, 1948:107, 174). Nekhbet, as the White Crown of Upper Egypt counts as Pharoah's mother and is shown in the mortuary temples of the Old Kingdom nursing him after his rebirth (Frankfort, 1948:174).

In later classical cultures, Greek and Roman, there are many references to large avian predators, particularly the eagle. It is beyond the purpose or the scope of this paper to investigate these references further, merely to note the continued symbolic use of the large predatory birds, even into our modern world.

We should like now to refer to some interesting data, both archaeological and ethnographic, on the role of the predatory birds, particularly the eagle, in the aboriginal cultures of the New World. Gods and demons with avian features or appendages are found in the ancient high civilizations of the New World. The eagle (emblem of the sun god) played a special historical role in Aztec civilization of central Mexico (and is today still evident in the national seal of Mexico which shows an eagle holding a snake in its beak). The eagle was felt to be a sacred bird also for a good number of aboriginal North American Indian tribes. Special customs were associated with the capture, keeping, and killing of eagles, and the feathers and skins could hold especial worth and significance. There were eagle dances and eagle ceremonies.

Ethnographic and ethnohistoric records make most clear the extensive use of feathers as ceremonial paraphernalia; to cause and even to cure illness; and in dress and for ornamentation. Feather fans were made out of bird wings or tails; in the former case the fan would include the radius, ulna, and the carpometacarpals to which the primary flight feathers were attached (Ubelaker and Wedel, 1975:441). The humeri and other long bones of eagles, swans, pelicans and cranes were used for the manufacture of whistles, and the talons of hawks, owls, and eagles were used for personal adornment and sometimes as ceremonial meat hooks when provided with wooden handles (Ubelaker and Wedel, 1975:451).

Good ethnographic data, as well as some archaeological evidence, are available for the Plains Indians of the United States. The veneration of eagle feathers and the use of such feathers as special emblems is characteristic of these tribes, and among them the taking and keeping of eagles is associated with rituals and beliefs. Sometimes the eagles are captured from the nest and reared in the villages. In a number of tribes the adult birds are captured in specially constructed 'eagle pits'. Ceremonies accompany the capture of the birds for they are considered sacred. Sometimes the birds are released after they have been plucked and sometimes they are killed and ritually buried.

Among the Hidatsa, for whom we have good ethnographic data, the traditional eagle hunt is carried out as follows (Wilson, 1928): it is considered a sacred undertaking normally under the leadership of a special person who performs the necessary rituals. The eagle hunters travel to an area known to be frequented by eagles, and here each man builds his own 'eagle pit'. The pit is dug large enough for a man to lie down in it, and then a covering is built over it out of poles and branches tied with grass, to hide the hunter from the eagles. The hunter lying in the pit could look upwards through the loosely built cover and watch for eagles. A bait (meat or a decoy) is securely tied to a peg in the pit, and when an eagle alights on the bait, the hunter (hidden from the eagle) tries to catch it by grabbing it by the legs and quickly tieing its legs and wings. The whole operation obviously requires agility and skill, and some danger is present for eagles are large birds with sharp talons. Men are sometimes wounded during the eagle hunt and special medicines are on hand for these wounds. A blanket is usually thrown over the captured birds to subdue them.

In the traditional eagle hunt described for the Hidatsa (Wilson, 1928), the eagles are killed by strangulation. At the very end of the eagle hunting ceremony, the leader cuts off the birds' wings; he cuts them very carefully at the joints so that the bones are not cut or scratched. The men gather up the wings and return with them to the special hunting lodge,

and pile them up in the eagle shelter. The bird wings and the tail feathers are then ritually cleansed and divided among the men of the hunt. The Hidatsa were particularly interested in the twelve tail feathers, which had great value for them. The tail feathers of a young golden eagle had the same value as a horse. Eagle feathers were worn as badges of honor among the Hidatsa, and were associated with war victories. They were used for the great feather headdresses characteristic of the Plains Indians or attached to sacred pipes. The white feathers from under the tail, had little trade value, but were valuable as offerings to the gods or in dreams, etc. The wings were used to make fans, or to feather arrows. The Hidatsa also used eagle claws, feathers, heads, etc. in medicine bundles (Wilson, 1928:25–226).

Among the Pawnee, as reported by Gene Weltfish (1965) eagle feathers or eagle wing fans were used in a variety of ceremonies. During the harvest ceremony four warriors dressed in full regalia had as part of their costumes a hawk's skin on the right shoulder symbolizing strength and fierceness; an eagle feather placed transversely in the scalp lock symbolizing Heaven during the creation; and a ball of white down feathers on the head symbolizing the clouds on which Heaven rode (Weltfish, 1965:260). Eagle wing fans were part of the Pawnee ceremonial paraphernalia (Weltfish, 1965:283, 287), and such fans were used in sorcery to project objects into a victims body and cause illness (Weltfish, 1965:343). The Pawnee also made the traditional Plains war bonnet, symbolizing a comet, but only a few men had the right to wear these. Eagle feathers could also be placed on the shields of a privileged one or two individuals.

Remains of predatory birds have also been found during the excavations of native North American Indian sites. At the site of Cahokia, (Illinois) a Middle Mississippi site thought to have been occupied from A.D. 1200 to 1550, much faunal material was recovered (Parmalee, 1958:235–242). Included were 58 species of birds, many of them waterfowl, but also including hawks, owls, kites, and eagles. Parmalee describes the predator material as follows:

> A bill, carpometacarpus and tarsometatarsus of the golden eagle were found, as were a tarsometatarsus, 2 phalanges, and 26 carpometacarpals of the bald eagle. The large number of carpometacarpals, the wing bone supporting the primary flight feathers, points to the possibility that the Indian used the wing tips of the eagle for decoration or ceremony. In this connection, of the 42 identified hawk and owl remains 38 (90%) were wing bones. Probably numerous species of birds such as hawks, owls, eagles and cranes were taken for their plumage rather than for food. (Parmalee, 1958:240)

Ubelaker and Wedel in the abstract of their paper 'Bird bones, burials, and bundles in Plain Archaeology', note that:

> Bird bones from several archaeological sites on the Missouri are shown to have been purposefully and selectively modified by man. They exhibit a remarkable similarity to prepared bird skins and other ceremonial objects found in Omaha, Osage, Arikara, and other Plains Indian medicine bundles in various museum collections. (Ubelaker and Wedel, 1975:444).

They note that although bird bones are found in small numbers at Plains sites, they are not present in large enough numbers to suggest a subsistence role (this is in contrast to the prehistoric Middle Mississippi sites mentioned above).

Recent excavations of historic Arikara cemeteries in South Dakota has provided some interesting new data on the use of birds in the Plains area. At the Leavenworth site (390C09) at least 19 of the 343 human burials contained bird or animal skeletons (e.g. ducks, crows, hawks, and eagles), and the report suggests that these birds were predominantly represented by skulls or bones of the wings (Ubelaker and Wedel, 1975:446). The nearby Mowbridge site (39WW1) has produced like quantities of bird remains (crows, ravens, ducks, owls, hawks, and eagles) associated with human skeletons (Ubelaker and Wedel, 1975:446). Here the birds are represented by skulls and/or wings and legs. The authors noted, furthermore, that most of the posterior portion of the occiput of several of the bird skulls had been cut away (Ubelaker and Wedel, 1975:446). They conclude then:

> The occurrence of bones of the legs and wings only in addition to the cut skulls then suggested that the bird bone assemblage represented not a deposit of foodstuffs or disarticulated bones but rather the inclusion of a bird skin in the form of a medicine bundle item, or perhaps a personal fetish. Such an assemblage of modified skull and bones of the wings and feet would occur, of course, if in the preparation process, the Indians removed the bird's body by severing it at the back of the skull, at the shoulder (or elbows), and at the knees, leaving the bones of the lower leg (tibiotarsus and tarsometatarsus) and outer wing (ulna, radius, and carpometacarpal), and the remaining portion of the skull in place to provide support and give form to the skin. (Ubelaker and Wedel, 1975:446).

And indeed, when the authors studied medicine bundles collected from Plains Indian tribes and now in the National Museum collections, they found stuffed bird skins containing substantially the same bones as those recovered from the Arikara burials (namely cut skulls and the bones of the wings and the legs). Most commonly these were hawks, apparently of the falcon type (Ubelaker and Wedel, 1975:446).

In resumé, we see a long history of man's interest in birds, for purposes other than as a food source. Far back in the Upper Paleolithic period in fact we have indications of a special relationship between death and birds. For more recent periods we have sure evidence of man's interest in the great bird predators as sources of special power, both physical and spiritual. Ancient man could hardly fail to notice these huge birds, magnificent flyers, as a power symbol, and at the same time viewing their raptorial habits, bestowing on them supernatural powers related to death or the dead.

The situation we have described for Zawi Chemi fits well into the above thesis. The Zawi Chemi people must have endowed these great raptorial birds with special powers, and the faunal remains we have described for the site must represent special ritual paraphernalia. Certainly, the remains represent a concerted effort by a goodly number of people, just to hunt down and capture such a large number of birds and goats; perhaps the entire village was involved in the undertaking. The Zawi Chemi faunal remains, as already described, were found in a grand heap just outside the only structure so far excavated at the site, and consist of the skulls of at least 15 wild goats, and the remains, primarily the wings, of at least 17 large birds (all but one a predatory species). One would not in the ordinary course of events expect the association of wild goat skulls jumbled together with the wings of large predatory birds. Obviously this is not the remains of a feast of any kind. We have found no evidence of cooking and/or burning on the bones, and, of course, the remains of a meal would include a greater variety of skeletal parts. Again from evidence at Zawi Chemi, and from other archaeological and ethnographic evidence, we conclude that complete birds or goats were not deposited at this location in the village, only selected parts. We have noted that at other sites a variety of skeletal parts, even from much smaller birds have been recovered, so their lack at Zawi Chemi cannot be attributed to preservation problems. We also know, from both archaeological and ethnographic evidence, that people bring back to their villages only those selected portions of their prey that they value, for one reason or another, not the entire animal. The wings in the Zawi Chemi deposit seem to have been still in articulation when they were discarded, and, therefore, we conclude that either the wings were saved to pluck out the feathers, or that wing fans were made, or that they were used as part of a costume for a ritual. One of the murals from a Çatal Hüyük shrine, Shrine VII.21, (Mellaart, 1967: pl. 47, figs 14, 15) depicts just such a ritual scene; i.e. a human figure dressed in a vulture skin partaking in what seems to be a burial rite. Interestingly enough, at Çatal Hüyük bulls' heads and rams' heads are found in the same shrines with the

vulture murals. This suggests that the goat skulls found with the wing bones at Zawi Chemi may be part of the same symbolism; paraphernalia for the same ritual.

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Fusion and Separation: Archaeology and Ethnohistory in Southeastern North America

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Since the early 1950s, when settlement patterns became a matter of importance, North American archaeologists have given more attention to prehistorical sociopolitical patterns. Indeed, some archaeologists attempt to reconstruct kinship systems and even whole social systems of prehistorical populations. This development accords a new importance to ethnographical and ethnohistorical data as more archaeologists try to use this data to go beyond merely identifying archaeological sites with historical peoples and supplementing descriptions of archaeological cultures. A good example of this new development is the work of William H. Sears (1954, 1961, 1962), who claims that highly-stratified societies and large-scale political states with ceremonial centers as capitols existed in some parts of southeastern North America. One main trouble with this development is that archaeological, ethnographical, and ethnohistorical researches are full-time endeavors. Hence, archaeologists often proceed in the old way of hastily selecting examples from ethnographical monographs and ethnohistorical studies. On the other hand, the same pitfall awaits ethnographers and ethnohistorians vis-à-vis archaeological data. Despite the risk of embarrassing error, ethnographers and ethnohistorians need to deal more with archaeological problems. If they did, then a larger body of pertinent examples and fruitful hypotheses might emerge to help archaeologists reconstruct sociopolitical patterns. Greater ethnohistorical attention to archaeological problems is a special need in areas like southeastern North America where the impact of acculturation has been so lengthy and massive that ethnographical field trips provide only minimal information about prehistorical peoples.

In this paper that is provisional, I deal with the development and function of settlement patterns and sociopolitical organizations in southeastern North America during the late seventeenth and eighteenth

centuries, giving attention to phenomena that have been neglected or whose significance has not been grasped. At the same time, I draw analogies to late prehistorical patterns. In doing so, I make new suggestions about sociocultural processes and present a new sequence of development of sociopolitical patterns. No apologies are made for the use of analogies, since analogy is crucial to archaeological thinking and the historical peoples were the descendants of the prehistorical populations.

Different kinds of settlement patterns existed in the Southeast in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and in the late prehistorical period known as Mississippian. One ethnohistorical pattern was the twin town. In this pattern, two peoples lived simultaneously in the same settlement but maintained separate sociopolitical organizations and maintained separate public buildings. These buildings were constructed frequently upon artificial mounds of earth. In 1700, Father Du Ru, a French Jesuit in the Lower Mississippi Valley, reported:

> there is a huge plaza in the midst of it [the settlement] and at the end of this two temples of about equal size. The one belongs to the Mougoulachas, the other to the Bayogoulas, for the village is composed of these two tribes. (Butler, 1934:19)

Sieur d'Iberville, a French official, and Father de Montigny, another Jesuit, described Bayogoula and Mugulasha in the same way (Swanton, 1911:274–277; Calder, 1935:208, 220). The pattern existed among other peoples of the lower Mississippi valley. Before 1730, it was reported for Acolapissa and Tangipahoa, Annocchy and Moctobi, Chakchiuma and Taposa, Koroa and Yazoo, Pascagoula and Capina, Pensacola and Biloxi, and Tunica and Huma (Margry, 1881, IV:154; Swanton, 1911:281, 294, 311; 1946:147; Rowland and Sanders, 1932,III:535). The history of the Taensa people reveals successive arrangements of this kind. They lived with Mosopella in 1682, Quachita in 1700, Bayogoula in 1706, Washa in 1722, and Mobile in 1726 (Swanton, 1911:262–263, 270; Mereness, 1916 : 35; Rowland and Sanders, 1932, III : 528; Calhoun, 1934:660). Indeed, twin towns occurred so frequently in the region that Indians had a special term for the pattern: they called it 'to village with' (Delanglez, 1937:146).

Twin towns were not confined to these small Indian groups. On the contrary, they existed in each of the larger confederacies of the interior. Before 1750 in the Creek confederacy, this arrangement existed between Abika and Natchez, Alabama and Okchai, Autauga and Tawasa, Chiaha and Osochi, and Kaskinampo and Koasati (Swanton, 1946:81, 87–88, 116, 144). At the end of the century, Atasi and Kealedji, Eufaulla and

Tukabahchee, Okchaiutci and Tuskegee, and Toosahatche and Colooswe were twin towns (Hawkins, 1848:31–32, 37; 1916:41, 46). In 1793, James Seagrove, United States Indian Agent, provided two explicit descriptions for the Creeks:

> the Cowetas, and the Broken Arrows, which is one town, as they live nearly in one spot; the Chehaws [Chiaha] and Oswitches [Osochi], which are as one town, they likewise living on one spot. (ASPIA, 1832,I:401–402)

Twin towns were numerous in the Cherokee Confederacy. In 1749, South Carolinians learned that Hiwassee and Euphersee were 'two Towns now in one' (CO,5/459:649). This arrangement also existed between Coweechee and Elojoy in 1751, Keowee and Toxawa in 1752, Sugar and Toxawa in 1757, Natali and Canoste as well as Tomatly and Connehitoyn in 1761 (McDowell, 1958:82, 256; 1970:413; FJ,II:119, 121). Perhaps the most striking Cherokee case was that of Great Tellico and Chatuga. In 1725, Colonel George Chicken, South Carolina Indian Agent, observed that 'Here are two town Housses [sic] in this Town by reason they are the people of Two towns settled together' (Mereness, 1916:112). Twin towns were not so common in the Chickasaw and Choctaw confederacies. It seems that only the Napissa in 1699 and then part of the Natchez after their defeat by the French in 1730 lived in this way with the Chickasaws (Margry, 1881,IV:180; Swanton, 1911:279; 1946:116–117; Rowland and Sanders, 1932,III:700). Only two examples have been found among the Choctaws: (1) Cheniacha and Yellow Canes and (2) Chiachae and Conchas (Mereness, 1916:274; Rowland and Sanders, 1927,I:95). Finally, twin towns existed among the Siouans on the western borders of the Southeast. In 1721, Father Charlevoix reported that the Torimas and Topingas, two of the four Arkansas groups, 'inhabit one village' (French, 1851:III:230).

This review shows that twin towns occurred throughout the Southeast for more than one hundred years. They occurred in several ecological zones, among populations of different sizes, as autonomous units and as parts of larger sociopolitical bodies, and as speakers of different dialects and languages. Twin towns were therefore an important and complex phenomenon. The study of twin towns must proceed cautiously in regard to ecological, demographical, technological, and diffusionist causality; on the other hand, the study can provide significant insights on Southeastern sociocultural developments. For instance, linguistic diffusion was encouraged by twin towns since they were sometimes composed of groups speaking different dialects and even dissimilar languages. George Stiggins, an educated Creek mestizo, described the

Alabamas living in Autauga and Tawasa as speaking an 'imperfect and mixt language'. Bilingualism and even polylingualism became mechanisms for this diffusion. Stiggins explained that the Alabamas in 'assemblies use the Creek tongue, but in their local concerns they use their own Language' (Nunez, 1958:20–21). Polylingualism was especially desirable for peoples, like the Taensa, who lived in a succession of twin towns. After being dispersed by the French in 1730, Natchez remnants lived among the Cherokees, Chickasaws, and Creeks, becoming 'notable for their polylingualism' (Haas, 1939:599). I suggest that twin towns helped spread pidgin languages. If so, the popularity of Mobilian as a lingua franca in the eighteenth century need not be explained entirely in terms of commercial and political relations between Indians and whites.

Twin towns pose serious problems for southeastern archaeologists. These settlements with their public buildings sitting on earth mounds and with intervening public grounds corresponded architecturally to Mississippian multiple mound sites. This was especially true of numerous sites containing only two platform mounds. Specific examples of two-mound sites existed at or near Douglass and Parker Fields in Alabama; Chattahoochie Landing and Walton's Camp in Florida; Broro Park, Lamar and Swift Creek mounds at Macon, and Woolfolk's Landing in Georgia; and Brooks' Landing and Indian Hill in South Carolina (Thomas, 1894 : 284–285, 287–288; Moore, 1897 : 55; 1899a : 164–165, 171–172; 1901 : 435–454; 1903 : 491; 1907a : 449; Kelly, 1938; fig.1, 25). Charles H. Fairbanks (1950:144) described the typical Lamar sites as consisting of two platform mounds separated by a central plaza and a ball court without mentioning any architectural differences between the mounds. Archaeologists have assumed that ethnic and sociopolitical unity characterized these prehistorical settlements. Hence, social divisions pertained to social ranking and stratification, unilineal descent groups, and cults of one religious system and other nonkin associations. Public buildings then reflected either these social divisions or a sharp differentiation between religion and politics, a differentiation allotting one building as a temple and the other as a chief's residence. This being the case, archaeologists should ascribe a similar ethnic and sociopolitical unity to twin towns. This ascription, however, would be wrong.

Twin towns did not possess ethnic and sociopolitical unity. Instead, they were composed of two peoples, two societies, two governments, and two religions. Evidence already presented, especially that relating to Bayogoula and Mugulasha and to Great Tellico and Chatuga, support this contention. More specific evidence was provided by French explorers in 1699 who reported that Bayogoula and Mugulasha 'have two chiefs' and by Antoine Bonnefoy, a French prisoner among the Cherokees in

1741, who reported that Great Tellico and Chatuga had 'two different councils' (Swanton, 1911:277; Mereness, 1916:245). Separate political organizations created the possibility of separate political decisions and even antagonistic policies. This happened at Great Tellico and Chatuga. In 1752, Great Tellico discarded its pro-English policy for a pro-French one, whereas Chatuga remained a steadfast English ally. In this decade, Great Tellico and Chatuga nearly separated and were on the verge of war with each other (Corkran, 1962 : 36–37, 106, 113, 131; McDowell, 1970 : 303–306, 349–351, 386–387). This explains why South Carolinians in 1757 referred to the 'honest Town of Chatuga', thereby making an invidious comparison with Great Tellico (McDowell, 1970:349).

By projecting the sacred–secular distinctions of white societies, explorers, traders, politicians, archaeologists, and ethnohistorians have exaggerated the separation of religion and politics among southeastern Indians. The distinction between temple and chief's residence and between priest and chief has been drawn too sharply. Once this is recognized, then a careful scrutiny of the ethnohistorical sources provides supporting evidence for my contention. In the eighteenth century, Cherokee and Creek public buildings were places for religious worship, political discussion, military defense, and plain recreation (Swanton, 1928b:177; Van Doren, 1928:298–299). Even among the Natchez where reporters have been most explicit about the distinction between temple and chief's residence, important religious ceremonies were performed at the residence of Great Sun, the divine Natchez leader who had important secular as well as sacred duties (Swanton, 1911:102–103, 140, 144, 174). At least some prominent Cherokee leaders performed both sacred and secular duties. In the first decades of the eighteenth century, Conjuror of Tugalo was the leading politician in all kinds of negotiations with South Carolina. At mid-century, Old Hop — who now held Conjuror of Tugalo's priestly title of Cheeratahege — was the leading politician; moreover, Warrior of Settico — also known as Smallpox Conjuror — played an important role in Cherokee–South Carolina negotiations (Cheves, 1894 : 330–332; Williams, 1930 : 85; McDowell, 1955 : 88; 1958:224, 434–435, 440). As late as 1792, William Bartram, the famous naturalist who traveled among the Cherokees, Choctaws, and Creeks, explained that the top priest 'maintains and exercises great influence in the state, particularly in military affairs; the senate never determines on an expedition against their enemy without his counsel and assistance' (Van Doren, 1928:390).

In view of the architectural correspondence between twin towns and two-mound sites, the absence of ethnic and sociopolitical unity might have prehistorical depth. If so, then multiple mound sites were not

necessarily ceremonial centers and political capitols of Mississippian states. This is especially true of smaller sites consisting of only two, three, or even four mounds. This possibility increases since some eighteenth century settlements in the lower Mississippi valley contained three and even four independent groups. In 1726, Sieur de Bienville, governor of Louisiana, reported the following cases: (1) Chachiuma, Ibitoupa, and Taposa; (2) Koroa, Ofo, and Yazoo; (3) Natchitoches, Doustonis, and Yatasis; and (4) Nasoni, Nacagdoches, Nanatsohos, and Kichais (Rowland and Sanders, 1932,III:529, 531). When South Carolina invaded the Cherokee country in 1761, Captain Christopher French indicated that Chiowee, Esthanary, and Tarruro lived together (FJ,II:121). These small settlements were not ceremonial centers nor capitols of large-scale states. The six Acolapissa towns were 'part of one settlement' in 1699 and the seven Chickasaw towns lived so contiguously in 1739 that Bienville stated that they 'appear to be only one [settlement] which occupies nearly one third of the prairie' (Swanton, 1911:281; Rowland and Sanders, 1927,I:394). These Acolapissa and Chickasaw towns were independent ceremonial and sociopolitical units, exercising no dominion over smaller settlements scattered in surrounding territories.

Before multiple mound sites can be even considered as ceremonial centers and political capitols, archaeologists must make plats of the sites and devise techniques that demonstrate the ethnic and sociopolitical unity of these sites. Statistical analyses of the distribution of ceramic types in regard to platform mounds and residential areas in these sites should provide some answer to the problem. The large multiple mound site at Kolomoki in Georgia contained at least two — and possibly three — distinct ceramic complexes as well as at least two — and possibly three — distinguishable residential areas. Moreover, excavations have shown that these assemblages were contemporaneous (Sears, 1951:22; 1953:43, 223–224; 1956:10). If ethnic and sociopolitical unity did not exist in multiple mound sites, then these prehistorical settlements also encouraged the linguistic processes of diffusion, bilingualism, polylingualism, and pidginization.

Large-scale prehistorical states might not have existed in southeastern North America. Sears (1962) has suggested their presence in the Gulf Coastal Plain, the extensive dominion of the states being indicated mainly by the widespread diffusion of 'nearly identical ceramics'. This equation of pots and politics is untenable: ceramic processes can spread easily by trade, visiting, intermarriage, captive-taking, and other non-political diffusionist mechanisms. However, if the equation of pots and politics is accepted, then I contend that the political significance of slight

variations in ceramic complexes has been ignored: points of slight variations might indicate political boundaries. If this is correct, then the geqgraphical size of Gulf Coastal Plain states is reduced. Although social rank and stratification probably existed in prehistorical societies of the Gulf Coastal Plain, these social distinctions were not inconsistent with small-scale states. Put another way, social rank and stratification do not demand large-scale states. Natchez and Taensa are good examples of stratified societies and small political structures. This coexistence might then extend the prehistorical depth of political states, since the presumed incongruity was apparently the sole reason why Sears (1954) rejected the presence of small-scale states in the earlier Hopewell period.

Social stratification and political states were not restricted to the Gulf Coastal Plain; instead, they occurred throughout the Southeast. The contrast made between stratified coastal societies and more egalitarian hinterland societies probably originated with John R. Swanton, who hinted at this contrast nearly 70 years ago (1911:108) and then made it more explicit in subsequent publications (1928a:696; 1931:1–2; 1946:642–653, 661–662). Swanton exaggerated the egalitarianism of the hinterland by ignoring opposing evidence. In 1765, Lieutenant Henry Timberlake, who had lived among the Cherokees, described their society as a 'mixed aristocracy and democracy' (Williams, 1948:93). Stiggins explained that the Creek government was a 'tyrannical oligarchy in its principles and practiced under that head to the full extent' (Nunez, 1958:31). Ascribed status based on birth was an important criterion for leadership. The top political office among the Lower Creeks descended from father to son through three generations (Willis, 1963:254). On the other hand, the career of Emistisiguo, an astute Creek politician, was impeded in 1772 because he was 'unfortunately . . . of a Slave race' (Mereness, 1916:524). Elite classes among the Cherokees, Creeks, and Choctaws despised lower class whites, equating them with their own 'little People' who were defined as 'signifying People of no great Note' (Williams, 1948:79; McDowell, 1958:6, 54, 193, 400). Swanton minimized stratification in hinterland societies because most ethnohistorical accounts stressed the achieved status via hunting and warfare that had been encouraged by white politicians and traders of the eighteenth century, whereas ethnohistorical reports of stratified societies in the lower Mississippi valley dated from the first decades of the century before white impact had created a similar democratization of society.

By extending stratified societies and small-scale states into the hinterland, the uniqueness of sociopolitical phenomena in the Gulf Coastal Plain is removed, and the need to seek an ecological explanation for this uniqueness also disappears. Since archaeologists have not pinpointed

unique ecological factors, this eliminates the pursuit of what is probably fruitless research. There is also less need to rely on diffusion from Mexico and the Antilles. The extension permits a new formulation of sociopolitical development during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in which twin towns are placed near the beginning of development and not near the end. In this new formulation, twin towns are preceded only by military alliances between independent towns separated geographically. By analogy, this permits the presentation of a new prehistorical development in which multiple mound sites are not always at the end of development but might also occur near the beginning.

In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the Southeast was an arena of unremitting struggle for empire among white peoples, a struggle making Indian wars almost continuous and more deadly. Fighting for survival and for prosperity, Indians were weakened and threatened with extinction. Indeed, many Indian groups did disappear. Nucleated settlements became a necessary defensive measure in most of the Southeast, and twin towns constituted a specialized form of nucleation. Dispersed settlements existed only in a few places away from the intense fighting. For long periods, part of the Choctaw country was one of these places, and this helps explain why twin towns were infrequent among these Indians. A different reason explains the infrequency of foreign peoples living with the Chickasaws: the location of the Chickasaw country in terms of eighteenth century warfare made it a very dangerous place to live (Swanton 1928a:706).

Some eighteenth century reporters attributed twin towns solely to warfare. Chicken explained that Great Tellico and Chatuga were 'very compact and thick Settled which they are Obliged to, otherwise they would be Cut of [sic] by the Enemy who are continually within a Mile of the Town lurking about' (Mereness, 1916:111). Despite the great importance of war, this explanation is incomplete, since it does not specifically explain why twin towns appeared. Being a specialized type of nucleation, special conditions were needed before a twin town was established. It did not arise from a mere anticipation of disaster, since anticipation more likely led to nucleated settlements that remained spatially separated at defensible locations. A twin town resulted from an actual disaster, one severe enough to alarm people about the survival of their society and institutions but not so severe that people became demoralized. Instead of an aggregation of disorganized individuals, newcomers in a twin town still constituted a viable society of determined and patriotic citizens seeking to avoid personal and ethnic extinction. Put another way, the twin town was a desperate last-ditch measure to ensure sociocultural integrity.

Most twin towns appeared in the aftermath of a severe military defeat, although a few followed natural disasters. Examples of natural disasters were an epidemic in the 1680s that induced Quinipissa to join Mugulasha and a crop failure in 1702 that induced Natchitoches to join Acolapissa (Swanton, 1911:280–281). In regard to military defeat, this happened occasionally to both groups combining into a twin town. For instance, Great Tellico and Chatuga after defeats by French Indians in 1724 and Keowee and Toxawa after defeats by Creeks in 1751 (CO,5/427:30; McDowell, 1958:247–249, 256). In most cases, however, only one group suffered a severe defeat — although the other group needed additional men as warriors, hunters, and farmers. This was true in 1682 when Tangipohoa joined Acolapissa and Mosopellea joined Taensa; it was also true in 1706 when Taensa joined Bayogoula and Tunica joined Huma (Swanton, 1911:262–263, 270, 281, 311; 1946:167). Le Page du Pratz, who spent almost 15 years in Louisiana, made this generalization: 'when a nation is enfeebled by war it retires to another which desires to adopt it' (Swanton, 1911:136). That a twin town did not appear until two groups agreed to associate more intimately than in ordinary nucleated settlements constitutes another factor limiting the appearance of twin towns. This suggests that preexisting sociopolitical ties — perhaps military alliances and inter-marriages — were essential between groups that became twin towns.

Negotiations after a severe military defeat provided additional reasons why twin towns were less numerous than nucleated settlements. The defeated people did not usually seek peace directly with the enemy; instead, they sought an alliance with a third and more powerful neighbor at peace with the enemy. If no alliance transpired, then the defeated people might disperse as individuals, and no twin town was formed. If the alliance was made, then they took temporary refuge with the new ally. The alliance was made by the calumet ceremony, the defeated people making gifts of captives and commodities. The new ally then became a mediator, its emissaries seeking peace for the defeated and carrying the calumet and gifts to the enemy. The negotiations usually ended successfully, since 'ordinarily these mediators take the part of the suppliants'. After peace was concluded, the defeated people returned to their own settlement, and again no twin town was formed (Swanton, 1911:136). Therefore, it was only in those cases when negotiations were unsuccessful and the defeated people remained with their new ally that a twin town was formed. That newcomers were allowed to live with the mediators indicates that the latter was also hard pressed and welcomed additional warriors. By analogy, 'singing and calumet' or 'playing the flutes', the possible predecessor of the calumet ceremony in the

eighteenth century, might have had a prehistorical presence in negotiations that established multiple mound sites.

Although whites intensified southeastern warfare, there is solid evidence for extensive warfare among Mississippian Indians. In addition to the narratives of the De Luna and De Soto expeditions, most prehistorical settlements were fortified, being encircled by palisades with bastions, moats, embankments, and natural features (rivers, swamps, or bluffs). The fighting ranged from the ambush of small groups to the destruction of whole settlements (Larson, 1972). By analogy, prehistorical warfare emerges as one main reason for multiple mound sites. Indeed, Philip Phillips, James A. Ford, and James B. Griffin (1951:441, 447) contended that warfare accounted for multiple mound sites in the late prehistorical period. However, intensification of eighteenth century warfare might mean only that more twin towns appeared in a shorter time than did multiple mound sites. This might weaken prehistorical warfare as a fusionist factor. If so, then prehistorical economics probably made up the difference. A shortage of rich soils and the presence of dense forests were greater problems for prehistorical societies than for eighteenth century ones. They planted fewer crops and did not use iron tools. Moreover, venison was probably not as plentiful in their diets, since hunters neither used guns nor sold deerskins to white traders. Hence, farming was more important economically than in the eighteenth century, causing more competition for arable lands and requiring more farm laborers. These needs probably acted as a greater fusionist factor than in the eighteenth century.

Indians did not like to live in twin towns. Indian groups of the eighteenth century had a strong sense of ethnic identity, cherishing their separate sociopolitical institutions. In 1764, James Grant, governor of Florida, observed: 'The Towns, belonging to each Tribe, may be considered as so many Different Republicks . . . [having] separate Views and Interests' (Carter, 1915:828). This particularism was abetted by personal ambitions and rivalries among Indian leaders, making cooperation difficult (Williams, 1948:95). Since positions in each sociopolitical organization were limited, competition for these positions by status-conscious Indians was intense (Williams, 1930:426, 453). Therefore, twin towns were a great threat to Indian leaders, especially those of the defeated society. In pursuing divide and rule, whites encouraged and exploited particularism and personal rivalries, warning Indians of the danger of losing 'ancient Rights and Customs' (CO,5/426:20–21; McDowell, 1958:512). Since twin towns posed a considerable threat to ethnic identity and sociopolitical positions, an additional reason emerges why twin towns were established only as a

desperate measure when fear of survival predominated. Despite this desperation, separatist tendencies persisted sufficiently to impede the immediate merging of sociopolitical organizations. By analogy, I suggest that a similar interplay of fusionist and separatist factors accounted for multiple mound sites.

The interplay of fusionist and separatist factors determined the influence and prestige of twin towns. Being desperate attempts to prevent extinction, they were initially arrangements of military weakness. Particularism and personal rivalries meant that twin towns were fragile arrangements that often did not last. In some cases, twin towns separated peacefully; but in other cases, the separation was violent. For instance, Bayogoula massacred Mugulasha in 1700; Taensa the Bayogoula and Tunica the Huma in 1706; Acolapissa the Natchitotches in 1714; and Taensa the Quachita in 1730 (Swanton, 1911:270, 283, 311, 335; 1946:204). The fear of massacre was present in twin towns after two peoples had lived together for years: Acolapissa and Natchitoches had been a twin town for 12 years before the massacre. Even when a twin town persisted for decades, separatist tendencies sometimes prevented the merging of sociopolitical organizations. Koroa and Yazoo settled in one town in 1702 and remained together for at least 30 years without losing their separate ethnic and sociopolitical identities (Swanton, 1946:147). Great Tellico and Chatuga became a twin town in 1724 but still maintained separate organizations in 1761: 37 years later (FJ,II:122–123; Mereness, 1916:112, 245; McDowell, 1970:413). Chiaha and Osochi became a twin town before 1738 and remained one continuously for more than 60 years (Hawkins, 1848:63–64; Mereness, 1916:550; Swanton, 1922:169; 1946:116).

The military weakness, fragility of structure, threat of massacre, and persistence of separate sociopolitical organizations hindered even long-standing twin towns in pooling their resources and achieving maximal exploitation of opportunities. This inability helps explain the failure of twin towns to play consistently a primary role in eighteenth century politics and religion. Great Tellico was the political capitol of the Cherokee Confederacy in 1730, but in one decade it had been superseded by Chota (Williams, 1928:123–127, 135; Corkran, 1962:17). By analogy, this is additional evidence that multiple mound sites were not necessarily political capitols nor even important centers of prehistorical ceremonialism.

Abika and Natchez, Chiaha and Osochi, and Great Tellico and Chatuga show that separatist factors did not always prevail over fusionist ones. Fusionist and separatist factors existed in a dynamic relationship, one of continous give-and-take, pull and counterpull.

Despite the Natchitoches massacre, the longer a twin town lasted the better its chances for accommodating particularism and personal rivalries. This permitted more personal contacts, friendships, and intermarriages: the Abikas 'intermarried . . . extensively' with the Natchez (Swanton, 1946:81). These relationships stimulated cultural diffusion; for instance, the Natchez probably borrowed matrilineal clans from the Abika people (Haas, 1939:600–602). By analogy, an overlapping of distinct ceramic complexes has been found at Kolomoki (Sears, 1953:224). Cultural diffusion developed more when residential integration occurred as in Great Tellico and Chatuga where private dwellings were 'mingled together indistinguishably' (Mereness, 1916:245). Residential integration encouraged social integration. To some extent, overlapping of distinguishable residential areas also occurred at Kolomoki (Sears, 1953:223). Hence, residential and social integration might provide a prehistorical basis for the puzzling coexistence of matrilineal and patrilineal features in the eighteenth century and for the absence of explicit evidence of postmarital residence rules (Willis, 1963). Moreover, residential and social integration facilitated cooperation and weakened separation in public life. Finally, the identical location of twin towns meant identical economic, military, and political problems. This also encouraged cooperation and sociopolitical unity, especially when the location was desirable for economic and military reasons.

Lengthy proximity, residential integration, and identical problems help explain why Great Tellico and Chatuga continued as a twin town. On the other hand, its location was marginal: it was an 'out Town and most in Danger' from enemy attacks. These attacks restricted economic activities, making it the 'poorest Town' among the Overhill Cherokees. These attacks nourished particularism and personal rivalries, driving each sociopolitical organization to seek separate solutions. In 1757, Captain Caesar, prominent Chatuga leader, admitted that 'now that the Tellico People were turned good [resuming cordial relations with South Carolina], the People of his own Town must turn Rogues' (McDowell, 1958:260, 1970:382, 384). We now see more clearly why Great Tellico and Chatuga maintained separate sociopolitical organizations. It is important to realize, however, that Great Tellico and Chatuga — despite enemy pressure — pursued common policies during most of their existence as a twin town. The conclusion emerges that the continuation of a twin town permitted fusionist factors to predominate, thereby facilitating ethnic and sociopolitical unity.

Despite the residential and social integration that might occur in twin towns, ethnic unity depended mainly on the merging of political

organizations. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, this merging was shown by several arrangements. From a logical point of view, these arrangements can be placed in chronological order, and a new developmental sequence emerges as a real possibility in southeastern North America. Since this sequence is a logical construction, it does not imply a genetic relationship among the arrangements. The demonstration of genetic relationships in this new developmental sequence is a task for future archaeological and ethnohistorical research. This new sequence does not exclude the existence of alternative sequences in view of the complexity of archaeological and ethnohistorical developments in the Southeast.

The merging of sociopolitical organizations was accomplished through the progressive domination by one people of another in a twin town. The first step was probably shown in Hywassee among the Cherokees where there developed a subordinate but still separate sociopolitical organization. This superordinate–subordinate relationship replaced the more nearly equal relationship that had initially prevailed in twin towns. A Natchez remnant, fleeing from the French, formed a twin town with Hywassee. When Euphersee joined Hywassee in 1749, the subordination of the Natchez had reached the point that South Carolinians did not bother to mention the presence of the Natchez, although 60 Natchez families still lived there as late as 1761, Nevertheless, Raven of Hywassee explained in 1757 that he 'looks upon [the Natchez] as his own people' and the Natchez acknowledged that they 'belonged to Hywassee'. Despite this subordination, the Natchez maintained a definite sociopolitical identity. For instance, they had their own political leader in Tossetee. Although Tossetee was inferior in rank to Raven, he occupied a position comparable to Skiakow, the son of Raven. Along with Raven and Skiakow, Tossetee negotiated with James Glen, governor of South Carolina. No evidence has been found that any social stigma was attached to these Natchez. Perhaps a similar arrangement emerged with the Natchez living in Abika, since Notchee King participated in important Creek-South Carolina negotiations (FJ,II:119; Willet, 1831:111; McDowell, 1958:155, 161–162, 261, 296, 314, 410).

Mugulasha and Quinipissa, which became a twin town in the 1680s, probably represented the next step in the merging of peoples and their sociopolitical organizations. By the end of the next decade, the same person had become the leader of both Mugulasha and Quinipissa. If subordinate Quinipissa leaders still existed, they were not so prominent to merit mention in negotiations with the French. The degree of Quinipissa subordination and loss of identity were shown by French efforts to bolster Quinipissa prestige. In 1699, Iberville reported that

Bienville 'nomme les Moguachas Quinipissas, parce que nous voulons faire revivre cette nation', claiming that the leader of Mugulasha and Quinipissa was really a Quinipissa! Nevertheless, French reporters usually ignored Quinipissa after Mugulasha and Quinipissa joined Bayogoula in 1699. After this combination, Mugulasha domination of Quinipissa was shown by reports of only two temples: one belonging to Bayogoula, the other to Mugulasha. No evidence, however, has been found that Mugulasha subjected the Quinipissa people to social discrimination (Margry, 1881, IV:453, 455; Swanton, 1911:274–280; 1946:176–177; Calder, 1935:207–208, 220).

The relationship between Natchez aristocrats and commoners might represent the next step in the merging of peoples and sociopolitical organizations. Before 1730 in Louisiana, commoners in the four main Natchez towns — Great Village, Apple, Flour, and White Earth — were despised being known as Stinkards; nevertheless, they were an integral, even necessary, part of the social organization. As is well-known, aristocrats governed and enjoyed sumptuary privileges but married only Stinkards; on the other hand, Stinkards did most of the work, some fighting, and served as sacrificial victims in religious ceremonies.

Excluding the allied towns of Grigra and Tioux that were composed of Tunicans, there is suggestive evidence that the ancestors of aristocrats and commoners were separate peoples. Myths explain that the Natchez resulted from the combination of different peoples. Although the temple in Great Village was apparently the only one in the early eighteenth century, contemporary tradition was that anciently the Natchez had two temples. Excavation of Great Village revealed a plaza area and three platform mounds, presumably one mound being the foundation of Great Sun's residence and the other two mounds as foundations of temples (Neitzell, 1964:63–64). That the Natchez had 'two war chiefs, two masters of ceremonies for the temple, [and] two officers to regulate what is done in treaties of peace and war' might have constituted a bureaucratic survival. The Feast of the Deer Month — one of the most important Natchez ceremonials — was a symbolic reenactment of conflict between two peoples ending in a joyous unification in front of the temple in Great Village and proclaiming the undisputed reign of Great Sun. Moreover, Stinkards still spoke a 'language entirely different' from the aristocrats. Finally, Stinkards had their own leaders, subservient to aristocrats and debarred from external negotiations. Not only was Tattooed Serpent — Great War Chief and brother of Great Sun — insulted as a 'Stinkard chief', but Great Sun 'summoned the Puant [Stinkard] chief' to kill a cowardly Frenchman 'unworthy of being killed

by a brave' (French, 1853,V:72; Swanton, 1911:102, 105, 111–112, 153, 170–171, 182–186).

Swanton (1911:181–182, 185–186) suggested that the Natchez society was the result of a combination of separate peoples, apparently deriving the original Stinkard class from an early incorporation of Atakapas and Chitimachas by Mushkogeans who then became the aristocrats. The affiliation of Grigra and Tioux was seen as a more recent occurrence, but Swanton took contradictory positions on the classification of these Tunicans as Stinkards. Their classification as Stinkards is problematical: Grigra and Tioux had political leaders who pursued independent policies toward the French. Indeed, Bamboche, the Tioux leader, defied Tattooed Serpent, calling him a liar and refusing to permit him to speak for Tioux. Moreover, Tioux had its own temple (French, 1853,V:59–60; Swanton, 1911:334–336).

Ignoring any differences in identifying Stinkards, Swanton's conclusions are consistent with my presentation. In the context of fusion and separation, an adequate solution emerges to the persistent puzzle of the obligatory exogamous marriages of aristocrats with commoners by which the offspring of male aristocrats progressively descended into the Stinkard class while the offspring of female aristocrats and the offspring of marriages among Stinkards remained, respectively, aristocrats and commoners. C. W. M. Hart's contention (1943) that commoners of the early eighteenth century would virtually disappear into the aristocracy within a few generations is no longer a valid criticism of Swanton's formulation of Natchez social organization, since assimilation of these Stinkards emerges as the goal of the unique exogamous system. Moreover, Stinkards who were brave warriors or stranglers of sacrificial victims became lifetime members of the Honored Class, the lowest level of aristocrats. Therefore, Hart's conclusion that the Natchez system could not last and that the fragmentary descriptions by French reporters need revision is only half valid.

I suggest that the Natchez system was not intended to last forever, not even for a long time. Instead, it was a temporary mechanism to bind separate peoples into a tighter ethnic and sociopolitical cohesion. Hence, 'transitional' is a more precise term to describe this system than either 'declining' or 'emergent'. Whenever assimilation threatened to eliminate the top aristocrats, then they could replace the exogamous system by an endogamous one. Indeed, aristocrats were thinking of doing this in the 1720s. William C. MacLeod (1923:514–515; 1924:214–217) and J. P. B. Josselin de Jong (1930:559) concluded that a 'strong tendency towards endogamy' appeared immediately before the Natchez dispersal. Eighteenth century descriptions then do not need revision, always a risky

procedure when independent descriptions have a high degree of consistency. There is also no need to formulate explanations, such as differential reproductive rates between aristocrats and commoners, for which there is no documentary evidence (Fischer, 1964). On the other hand, ethnohistorians now have a new research problem: the study of mechanisms designed to resolve internal differences arising from separate origins. In addition to being substitutes for warfare, I suggest that important ball games can be investigated profitably as one main mechanism, especially in regard to the extensive preparations required for these games. Indeed, Mary R. Haas suggested forty years ago that the merger of towns was one context for two-goal ball games (Swanton, 1928b:456–470; 1946:674–686; Haas, 1940). A more solid basis now has emerged for George I. Quimby's astute opinion (1946) that the Natchez social system was an instrument of assimilation, an opinion that Quimby believed could never be proved.

If major architectural designs in archaeological sites represented sociopolitical relationships, then steps toward the progressive merging of peoples and their organizations are discernible in certain multiple mound sites. Specifically, differences in continguity, elevation, and size of mounds might indicate degrees of superordinate-subordinate relationships. One step consists of sites in which two platform mounds were separated by a central plaza with one mound being substantially larger than the other. This was the most common arrangement in the lower Mississippi valley, the Emerald Mound and Lake George Mound sites being excellent examples (Phillips, Ford and Griffin, 1951:315; Griffin, 1952:fig. 142,A). We also have two mounds of unequal size at 30-Acre Field in Alabama and at Stark's Clay Landing in Georgia; moreover, Robert Wauchope's survey of northern Georgia provides additional examples at Brightwell Field, Falling Creek, and Shinholser Ranch (Moore, 1899b:333–334; 1907a:447; Wauchope, 1966:377–378, 430). Perhaps this step is shown most clearly at Kolomoki: Mound A stands 56½ feet high with a basal diameter of 325 x 200 feet, whereas Mound D stands no more than 20 feet with a basal diameter of only 30 x 50 feet (Sears, 1951:1; 1953:41; 1956:10).

The next step consisted of two platform mounds adjacent to each other, similar in elevation and size. This arrangement is shown by Mounds B and E at the Carson Mound site in Mississippi (Thomas, 1894:253–255). The third step existed where one platform mound had two levels; each level supported a public building, one larger than the other. This arrangement has been revealed by excavations of the Hiwassee Island Focus in the Tennessee River and of Mound A in Kolomoki. Mound A at Rood's Landing in Georgia supported three

public buildings, one higher than the other two, and with two ascending ramps. Moreover, similar mounds have been observed in Arkansas and the lower Mississippi valley (Thomas, 1894:235, 238, 243; Lewis and Kneberg, 1946:9, 41, pls. 13–19; Phillips, Ford and Griffin 1951:330; Caldwell, 1955:26–29; Sears, 1956:10). Especially since differences in elevations became greater as time passed, Thomas M. N. Lewis and Madeline Kneberg (1946:10, 30, 32, 40) interpreted the history of Hiwassee Island as showing the merging of two peoples toward an 'amalgamated community', thereby indicating a continuous increase in central planning that improved the exploitation of resources and brought more prosperity. They concluded that this history was 'certainly little different from that of numerous localities throughout the Southeast'.

MacLeod's conclusion (1924:214) that the Natchez system was an 'imperfect adaptation of disparate structures of two separate tribal groups or fragments of such groups' can be extended in different degrees to all prehistorical and historical steps toward ethnic and sociopolitical unity. Nevertheless, I suggest that the Chitimacha, neighbors and 'brothers' of the Natchez, and possibly the Timucua in Florida came closest to achieving this unity via merger before being destroyed by white invaders. The Chitimacha and Timucua societies consisted of bona fide social castes, endogamy regulating marriages of aristocrats and commoners (Swanton, 1928a:695; 1946:661–663). This suggests that the threat of internal divisiveness arising from separate origins had been so allayed that aristocrats protected their privileges by introducing endogamous regulations. Put another way, the domination of commoners of separate origins had reached the point that the peculiar exogamy of the Natchez could be discarded, a measure that Natchez aristocrats were contemplating. From a logical or structural point of view, the Chitimacha and Timucua societies represented the apex of sociopolitical development, an apex that implied a better exploitation of resources and opportunities. If this suggestion is valid, then ethnohistorians have another research problem: the search for evidence to demonstrate the separate origins of Chitimacha and Timucua castes.

By analogy, sites consisting of only one large platform mound constituted a similar apex of prehistorical development. The Crystal River Mound site in Florida, Irene and Nacoochee Mound sites in Georgia, Dallas Mound sites on Hiwassee Island, and Peachtree Mound site in North Carolina are good examples of this arrangement. This analogy is strengthened by excavations on Hiwassee Island where two-level mounds evolved into one-level mounds and by excavations at Horseshoe Bend and Eastwood sites in Georgia where two adjacent mounds of different sizes were remodeled into single and larger mounds without any

differences in elevation (Moore, 1907b:407; Caldwell and McCann, 1941; Setzler and Jennings, 1941:13–29; Lewis and Kneberg, 1946:41; Wauchope, 1966:324–325, 347–348, 353–356).

Chitimacha might have been the logical or structural apex of sociopolitical development; but, solitary sociopolitical entities like Chitimacha were seldom the main centers of comparative power and prosperity. The reason is simple: success attracts, failure repels. This depressing but universal truth provides the basis for the following speculations. The continuation of twin towns and their sociopolitical evolution meant that the arrangement had not only worked but that it had prospered and had been able to withstand jealous enemies. This was especially true since these twin towns occupied desirable locations in regard to economics and defense. This overall success then acted as a magnet, inducing additional peoples to petition for some kind of affiliation and nearby relocation. At least some newcomers maintained their own temples and sociopolitical organizations. The newcomers increased the concentration of population at these locations. This concentration and greater prosperity led to a natural increase in population. Hence, a time would come that demanded the splitting off of surplus people. These people remained as near as possible in satellite communities, although some might have constructed their own temples. If these speculations coincide with realities, then the processes emerge that explain why successful twin towns frequently became the nuclei of town clusters.

We have two good examples of twin towns as nuclei of town clusters in the Cherokee Confederacy. Raven of Hywassee had 'Eight other Towns under him', and these towns were located near Hywassee (CO,5/459:649; McDowell, 1958:112). The second example was Keowee which was the nucleus for four or five adjacent towns. Moreover, Whokiorer, the Keowee leader, was the 'princeable [sic] Head Man . . . that [is] looked on by all these [Lower] towns' (Mereness, 1916:153; McDowell, 1958:486). Several examples of town clusters existed among the Creeks. The most striking example was the 'Point Towns' which were formed when Hitchiti, Kashita, Okmulgee, and perhaps Hoglogees and Sawokli moved very near the twin town of Chiaha and Osochi, located at a bend in Chattahoochee River. At least Hitchiti, Kashita, and Okmulgee maintained separate sociopolitical organizations. Moreover, these towns produced satellite communities, some of which were located on Flint River. James Adair, a South Carolina trader who was the best reporter on mid-eighteenth century Southern Indians, stated that Chiaha was one of the principal towns in the Creek confederacy (Swanton, 1922:166, 169–170, 177–178, 222). Therefore, the town cluster emerges as a neglected but important sociopolitical

phenomenon existing between town and confederacy, playing a more crucial role in eighteenth century politics and ceremonialism than the twin town. But many twin towns as the nuclei of town clusters were not necessarily the political capitols of extensive confederacies, certainly not of large-scale states. Indeed, some town clusters were independent and comparatively self-contained, not part of a larger political system of any kind. For instance, the Chickasaw towns were so near together that they might be seen as one town cluster and the combination of Natchez towns with Grigra and Tioux might be seen as another (Albrecht, 1944:77). It is important that ethnohistorians pursue more research on town clusters, especially those that were members of confederacies.

By analogy, town clusters corresponded to those extraordinary prehistorical sites containing numerous platform mounds of different sizes. Specifically, I refer to the following sites: (1) Moundville in Alabama; (2) Etowah and Rood's Landing in Georgia; (3) Greenhouse and Troyville in Louisiana; (4) Anna and Winterville in Mississippi; and (5) Pinson in Tennessee (Moore, 1905; 1907c; Walker, 1936; Ford, 1951:13–14; Phillips, Ford and Griffin, 1951:327, table 13; Griffin, 1952:fig.142,B; Caldwell, 1955; Nuckolls, 1958; Wauchope, 1966:251–259). If this correspondence is valid, then we have reason to suspect that even these multiple mound sites might not have been political capitols of large-scale states. Since southeastern mounds were built by accretion during many years, this suggestion coincides with the attempts by David Kaplan (1963) and Charles J. Erasmus (1965) to show that monumental architecture in Mesoamerica does not necessarily imply a large labor force nor large-scale states. Nevertheless, the importance of these extraordinary sites in prehistorical politics and ceremonialism seems obvious. The exact dimension of this importance, however, must await further archaeological analysis.

The correspondence suggests that these sites represented a concentration of population more than a natural increase in population. If so, archaeologists must be more cautious in using large sites as evidence of an expanding population in the Mississippian period. They must be equally cautious in postulating a progressive increase in agricultural production, since three main reasons for this postulation have been large sites, extensive refuse deposits in these sites, and population increase. Therefore, the hypothesis of improved agricultural production must rest mainly on the development of more efficient farming methods. Since a succession of technological innovations in farming has not been demonstrated, then greater weight must be placed on improved efficiency in the management of a larger number of farm workers in order to explain any increased agricultural production.

Twin towns were probably the best starting point for more efficient management of larger labor forces. They had the potentiality for greater central planning of more labor power than most single towns. This potentiality, however, did not frequently become a reality for reasons presented earlier in this paper. Put another way, the maximal exploitation of this potentiality was usually restricted to the minority of successful twin towns that sometimes evolved into larger and more unified single towns but more often into the nuclei of town clusters. If this suggestion is correct, then marked differences in agricultural production existed among eighteenth century Indians. By analogy, substantial agricultural production was typically restricted to successful multiple mound sites and especially those extraordinary ones like Moundville. If marked differences in agricultural production existed among prehistorical and historical Indian groups, then archaeologists and ethnohistorians have a new key to a deeper analysis of southeastern sociocultural development and function.

My speculations might have implications in regard to the emergence of political states in irrigation civilizations of the Old and New Worlds. A multicommunity under some kind of supracommunity organization has been seen as the starting point of the political evolution of states that managed vast irrigation systems. This evolution has been explained by intercommunity needs: irrigation, specialized production and trade, imperative ceremonialism, and aggressive warfare. But how did multicommunities get started in the first place? This is the rub.

At one time, Pueblo ethnography seemed to provide the first step. Specifically, more or less voluntary cooperative work on small-scale irrigation systems among Pueblo societies was performed under the direction of modest bureaucracies that applied minimal coercion periodically and sometimes ineffectually. More recent research, however, suggests that small irrigation systems did not always precede multicommunities nor even large irrigation systems always precede developed political states. Mesoamerican archaeology has been crucial in raising doubts about the role of irrigation. Since irrigation might not have been the causal factor, explanations have shifted more to the impact of microenvironmental differences. These differences may have then created specialized production that made intercommunity trade so essential that it demanded managerial control. As this control was established, supracommunity organizations emerged into bona fide political states that then developed large-scale irrigation systems. Since religious organizations performed important ceremonies in early and small single communities, these organizations grabbed managerial control of specialized production and intercommunity trade. This conception not

only explains the theocratic orientation of initial supracommunity organizations but avoids the unacceptable contention that imperative ceremonies constituted the first step. Aggressive warfare as a first step is not in vogue, being given a later evolutionary position (Wittfogel and Goldfrank, 1943:26–30; Wittfogel, 1957:142, 149–150, 152; Adams, 1966; Hole, 1966; Steward, 1960:1–59; 1966). These explanations in terms of meeting intercommunity needs to achieve higher levels of living make one common assumption: people are so rational that they see the potentials for advancement and are so determined that they make the necessary actions to take advantage of potentialities. This is a debatable assumption.

Twin towns, town clusters, and multiple mound sites in the Southeast were multicommunities. This region, however, lacked irrigation. The challenge of dense forests can not be equated with that of water shortage. Agricultural technologies did not improve during the Mississippian period. Iron tools and new crops introduced by whites — and some black fugitives from slavery — were offset by more hunting. In addition, hunting was usually done by small parties devoid of political control. Since local specialization in production was limited, trade managed by sociopolitical organizations in single and multicommunities was — with the exception of salt — mainly a trade in luxury goods, a trade to foster sociopolitical ties more than economic well-being. Even trade among communities for iron tools and new crops was exceedingly meagre. There were no systems of markets with professional traders. The shortage of arable lands suggests that sociopolitical organizations circulated products in an economy of comparative scarcity more often than in one of rising productivity. This helps to explain the slight development of craft specialization. It also indicates the need for more research on southeastern economics, since the sociopolitical organizations resembled chiefdoms but our present-day knowledge does not indicate a well-defined redistributive economy.

Since multicommunities in the Southeast occurred without irrigation systems and important systems of trade, then multicommunities might have appeared in areas of irrigation civilizations before these conditions developed. Ceremonialism is dismissed as a causal factor: eighteenth century Indian peoples did not relocate solely — or even primarily — in order to perform essential and larger ceremonies. In addition to evidence presented in this paper, a process of elimination suggests that warfare was the crucial factor in the development of southeastern multi-communities.

Despite this contention, my view of warfare is in considerable agreement with Morton H. Fried's formulation (1961; 1967:178–182,

213–216) that minimizes the role of warfare in political evolution. Wars of conquest were probably a late evolutionary development that merely intensified preexisting stratification and state organizations. Hence, wars of conquest probably did not create the first states of Egypt, China, the Indus valley, Mesopotamia, the Central Andes and Mesoamerica — although they played an important part in the formation of secondary states in the Old and New Worlds. Fried's preoccupation with wars of conquest causes him to discount the evolutionary potential of the type of warfare that prevailed in the Southeast. This is the point of my departure from Fried's formulation.

Although southeastern wars were more than senseless terroristic games (Kroeber, 1939:148–149), they were not wars to incorporate defeated peoples as subject peoples. They were wars to kill, capture, and torture individuals, and to acquire control of the productive territories of dispersed peoples. Hence, they were not wars for territorial expansion: the victors frequently abandoned their old territories for the new ones. Put briefly, southeastern wars were wars of replacement. Ecological adaptation and sociopolitical development probably did not permit anything more. The terrorism in these wars was a means to achieve this replacement and also to prevent it. This coincides with Elman R. Service's conception of the function of terroristic warfare (1962:115). As we have seen, this warfare played a main role in the creation of southeastern multicommunities. These structures may be classified as chiefdoms or incipient states. Since they preceded bona fide states, Fried should then accord more evolutionary significance to wars of replacement. On the other hand, Service (1962:151) should not restrict terroristic wars of replacement to the 'tribal' level of sociocultural integration. Finally, the incorporation of defeated peoples was not an invariable goal of warfare in the chiefdom level of integration.

That the southeastern type of warfare is given an early evolutionary position obviously does not resurrect older formulations that explained social stratification and political states by wars of conquest. Moreover, these formulations made a serious error in concentrating too much on the victors in wars. My speculations about the Southeast suggest that more attention should be given to the victims, the hard pressed, and the nearly-vanquished in warfare. They also had evolutionary potential for sociopolitical development, sometimes achieving higher levels of sociocultural integration. Put another way, southeastern multicommunities originated as defensive mechanisms more for the purpose of survival than for achievement. Once these structures were formed and if they lasted, then they might be utilized to achieve more positive goals than mere survival. This might have occurred in the early history of irrigation civilizations; if so, we have a new alternative to Pueblo

ethnography. Finally, my formulation is permeated by this assumption: in trying to survive, men and women are forced to make unpleasant decisions, ones that are often blunders from the point of view of logic and often mean failure — but sometimes they lead to success. The wretched of the earth, so often stumbling along, might have great expectations.

Note

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Afro-Americans, Africa, and America

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The descendants of Africans in America never accepted the basic premises of the Euro-Americans that they should not be free and were not capable of participating fully in the evolving society that was to be America.[1] It was physically impossible for them to suddenly turn white and psychologically impossible to give up their African culture. Yet, it was these two characteristics (over and above the need for cheap labor) that kept Afro-Americans apart from their fellows. Consequently, in their attempt to be free and independent, Afro-Americans have had to deal with their blackness as well as with their Africanness. Dr W. E. B. DuBois once said that in order to deal with this situation, the Afro-Americans had to be endowed

> with second-sight in this American world — a world which yields him to true self-consciousness, but only lets him see himself through the revelation of the other world. It is a peculiar sensation, this double-consciousness, this sense of always looking at one's self through the eyes of others, of measuring one's soul by the tape of a world that looks on in amused contempt and pity. One ever feels his two-ness — an American, a Negro; two souls, two thoughts, two unreconciled strivings: two warring ideals in one dark body, whose dogged strength alone keeps it from being torn asunder.
>
> The history of the American Negro is the history of this strife, this longing to attain self-conscious manhood, to merge his double self into a better and truer self. In this merging he wishes neither of the older selves to be lost. He would not Africanize America, for America has too much to teach the world and Africa. He would not bleach his Negro soul in a flood of white Americanism, for he knows that Negro blood has a message for the world. He simply wishes to make it possible for a man to be both a Negro and an American, without having the doors of Opportunity closed roughly in his face.
>
> This, then, is the end of his striving: to be a co-worker in the kingdom of culture, to escape both death and isolation, to husband and use his best powers and his latent genius. (DuBois, 1961:16–17)

The effort of Afro-Americans to develop their true personalities, or to become authentic, is one of the most dramatic stories of a captive people in the history of the world. Chattel slavery in the United States had some very unique characteristics. Alexis de Tocqueville wrote in 1837:

> The only means by which the ancients maintained slavery were fetters and death; the Americans of the South have discovered more intellectual securities for the duration of their power. They have employed their despotism and their violence against the human mind . . . and [adopted] measures to deprive [the captive] of his desire for freedom. (Tocqueville, 1955:395)

The southern planters did not succeed in eliminating the desire for freedom from the minds of the African captives and their descendants. There were more slave revolts in both the southern and the northern parts of America than most white historians are prepared to admit. But it was in the everyday life of the African captives that a more subtle type of reaction to captivity and enslavement occurred. As Richard Wright described it:

> The steady impact of the plantation system upon our lives created new types of behavior and new patterns of psychological reaction welding us together into a separate unity with common characteristics of our own. We strove each day to maintain that kind of external behavior that would best allay the fear and hate of the Lords of the Land, and over a period of years this dual conduct became second nature to us, and we found in it a degree of immunity from daily oppression. Even when a white man asked us an innocent question, some unconscious part of us would listen closely, not only to the obvious words, but also to the intonations of voice that indicated what kind of answer he wanted; and automatically we would determine whether an affirmative or negative reply was expected, and we would answer, not in terms of objective truth, but in terms of what the white man wanted to hear. (Wright, 1941:41)

Whites in the American South during the Civil War were surprised when their so-called 'contented slaves' welcomed emancipation. The southern planters believed it was northern agitators and radical freed slaves who had corrupted their people and induced them to act against their wills and better judgments. These whites did not recognize the basic attitudes of their captives — their love of freedom, their hopes and their dreams of liberty. Unfortunately, this lack of perception of the basic values, attitudes, and aspirations of the Afro-Americans has persisted in America throughout the centuries. Every step that the Afro-Americans have taken to vindicate their status, claim their rights, and project their true personality has been opposed by whites who still cannot accept them

as true equals. Now that much of Africa is independent, some whites claim that the reason for this lack of acceptance of the Afro-Americans has nothing to do with either color prejudice or cultural chauvinism, but is related to the slave background of American blacks. They would like to ignore or forget the sentiment of Robert G. Harper, a white proponent of the emigration of freed Africans to Africa, who in 1822 declared that 'the distinctive and indelible marks of [the Negroes'] color and the prejudice of the people' were an 'insurmountable obstacle . . . to placing them on a footing with their brethren of the same [American] family' (Skinner, 1965:381).

Afro-Americans developed numerous strategies to deal with their Africanness in white America. Understandably, not all of these strategies were consciously formulated, or even articulated by the early Afro-American ideologues. Moreover, both the ideologues and ordinary Afro-Americans often supported contradictory strategies at the same time or shifted from strategy to strategy as local and world historical conditions changed.

Apparently there was always a minority of Afro-Americans who sought to resolve what was for them an intolerable marginal position in America by returning to Africa. Such a strategy was supported not only by ordinary white persons such as Robert Harper but by presidents Jefferson, Madison, and Lincoln — men who saw no future in America for persons of African descent (Jordan, 1969:436ff, 552–553; Bennett, 1966:158). Therefore, singly and in small groups, Afro-Americans began to return to Africa. One such prospective emigrant was Captain Paul Cuffee, a freedman of possibly Akan origin, who despaired of Africans ever getting the opportunity to attain true dignity and equality in the U.S. He made an exploratory voyage to Sierra Leone in 1811, and in 1815 took 38 emigrants on his ship, the *Traveler*, to that country. Concerning the plight of the Afro-American, Cuffee felt the

> force of prejudice operating so powerfully against them, as to give but little encouragement to hope that they could ever rise to respectability and usefulness, unless it were in a state of society where they would have greater incentives to improvement and more favorable opportunities than would probably be ever granted to them where the bulk of the population are whites. (Fisher and Quarles, 1967:76–77)

Between 1820 and 1831 under the auspices of the American Colonization Society, some 2000 freed Afro-Americans settled in what was to become Liberia. Their motto was 'The love of Liberty brought us here'. Some 20 years later, Dr Martin R. Delany exhorted his fellow

Afro-Americans to emigrate to Africa. He felt that it was 'a great principle of political economy that no people can be free who themselves do not constitute an essential part of the ruling element of the country in which they live' (Ullman, 1971:167ff). He saw no future for the black man in white America.

The wholesale emancipation of Afro-Americans after the Civil War did not halt the black exodus to Africa. Indeed, the failure of the Reconstruction Era appeared to have encouraged the view that Afro-Americans could never achieve true equality in America. Bishop Henry McNeal Turner of the African Methodist Episcopal Church, a man who had long interested himself in African affairs, declared in December, 1895:

> I believe that the Negro . . . has been free long enough now to begin to think for himself and plan for better conditions than he can lay claim to in this country or ever will. There is no manhood future in the United States for the Negro. . . . I believe that two or three million of us should return to the land of our ancestors and establish our own nations, civilization, laws, customs, styles of manufacture, and not only give up the world . . . the benefit of our individuality, but build up social conditions peculiarly our own, and cease to be grumblers, chronic complainers, and a menace to the white man's country, or the country he claims and is bound to dominate. (Bowen, 1896:197–198)

African emigration movements of 1890 to 1910 were black inspired and broad in extent. Some white men of the American Colonization Society and of the International Migration Society provided transportation, but the leadership, money, and inspiration came from blacks. Just how broad the movement was is difficult to judge, but emigrationists were active in all southern and southwestern states, where most Afro-Americans lived. Thousands were caught up directly in one or more of the emigration schemes, and millions may have shared the black nationalists' pessimism about the United States. 'African fever' reached its peak in the mid-1890s, but it never died out completely (Redkey, 1969:287–288).

Not all of the nineteenth-century black Afrophiles advocated a physical return to Africa. A significant number sought to define themselves and redefine their relationship to America by cultivating an interest in Africa and rehabilitating that continent in the eyes of America and the world. Thus, John B. Russwurm, editor of the first black newspaper in the United States, *Freedom's Journal*, vowed in his first editorial in March 1827, that: 'Useful knowledge of every kind, and everything that relates to Africa, shall find a ready admission into our

columns' (Thorpe, 1959:7). A few years later, in 1831, Benjamin Luddy launched this appeal to Afro-Americans:

> Rouse ye! And show to your traducers, beyond the power of contradiction, that the African bosom yet glows with the generous emulation that first nourished the arts and sciences to maturity in Ethiopia and Egypt. . . . while Asia made less pretensions to knowledge and moral grandeur, Europe was in barbarism and America unknown to the civilized world. (Loggins, 1931:54)

From the 1840s to the present, innumerable Afro-Americans wrote tracts and histories extolling their African heritage and urging its study. Henry Highland Garnett charged that the non-Africans of his day sought to subvert the authenticity of the African:

> By an almost common consent, the modern world seems determined to pilfer Africa of her glory. It was not enough that her children have been scattered over the globe, clothed in the garments of shame — humiliated and oppressed — but her merciless foes weary themselves in plundering the tombs of our renowned sires, and in obliterating their worthy deeds, which were inscribed by fame upon the pages of ancient history. (Garnett, 1848:6–12)

Like Luddy, Garnett believed that Afro-Americans should spearhead the change in the world's notions about Africa. This sentiment was undoubtedly shared by the young DuBois who in 1895, though apparently unwilling to debate whether Egyptian civilization was founded by blacks ('. . . it is still a mooted question among scientists as to just how far Egyptian civilization was Negro in its origin; if it was not wholly Negro, it was certainly very closely allied') (DuBois, 1897), felt blacks had the major responsibility for demonstrating what they could do. He declared:

> For the development of Negro genius, of Negro literature and art, of Negro spirit, only Negroes bound and welded together, Negroes inspired by one vast ideal, can work out in its fullness the great message we have for humanity. We cannot reverse history; we are subject to the same natural laws as other races, and if the Negro is ever to be a factor in the world's history — if among the gaily-colored banners that deck the broad ramparts of civilization is to hang one uncompromising black — then it must be placed there by black hands, fashioned by black heads and hallowed by the travail of 200,000,000 black hearts beating in one glad song of jubilee. (DuBois, 1897)

DuBois felt that if due to historical reasons the blacks in America were

> in the van of Pan-Negroism, then their destiny is *not* absorption by the white Americans. That if in America it is to be proven for the first time in the modern

world that not only are Negroes capable of evolving individual men like Toussaint, the Saviour, but are a nation stored with wonderful possibilities of culture, then their destiny is not a servile imitation of Anglo-Saxon culture, but a stalwart originality which shall unswervingly follow Negro ideals. (DuBois, 1897)

While many early Afro-American ideologues were cultural chauvinists, a number of them sought to use their skills or positions to ameliorate the condition of the African. Cuffee petitioned the president and Congress for help in executing a plan which he hoped may ultimately prove beneficial to 'brethren of the African race within their native climate' (Cuffee, 1814). Likewise, Dr Martin R. Delany, who favored emigrationism, felt that what was necessary for the 'regeneration' and 'civilization' of the Africans was

a *new element* introduced into their midst, possessing all the attainments, socially and politically, morally and religiously adequate to so important an end. This element must be *homogeneous* in all the *natural* characteristics, claims, sentiments, and sympathies — *the descendants of Africa* being the only element that can effect it. (Delany, 1858:30)

Delany believed that a group of enlightened Afro-Americans could effectively introduce to Africa all the requirements for the pursuit of civilized life.

Alexander Crummel, the New York born son of a Temne ruler and later both a missionary and an educator, felt Christianity could do much for Africans on the continent. In a letter written to a black doctor in New York in 1860 concerning 'The Relations and Duties of Free Colored Men in America to Africa', Crummel called upon his 'skillful and energetic brethren to come to us and share the suffering and the glory of saving Africa'. He felt that 'the sons of Africa in foreign lands are called upon to bear their part in the vast and sacred work of her evangelization', and that it was 'the duty of black men to feel and labor for the salvation of the mighty millions of their kin all through this continent' (Crummell, 1860:87–93). Crummel accepted the reality that many Afro-Americans

repudiate any close and peculiar connection with Africa. They and their fathers have been absent from this soil for centuries. In the course of time, their blood has been mingled somewhat with that of other peoples and races. They have been brought up and habituated to customs entirely diverse from those of their ancestors in this land . . . But notwithstanding these pleas, there are other great facts which grapple hold of these men, and bind them to this darkened wretched Negro race, by indissoluble bonds. There is the fact of kinship, which a lofty

manhood and a proud generosity keeps them now, and ever will keep them, from disclaiming. There are the strong currents of kindred blood which neither time nor circumstances can ever entirely wash out. There are the bitter memories of ancestral wrongs, of hereditary servitude, which cannot be forgotten till the last syllable of recorded time How then can these men ever forget Africa? (ibid.)

Those early black missionaries who went to Africa identified with the interest of the Africans. Almost all of them subscribed to the biblical statement that 'princes shall come out of Egypt, and Ethiopia shall soon stretch forth her hands towards God' Therefore, they could not keep silent in the face of injustices meted out to Africans by either church or state. Bishop Coppin writing to his coreligionists about what he had experienced in South Africa declared:

When we are told that a man in America is denied civil and political rights on account of being a descendant of Africa, we are content to call it unjust, ungodly, but when we are told that an African in Africa is denied civil privileges because he is an African, we feel that besides being unrighteous and unworthy of our Christian civilization, it is ridiculous in the extreme. (Coppin, 1900–1904:247–248)

He implored his people back in America:

Pity them, pity them, Christians at home, we could then begin work at once, and what a blessing it would be. It is not at all likely that any more will be done for this class of natives by the Europeans than is being done. There is already a measure on foot — and it finds many advocates — to remove them to a 'location', that is to say, to get a camp outside of the city and place them there, where they will be beyond the reach of civilizing influences. (ibid.)

An Afro-American missionary who served in the Congo Free State was even tried for sedition when he protested the treatment of the local people. The Reverend William H. Sheppard had arrived in Bakuba country in 1890 and reported that he had received a royal welcome from the people, who believed that his quick grasp of their language indicated 'that his body must contain the spirit of some member of the tribe who was trying to return to them after death' (Slade, 1959:105–106). In 1897 Sheppard reported that the Zappo-Zap (Basonge) soldiers used for tax collection were in fact slave-raiding for the Free State and in the process were committing atrocities. The missionaries demanded an inquiry, but the European held responsible was not punished.

Even after the Belgian State took over the Congo, Reverend Sheppard felt that the new policy was not any better than under Leopold. In

January 1903 he published an article in the *Kasai Herald* criticizing the treatment accorded the Bakuba by the Kasai Company. The company countered by charging him with libel. The missionaries challenged the right of the Congo courts to try American citizens, but the trial took place in Leopoldville in 1909. During the trial, Sheppard, probably out of missionary zeal, but perhaps out of complete identification with the Bakuba, stated that he was 'no longer of England or America, but of the Kasai' (Slade, 1959:105–106). He was acquitted along with his collaborators Vandervelde and Morrison and continued to work in the Kasai. He apparently never stopped hoping that other Afro-Americans would join him. One of his letters stated: 'So we beg of you that you lift up your eyes and see the fast ripening harvest field, and hear our soul's pleading cry, "Come over into Macedonia, and help us"' (Sheppard, 1910:447).

A number of the nineteenth-century Afro-Americans who served as diplomats or who were interested in foreign affairs used their prestige or influence to ameliorate the plight of the Africans and, by extension, to improve the status of Afro-Americans. One such man, the Honorable John Henry Smyth, who was named Minister Resident and Consul General to Liberia by President Hayes at the behest of Frederick Douglass, felt it was

> my duty as an American citizen and a Negro, in vindication of the men and women of like descent with myself to state some facts explanatory of and in rebuttal of much that has been said, ignorantly, unwisely and unsympathetically, to the detriment of the effort being made at self-government in Liberia, West Africa. (Smyth, 1882:94–97)

Smyth rejected categorically the notion that he could not be loyal to both his race and the U.S. He stated that

> race allegiance is compatible with patriotism, with love of the land that gave us birth. Though we are part of this great national whole, we are a distinct and separate part, an alien part racially, and destined to be so by the immutable law of race pride, which is possessed by our white fellow citizens, if not by us. The sentiment, the something stronger than sentiment which makes an English American proud of his connection with Britain, a French American proud of his connection with La Belle France, and a German American fondly attached to the memories of the Fatherland, and all European races of their Aryan descent, has something that partakes of the moral sublime. (ibid.)

Personally and professionally, Smyth also found no contradiction in his role as a United States representative in Liberia and his high regard for people of that country. In a dispatch he sent to the State Department

on October 2, 1882, he sought to encourage the U.S. to intervene on Liberia's behalf against Britain's desire to seize Liberian territory and attach it to Sierra Leone. He suggested to one Frelinghuysen that

> if not incompatible with the relation of a foreign mutual friend of England and Liberia, you will make such suggestions favorable to the Negro nation's rights as may tend to a final and speedy settlement of the matter in justice and equity to both nations, should you feel called upon to interpose, and your suggested views should be heeded This, I am advised, is the desire of the [Liberian] President. (ibid.)

Then, in a revealing postscript, Smyth added:

> The civilized Negro in Africa under foreign domination, as the civilized Negro out of Africa under like control, suffers in his liberty, because it has not the element of imperium. 'Imperium et Libertas' must be the motto and the practice of the Negro, if he is to have self respect; if he is to merit the respect of others. I hope it may be found in consonance with the foreign policy of our Government to aid Liberia in a retention of her self respect unimpaired, her control of her territory, her prestige which is the consequence of her control. (ibid.)

Another Afro-American statesman, Colonel George Washington Williams, like Sheppard protested the cruelty shown to Africans in the Congo Free State. In 1890 he denounced Leopold's administration and leveled 12 specific charges against the king. Lawyer-like he concluded his charges with the following peroration:

> Against the deceit, fraud, robberies, arson, murder, slave-raiding, and general policy of cruelty of your Majesty's Government to the natives, stands their record of unexampled patience, long suffering and forgiving spirit, which put the boasted civilization and professed religion of your Majesty's Government to blush. All the crimes perpetrated in the Congo have been done in *your* name, and *you* must answer at the bar of Public sentiment for the misgovernment of a people, whose lives and fortunes were entrusted to you by the August Conference of Berlin, 1884–1885. (Williams, 1890:94–97)

Williams appealed to the International Commission to investigate the charges and to the antislavery societies in all parts of Christendom to end the tragedy in the Congo. He asked the constitutional government of the Belgian people

> so proud of its tradition, replete with the song and story of its champions of human liberty, and so jealous of its present position in the Sisterhood of

European States to cleanse itself from the imputation of the crimes with which your Majesty's unlimited personal State of Congo is polluted. (ibid.)

Finally, fearing that he would be misunderstood, Williams called upon the

Heavenly Father, whose service is perfect love, in witness of the purity of my motives and the integrity of my aims; and to history and mankind I appeal for the demonstration and vindication of the truthfulness of the charge I have herein briefly outlined. (ibid.)

Williams sent a copy of his report on the Congo to the President of the United States of America but there is no evidence that the President acknowledged its receipt. An America which was not ready to recognize the personality of the Afro-Americans in its midst was hardly prepared to heed the appeals on behalf of continental Africans.

In contrast to those early Afro-Americans who accepted their Africanness and sought to deal with it by either emigrating to Africa, highlighting the glorious past of Africa, defending its institutions and cultures, or trying to transform the continent by introducing Christianity and Western civilization, some of their contemporaries rejected emigrationism and Africa. Even while Paul Cuffee and the American Colonization Society were encouraging blacks to return to Africa, members of the free Afro-American community in Philadelphia stoutly refused to leave America. They issued the following declaration in January 1817.

We are NATIVES of this country, we ask only to be treated as well as FOREIGNERS. Not a few of our fathers suffered and bled to purchase its independence; we ask only to be treated as well as those who fought against it. We have toiled to cultivate it, and to raise it to its present prosperous condition; we ask only to share equal privileges with those who come from distant lands, to enjoy the fruits of our labour. Let these moderate requests be granted, and we not go to Africa nor anywhere else to be improved and happy. We cannot but doubt the purity of the motives of those persons who deny us these requests, and who would send us to Africa to gain what they might deny us at home. (Woodson, 1925:80–81)

In an effort to underscore their attachment to America, these free Afro-Americans denigrated the land from which their forefathers came. Their spokesmen declared: 'That without arts, without science, without a proper knowledge of Government, to cast into the savage wilds of Africa the free people of color seems to use the circuitous route through which

they must return to perpetual bondage' (ibid.). When several decades later Martin Delany started to preach emigrationism, his principal opponent, Frederick Douglass, denounced the back-to-Africa movement. He declared:

> We have grown up with this Republic and I see nothing in her character or find nothing in the character of the American people as yet which compels the belief that we must leave the United States. (Ullman, 1971:152)

Douglass felt that the less said about the relationship of the Afro-American to Africa, the better off the black man would be:

> No one idea has given arise to more oppression and persecution toward the colored people of this country than that which makes Africa, not America, their home. It is that wolfish idea that elbows us off the side walk and denies us the rights of citizenship. (Foner, 1950, vol. 2:441–447)

Frederick Douglass was later to concede that Africa was less the cause of his undoing than the attitude of the whites in America. He said:

> I have no love for America, as such; I have no patriotism. I have no country. What country have I? The institutions of this country do not know me, do not recognize me as a man. I am not thought of, spoken of, in any direction, out of the anti-slavery ranks, as a man. I am not thought of, or spoken of, except as a piece of property belonging to some *Christian* slave-holder, and all the religious and political institutions of this country, alike pronounce me a slave and a chattel. (Foner, 1950, vol. 1:236)

Nevertheless, Frederick Douglass could not embrace emigrationism. He did not believe that those Afro-Americans who were free should abandon their brothers who were still captives. Nor did he believe that his contemporaries should return empty-handed to Africa, ignoring the contributions that earlier generations of Afro-Americans had made to building America.

In contrast to Frederick Douglass, who had never denigrated the African even while striving to enter fully into American society, George Washington Williams, Leopold's critic, exhibited many negative attitudes toward the African. He said of the black in Africa:

> His blood infected with the poison of his low habitation, his body shrivelled by disease, his intellect veiled in pagan superstitions, the noblest yearnings of his soul strangled at birth by the savage passions of a nature abandoned to

sensuality, the poor Negro in Africa deserves more our pity than our contempt. (Williams, 1883:363)

Colonel Williams had completely different notions, however, about the children of Africa in America. A soldier in the Civil War, the colonel said of his black comrades in arms:

Endowed by nature with a poetic element, faithful to trusts, abiding in friendship bound by the golden threads of attaehment to places and persons, enthusiastic in personal endeavor, sentimental and chivalric, they made hardy and intrepid soldiers. (Williams, 1888:363)

Interestingly enough, these ideas resemble those that certain later poets of negritude were to voice about African peoples everywhere.

The attitudes of the ordinary Afro-Americans of the nineteenth century toward their Africanness and their blackness have not received the study they deserve. Less acculturated to Anglo-Saxon norms than their educated brethren, the ordinary Afro-Americans, though not immune from self-hate and self-doubt, were quietly synthesizing a full culture based on African values but adapted to life in America. Their African food habits persisted; African speech patterns influenced the English they used; their African rhythms began to blend with the music of Europe to create the only authentic American music: the spirituals, the blues, and jazz. These folk traditions would one day be used by the Afro-American intellectuals to assert, if not their Africanness, then their *soul.*

Twentieth-century Afro-Americans were to use many of the strategies of their predecessors to define their status and role in a rapidly changing world. It soon became clear that the younger black intellectuals saw politics as a means of achieving their goal. Their two principal leaders, Booker T. Washington and W. E. B. DuBois, agreed upon the use of this weapon. But whereas Washington sought his goal through compromise with the white power structure, DuBois was determined to challenge it. DuBois wrote in 1899: 'The problem of the twentieth century is the problem of the color-lines, the relation of the darker to the lighter races of men in Asia and Africa, in America and the islands of the sea (DuBois, 1961:23). And when in 1900 DuBois was invited to London to join some 30 black delegates attending the 'First Pan-African Conference of the World', called by Henry Sylvester Williams 'to protect Africans from the depredation of the Empire-builders' (Padmore, 1971:95–96), one aspect of his life was set.

DuBois was to transform Sylvester Williams' modest conference into a

major movement for black liberation. As chairman of the conference's Committee on Address to the Nations of the World, he placed the plight of Africa's children in world perspective. He urged the British to give 'as soon as practicable, the right of responsible government to the black colonies of Africa and the West Indies', he proposed that the Congo Free State become 'a great central Negro state of the world', and he appealed to the imperialist powers to respect the territorial integrity and independence of Haiti and Ethiopia (Logan, 1965:90). The delegates expressed the hope that the blacks in South Africa would receive more consideration from Britain after the Boer War, and they voiced their concern over the plight of the Afro-Americans who had the 'misfortune to live among a people whose laws, traditions and prejudices had been against them for centuries' (Hamdoe, 1969:223). The delegates resolved that black men everywhere should have justice and the right to achieve as much as they were capable of.

DuBois returned to America determined to seek for the Afro-American the civil, economic, and social rights that the Pan-African conference held were the right of all black men. In 1910 he took part in the founding of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) in America, but he never missed the opportunity to establish contact with the wider world on behalf of black both in America and in Africa. In 1911 DuBois eagerly accepted an invitation to London to attend the First Universal Races Congress. For him, this meeting symbolized the recognition by the world of the changing status of the darker peoples. At the conference he met such Africans as the Reverend Rabasana, the parliamentarian, and Mr J. Tengo Jabavu, the journalist and scholar, both South Africans. He was to say later that up to that time, this conference was 'the greatest event of the twentieth century and far . . . more significant than the Russian-Japanese war, the Hague Conference, or the rise of Socialism' (DuBois, 1911:196). This statement is intriguing because it reveals that for DuBois, the first defeat of a European power by a colored nation was a major world event, as important as world disarmament and the rise of socialism. He believed that the Congress 'would have marked an epoch in the racial history of the world, if it had not been for the World War' (Lester, 1971:63). DuBois was convinced that the roots of World War I lay in the competition among the 'civilized nations' for 'the right to own and exploit' the darker peoples.

DuBois was in favour of black participation in World War I because he saw in the war the seeds of liberation for all the darker peoples. He wrote:

This war is an End and also a Beginning. Never again will darker people of the world occupy just the place they have before. Out of this war will rise, sooner or later, an independent China; a self-governing India; and Egypt with representative institutions; an Africa for the Africans, and not merely for business exploitation. Out of this war will rise, too, an American Negro with the right to vote and the right to work and the right to live without insult. These things may not and will not come at once, but they are written in the stars, and the first step towards them is victory for the armies of the Allies. (DuBois, 1918:60)

DuBois was certainly too optimistic about the effect of World War I on the policy of whites toward the subordinate and colonized peoples of the world. William Trotter, his onetime friend and spokesman for an Afro-American organization, the National Equal Rights League, had tried to internationalize the American race problem when testifying before the U.S. Congress on the peace treaty. The State Department retaliated by refusing him a passport to go to France. The United States delegation in Versailles was equally hostile to DuBois' own effort on behalf of Africa's peoples. President Wilson refused to grant him an audience and allegedly tried to prevail on Clemenceau, the French premier, to expel him from France for seeking to convene a Pan-African congress. DuBois claims that Clemenceau called in Blaise Diagne, the black French deputy from Senegal, who was serving as president of the congress, and said to him: 'I want to ask you one question: Does this congress have as one of its goals sowing disaffection among African troops?' Diagne replied, 'No', and Clemenceau said, 'Go ahead with your congress' (Logan, 1965:92–93).

The early Pan-African congresses were significant in that they focused the attention of the world on the black man's attempt to free himself. Like the 1900 congress, the 1919 congress passed a number of resolutions including one demanding the right for educated blacks in all countries to play an important role in affairs concerning them. The 1921 conference held in London, Brussels, and Paris attracted more attention. Great Britain readily gave the Pan-Africanists permission to meet in England and many radical and liberal white British intelligentsia attended the London session. In contrast, the Belgian capitalist elite tried to get their government to prohibit the Brussels session. Voicing the concern of this group, the newspaper *Neptune* charged that the Pan-African Congress was organized by the NAACP and that its principal participants were paid by the Bolsheviks. The *Neptune* warned that the

association has already organized its propaganda in the lower Congo, and we must not be astonished if some day it causes grave difficulties in the Negro

village of Kinshasa, composed of all the ne'er-do-wells of the various tribes of the colony aside from some hundreds of labourers. (Padmore, 1971:110–111)

The Belgian paper was, of course, wrong when it stated that the NAACP supported the congress, but it was correct about the attitudes of the Afro-Americans toward the situation in the Congo. The Belgian government, less fearful than the capitalist elite, permitted the conference to take place. However, the uproar had disturbed the conferees, who then moved on to France. The Paris session was conducted in relative calm, but the French were to become leery of the congresses. In 1923 the British again permitted the Pan-African Congress delegates to meet in London, and Portugal gave them permission to hold the second session in Lisbon. Here again, the participants passed resolutions, but did not succeed in changing colonial policies. The next congress took place in 1927 in the United States but drew only mild support from the black leaders. The French refused the delegates permission to meet in Tunisia in 1929, and the subsequent worldwide depression ended this phase of the Pan-African movement.

Many members of the Afro-American elite, especially the members of the governing board of the NAACP, were impatient with DuBois and his Pan-African congresses. They insisted that the real task was to improve the status of the blacks in America. Always the dialectician, DuBois retorted that these men were parochial, did not understand the importance of 'internationalism in race problems, and to many of them, it seemed quixotic to undertake anything of the sort' (DuBois, 1940:275). He charged that they hesitated to show an interest in Africa, for fear of resurrecting the bogey of the forced repatriation of blacks to Africa. DuBois was convinced that Afro-Americans could never solve their problem by working only within America. He felt that the source of their difficulty lay in the weakness of Africa, and could not be solved apart from the liberation of Africa.

While the debate between DuBois and the NAACP was taking place, the black masses whom the NAACP were presuming to lead, especially the migrant southern blacks and migrant West Indians, were joining the ranks of Marcus Garvey's Universal Negro Improvement Association whose aim was to return to Africa. Eimigrationism was far from dead among the commonality of Afro-Americans. On the eve of World War I, a man named Chief Alfred Sam was able to raise $100,000, buy a steamship, and transport a number of Afro-Americans from the midwestern United States to West Africa. Sam's movement failed, but the desire for emigration among the black masses did not die with it. Like Delany and Sam, Garvey saw in the return to Africa a solution to the Afro-

American's plight in America as well as an opportunity for New World Africans to liberate their motherland.

Again, like others before him, Garvey was struck by the impotence of the black man.

> I asked, where is the black man's government? Where is his president, his country, and his ambassadors, his army, his navy and his men of big affairs? I could not find them and then I declared, 'I will help them . . .' (Ottley, 1943:68)

Garvey exhorted his followers: 'Up you mighty race . . . You can accomplish what you will!'

Significantly, Garvey, like DuBois, saw the problem of African peoples in global terms, and he saw their solution also in these terms. He declared:

> As far as Negroes are concerned, in America we have the problem of lynching, peonage and dis-enfranchisement.
>
> In the West Indies, South and Central America, we have the problem of peonage, serfdom, industrial and political government inequality.
>
> In Africa we have, not only peonage and serfdom, but outright slavery, racial exploitation and alien political monopoly.
>
> We cannot allow a continuation of these crimes against our race. As four hundred million men, women, and children worthy of the existence given us by the Divine Creator, we are determined to solve our own problems, by redeeming our Motherland Africa from the hands of alien exploiters and found there a government, a nation of our own, strong enough to lend protection to the members of our race scattered all over the world, and to compel the respect of the nations and races of the earth. (Garvey, 1967:38–39)

Garvey believed that while awaiting the return to Africa, blacks should be mobilized economically, socially, and especially psychologically. He waged a vigorous campaign against the Afro-Americans' shame in being black and in being of African descent. His uncompromising attitude toward color and Western values infuriated many Afro-American ideologues, such as DuBois who had some white ancestors, and who were university-trained. Nevertheless, Garvey enhanced the cult of blackness. He created black nobility, Black Cross nurses, black dolls for little girls; designed a flag with the colors red, black, and green for Africa; and painted almost all the symbols of Western Christendom black so that they could serve blacks. Garvey himself was never to get to Africa, but he did manage to effect a great change in the attitude of the Afro-American masses toward themselves as well as to Africa.

Garvey's movement spread to Africa itself and was blamed for

stimulating many African movements, including Kimbanguism, which was described in the journal *Congo* as 'garvéyisme tout pur' (Histoire et politique coloniale, 1921:576). The Belgians accused Garvey of teaching 'that European religions are not adapted to the psychology of Blacks and that the need is to found a "Negro" religion' (ibid.)

The Belgian authorities vowed to keep a close watch on the movement to prevent an excess of zeal among the N'Gunza. They also persecuted known or suspected Garveyites. We are told that

> Le nommé Wilson, noir d'Amérique, au service des Huileries du Congo Belge et représentant du mouvement pan-nègre à Kin, a été expulsé. Il est établi qu'une lie d'intellectuels du Stanley-Pool, empoisonnés par le garvéyisme, a tenté de créer parmi les populations naïves de la brousse un mouvement de forme religieuse, mais avant tout xénophobe. (ibid.)

Whether or not Garveyism was really responsible for those early Zairois nationlist movements awaits the work of Zairois scholars. Garvey did not live to see the birth of the first modern African nation, but his black star graces Ghana's flag and the colors of his own flag are in common use among young blacks in present-day America.

Seen in historical perspective, the emigration stategy of Afro-Americans did not result in the creation of an African state powerful enough to challenge racism in America. Nevertheless, emigrationism had a profound effect on the psyche of Afro-Americans. Roi Ottley believed that this movement

> set in motion what was to become the most compelling force in Negro life — race and color consciousness which is today that ephemeral thing that inspires 'race loyalty'; the banner to which Negroes rally; the chain that binds them together. It has propelled many a political and social movement and stimulated racial internationalism. It is indeed a philosophy, an ethical standard by which most things are measured and interpreted. (Ottley, 1943:68–74)

Emigrationism was, however, only one of a number of movements in post-World War I America that contributed to a new race and color consciousness among Afro-Americans. Quietly and almost imperceptibly a new force was arising in black America — born out of the migration of thousands of rural people to the northern cities; the arrival of thousands of West Indians seeking economic opportunities; and a growing determination to be free. World War I had shattered the Afro-American's view of the white man's power and civilization, and led him to search for a valid and 'authentic experience' in 'folk and African culture'. Writing about this period, Huggins states:

In so far as Afro-Americans could see their own lives as being more natural and immediate than their countrymen's, they could be convinced that the mere accentuation of their characteristic spontaneity would work toward the creation of a new Negro, a new man. (Huggins, 1971:7)

During the 1920s, blacks believed they had seen the last of the 'old Negro', a being who bowed before white power, who knew his place, and who did not try to assert himself. In his place had appeared a younger generation vibrant with a new psychology; stirred by a new spirit awake among the masses; and transformed into a progressive force in American life.

The 'new Negro' of an epoch that was to be called the Harlem Renaissance was militant and self-assured. He was determined to build race consciousness and define a culture. This meant that he had to recognize and exploit his heritage. Alain Locke declares that this change was dramatic:

Recall how suddenly the Negro spirituals revealed themselves; suppressed for generations under the stereotypes of Wesleyan harmony, secretive, half-ashamed, until the courage of being natural brought them out — and behold, there was folk music. Similarly the mind of the Negro seems suddenly to have skipped from under the tyranny of social intimidation and to be shaking off the psychology of imitation and implied inferiority. (Locke, 1941:949)

Freed from these inhibitions, and intent on finding his roots, the new Negro was thrown back upon Africa. The eternal continent tantalized the poets of the Harlem Renaissance. In his poem, 'The Negro' Langston Hughes states defiantly

I am a Negro
Black as the night is black,
Black like the depths of my Africa.

Then more philosophically he wrote in his poem, 'The Negro speaks of rivers':

I've known rivers ancient as the world and older than the
flow of human blood in human veins

My soul has grown deep like the rivers.

I bathed in the Euphrates when dawns were young.
I built my hut near the Congo and it lulled me to sleep.
I looked upon the Nile and raised the pyramids above it.

I heard the singing of the Mississippi when Abe Lincoln
went down to New Orleans, and I've seen its muddy
bosom turn all golden in the sunset . . .

I've known rivers: Ancient, dusky rivers
My soul has grown deep like the rivers.

Afro-Americans in the early 1920s achieved something like a spiritual emancipation. Like some earlier generations, they felt that they were called to act as 'the advance guard of the African peoples in their contact with Twentieth Century Civilization . . .' (Locke, 1941:957). They also felt they had to rehabilitate 'the race in world esteem from that loss of prestige for which the fate and conditions of slavery had so largely been responsible (ibid.). These Afro-Americans were determined to fight to maintain their new self-respect and valued self-dependence. The poet Claude McKay echoed the feelings of many blacks of the twenties when he wrote:

If we must die, O let us nobly die . . .
Though far outnumbered let us show us brave . . .
Like men we'll face the murderous cowardly pack,
Pressed to the wall, dying, but fighting back! (McKay, 1922:53)

The onset of the worldwide depression in the late 1920s dampened the fires of the Harlem Renaissance, and as we have seen, sapped the strength of DuBois' Pan-African movement. Yet the Afro-American was left with a heightened self-image and conscious of his links with Africa. This became evident when in 1936 blacks reacted violently to Italy's attack on Ethiopia. Roi Ottley reported that

From the beginning the Ethiopean crisis became a fundamental question in Negro life. It was all but impossible for Negro leaders to remain neutral, and the position they took toward the conflict became a fundamental test. The survival of the black nation became the topic of angry debate in poolrooms, barbershops, and taverns. (Ottley, 1943:109)

White Americans wondered that the blacks could become so fiercely stirred up by a foreign affair; but as far as the blacks were concerned, they could not get enough information about the war. The *Pittsburgh Courier* sent J. A. Rogers to Ethiopia as correspondent, and an enterprising editor in Harlem published the weekly *Voice of Ethiopia*. Blacks in East Harlem fought against their Italian neighbors and saw in Joe Louis' victory over Primo Carnera a vindication for Ethiopia's cause.

They attempted to recruit volunteers for the war. They also organized the United Aid for Ethiopia and held a mass meeting at Madison Square Garden attended by more than 20,000 people to raise funds for an Independent Red Cross group for Ethiopia. Later Dr Willis N. Higgins organized the International Council of Friends of Ethiopia, and at the instigation of Dr Maluku Bayan, a personal representative of the Ethiopian emperor, these organizations merged to form the Ethiopian World Federation, Inc.

Afro-Americans were frustrated by their inability to mobilize the world against Italy. Writing in *Foreign Affairs* about the 'Inter-racial implications of the Ethiopian crisis', DuBois voiced the 'lost faith' of blacks 'in an appeal for justice from the United States in this war, or in any affair that concerned black people' (DuBois, 1935:88, 92). Dr Huggins in a petition to the League of Nations on Ethiopia's behalf declared that the fascist destruction of Ethiopia would imperil world peace, would increase the spread of subversive political theories, and would increase the guilt of modern hypocritical Christian nations 'who yesterday raped Africa and carried away millions of her children to be enslaved in the Americas' (Ottley, 1943:109). Huggins' attack was against not only the United States. His reference to 'subversive political theories' reflected black anger over Russia's alleged role in this war. Ethiopia had charged that the Soviet government 'sold oil to Mussolini when the fascist dictator was planning his invasion of Ethiopia. This aroused great indigation among American Negroes and led to the resignation of many of them from the Communist Party' (Padmore, 1971:286).

Coming as soon as it did after the Ethiopian crisis many Afro-Americans saw the beginning of World War II, including the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, as retribution for the rape of Ethiopia. Nevertheless, their consciousness of being American citizens led them to ignore the American Communist party allegations that the war was not their concern, and they enlisted to defend America. Yet, DuBois was careful to put the role of Afro-American troops in perspective. He pointed out that while these troops were fighting in the war, the white leaders of the world were not considering the interest of African peoples at the upcoming peace conference. He accused President Roosevelt of not thinking of Africa when he made his 'four freedoms' speech in January 1941. He complained that the eight points of the Atlantic Charter were really aimed at Europe and North America, even though Roosevelt in contrast to Churchill had meant it to apply to some colonial peoples. DuBois blamed Pope Pius XII, the British Christian leaders, and the American Friends Service Committee for not really considering Africa's

needs in the postwar world. He also warned that unless Africa were seen as an end in itself, and not as a continuing means to Europe's ends, the postwar period in Africa could be tragic (DuBois, 1964:7231–7232).

These concerns were uppermost in DuBois' mind when he participated in a number of postwar conferences. He was scandalized by the contradictions he encountered at the U.S. sessions in San Francisco in 1945: Britain wanting a world of free states and democracy while at the same time holding in thralldom millions of colonials who had neither freedom nor democracy; Jan Smuts waxing sentimental about 'holism' and humanity, while considering anyone who viewed the South African blacks as human as whites to be 'mad, quite mad'; Secretary of State Byrnes arraigning Russia for lacking democracy while in his native South Carolina the black majority did not have the right to vote. DuBois was therefore psychologically prepared to heed the call of black leaders in England to organize a Pan-African Congress (DuBois, 1971:255).

The Manchester Conference, held in September–October 1945, was an important event in the history of the African people because from then on continental Africans assumed the leadership of the Pan-African movement. Now, the main task of representing Africa and its peoples was to fall to persons from the homeland. Nevertheless, the then 73-year-old

> Dr. DuBois was by no means a silent spectator at the Fifth Pan-African Congress. He entered into all the discussions and brought to the deliberations a freshness of outlook that greatly influenced the final decisions, the implementation of which is already shaping the future of the African continent. (Padmore, 1971:140)

Moreover, when he returned to America, he once again tried to persuade the black elite of the NAACP to work with the Africans in the interest of all black peoples. He declared:

> We American Negroes should know that . . . until Africa is free, the descendants of Africa the world over cannot escape their chains . . . The NAACP should therefore put in the forefront of its program the freedom of Africa in work and wage, education and health, and the complete abolition of the colonial system. (Skinner, 1965:384)

The black elite of the NAACP did not heed the injunction of DuBois, for they felt that their major efforts should be directed toward improving the status of the Afro-American within what was the most powerful white country of the world. The NAACP directed most of its energies toward securing Civil Rights, and the passage of a Fair Employment

Practices Act which in its estimation lay at the core of the black man's problem in the United States. The whole emphasis of the NAACP and the other civil rights organizations was to secure the full integration of Afro-Americans into American society. Both consciously and unconsciously, this meant that blacks were expected to adopt white life-styles, attitudes and values. In opposition to this, the surviving Garveyites, and the more radical blacks such as DuBois, Paul Robeson, and Max Yergen still saw the solution to the Afro-American's plight in international terms. They generated interest in Africa through the Harlem-based Council on African Affairs, while on the streets of Harlem the black nationalists beseeched passersby to 'Buy Black!' by which they meant, support the activities of black people.

There is now widespread consensus that DuBois was basically correct when he suggested that the future status of the Afro-American in America was linked to developments in Africa. Though never an emigrationist, he grew tired of being harassed by a hostile American regime and would later accept sanctuary in Ghana, where he died and was buried. Meanwhile, the political evolution of Africa was to have important influence on the plight of African people in America. John Hope Franklin, the most important Afro-American historian, has suggested that it was international factors rather than either presidential urging or pressure from civil rights advocates that induced the United States Congress to pass voting rights acts. He feels that the independence of Ghana and

> the emergence into independence of the Sub-Saharan nations enormously changed world-wide significance of the American race problem and provided a considerable stimulus to the movement for racial equality in the United States. As Congress began to debate the proposed civil rights bill in the summer of 1957, the diplomatic representatives from Ghana had taken up residence at the United Nations and in Washington. This important fact could not be ignored by responsible members of Congress. It seemed that black men from the Old World had arrived just in time to help redress the racial balance in the New. (Franklin, 1969:622)

The independence of Ghana also literally revolutionized the thinking of the Afro-Americans about themselves and about their place in America. Many Afro-American leaders had gone to Lincoln University, a black institution, with Kwame N'krumah, and he invited many of them to celebrate his country's independence. The ordinary Afro-American, seeing toga-clad Ghanaians speaking before the United Nations and being received at the White House, started to reevaluate his relationship

to Africa and took great pride in its new status. Thus Afro-Americans were shocked and dismayed when conflict arose in the newly independent Congo. Unconcerned with the Communist problem, Afro-Americans were suspicious of both United States and United Nations actions in the Congo and did not know what to make of the behavior of the Soviet Union and that of the independent African states. They were therefore horrified and distraught when Lumumba was assassinated, and in frustration a number of 'black nationalists' rioted at the United Nations in February 1961 during Adlai Stevenson's speech purporting to explain U.S. policy in that unhappy land. This demonstration shocked and baffled most white Americans, but it pointed out the visceral feeling among many blacks towards Africa — a feeling unknown to whites and one that had not been well articulated by the Afro-American elite.

As more and more African states gained independence, Afro-Americans simultaneously increased their interest in Africa and fought harder for full equality in America. The black elite, working through the American Society for Africa Culture (AMSAC) and the American Negro Leadership Conference on Africa (ANLC), began to mobilize and to articulate interest in Africa. At a number of meetings and conferences, black scholars and men of affairs took a hard look at the realities facing both Africans and Afro-Americans. In a background paper, Dr St. Clair Drake stated that both the African leaders and the Afro-American leaders were still powerless. But whereas the Africans were striving to overcome their weakness by working within the context of new nation states, and could form alliances with Asians and the Soviet bloc, the Afro-Americans were trying to overcome their powerlessness by acquiring political and economic power *within* a 'white' nation state and by participating in the vital decision processes of its economic, political, and educational institutions. Nevertheless, Drake felt that the two groups could cooperate for their mutual benefits. He believed that the Africans had to recognize the peculiar situation of the Afro-Americans, and the latter had to realize that the Pan-African sentiments that were useful in the past were now of necessity taking second place to the welfare of the African states (Drake, 1962:23–25).

The Afro-Americans were pleased by the African display of racial solidarity. They applauded Mr Jaja Wachuku of Nigeria who before the 15th General Assembly on December 13, 1960, declared: 'Anybody who is not prepared to eradicate that humiliation that has been meted out to people of African descent or people of our racial stock cannot claim to be in love with us' (Skinner, 1965:388–389). Afro-Americans also cheered when American whites were rebuffed by Africans because of racism in America. For example, in May 1963, Gordon Cooper, unaware

that Africans were not as concerned about his dramatic space flight as about the Birmingham riots, beamed a message of good will to the African heads of state meeting at Addis Ababa as he soared over Africa. Not only was the greeting ignored, but the final communique of the conference included an open letter to the late President John F. Kennedy which read in part:

> The Negroes who, even while the Conference was in session have been subjected to the most inhuman treatment, who have been blasted with fire hoses cranked up to such pressure that the water would strip bark off trees, at whom the police have deliberately set snarling dogs, are our own kith and kin. . . . The only offenses which these people have committed are that they are black and that they have demanded the right to be free and to hold their heads up as equal citizens of the United States. (Skinner, 1973)

Afro-Americans had reached the point in their political evolution where they were prepared to challenge inequality in all American institutions. Black students started to 'sit-in' at segregated lunch counters in southern cities, and they were soon followed by older people who boycotted the buses to protest segregated seating. Throughout the South, people demanded the right to vote and the opportunity to enjoy all the rights of American citizenship. When either the federal, state, or local governments resisted the demands for equal rights, equal accommodations, or equal justice, Afro-Americans protested. A number of new leaders arose, each one reflecting the thinking of groups of Afro-Americans: Martin Luther King represented the solid middle-class blacks who believed in 'nonviolence' as a weapon to achieve equality; Malcolm X represented those who had lost so much faith in American society that they attacked its institutions, embraced a brand of Islam, and abandoned their 'slave' (European) names; and Stokeley Carmichael, who represented the impatient youth, advocated 'Black Power!'. Significantly, all these leaders had close ties with Africa and African leaders, and saw their activities as part of the struggle of all black peoples.

What surprised many older Afro-Americans and most white Americans was the almost sudden identification of the Afro-American youth with Africa. Many of these young people had grown up in homes where their parents had espoused integration with the rest of America, but these youths reacted against being subordinated to the dominant culture. Striving for their authenticity, the youths reached back to the 1920s, took Garvey's red, black, and green flag as their standard, adopted the Nigerian dashiki as their dress, let their 'Afro' hair grow naturally, and proclaimed themselves black! Young people who had had

more civil rights than any other blacks in America attempted to become more African than any other generation of Afro-Americans. They attempted to learn Swahili because it was one of the few African languages they had heard about, they adopted African names or Africanized Islamic ones, and pushed for African and black studies at 'white' universities.

The heightened interest of Afro-Americans in Africa was not unrelated to the global crises that faced America. The anticolonial war in Vietnam, mistaken by the people of the U.S. as an epochal clash between communism and anticommunism, was being discovered for what it was — Asian nationalism. This realization shook the nation because it revealed Euro-Americans were losing their centuries-long domination of Asia. Martin Luther King, who attacked the war not only because he judged it immoral, but also because it deprived the poor of help and killed an unequal percentage of black youth, was assassinated by a racist determined to keep blacks 'in their place'. Blacks reacted, set torch to the cities as symbolic pyres for King's body, and led other Americans to fear internal rebellion as well as external humiliation. These factors led to President Johnson's fall from power. And when Robert Kennedy was assassinated during a try for the presidency, many whites and blacks wondered whether this was the end of the American era.

Afro-Americans certainly *do not* welcome the decline of a country their ancestors had helped to build, but they are also aware that it might take the end of Euro-American world domination to end their travail — that double-consciousness of which DuBois spoke. Nevertheless, like Gene Weltfish and Ruth Benedict, they recognize that

> Since the beginning of history an unusual collection of fortunate circumstances have been present among one race, sometimes among another. Up to now, every great center of civilization has had its day and has given place to others. The proud rulers of yesterday become the simple peasants of another era. The crude people who once threatened the great cities become later the kings and emperors in the same country. (Benedict and Weltfish, 1943:21–24)

Many American whites, including anthropologists, have not understood (or understand only too well) the nature of the Afro-American's dialectical relationship in their relationship, and many whites fear that the rise of black power will end it. Certainly, the retreat of the captains and the kings, and the political independence of Africa and most of the colonial world, will change the relations among the black, brown, white, and yellow peoples in Africa, America, Asia, Europe, and the Islands of the Seas. Afro-Americans will in time be able to relate to both Africa and

America as authentic human beings and not as the victims of that cruel double-consciousness.

Many of the more perceptive black scholars see the growing identification of blacks with Africa as having a positive function for life in contemporary America. Adelaide Hill has remarked (1967:134) that the growing self-consciousness of blacks has been 'strengthened by having its most basic ingredients, Africa and our blackness, viewed positively . . . by the white world and by us'. She feels that the growing practice of blacks learning about the languages and cultures of Africa should continue so that 'we can accept the responsibility of forming a bloc of informed citizens speaking out within our society on matters of foreign policy especially as they affect African areas'. Dr Hill concludes that 'this identification in turn will make our young people see a greater need for exercising their suffrage, getting an education, seeking positions of power. The strength to achieve these goals will come from Africa'.

This is indeed the only fitting resolution of the conflict posed for Afro-Americans by the consciousness of being both African and American.

Note

1. 'With America's great tradition of democracy, the United States should clean its own house and get ready for a better twenty-first century.' These words were not written by a naive liberal who did not understand that prejudice and racism were profitable to the privileged. Gene Weltfish who, with Ruth Benedict (1943), wrote these words some quarter of a century ago realized that 'Race prejudice is, after all, a determination to keep a people down, and it misuses the label "inferior" to justify unfairness and injustice.' Her hope was that America, then embattled with Hitlerite Germany, would recognize the common humanity of all men and end the mistreatment of its minority peoples, especially the people of African descent. She hoped that the changes that were taking place in the world as a result of World War II might herald a new day for the races of mankind. What Gene Weltfish saw clearly was that 'race prejudice makes people ruthless; it invites violence'. She was convinced that our civilization profited from its racial and cultural diversity; for she believed that 'Our country would be poorer in every phase of its culture if different cultures had not come together here, sharing and learning the special contributions each had to offer'.

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Politics, Theory, and Racism in the Study of Black Children

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A fundamental dilemma that has beset anthropology as a scientific discipline is that, while the societies and cultures that anthropologists have studied are predominantly those of oppressed peoples, the serious discussion and analysis of oppression itself has been taboo. As Kathleen Gough has put it, anthropology is 'the child of imperialism' (Gough, 1968). Although anthropologists commonly feel that their sympathies lie with the people they study, they more often than not find themselves unwilling to play more than the safe role of 'objective' commentator and educator when critical issues concerning these peoples are raised. Furthermore, instead of considering what the political basis for this unwillingness might be, they feel impelled to establish as 'disinterested' and 'objective' what is in fact the avoidance in their writings of the touchy social-economic and political realities that accompany imperialism.

To the individual anthropologist, the avoidance of what might be embarrassing political issues may be seen as little more than the 'tact' that is expected of professionals in positions of relative influence and prestige. The effect on the field of anthropology as a whole, however, is the distorted analysis of economic and political structure, especially with regard to processes of fundamental change. In place of such analysis is the terminological mystification and theoretical myth-making that pervade the social sciences. Since anthropologists are generally white, despite all good liberal commitments and intentions, this mystification is permeated by white-supremacist themes.

For the opportunity to engage in the research from which some of the conclusions discussed in this paper are drawn, I am indebted to the Bureau of Research, U.S. Office of Education, and the Louis M. Rabinowitz Foundation, Inc., for funding a project on schooling in Zambia, sponsored by the Institute for African Studies, University of Zambia; and to the National Institute of Mental Health that funded a special Schools and Mental Health Project at the Bank Street College of Education, in which I was responsible for the study of Social-Psychological Processes in the Classroom.

The effects of white-supremacist ideology are difficult to escape for the Western social scientist, since the ideology is so deeply rooted in the history of thoroughly racist relations between white and nonwhite peoples and nations that have unfolded in the Western world. In the discipline of anthropology, it is the ambiguous and ill-defined term 'culture', that anthropologists who wish to avoid political realities have conveniently hidden behind; and it is the concept of culture, with its strong psychological and ideological emphasis, that has recently opened the door to new forms of racist ideology with which to rationalize the status quo.

The fact that mythologies reinforce social-economic structures is, of course, taken more or less for granted by anthropologists when they analyse other societies. Yet the principle is seldom considered seriously as a basis for evaluating the prevailing ethos of the discipline itself, and the significance of the fact that its central concept is so ambiguous (Kroeber and Kluckhohn, 1952). When I was still a student, I accepted the concept as valuable in its relativistic, nonbiological, holistic, and humanistic aspects, while at the same time I was aware of its overemphasis on ideological at the expense of structural determinants of behavior. However, I did not deal with the theoretical problems inherent in this distortion of reality until I joined an interdisciplinary team studying elementary schooling in New York City (Leacock, 1969). That was in 1958, and precursors to the 'culture of poverty' theme were being developed to rationalize unequal and segregated schooling in northern cities by 'explaining' the poor school performance of urban black children in nonbiological — hence supposedly nonracist terms. More recently, I had the good fortune to be able to spend time studying primary education in Zambia (Leacock, 1973). At this time, I confronted the 'traditional–modern' dichotomy as the framework that has been used to gloss over the harsh effects of neocolonialism on the new nations of Africa. I also noted with some dismay the failure of anthropologists to define and expose the ethnocentrism that has characterized the study, usually by psychologists, of African children.

In the literature on both the United States and Africa, I encountered new forms of old racist themes that have filled the gaps left by the avoidance of the political and economic bases for children's failure at school, and for poverty and general 'underdevelopment'. The implications in both cases were that 'modern' or 'Western' or 'middle-class' — read white — children are somehow active, rational, cognitively adequate, and generally on top of things, by comparison with nonrational, fatalistic, cognitively inadequate, and dependent poor or 'tribal' — read nonwhite — children, and that such differences follow

from different 'cultural backgrounds' (Drucker, 1971). Though no single writer states the whole matter thus baldly, some almost do, yet they see their work as making a positive contribution. It is the purpose of this paper to explore this state of affairs.

The 'Culture of Poverty'

The culture of poverty hypothesis affords a clear-cut example of how the distortion of political and economic reality has allowed a supposedly neutral scientific concept to be employed in a politically pernicious way; and, moreover, how the conceptual fuzziness of a nonbiological, hence supposedly nonracial, hypothesis has allowed this pernicious use to be along racist lines. Although Oscar Lewis' definition of a poverty culture had racist overtones in relation to Mexico and Puerto Rico where his work was carried out, he did not see a culture of poverty to be prevalent in the United States (Lewis, 1966). In the hands of Patrick J. Moynihan, however, and other architects of the elaborate programs for token integration that characterized the Johnson administration, the concept became firmly entrenched throughout schools, welfare agencies, and similar institutions, that educational and occupational failures on the part of black Americans derived from values and attitudes learned by black children in the context of a disorganized family life that had become self-perpetuating (Moynihan, 1965). It was the 'culture of poverty' and not the nature of schools that caused the low achievement of black and other nonwhite children; and it was failure at school, and not discrimination in its myriad and pervasive forms, that was basically responsible for the marginal employment and low incomes found in nonwhite communities. Since 'culture' is learned and not transmitted biologically, the explanation was accepted — indeed welcomed as nonracist — by people who deemed themselves liberal. Therefore, through blatantly blaming the victims for their own victimization (Ryan, 1971) in what were nonbiological terms, the culture of poverty thesis became a highly effective rationalisation for unequal educational and occupational opportunities for nonwhites, and a further support to the institutionalized racism of our society.

A number of anthropologists have attacked the culture of poverty hypothesis on both theoretical and empirical grounds. There is, for example, the work of Charles and Betty Lou Valentine on a black urban neighborhood, prefaced by Charles Valentine's critical review of poverty culture and related formulations (Valentine, 1968). There are also the writings of Anthony Leeds on Brazil, of Harland Padfield on

unemployed workers, of myself on black and white urban classrooms, and of William Labov on the related question of speech styles, along with a growing body of at least implicitly critical research (Leeds, 1971; Padfield, 1970; Padfield and Williams, 1973; Labov, 1969). An unfavorable view of the concept has even found its way into some introductory anthropology tests (Harris, 1971, ch. 20; CRM, 1971, ch. 13). Nonetheless, it is substantially Moynihan's application of Lewis' original formula that is represented in the plethora of writings on black Americans that are read by the many thousands of students in education and social work; while within the field of anthropology the culture of poverty concept is all too often drawn on uncritically in discussions of black culture and black inequality.

Thomas Gladwin has stated the matter succinctly. The culture of poverty formula has been used to distort the lives, 'and intervention into the lives, of people less powerful than we', he wrote in a letter addressed to his colleagues in anthropology (Gladwin, 1971:9). 'The culture of poverty concept, by focusing on the behavior of poor people, legitimized the assumption that poverty was somehow caused by the poor themselves, and therefore could be corrected without changing the larger more powerful sectors of the society' (ibid.). Lewis himself wrote with seeming approval that the major solution proposed in the United States for 'multiple-problem families and the so-called hard core of poverty has been to attempt slowly to raise their level of living and to incorporate them into the middle class', and, wherever possible, to rely upon psychiatric treatment (Lewis, 1966:1ii). Yet the implication is one Lewis could hardly have really believed: the ultimate cause of poverty as a social condition is individual failure.

In the United States, the poverty culture concept has been applied almost wholly to nonwhite peoples, thereby linking the cause of their difficulties securely with their internal family relations. Through this means, the attention of people working in various institutions and programs could readily be diverted from the mechanisms through which the realities of poverty, powerlessness, and discrimination confront the nonwhite poor repeatedly and consistently at each and every stage of their lives. A truncated view of culture had supplied a theory that served as well as biologically grounded theories of racial inferiority to rationalize the continuing oppression of nonwhite peoples.

The fact that a supposedly neutral social explanation for black social and economic inequality, could so readily serve the same purposes as openly racist biological explanations, follows from the psychological reductionism inherent in typical anthropological views of culture and enculturation or socialization. For Lewis was squarely within the

traditions of 'personality and culture' anthropology when he wrote that, although originally adaptive, the culture of poverty tends to become self-perpetuating

> from generation to generation because of its effect on the children. By the time slum children are age six or seven they have usually absorbed the basic values and attitudes of their subculture and are not psychologically geared to take full advantage of changing conditions or increased opportunities which may occur in their lifetime. (ibid.: xlv)

Lewis stated further, 'It is much more difficult to eliminate the culture of poverty than to eliminate poverty *per se*'; and he suggested 'that the elimination of physical poverty *per se* may not be enough to eliminate the culture of poverty which is a whole way of life' (ibid.:li, lii). With such a view of culture, one scarcely needs race to blame black and other non-white peoples for their own misfortunes.

In culture of poverty terms, therefore, the close fit between 'good' schools and white middle-income student bodies, and 'bad' schools with low-income and nonwhite student bodies needs no further explanation than that the latter follow from the children's 'cultural deprivation'. A convenient explanation indeed, in view of the reality known by every parent, that 'good' schools in 'good' neighborhoods track children into academic junior high and college-bound high schools; while 'bad' schools in 'bad' neighborhoods track all but the most persevering (and, recently the token few in special programs of various sorts) into trade schools or what might best be called 'drop-out' high schools. It is no secret that this dual-track structure is well grounded in urban demographic patterns of segregation by class and race; or that children in heterogeneous and 'changing' neighborhoods are segregated through zoning, or, as a last resort, by tracking of 'fast' and 'slow' classes within a grade.

According to a holistic view of culture, the formal double-track structure of the school system has to be taken into account as fundamental — not accidental — to the function of schooling. And this function has always been, not just to educate children, but to educate them for their particular station in society (Lauter and Howe, 1970). Writing in the *New York Times Book Review*, Ronald Gross stated the matter bluntly:

> Plato knew it, and Rousseau, and Dewey. So does Paolo Freire, thrown out of Brazil for teaching peasants to read in six weeks by using revolutionary words like land, property, money, power, and so do the Italian schoolboys of Barbiana who write in their 'Letter to a Teacher' that 'school is a war on the poor'.

> Education is political: schools are political organizations, and schooling as an institution serves political ends. (Gross, 1970:8)

Today the function of preparing children to accept their predetermined status in society must be carried out in such a way as to preserve, to some extent at least, the myth that schools serve to equalize opportunity. In principle, the technique is simple: translate the condition of poverty into the terms of individual school failure — give students a chance to 'prove' themselves in such a way that only a few of the black and the poor will succeed, while most are sure to fail. In the second annual report of the seminar on alternatives in education, Everett Reimer wrote, 'Schools, we found, keep two-thirds of the world's children out, and make early dropouts of most lower class children who manage to get in.' Furthermore, 'A dropout from a general school system . . . has learned that the good things of his society are not for him — and probably also that *he does not deserve them.*' (italics his) (Reimer, n.d.: 167/1, 167/4).

Ivan Illich elaborated on the function of school failure in relation to Latin America:

> The higher the dose of schooling an individual has received, the more depressing his experience of withdrawal. The seventh-grade dropout feels his inferiority much more acutely than the dropout from the third grade . . . As the mind of a society is progressively schooled, step by step its individuals lose their sense that it might be possible to live without being inferior to others. As the majority shifts from the land into the city, the hereditary inferiority of the peon is replaced by the inferiority of the school dropout who is held personally responsible for his failure. Schools rationalize the divine origin of social stratification with much more rigor than churches have ever done. (Illich, 1969:32)

The challenge for anthropologists who wish to analyse social-cultural processes, and to do something useful with that understanding, is to study and to describe how the institutional structures of a society so interconnect that poor and nonwhite children consistently learn less in school, as groups, than do children from affluent homes. This in turn requires that simplistic unidimensional explanations be avoided. Political, economic, social, and ideological dimensions are interwoven so closely that it needs no overall conspiracy for the schools to effect their dual function. This is not to say that there is not a good deal of conspiring at all levels how best to gain some advantage through manipulation of the schools; nor to suggest that people in important positions do not consciously exert their influence to see that educational reforms do not fundamentally affect the status quo; but rather to em-

phasize the multiplicity of interests that become involved in the process of schooling, and the indirect influences that so commonly render direct controls unnecessary.

For example, direct political censorship is not necessary when the same end is accomplished by textbook publishers who, wanting their product to sell on the widest possible market, produce books that will not offend even the most racist and jingoist of state educational authorities. And rulings on equality of financial allocations can be safely made, when they will be rendered meaningless by overcrowding in ghetto areas, and hence in ghetto schools (when class size is reduced, schools go on double session); and by the relative powerlessness of ghetto parents to press effectively for new school buildings, and adequate and up-to-date equipment and materials. Quotas to equalize teaching experience in middle-income and low-income districts can safely be set when various processes of assignment and self-selection will still assure greater competence (with notable individual exceptions) in 'better' schools. And the justified concern of teachers for job security can be manipulated by ambitious union leaders to assure maintenance of a system in which there is virtually no accountability for failing to teach children in poor and non-white neighborhoods. Finally, the realities can be hidden behind the myth promulgated by the media, always on the lookout for provocative material that is 'safe', that black people are making great gains, and that middle-class suburbanites are being forced to pay for the support of the inner city indigent and problem-ridden population.[1]

Ultimately, all of these influences, and more, are reflected into the classroom itself, and pattern the relations between teachers and students. Outright contempt and brutality have been recorded for many schools in black neighborhoods (Kozol, 1967; Clark, 1965; Rosenfeld, 1971), but my own study documented the drab, dishonest, and moralistic curriculum, from which, at that time, any semblance of the children themselves was totally absent; as well as the authoritarian structure of teacher–student relations; and the repeated projection of expectations for failure upon the children (Leacock, 1969; Rosenthal and Jacobson, 1968). Others have documented the socialization process whereby new teachers, frustrated by the pressure of their teaching loads, by the lack of freedom in curriculum planning, or of time and facilities for adequate preparation, by either disinterest or outright hostility from the principal and older teachers with regard to innovations, and by the primacy of the demand for quiet and orderliness, either leave or succumb to the rationale that these children are, after all, uneducable (Fuchs, 1969; Lester, 1971). If I may quote myself:

> The tragedy is that the teachers are, like the children, also being cheated. Most of them start out trying and most would doubtless like to be successful at their trade. But they defeat themselves as they take part in what is one of the many divide-and-rule games which prop up our system . . . The last thing teachers are attuned to consider is how they themselves fit into a system which functions to train the children of the poor to accept their station in society as poor. (Leacock, 1970)

Scattered successes in programs here and there underline the fact that when they are called upon to do so, and given some help and encouragement, teachers *can* teach poor and black children.[2] However, the temporary nature of such programs, which, instead of being carried further, are discontinued and followed by other experimental programs, indicates how firmly and institutionally based in our educational system is our society's white arrogance and general conservatism. The community control movement in New York City at the end of the 1960s illustrates well how threats to the dual-track structure of the schools can be met. When ghetto parents, along with some dedicated teachers, both black and white, organized to insist upon some control over the schools in their districts, and over the quality and content of teaching, they encountered enormous confusion and fear among most teachers, and astute and unprincipled political maneuvering on the part of the educational hierarchy, the union leadership, and various political figures. The story of the confrontation is told elsewhere (Rubinstein, 1970); it is the aftermath that is most telling here. For in the end, the parents, confused and divided, had little recourse but to accept the same double-track structure under the new guise of 'community control'. Local school boards were established that had no effective power, and that were so hedged around with complicated election procedures that they became the vehicle whereby local elites could act as buffers between the school system and the parents. Meanwhile, here and there, parents and teachers continue in their attempts to organize and influence the schools, while educators and social scientists, most of them well-meaning and doing the best they can, as they see it, under the circumstances, devise programs to 'compensate' for the 'cognitive deficiencies' that supposedly arise from 'cultural deprivation'.

The Modern–Traditional Dichotomy

The modern–traditional dichotomy, like the culture of poverty hypothesis, serves as the means whereby anthropologists ignore reality while professing both their concern and their scientific objectivity. In the terms

of the dichotomy, the 'traditional' represents age-old and virtually autonomous ways of life that are only now substantially changing, while 'modern' or Western — i.e. capitalist — represents the direction in which the 'underdeveloped' countries either are or should be moving. By working within this framework the realities of colonialism and imperialism are reduced to recent 'urbanizing' influences, such as the involvement of tribal peoples in a 'cash nexus', that disrupt what have been well-established and integrated ways of life. It is assumed to be the anthropologist's task to analyse these influences without direct reference to the furious struggles that have been underway for the past five centuries, as the Western powers have vied for economic control of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Such matters are implicitly ruled out of bounds as economics or history, and not anthropology.

Through the use of the modern–traditional polarity, therefore, three touchy considerations are avoided: first, the fact that European and United States development was initially built upon and is being sustained in great part by 'underdevelopment' in the rest of the nonsocialist world; second, the 'modernizing' Western influences, therefore, cannot be disassociated from the continuing crass exploitation of Third World lands and peoples; and third, that there are socialist alternatives for development.

As is the case with the culture of poverty formulation, the modern–traditional framework, by avoiding the realities of political and economic oppression, lends itself to psychological reductionism. The totality of social-economic structure is truncated, and social-psychological and ideological factors move into a determinate status. Value-attitude patterns are commonly seen as in and of themselves a driving force — as 'traditional' ways that cause a people to resist 'modernizing' influences. Where structure is dealt with, a limited set of relationships is typically examined, such as a 'network' of some sort, with at best a cursory discussion of its place in the larger context. If the 'one world' that Worsley has spoken of as produced by imperialism is passingly acknowledged (Worsley, 1964), it is as often as not relegated to the area of factors 'held constant' as comparative analysis proceeds.

Although not referring to the modern–traditional terminology as such, Magubane described some of its features in a criticism of anthropologists whose 'unit of analysis (in studies of Africa) is the individuals rather than the social formation of colonialism with its complex social relations' (Magubane, 1971:420). Magubane wrote:

> . . . these anthropologists, instead of treating the colonial system as an essential dimension of the new social structure, have tended to take it for granted, or to

assume that its general characteristics are known. Attention has been focused on the behavior and value system of the Africans in towns — the objects of investigation — as though they exercised free choice. Consequently their attitudes and actions have been distorted. . . .

The style of analysis used in these studies has acted, *politically as well as sociologically*, as a powerful mystification of the real social forces at work. (ibid., emphasis his).

Even peoples of 'traditionally rural areas', Magubane pointed out, 'whose supposed non-market subsistence economy is often said to isolate its inhabitants from towns and mines of colonial exploitation, find themselves fully integrated into the same colonial structure, albeit as super-exploited victims' (ibid.:425). In 'The development of underdevelopment', Andre Gunder Frank made the same point:

A mounting body of evidence suggests, and I am confident that future historical research will confirm, that the expansion of capitalist system over the past centuries effectively and entirely penetrated even the apparently most isolated sectors of the underdeveloped world. Therefore, the economic, political, social, and cultural institutions and relations we now observe there are the products of the historical development of the capitalist system no less than are the seemingly modern or capitalist features of the national metropoles of these underdeveloped countries. (Frank, 1972)

It is not only the ugly realities of the continuing resource drain on Third World countries by imperialist powers that are drawing lavish profits from miserably low wages, then, that are being glossed over, but also the massive impact made during some five centuries of Western involvement in the affairs of other peoples. The genocide practiced against native peoples, the obliteration of native political and commercial centers, the wholesale enslavement or indirectly enforced labor of peoples — these might be noted as brutal and traumatic events, but then they are set aside when it comes to the study of 'primitive' social-economic and political forms. Kinship systems and the status of women have been analysed as if centuries of upset in the balance of the sexes, and of other pressures on land and labor, have left them virtually unaffected. Political and economic systems have been described as if unaffected by colonial administrations or the draining of labor and resources without concomitant return. When I was in Zambia, the question posed itself to me sharply: what was the area like before the Portuguese razed the coastal trading centers and the interior urban centers had fallen to ruin? Even from what little there is to read (and the task of reconstructing their history from ethnohistorical and archaeological sources

awaits a generation of African scholars), the Africa the Portuguese recorded as they attempted to move in from east and west toward the much sought-after copper of the interior, was a different Africa from that reflected in classical British functionalist writings. Apparently it has been partly in fact, as well as partly in fiction (social science fiction), that internal organization has been reduced to the level of virtually autonomous village life that suits Western notions of 'traditional' Africa.[3]

All of this is not to suggest that the task should be to reconstruct fifteenth-century Africa as 'pure' and 'traditional', after which all else is European influence. Quite the contrary. It is rather to recognize that the contemporary scene flows from all manner of changes and developments over the past centuries which, although heavily influenced by the necessity of coping with European intervention, have always been and will continue to be, changes specific to Africa and to the history of its peoples. African societies never have and never will fit either the 'traditional' or the 'modern' ends of the spectrum as these have been conceptualized. For Africans have been involved in an active process of continual change and adaptation as, in the context of their histories and relationships with one another, they have integrated into ever-old and ever-new 'traditions' of community living, economic concomitants of colonialism, influences of Western religions, and frustrations and tensions following from loss of political freedom; and it is this active adaptive process in Africa (as in the rest of the neocolonial world) that is distorted in the somehow passive and nonvital implications of the 'traditional' concept.

It is in the passivity implied by the modern–traditional concept, as it has been employed, that new forms of white supremacist themes enter in to replace (or supplement) straight biological racism. Fanon made the point that 'the perfecting of the means of production', with an end to directly enforced labor, brings about 'the camouflage of the techiques by which man is exploited, hence of the forms of racism'. He wrote, 'Vulgar racism in its biological form corresponds to the period of crude exploitation of man's arms and legs' (Fanon, 1969:35), but with new forms of exploitation, such 'old-fashioned positions tend . . . to disappear'. He continued:

> This racism that aspires to be rational, individual, genotypically and phenotypically determined, becomes transformed into cultural racism. The object of racism is no longer the individual man but a certain form of existing. At the extreme, such terms as 'message' and 'cultural style' are resorted to . . . Exoticism is one of the forms of this simplification. It allows no cultural confrontation. There is on the one hand a culture in which qualities of

dynamism, of growth, of depth can be recognized. As against this, we find characteristics, curiosities, things, never a structure. (ibid.:32, 35)

Shortly, I shall discuss ways in which the modern–traditional dichotomy, through its distortion of social structure and culture history, enbles the study of African children to continue taking an essentially racist course. First, however, I want to comment on the dilemma of liberal social scientists who feel they can at least work in limited ways to improve the lives of people with programs in medicine, nutrition, agriculture, and the like, while they avoid politically inflammatory questions. Each instance must be separately weighed, but the possibility that by so 'helping' they may in fact be staving off greater improvements that could be derived from independently and collectively made decisions by Third World countries must be faced. Only occasionally is this sharply revealed — such as when the United States government proposes to 'help' Viet Nam recover from the war.

In a letter to his fellow anthropologists, Thomas Gladwin urged them to consider their relations to Third World peoples. He wrote, 'the new colonialism of economic penetration is if anything more pervasive, probably more destructive, and is unwittingly served by far more anthropologists than the old', and he continued:

Anthropologists who deal in neo-colonialism are not only more numerous, they are also more effective. They are more effective because they often have as much influence on the subjects as on the 'masters'. They have in addition more impact because they are now members of a well-orchestrated team which embraces all the social sciences. The theme around which this team is joined is modernization.

Gladwin went on to point out that in a country like Tanzania, that is attempting to counter neo-colonialism with its own unique national style, the 'innovator–modernizer' emphasized by anthropologists may in fact be 'a principal internal enemy', while, in relation to Micronesia's growing independence movement, few fellow anthropologists are useful allies. 'Some', Gladwin stated regretfully, 'are inadvertent enemies' (Gladwin, 1971:9–10).

Schooling in Africa

The modern–traditional framework affords no basis for dealing with children's schooling in terms other than as a conflict between religious and authoritarian 'traditionalism', on the one hand, and scientific,

critical, and egalitarian 'modernism', on the other. Such a framework involves three major distortions:

1. The history and function of schooling in colonial Africa is ignored, and the authoritarian, moralistic, and noncritical atmosphere of contemporary schools is seen as a response to traditional African culture. Further the implication is that Western-type schooling has in fact represented a scientific and egalitarian orientation.
2. The world in which the children live is reduced to negative stereotypes, either of urban disorganization and poverty or of isolated 'traditional' communities, while the alternatives open to children are restricted either to hanging on to the 'old' and reputedly unproductive African ways, or to adopting new and supposedly effective 'Western' ways.
3. Researchers see themselves as detached observers outside the structure of relationships between Europe and the U.S. on the one hand and Africa on the other (once they have established their friendliness and good intent, that is). They seldom question seriously how their affiliation with the United States or Europe affects both the acquisition and interpretation of their data.

As a result of these distortions, discussions of teaching African children are vulnerable to the racist ideology embedded in polarities like civilized–primitive, logical–prelogical, scientific–magical, and abstract–concrete, that have long characterized Western ethnocentrism, and that have in recent times been given strong scientific sanction by practices of psychological testing. The precise terminologies used by different researchers vary, but the basic themes are the same. They are typified by statements that school difficulties are caused by such problems as 'the presence of conservative, traditional, and primitive cultures often antagonistic to both the modern literary-humanistic and the science-rationalistic value system' (DeWitt, 1969:125); or by the 'basic intellectual hindrances to national development' in cultures that provide 'little in the way of scientific concepts' to children (Poole, 1969:57, 62). The upshot at times has its ludicrous aspects; in Africa children are given Western materials, since their culture is so 'deficient' in activities basic to 'Western' cognitive skills, while in the West parents can buy a version of the traditional African checker-board game in order to introduce their children to number concepts! Let me, however, follow through on the above three aspects of studying African schooling in more detail.

Primary Schooling in Africa

The dedication to schooling I observed in Zambia is to be observed throughout Africa. Where parents are called on to assist the school, it is from the ground up; with initiative and energy they turn to making bricks, as they have done for centuries, with which to build new schoolrooms. Schools may be opened to receive new children even though all walls may not be hung with windows, or all floors cemented. One of the schools I observed had a hanging blackboard serving as the wall between two rooms; the neighboring classroom's work formed the constant background to the class work I was observing. Teachers have, by Western standards, very little training. However, considering the lack of materials, the large size of classes, and the minimal training of teachers, my impression was of enormous productivity and effectiveness relative to Western schools, flowing from the earnest commitment and sense of common purpose on the part of teachers, students, and parents. I know this statement would seem a gross exaggeration to Zambian teachers with whom I talked. While proud of their nation's achievements, they often saw some of their colleagues as lazy, and they were well aware of how inadequately prepared teachers were a mere six years after independence. However, they had not seen what failures a relative abundance of money, material, and training can produce in the West.

However, the atmosphere in Zambian classrooms, and in Third World schools generally, is distinctly authoritarian from a Westerner's point of view. Although the children I observed seemed to me extremely self-disciplined, especially in view of how rowdy they can be, the feeling was expressed by some teachers as well as parents that they are by no means as disciplined as children ought to be. Furthermore, the children were consistent in their expectation that their role in the classroom was to do precisely what was told them by the teacher. Learning was overwhelmingly by rote, and even the new curriculum that was designed to involve children in question and answer interchange seemed very tightly structured.

The assumption is common among Western educators and consultants working in Africa, therefore, that the rigid and formal structure they observe reflects the authoritarianism of traditional African society. Youngsters can be observed obediently listening to or following the orders of teenagers; and teenagers may be seen listening to people in their early twenties; and so forth. To the outsider, the children seem highly respectful, even fearful, of the elders, despite the fact that older people complain that children are no longer respectful and obedient — and not as they were in their own youth. Many young people who trek from the

United States and Europe to Africa to spend several years teaching in high school, as well as more mature expatriates who teach at the university level, find the experience frustrating, for their students expect to be told, to memorize, to accept authority, never to question the teacher. The picture seems complete; education is hindered by the authoritarian style in which knowledge has been handed down as a set body of traditions and injunctions. The whole is antithetical to the critical, inquiring, scientific view that the Westerner, in presumed Western tradition, is trying to impart.

To point to the problems of Western education that are glossed over by such a view — the mixture of myth and moralizing that surrounds the teaching of basic skills, and the double-track system with the commonly punitive behavior of teachers towards poor and nonwhite children — does not speak to the main point here, which is that rote learning, with children endlessly repeating what the teacher says, and commonly being whipped for academic failure as well as disobedience, obtained until recently not only in colonial areas the world around, but in the West as well. It was the form of schooling introduced into Africa. Ndabaningi Sithole recounted that his mother left school after two weeks, revolting 'against her teacher's constant whipping'. He wrote of his own early experience in Southern Rhodesia in 1931:

> We had a very strict teacher who did not spare his whip if he thought we needed it. He used the whip to get us to master the lesson quickly and thoroughly, to make us quiet when we were noisy, to get good attendance, and to make us come to school at the right time. There was magic in our teacher's whip. It achieved exactly what he wanted. . . .
>
> Despite our teacher's constant whippings we liked our school. Learning and whipping became inseparable. We all accepted the fact that without whipping there could be no real learning. (Sithole, 1968:12–13)

Later, Sithole met a teacher who was opposed to corporal punishment, though his advice to the boys tutoring the younger ones was, 'Hammer it, hammer it, and hammer it, into the children's minds' (ibid.:17). As for whipping, Sithole wrote:

> We did not agree with him. At home old people had not spared the rod to spoil the child; at my previous Central Primary School whipping had been used as part of disciplining the students. Apparently, I had come out the better for it. I warmly supported corporal punishment, and as most of us were not adherents of the 'no-whip' theory, we secretly thrashed the children we taught during our practical teaching periods. (ibid.)

Furthermore, as Herskovits pointed out, rote learning was reinforced by the effect of a curriculum based on European materials. Such curricula 'set up far-reaching discontinuities between the school and the rest of the African child's social and cultural environment', Herskovits wrote (Herskovits, 1959:223); children in French Africa, for example, might have read such absurdities as 'Our ancestors, the Gauls, who were tall, blue-eyed people with golden hair . . .' (ibid.:231). He continued:

> This, perhaps, more than anything else, accounted for the stress on rote memory which came to characterize the schooling of Africans, and which gave rise to the charge that Africans were unable to do creative or critical thinking. In terms of the transfer of culture, however, it is self-evident that the schooling of Africans under these conditions could be no more than exercise at memorizing facts. (ibid.:233, see also, Ngugi, 1964:50–53)

Presumably African children and their parents put up with all of this — to the extent that they did — for the same reasons children and parents always do: schooling was the avenue to desirable occupations. In colonial Africa, to know a European language, some arithmetic, and some modicum of political and geographical information, led to clerical jobs; while for those who were more ambitious, or were guided by their vision of a free Africa to be won, it led to the possibility of a university degree. If some quota of esoteric knowledge had to be mastered as well, it was perhaps seen in some way for what it was — the European equivalent of the esoteric and traditional knowledge that had to be mastered as the prerequisite for formal initiation into adulthood (the African equivalent of the Catholic confirmation or the Jewish Bar-mitzvah). And in Africa, as elsewhere, the ritual necessity of mastering esoteric knowledge as a major part of formal education still obtains. The Cambridge Overseas Certificate exam or one of its equivalents have continued in much of Africa to guard the door to higher education and the opportunities it opens up. When teachers try in vain to arouse student interest in critical discussion, rather than simply in learning information, behind the silence they so often meet lies the question: Is it on the exam? It is not African 'traditionalism' but the entire educational system, inherited from the West, which the examinations represent, that experimental educators in Africa must really combat.

African Children as Learners

Most training in social and political knowledge and skills took place in Africa as such eduction always has, through observation, participation,

and the experimental forms of play. Kenyatta wrote that in their play, Gikuyu children

> do most things in imitation of their elders and illustrate in a striking way the theory that play is anticipatory of adult life. Their games are, in fact, nothing more or less than a rehearsal prior to the performance of the activities which are the serious business of all members of the Gikuyu Tribe. (Kenyatta, 1962:98)

And Joseph Lijembe, a student of education at Makerere College wrote of his own childhood:

> Looking back, I know now that through these play activities (I) developed my imagination, made discoveries about the world of nature, and gained important social skills, usually finding myself organizing and generally taking the leadership of my group of playmates. (Lijembe, 1967:11-12)

Training in the professional roles of religious practitioner or healer, and in the technical skills of ironworking, tanning, barkcloth making, wood carving, and so on, involved a more formalized period of apprenticeship. Other semiformal techniques were also used for educating the young. Herskovits wrote that 'the value as an important pedagogical tool of the evening story-telling sessions was well understood, not only for imparting lore and teaching the art of communication, but for memory training as well (Herskovits, 1959:222). Kenyatta referred to the use of riddles as 'mental exercises' (Kenyatta, 1962:100; see also, Read, 1967:97), and also described the formal testing of herdboys, hiding or mixing some of their animals to see whether they knew each individual of as many as a hundred head of cattle, sheep, or goats.

The inference running through the literature on contemporary African children is that urban life has disrupted these forms of learning, and, although increasing access to formal schooling, has impaired children's motivations and ability to learn through the effects of poverty, malnutrition, and social disorganization. In other words, rather than counteracting the supposedly adverse effects of 'traditionalism', urbanization is instead said to compound children's learning problems by adding deficiencies along culture of poverty lines.

The hardships of poverty and malnutrition cannot be denied, and in both city and countryside one can see tragic figures of apathetic children with vacant faces that attest to severe deprivation. Furthermore, children have been tested and retested in formal situations with Western culture-bound methods that demonstrate cognitive 'deficiencies' which are only partly compensated for by Western-type schooling.[4] Therefore, the above-stated position seems accurate — until one takes a second look.

In Zambia, Cinyanga-speaking research assistants working with me interviewed hundreds of children, and I watched youngsters playing and helping their families both in a large working-class neighborhood of Lusaka and in a farming village, as well as observing them in school, and recording them singing, dancing, and story-telling. Elsewhere I have reported in some detail on this material (Leacock, 1971b). In summary, it yields an altogether different picture from the above. Technical skills, linguistic skills, and numerical skills, were all constantly being developed and exercised as children made model houses, pottery, wagons, and all manner of other toys; played *nsoro*, the Zambian version of the African checker-like game that involves calculating or estimating alternative moves in terms of successive additions and subtractions of small numbers; interacted with children speaking other languages than their own; made musical instruments and composed songs; formed ball-playing and other clubs and took on odd jobs to buy equipment and club shirts; helped their parents or relatives shopping, sewing, cooking, making bricks, or whatever it might be; and so on. Most impressive, perhaps, were the wire models of trucks and automobiles, with complicated steering mechanisms, that were cleverly constructed from wires scrounged from dump heaps or filched from fences. Indeed, the Zambian children I observed where engaged in precisely the kinds of activities recommended in new Western curricula for developing cognitive skills,[5] yet Western and Western-trained educators continue to issue advice based on the Western myth of their deficiencies. Only a few as yet depart from such a stance (e.g. Cole et al., 1971).

Children were urged, in the interview, to talk about aspects of the weather they wondered about, and their answers were, to be sure, largely stereotyped and unimaginative. It would have taken more than one short interview to cut through the relative formality of the questionnaire technique, even though the queries were open-ended, and children were interviewed out-of-doors in their own neighborhoods. However, a few thoughtful answers were nonetheless elicited, enough to indicate how stereotyped itself is the myth of nonrationality among non-Western children. Some statements by eight to ten-year-old girls and boys, translated into English, were: 'I want to know why the wind makes your body cold'; 'I have heard much about the sun. But how did they learn all that about the sun, for they say it's millions of miles away from the earth?'; 'I want to know why the moon does not shine in your eyes like the sun'; 'I want to know why the moon sometimes does not appear'; 'I also wonder why we have clouds when it is going to rain, and why it can't rain without clouds. This gives me the impression that rain is caused by clouds, but sometimes days are cloudy and it does not rain. I do not

know why'; 'I want to know what it is that looks like a hare on the moon'.

Children in contemporary Africa are said to lack adequate role models when it comes to technical skills, especially since older crafts have so often disappeared in the face of manufactured consumer goods. Yet, in Zambia, I observed no lack of adult models when it came to the everyday use of 'modern' technical skills. I found instead such skills to be rather taken for granted, as people tried to keep broken-down cars running on virtually no money, and learned to repair watches, clocks, radios, sewing machines, and the like. I was impressed with what I thought to be the unusual dexterity of a research assistant who took apart a SONY cassette to rethread its broken tape, only to be doubly impressed when another young man casually did the same. A long-time British resident in Zambia mentioned to me that even in colonial days the white Rhodesians grudgingly admitted the ability of Africans to work with radios. At that time ironworking had been made illegal, and Africans were making their own guns in secret.

The problem in taking advantage of widespread technical abilities, however, is the same as in the West. Practical technical education is relegated to lower track vocational schools and separated from the science education of the university. This separation between technical skills and science education is further widened by the noncritical style of schooling established by the missions and perpetuated both by the examination system, and by the general divorce of liberal arts education from practical problems. The difficulty that results in developing among university students the critical stance appropriate for science is then laid at the door of 'traditional' African thought styles.

The Illusion of Scientific Detachment

I have already indicated that the modern–traditional framework, by transmuting political and economic problems into ideological ones, helps maintain the illusion of scientific neutrality and detachment. This illusion, in turn, leads to further distortions in the procuring and analysis of data, for it enables Western researchers to ignore the fact that, when 'in the field', they are entangled — whether they wish it or not — in relations that pertain to power. Westerners represent, albeit in an attenuated form, imperialist nations that are actively seeking to maintain relations of dominance, economically and politically, over people who have been seeking to win their freedom from a colonial or neocolonial status. Failing to recognize this, Western researchers do not see that the

simplistic dualisms of the modern–traditional dichotomy, like those of the poverty-culture concept, involve assumptions and half-truths that arise in great part from conditions of superordination and subordination.

Western social scientists, generally white and by definition 'middle class', see themselves as active, rational, logical, or, in short, *effective*, by comparison with colonial or lower-class people, typically of color, who are seen as essentially opposite, and as passive, fatalistic, non-rational, the ones acted upon. When they themselves fail to act, such as when they fail to take clear-cut positions on political issues, Westerners see their behavior as following from the realistic or rational assessment of a situation. However, the failure of the 'other' to act is seen in terms of 'fatalism' or 'passivity', or the like. The 'initiative' and 'decisiveness' that Western researchers are able to exert in their everyday relations with members of oppressed nations are implicitly seen by them as the cause, rather than the result, of their position of relative power. Since they see themselves as detached outsiders, they often fail to see how structured and limited are the situations in which they interact with the people they are studying. Abstract–concrete dichotomies seem to make sense in this context, for dependent people must deal specifically with each situation that involves a representative of the oppressor, approaching it with care, in order to survive. Social scientists then interpret this specificity as the whole of thought for the 'other', whom they see and deal with 'in general'. Contradictions abound. For example, active–passive dichotomies may be crosscut by polarities that involve self-control versus impulsiveness, for the oppressed may suddenly and violently rebel, either as individuals or groups.

Formulations of this type have been made most extensively by psychologists or psychiatrists. Carothers, who analysed the Kenyan resistance movement known as Mau Mau in terms of psychological pathology, is a classic example for Africa, as is Ritchie who, somewhat earlier, formulated a view of African psychological dependency in an article on 'The African as suckling and as adult' (Carothers, 1954; Ritchie, 1943). To watch an African fall into a pathetic pleading stance when asking a favor of a European, and, when the European is gone, to shift into a calmly assured and practical stance, gives witness to the pervasive patron–client relations of neocolonialism that have to be evaluated before any real understanding can be arrived at. My point here is that the modern–traditional conceptualization does not call for such an evaluation. It enables anthropologists to continue with a kind of liberal and well-intentioned racism that glosses over the centuries of history in which Africans have been appraising situations, weighing alternatives, changing, adapting, and dealing with ever new situations.

In Conclusion

Like the culture of poverty concept, the 'modernization' concept allows theoretical confusions, and sociocentric and racist biases, to intersect with political influences in discussions of oppressed peoples. Both concepts freely use 'culture' as an ill-defined term that focuses heavily on the social-psychological and ideological dimensions of social-historical process, and glosses over structural realities of political power and economic control. Cultural holism should mean treating human institutions in their total context. In fact, however, it means interpreting a colonized people's cultural, political, and economic life as virtually a closed unit, apart from the realities of their colonial status. Functionalists, who focus on the interconnectedness of social institutions; along with evolutionists, or cultural ecologists, who focus on the determinate role of the economy, technology, and environment in this interconnectedness; as well as historical particularists, who have focused on the external source of specific traits among neighboring peoples, have in the main all been united in this respect. The fact that the military, political, and economic domination by Europe and the United States of the peoples anthropologists study has been transforming the entire structure of these peoples' lives for centuries is seldom confronted.

The resulting mystification encourages and reinforces a series of assumptions about education that are not only taken for granted by most Western social scientists and educators, but are all too widely accepted, with but minor modifications, by Third World peoples themselves. The traditional–modern framework, by masking neocolonial realities, fosters the assumption that what is needed to 'modernize' a nation — or to achieve the standard of living commensurate with the West is to attain a level of education presumed necessary for technological advancement. The stumbling block is seen not as structural, but as 'cultural'. 'Traditionalism' affects children's cognitive style and motivation, and hinders their readiness for scientific and technological training.

The assumption, further, is that it was a Western world view that made possible Western technology and the Western high standard of living (thought in Africa, by the way, to be far more widely shared by all sections of the population than is the case). Thus it is with great initiative and dedication that Africans have turned to building their education systems.

Hidden from view are the realities of neocolonial control, and the simple fact that, under the present economic structure, there are not enough pieces of pie to go around. That the U.S. standard of living is based upon the fact that its 6% of the world's population consume over

50% of the world's nonreplaceable resources is not faced. Neocolonialism affords enough profit, after all, to allow some gravy for the elite and the token few who 'make it', and there is the illusion of material betterment due to the increasing availability of cheap manufactured goods — and Coca Cola — to cover over what is probably a continuing decline in diet. Here, too, there is much concern with nutritional *education* — the problem is seen as knowledge, not income.

Glossed over is not only the nature of an economy in which affluence for the few is achieved through poverty for the many, through incredible waste of the world's resources and its threatened destruction as a home for mankind. Glossed over, also, are the historical realities of the West's rise to ascendancy which was achieved not through 'rational' progress based on a scientific viewpoint, but through the accumulation of capital squeezed not only from the labor of Africans, Asians, and American Indians, but also from the poor in Europe, with children as well as women and men laboring under what appear today impossible hours and conditions.[6] As for the study of children in school, the role education has played historically in socializing each new generation is ignored, and the myth of schooling as the inevitable road to progress continues to prevail. Yet it is clear that something is wrong. The ideology embodied in the culture of poverty and the modern–traditional concepts would have us believe that schooling practices and occupational structures are not the problem, but that the children themselves are to blame.

Notes

1. Materials documenting the favoring of the suburbs at the expense of the inner city through differentials in tax burdens, through expenditures for highways rather than mass transit, through housing loan policies, and the like are widely scattered. An example is Bernard Weissbourd, 'Are cities obsolete?' in Jeffrey K. Hadden, Louis H. Masotti, Calvin J. Larson (eds), *Metropolis in Crisis, Social and Political Perspectives* (Itasca, Illinois: F. E. Peacock, 1971).
2. As most dramatically documented in Herbert Kohl's *36 Children* (New York: The New American Library, 1968). A significant instance where school reading levels as a whole were raised is afforded by the LP Hill School in North Philadelphia. The principal, Oscar Goss, set goals for each individual child in consultation with their teachers on a monthly basis, and followed up to see whether the child attained the goal.
3. I had a rather interesting experience trying to combat the perpetuation of such notions when working with an editor of *Natural History Magazine* on my article on children's play. Having argued against the cutting out of all references in my article to old traditions of urban trading and political centers, I was shocked to see, when the journal came out, that the title 'African children at play' had been changed to 'At play in African villages'. That most of my materials were gathered in the city of Lusaka was clearly stated in the article.

4. The literature on this topic is reviewed in a United Nations Research Institute for Social Development report: *Preparation of the Child for Modernization, Skills and Intellectual Requirements*, by P. E. Mandl (Geneva, 1969).
5. As presented, for example, in the pamphlets of the Nuffield Mathematics Project, published in London by the Newgate Press.
6. Cf. for Africa, Rodney, Walter, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*, (Dar es Salaam: Tanzania Publishing House, 1972). Such a book documents the myth of European and African history taught in both Europe and Africa. A nice example of the 'rationality' of European 'modernization' is quoted from Robert L. Heilbroner, *The Worldly Philosophers* (Simon and Schuster, 1966), p. 18, in Denis Goulet's *Cruel Choice* (1971): 'In England a revolutionary patent for a stocking frame is not only denied in 1623, but the Privy Council orders the dangerous contraption abolished. In France the importation of printed calicoes is threatening to undermine the clothing industry. It is met with measures which cost the lives of sixteen hundred people! In Valence alone on one occasion 77 persons are sentenced to be hanged, 58 broken on the wheel, 631 sent to the galleys, and one lone and lucky individual set free for the crime of dealing in forbidden calico wares.'

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Women, Work, and Property in a South American Tribe

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The relationship between the sexes and the problem of female status remain as enigmatic to us today as they were when Engels wrote *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State*, over 90 years ago. We have traveled some distance since then, of course, and most anthropologists look upon primeval polyandry, the pairing family, the primitive matriarchy and the universal transition to patriarchy as rather whimsical notions that emerged from the faulty empiricism of the time. The intervening century has seen us gather an almost numbing variety and number of facts, a profusion of data that certainly defeated the grand schemes of Morgan and Engels but which, in the final analysis, could not only be used to disprove almost anything but to prove it as well. We seem to have moved from ordered error to a chaos of fact.

Much of the problem with Engels' work derived from adherence to the evolutionary scheme, *qua* scheme, of Morgan's *Ancient Society* (1877). If we have made any substantial progress in anthropology over the past decade it has been in the steady movement away from rigid empirical frameworks, whether evolutionary or structural, toward attention to social and historical process. In this sense, we can well dismiss Engels' statement that: 'Women occupied not only a free but also a highly respected position among all savages and all barbarians of the lower and middle stages and partly even of the upper stage' (Engels, n.d.:77). The observation may have been true for the Seneca, used as illustration by Engels, but it would seem to have no relevance to much of New Guinea, Australia, Africa, South America and, indeed, most of the 'savages' and 'barbarians' of the world other than the Iroquois. The Yanomamo beat

Yolanda Murphy takes pleasure in noting that it was Gene Weltfish who first encouraged her to see the realm of the female as an integral and distinct sector of culture and who urged her to do ethnography of the Mundurucú woman. This essay is a token of her gratitude. Both authors also wish to thank Orna and Allen Johnson for their helpful suggestions.

their wives unmercifully, Australian men pass them around as economically useful pawns in a prestige game, they are kept (ostensibly) cowed by bull roarers and a variety of other sacred instruments in a number of societies, and female labor has been used for the advantage of males long before the working wife became the norm. Their blood and bodies have been treated by males in simpler societies as impure, their sexuality as dangerous, their legal status the equivalent of children. The ethnographic data for this are too well known to need recounting, and we may well look askance at any categorical statements linking women's status to evolutionary stage.

The true significance of Engels' work, and what made it go far beyond Morgan's theories, lies not so much in its attempt at historical, or evolutionary, reconstruction as in the processes he saw to underlie history. First and foremost, these include those social relations involved in labor and control over productive resources. It is this emphasis, rather than one kind or another of evolutionary sequence, which makes Engels intelligible in terms of modern anthropological theory. It is a perspective that, in the best tradition of social anthropology and of cultural ecology, asks who does what, when, where, how, and with whom.

Relations of labor and property are not, of course, the only factors in the structuring of relations between the sexes, for, despite all the economic variability found ethnographically, the simple fact remains that we have never found a bona fide matriarchy. The various disabilities connected with childbirth and rearing of the young must also be taken into account, as must the social devices used by males to gain control over the issue of women. There are problems, too, in the respective life experiences of males and females that require the male to transform the relationship to the mother and shift his identity to the father or another man. The psychological residue of the escape from maternal envelopment produces a series of defenses, some of which find their way into the realm of public institutions. There is, then, a primordial opposition between the sexes that goes far beyond the limits of Engels' theory, and factors within the productive sphere operate within the parameters of this relationship. Humanity is not a tabula rasa, nor are the sexes; to assume the indefinite plasticity of sex roles would lead to the worst kind of relativism — paradoxically, this is certainly where a single-minded materialism can lead us.

The significance of women's work in relation to female status has received considerable attention in recent publications. In a volume of essays entitled *Women, Culture, and Society* (Rosaldo and Lamphere, 1974), Karen Sacks argues that it is the exclusion of woman's work from social production and its relegation to the domestic sphere that accounts

for deprivation of the female role (Sacks, 1974). The same book also includes an article by Peggy Sanday, who applies a cross-cultural test to the thesis that female status will vary directly with the importance of the female contribution to subsistence (Sanday, 1974). The results were indifferent, suggesting that heavy female involvement in the subsistence economy can just as easily lead to her enslavement as her manumission. One is reminded of Oscar Lewis's doctoral dissertation (Lewis, 1942), in which he shows that Blackfoot polygyny increased dramatically after trade in buffalo hides developed, due to the need for female labor in tanning. Inversely, noble Tuareg women, surely among the most elevated of womankind, do practically nothing, or at least so it was before the great droughts. We would not argue that they were prestigious because they were idle — rather, they were idle because they were prestigious. If one considers then only gross amount of work in subsistence, or proportion of food supplied by women, there is no incisive correlation, or working relationship for that matter, with status.

If contribution to subsistence is not the key variable, then what is? Orna and Allen Johnson (1975), comparing their data from the Peruvian Machiguenga with our own Mundurucú material (Murphy and Murphy, 1974), conclude with us that it is the *organization* of work, the labor process itself, rather than amount of work performed by each sex which explains the relative status of women. This is in accord with the much earlier finding of Fred Eggan that, among the Hopi, where the men do the agricultural work, male productive efforts are generally solitary, whereas the women grind corn together in sociable cooperation (Eggan, 1950:131). This cooperation, says Eggan, is one of the mainstays of the integrity of the matrilocal extended family, and, we would presume, of female status. It is this factor of the organization and cycling of work, and the modalities introduced by labor into social relations, in general, that will be the principal concern of this paper. In the same vein, we will discuss property as a relationship between people, and not as a relationship between people and things. In short, though we will treat the economic life of a primitive people, we will look upon economy as part of social structure, albeit a very pivotal part.

The Mundurucú Indians of Amazonian Brazil would seem an appropriate test case of the notion that the social abasement of women is the historic result of private property and class stratification, for they incorporate a thoroughgoing ideology of male supremacy with a social system that is a close approximation of 'primitive communism'. Women in Mundurucú culture — and here we use the term culture in its normative sense — have a decidedly second class status. As would be expected for any society in the Amazon region, women cannot hold

political office of any kind, nor are religious offices open to them. Women cannot be chiefs, nor can they be shamans, nor can they perform any leadership function in the ceremonial cycle. Their ritual roles are few and usually restricted to acting as a chorus to the words and movements of the men. The status of women is considered by the men to be inferior to their own. A woman should wait upon her husband, she should respond to his sexual demands, she should content herself with bearing and raising children and doing the chores assigned her within the order of things.

The social superiority of the Mundurucú male is bulwarked by both living arrangements and ceremony. The details of these institutions of male supremacy have been thoroughly discussed elsewhere (Murphy, 1958, 1959, 1960; Murphy and Murphy, 1974), and we recapitulate here only the minimal facts needed to support our argument. First, the Mundurucú practice a quite radical separation of the sexes in residence, association, and work. Each of their traditional villages has a men's house, a large, open-sided structure in which all males above the age of puberty sleep and relax. It is a male sanctuary by day and night, a place where women almost never enter and in which the men do odd jobs, such as arrow making and basketry, as well as simply loll about and talk. The men's house is the active arena of male solidarity, a clubhouse and a negation of all the virtues of domesticity. The men sleep there in two long rows of hammocks, the older men hanging theirs in the most sheltered end, the young boys more exposed to the weather; nobody is more than two feet away from his neighbor. There is nothing exclusive about its membership in the sense of social rank, for all the village males live in it, but it is certainly rigidly exclusive of women.

The men are not totally divorced from the dwellings of the villages. Large communal meals are served in the men's house on evenings when there is an ample supply of meat in the village, but morning meals and snacks are eaten in the dwelling. The women are the hewers of wood and the bearers of water, but they do not bear water for the men's house; the thirsty male has to go to the house of his wife, or perhaps his mother, if he wishes a drink. Men very often pass time in their houses, speaking to their wives, playing with the children or carrying out some small task. They sometimes visit the houses late at night for love-making, but this occurs just as often during excursions outside the village.

Each men's house has a small chamber located on its south side where a set of three tubular musical instruments are kept and played. The instruments are believed to house the ancestral totemic spirits of the Mundurucú patrilineal clans, and symbolic offerings of food are made to them almost daily. The instruments are played most evenings, one man

taking the lead and two others playing in counterpoint, but the deep vibrant music is not believed to be, or represented to be, the voices of the spirits. Even the women, who are under a strict injunction not to so much as cast their eyes on the instruments, understand that it is just music — they can even recognize who is playing.

According to a Mundurucú myth, the instruments once belonged to the women, who had originally found them, but were taken away by the men because the women could not offer game meat to the spirits. Possession of the instruments is believed to bring power, and the women are said to have dominated the men during the short period in which they owned them. After the men took them away, they, in turn, became the dominant sex. Hunting, and the ability to provide meat, therefore, became the basis of the men's control of the instruments and, thus, of their ascendancy over women. But the women could reclaim the instruments if the men are not careful, and it is for this reason that they are prohibited to female eyes. This is but one of a number of strictures against female intrusion into the male sphere. Another is the male view that though sexually available women are regarded as an asset, no woman may aggressively and openly undertake a sexual liaison. The penalty for female promiscuity is gang rape, which is the same punishment that would be meted out to a woman who had spied on the instruments. In passing it should be noted that we never heard of a case in which a woman was assaulted by the men for looking at the instruments, though there were several instances of gang rape of women who were sexually aggressive or had in some other way openly threatened the male role. There is probably a simple reason for this: the women had a healthy interest in sex, but they never expressed curiosity about the instruments or any desire to see them. Some woman in the past must have taken a peek, as the women all had a rough idea of what the instruments were like, but they were largely indifferent to these reservoirs of male power, though they are said (by the men) to have once owned them.

One can always look upon every social phenomenon in two ways. On one hand, the Mundurucú men were the overlords of their women, and so haughty and elevated was their position that they did not deign to live in the dwellings, inhabited as they were by women, crying children, and snarling dogs, and always redolent of the cooking fires. Now, looking at the situation in another way, the men had effectively abdicated the dwellings, along with control over the women and their own children, and had estranged themselves from the core of social continuity. Let's phrase it even more strongly and say that the men were, in effect, thrown out. All these premises are true, of course, and the way that one chooses

to look at the situation is largely a political choice. But the rule of the men is too neat, patent, and manifest to be wholly accurate or even interesting, and we elect for the time being to take the latter viewpoint, to pursue the covert premise that the men were outcasts.

The two most important institutions within Mundurucú social structure are the men's house and, equally important, the extended family. There are two to five dwellings in each of the extant traditional Mundurucú villages, and their residential composition is structured by a preference for matrilocality. The sons of chiefs may exercise an option to remain in the house of the father after marriage, but the other residences are organized around a core of related women. This is by no means an invariant rule, but matrilocal unions are indeed the statistical norm. The social networks of the men, then, are quite different from those of the women. The occupants of the men's house are quite commonly from other villages, separated by marriage from their fathers and brothers and from their fellow clansmen; one effect of the residence preference is that the patrilineal clans have no local nuclei and patrilineages are wholly absent. The women, on the other hand, commonly reside in the same household as other primary female relatives. Given the vicissitudes of marriage and a quite high divorce rate, these clusters of related women are, in effect, the most stable social units in Mundurucú society. Mothers and daughters are not, of course, members of the same patriclan, or even of the same patrilineal moiety, but this is irrelevant to the maintenance of close and enduring bonds between female kin. Nonetheless, in as much as the matrilocal extended families are not defined by genealogy or by unilineality, it would be incorrect to speak of them as matrilineages. Descent is not reinforced by coresidence for either males or females, and the result is that the patriclans are not corporate units in any sense of the term, their main function today being a framework for the attribution of common kinship to people of different villages. Moiety membership determines marriage choices, and clan membership serves to unite all the Mundurucú villages in a common web of kinship. Unilineality has little to do, however, with the structuring of social solidarity within the communities.

Mundurucú clans are not corporate units, but neither are there any corporate groups of any kind in Mundurucú society, if we are to define the term as denoting control over some strategic resource or estate; the female households are actually the closest approximations of corporate units among the Mundurucú. There is no private property in natural resources, except for rubber trees in modern times, nor is there any form of ownership by a group. This total lack of closure of access to the needs of life is closely related to the subsistence economy and the forest en-

vironment. The Mundurucú live by slash-and-burn farming, hunting, fishing, and the collection of wild fruits and nuts. Hunting is an exclusively male occupation, commonly undertaken by collective hunting parties but often pursued by individual men or groups of two or three. Whether alone or in groups, the entire region of forest and savannah surrounding the villages is open to all, and the only restriction on range is the desire of the hunter to get back to his village before nightfall. The vicinities of the villages are not bounded hunting territories, except for the simple fact that one would ordinarily hunt near home, and hunting parties occasionally chase herds of peccary into the neighborhood of another village. Courtesy requires that the men of the other village be invited to join the hunt, but this is done only because of the high value on sharing and cooperation and not because of territoriality.

Fishing, similarly, involves no proprietary rights by any group, and access to waters is limited only by the common-sense factor of physical proximity. Whether fishing is done by two people in a canoe, a solitary male along the shore, or by the entire population of a village, as in the case of poisoning streams or lagoons with *timbó*, anybody can fish anywhere. Travelers fish where they please, just as they would hunt where they find game, whether or not it is done near some other village. In the same way, gathering is done by both men and women wherever the fruits are to be found; the forests and waters are freely open to any person or group.

Mundurucú horticulture follows the slash-and-burn, or swidden, routine that is almost universal in the forest regions of South America. A tract of land is chosen by a man, cleared with the help of all the men of the village and then burned over before the start of the rainy season. It is planted after the first rains and replanted again the following year; at the end of two plantings, the soil has been depleted of its nutriments, weeds invade the garden and it is abandoned. The tract becomes covered with secondary forest, which is allowed to grow for at least 20 years before the land can be cleared again. The long fallow cycle and the short productive span of the land makes for a most extensive form of cultivation, and large tracts of land are necessary to support a village. But suitable forest lands are abundant in the vicinity of most Mundurucú villages, and we noted no pressure on land resources during our fieldwork. Villages are rebuilt every ten years or so, usually because the houses deteriorate and the precincts become overgrown. Moves usually are not made because of any shortage of nearby agricultural land, and one village shifted around in a radius of about a mile and a half over a period of almost a half-century.

Given the abundance of tillable terrain, it is understandable that access

to forested lands is not limited by property relationships. Gardens, however, are considered to be 'owned' by the household that had initiated the clearing of the forest and had done the main work of planting. One must specify exactly what is involved in this 'ownership'. Many houses have one garden, though larger extended families often have two. The garden site is selected by the senior man of a household, who then invites the other men of the village to help him clear it. Planting of the manioc shoots is done by all the men and women of the household, one of the few occasions for intersexual cooperation, and the sowing of the remaining crops is done by the household women in cooperation with each other. The women do all the work of weeding and harvesting. The extended family that undertook the garden has the primary right to use its yield, though it is shared by others on occasion, and it is only in the sense of usufruct that 'ownership' can be said to exist. Mundurucú men speak of the senior man of the house as the owner of the garden he initiated, but the women are just as likely to speak of it as belonging to the senior woman. Here again, we must qualify ownership, for the word used to denote this relationship means, in a more general sense, 'the person in charge', a term that is also used to signify the chief's position in the village or the organizer of a ceremony. Once the garden goes out of production, the household maintains no rights, residual or otherwise, on the land. It returns to being a free resource.

If property in land does not exist, and if forest areas have value only insofar as labor has been expended on clearing them, who then owns the products of the soil? We have said that the extended family-household units exercise usufruct rights over gardens and their yield, but this in no way implies exclusiveness of consumption. The produce of the fields is shared collectively by all the members of the extended family to the degree that nuclear families do not even have a separate hearth — each Mundurucú dwelling has but one fireplace which serves the needs of the approximately three to six families in residence. Sharing, then, does not mean the simple allocation of supplies of raw food to individuals, for everybody figuratively, and often literally, eats from the same pot.

A certain amount of food is distributed beyond the household. Small game animals, such as monkey and paca, are usually shared by the members of the extended family, and the men of the house join in these meals. Larger animals, such as peccary and tapir, are brought by the hunter to his wife or, if he is unmarried, to his closest female relative. She, with the other women of the house, butchers the animal and sends approximately equal portions of it to all the other houses of the village. This is done even if every household has a successful hunter. The women of the house then cook up their shares; a part of the cooked food is sent

out to the men's house and the rest eaten by the women and children. It is on these occasions when large game has been taken that all the men eat a communal meal in the men's house. Vegetable foods are not shared on so systematic and regular a basis, but then they do not have the status of the ritual food par excellence, as does meat. The women of several houses join each other in the preparation of manioc flour, or *farinha*, and all the participants receive a gift of several gourds of fresh farinha for their help. In the event that a household has no producing gardens, due to a recent move to the village or an invasion of their garden by armadillos, all the other households contribute to their subsistence, either by gifts of farinha or by allowing the needy group to harvest from their gardens. Nobody goes hungry among the Mundurucú, for food is not a commodity in any commercial sense. Indeed, one of the worst accusations that one Mundurucú can make about another is that he would sell food to his own brothers. This is one of the few societies in the world that operates on the principle of 'from each according to his ability, to each according to his need'.

Given the importance of food sharing for both the requirements of subsistence and as a continuing generator of social solidarity, it is worth stressing that the women control the distribution system almost completely. As the primary producers and harvesters of vegetable foods, they are also the dispensers of it to others. As for fish and game, one of the key external manifestations of the marriage tie is that the man gives his take to his wife, and to nobody else. When he does not do so, it symbolizes the breakage of the tie and divorce; when he gives food to another woman and she accepts it, it signifies a new union. There is thus a neat equivalence of meat and sex in an exchange system that binds men and women, and which is often expressed metaphorically by Mundurucú men, who speak of women as 'game meat'. In a much broader way, food sharing is a measure of unity and, as such, must be considered a profoundly political act. As producers and as wives, women ultimately have jurisdiction over all food and it is they who both prepare it and dispense it. Even when it is almost automatically shared with everybody, the women determine which houses get the choicest parts, and, when the amounts are too limited to be passed throughout the village, they determine which women will receive; usually, it is their closest kin.

The significance of all this is that the basic system of exchange and consumption of the goods of subsistence is female-controlled. And since there is no property, corporate or individual, of the natural resources from which subsistence is taken — lands and their flora and fauna — it follows that there is no focal point at which men can exercise control over the productive process and, through such control, over women or

other men. To be sure, the lack of property and social hierarchy, for this is an absolutely classless and rankless society, prevents women as well from using economic devices for the coercion of others, but their monopoly on distribution does allow them to exercise some management over the politics of interhousehold relations.

That men cannot exercise dominance over women through wealth or control of the goods of life is manifest within the household economy. The nuclear family has little economic identity of its own, except for the provision of trade goods to the wife and children by husbands, who collect wild rubber during the dry seasons. Women depend upon their husbands' collecting activities for pots, pans, and dresses, but not for subsistence. A woman and her children do need protein, of course, and game and fish are essential to them, and these are indeed provided by men. They are, however, entitled to enjoy these goods of life as members of communities, as residents of households, and not as wives. An unmarried woman works with the other women in the gardens and receives her meals from the common larder. Similarly, though no man presents her with a ceremonial bestowal of meat at the end of a day's hunt, she receives an equal share of whatever meat is brought by other women's husbands; this is certainly true of men of the household, but it is also true of all the village men, whose kill may well find its way into every house's cooking pots. If a husband walks out of the village in divorce or dies, the community as a whole will suffer the loss of one male producer, but the ex-wife and her children will experience only the same small margin of food deprivation as the rest of the community. Hopefully, another man will come along and marry her, and the village's hunting force will be back to its former level. Males and females, as collectivities, depend upon each other for subsistence, but individual men and women do not so depend upon each other. Husbands and wives, of course, perform services for each other. A woman will make her husband's hammock, and he will make baskets for her; if he kills only a couple of pigeons, there may well be a nuclear family meal, though this would be rare. Of course, there is also the realm of sexual access and child-rearing services. Mundurucú marriage, too, has its amenities and virtues, but it is not a life and death question, nor, within its confines, is there much room for the manipulation of one mate by another through economic means.

One of the more important aspects of Mundurucú collectivism is that men do not have a deep and immediate interest in the labor of their wives, or vice versa. The reasons for this go beyond sharing and the lack of property in resources and directly to the labor process. One of the central premises of Mundurucú social structure is a high value upon

cooperation in work. Bow-and-arrow hunting is generally carried out by groups, sometimes comprising all the males of a village, especially when tapirs or herds of peccary are pursued. The man who delivers the shaft that brings the animal down has the right to bring it back to the village and present it to his wife, but the very fact that his success is only partially an individual feat establishes the community's right to share in it, a right that also has the very practical reason that meat does not keep long in the tropical climate. That the communally hunted and distributed meat is considered to be the property of one man poses a possible contradiction that Dowling (1968) resolves by linking the ownership to the need to dampen conflict over hunting prestige. Johnson (1975) further notes that ownership provides fixed denotata within the overall system of exchange, stressing rather than denying the practice of reciprocity. This would follow Lévi-Strauss's observation in *The Elementary Structures of Kinship* (1968) that promiscuity, or formlessness, is as antithetical to reciprocity as is incest, or total appropriation.

The village men, as an entity, also carry out the heavy work of clearing each other's gardens, reducing the uniqueness of rights to it and rationalizing the garden's status as the common property of the household, but an asset upon which the community maintains a tacit lien. Even housebuilding is carried out by the entire village, both men and women, on each other's houses. The house, of course, falls under the domain of those who live in it, but it would be difficult to speak of it as the extended family's property, for it is abandoned and allowed to fall apart after only a decade.

Women's work is similarly cooperative, as it is in many societies, contrary to popular prejudices that attribute a far less gregarious nature to women than to men. Even ostensibly solitary tasks, like weaving or spinning, draw other women who bring their own work nearby or simply sit and chat with the worker. Any task that takes women outside the village, such as fruit gathering or garden work, is always done in cooperation with others for reasons of help and companionship, but also because a solitary woman is considered fair sexual prey by the men. The most difficult of female chores, farinha making, always involves extensive cooperation. The steps in this process have been described elsewhere (Murphy and Murphy, 1974:123–127), and it need only be noted that the digging up of the tubers, peeling and grating, extraction of the prussic acid bearing liquids from the grated pulp, and the sifting and toasting of the meal all involve cooperative effort. Minimally, all the women of a household are the basic work team, but they are generally joined by many, though not all, women from other houses. Since all of

the above steps are usually going on at once, with women swapping off tasks at intervals, and as many of the steps require the work of two to four women, it is understandable that a dozen or more women may be working on the process at any one time. Farinha making is an almost constant chore in every village, and the cooperation of the women is, therefore, a significant element in the economic life of the Mundurucú, its coordination an important function.[1]

The Mundurucú are a male-dominated society, and one would expect so essential a task as farinha making to fall under their jurisdiction, but this is not true. The initiative to undertake gardening work or the preparation of farinha is not taken by the senior man of a household but by the senior woman, who may or may not be the wife of the male leader. Indeed, we speak of houses as having male leaders only because the position is recognized by the other men and because the oldest male sometimes serves as public spokesman for the house. For all practical purposes, most undertakings of the household are under the control of its oldest woman. It is she who decides what cooperative work needs doing, it is she who enlists support from women of other houses, it is she who directs, to the extent that direction is necessary, the course of work. She is a focal figure within the house, the arbiter of its residents, and often the mother, aunt, or elder sister of many of them.

Men do not intrude into women's work or household management by virtue of the strictness of the division of labor and the separateness of their residence. Men are considered to be members of their wives' households but they remain marginal members whose principal locus of activity is the men's house. Husbands have few occasions to direct the activities or work of their wives, for this would be an unwarranted usurpation of the prerogatives of the senior woman, who may well be his mother-in-law. A husband may ask his wife for water or food, he may tell her to mend a worn cotton shirt, he may demand her sexual services, but he does not tell her *how* to prepare farinha or even *to* prepare farinha. In fact, except for the performance of personal services, one almost never hears a Mundurucú of the traditional villages ordering his wife about or directing her work. Just as sharing reduces his immediate interest in her work, so also does the cooperation of the women diminish his investment in her labor. Her work, its quality and intensity, is the concern of the other women of the house and not of her husband. No Mundurucú man wants a lazy wife, and this is sometimes a cause for divorce. The husband, however, is not displeased and estranged from his mate because her laziness deprives the family of food or diminishes his wealth, but because her low position in the eyes of the other women brings personal disgrace to him. Aside from that, there are no values that

he can extract from her labor that are convertible into other values. Mundurucú women work hard — they work harder than do the men and at more tedious jobs — but they are not exploited, except in the vernacular sense.

By now it should be clear that the economic collectivism that underlies Mundurucú egalitarianism also militates against the use of economic constraints by men to control their women. The question of the relative statuses of men and women is commonly a dyadic matter of marital authority and not at all comparable to class phenomena, and we may well ask what is the nature of male dominance in this society. We can even ask whether it is a reality. Perhaps, it may be postulated, it is a simple function of physical force, control through the superior strength of men. But in the year that we spent with the Mundurucú, there was not a single — not one — case of wife beating in the villages in which we lived. Do they browbeat their women verbally? Again, we have racked our memories and cannot even recall one instance of an American-style shouting match between husband and wife. Informants told us of physical violence between husbands and wives, but it was evidently infrequent. Moreover, they also told us of a couple of fights in which women chased after their husbands with burning firebrands. As we look back upon Mundurucú male–female relations, they were remarkably placid, though somewhat aloof.

Authority sometimes has a curious tendency to become so swollen and aggrandized that it becomes stripped of power. May Diaz, writing of the Mexican town of Tonalá (1966:85–93) tells us that the father is so awesome and majesterial a figure that he cannot be bothered with the petty affairs of the household. He can be found in the plaza or the cantina in the company of other men, discussing politics, sports, and other topics of masculine concern. The children know better than to bother him with their petty problems and requests and go, instead, to the mother, who then acts as intercessor with the father. In effect, the mother is easily able to set up the situation in such a way that the father will give the response she favors. And, in the process, the mother has effective control of the family in most cases and most of the time.

In much the same way, the status of the Mundurucú male is so completely above that of the woman, so heavily supported by sacred story and rite, so aloof from the women's world, that he has effectively opted out of much of the life of the household and, therefore, from the economy of agriculture and distribution. The male remains firmly in control of the political and religious life of the society, while the women have a virtual monopoly over the domestic realm. What is it really that the men control? Warfare ended in the region early in this century, and

the glories that could accrue to the valiant warrior — and the honor to his wife — are distant memories. Men still are chiefs, but there is only one to each village and the position usually is inherited by an elder son. Besides, chiefs have no great importance today, for they no longer bargain with traders for the whole village any more than they lead war parties. The chief is a concensus manager, much the same as the wily chairman of an academic department in which everybody feels himself to be at least the equal of everybody else. Men are also the shamans of the society, honored positions but dangerous ones due to the fact that they are the logical suspects in witchcraft. What the men do today which they value most and which still defines the superiority of their status is to hunt. But by whose lights is hunting an intrinsically worthy occupation, not just among the Mundurucú but in other societies as well? We would venture the guess that it is by the standards of the males studied and of the anthropologists themselves.

The absence of property, which after all is a form of control over people more than over things, and the organization of labor create a structure that provides little leeway for direct and instrumental control of women by men. As we have said elsewhere 'coercion and obedience had no subject matter' (Murphy and Murphy, 1974:160). The separation of the sexes is so complete that male authority is left empty of power. It is evident that the position of the woman is not at all as low as male ideology would have it, but we still cannot deny the fact that it remains secondary. There are two primary reasons for this. First, the women do most of the dirty drudgery; they haul firewood and water, they cultivate the gardens, they process the crops. These are matters that the women themselves understand and actually see as unjust and oppressive. Second, they are largely excluded from the area of public symbolism. The Mundurucú women are eminently pragmatic, however, and do not see this as a major deprivation. After a year with them, we were left with the clear impression that the men could blow their sacred instruments all they wanted if only they would help occasionally with farinha making. If they suffer cultural deprivation, this is largely in the eyes of the observer.

Our discussion brings us at this point to a thorny issue. We have said that the Mundurucú women do not tell myths, they have minor parts in ritual, they are excluded from some of the principal values of the society, they do not exercise public authority, they do not cure — and on top of that they do not seem to mind all that much, annoyed though they are at the laziness of the men. In short, they are pursuers of the practical life. One could well ask: don't the Mundurucú women have culture? Of course they do. They speak, and the language is as pre-eminently symbolic as any other. They communicate with each other and with the

men in terms of an entire series of nonverbal symbols as well. Moreover, as mistresses of the domestic realm, they have staked out as their own much of the culture of affect. They have values of solidarity with other women and of restraint towards men that are just as strong as any values held by men. And, finally, as the cores of domestic units, the female role in kinship and the careers of marriage is all-important. The point here is that the women do indeed have a culture, but it is different from that of the men. Moreover, it tends to lie in the area of the mediation of face-to-face interpersonal relations and not in the area of public symbolism. We anthropologists have not developed the conceptual paraphernalia to distinguish the two, and we too often operate with the lurking, unspoken assumption that the sphere of public symbolism — of bull roarers, of trophy heads, of mythical sagas and elaborate ceremony, of talking chiefs and sacrificing priests — is *really* the nub of culture. And since these are so commonly masculine domains, we fall into the assumptions of our male informants and, indeed, of our own culture that this is the heart of social life.

Engels' anthropology was avowedly in the service of politics, and there were many ideological reasons for his apotheosis of the primitive. Primitive society, which he understood to be society without classes or property, represented for him a possibility in human life, a condition that once existed and some outlines of which could be recaptured. Class societies represented the negativity of the primitive, the start of the historic process, and also of entrenched and institutionalized injustice. If the lot of the female approached servitude in the Europe of his time, then this status, almost by definition, had to emerge from property relations. We know from ethnography that his assumption was erroneous, but his error was one of excess. If we have demonstrated anything in this paper, it is that property relations and the relations of work are of consummate importance in the structuring of sex roles. Women may indeed be subordinate to men in Mundurucú society, but the form and quality of male dominance are different than in industrial society. The very fact that there nonetheless exists manifest inequality of the sexes shows that there are a host of other factors operative that were not within Engels' purview. We cannot end, however, without noting that the inequality of the sexes among the Mundurucú is not as deep as the male culture would have it, nor as pervasive as the men themselves believe. False consciousness, it would seem, is not just the inverted and fractured reality of civilization, but a constant condition of human existence. If anthropology has a purpose, it is to ameliorate these errors of social concensus.

Note

1. It should be stated that in some South American societies, bitter manioc is processed by women working alone or in small groups of two or three. The form of cooperation found among the Mundurucú, then, is not an invariant pattern in the region, indicating that further comparative work is necessary on technology and labor organization in the forest areas of South America.

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Men and Women in Arab Peasant to Proletariat Transformation

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Under social, economic, and political conditions that pertained up until the last three or four decades in Palestine, Arab village-peasant marriages might best be understood as comprising a 'system'. Changes, mainly those relating to wage labor, in these conditions (in Palestine as well, but our concern is specifically with the Arab village in Israel[1]) make it more appropriate today to view marriages in terms of 'strategies'. Within the framework of these transitions from peasantry to proletariat and from marriage 'system' to marriage 'strategies', and through an understanding of the present meaning of bride price, especially of the woman's share, and of other outlays and expenses in marriage, and of housing, we spell out certain of the means through which the subordination of women by men receives ongoing formalization. The discussion relates to village Moslem Arabs (the majority Arab population in Israel),[2] but some comparative analysis will be presented for village and urban Christian Arabs.

For our purpose, let us say that a marriage system is present when the transfer of women from one group, (for example, a descent line or a moiety) to another underwrites, and makes explicit by means of control over the order, specificity, and continuity implicit in the transfer, existing internal (social, economic, political, ideological) relations within the society in general.

Since I have discussed the Arab village 'marriage system' elsewhere (Rosenfeld, 1968a, 1976) and, although not specifically in regard to that 'system', the status of Arab village women and of bride price (1957, 1960, 1968a, 1974), as have others (see Granqvist, 1931, 1935), we mention the underlying operative processes of that system in a few words only.

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Conditions Underlying the Peasant Marriage 'System' and Bride Price

In the agrarian, peasant society of eighteenth-, nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Palestine, strong village patrilineages gained recognition from the government and/or representatives of power (military governors, tax officials, administrators) in the form of derived local authority and titles (muhktar, shaikh) for its dominant personages/leaders and/or enjoyed minor economic advantages. The political and prestige potential of a patrilineal descent line was made explicit by means of preferred endogamy, that is, by denying female lineage members in marriage to others. Competing village lineages sought to alter their disadvantageous political-economic status; in addition to their own endogamous marriages, their main, although not only, means to this end was in the creation of alliances through the giving and taking of women in marriage between lineages. In order to offset a growing force, a leading lineage had necessarily to compromise its internal endogamy by taking women from and giving women to other lineages, i.e. by creating allies of its own. In brief, patrilineal, (patrilateral) endogamous and interlineage (village and sometimes extravillage) marriages comprised a dynamic marriage 'system' that fostered village factions. (We discuss later the meaning of those marriages that do not fit our ad hoc definition of 'system'.) By means of lineage ties with effendis-merchants, patrons, and officials, the 'system' not only ramified throughout the country, but also, undoubtedly, its continuity was shored up at the local level.

In regard to such marriages, bride price was greatest for the bride who went to 'build up' others, that is married outside the village, and higher for a marriage between those from different lineages within a village than for the bride who married a paternal cousin, a man from her own lineage; it was also necessary to 'bribe' men to forego their rights to lineage and village women (Granqvist, 1931:133–134; Rosenfeld, 1968a:258). In other words, the differential rates in bride price, and the prerogatives of certain categories of kinsmen and covillagers (essentially those from lineages attached through marriage) showed definitely the weighting of the system. Strictly speaking, fathers, especially those well-off and with authority, could contravene others' rights. Nevertheless, marriage negotiations by fathers without the presence and/or consent of representative paternal, maternal, and affinal or attached kin, threatened lineage solidarity and factional alignments between lineages. Only those seeking to breach existing ties would attempt to conceal from kin knowledge of negotiations in progress; the rifts created with kin so excluded, the counterallegations in this sensitive area, and for that matter the ability of kin and others with 'rights' to extract 'bribes', even

during the marriage ceremony itself (see Granqvist, 1931:127, 131), while pointing up the conscious design of the marriage system, show also the potential for conflicts inherent in it.

In this context we point out that, while the existence of private property stood in contradiction to the functioning of a 'pure' kin-dominated marriage system, the backward peasant economy and the general level of poverty of the inhabitants did not push it to an irresolvable extreme. Thus, among other things, while males had the right to marry their patrilateral female cousins (access to its females was controlled by the lineage), in keeping with family-head property ownership, fathers alone received the bride price for their daughters. They did not share it with lineage members at any level of segmentation and, equally, they alone paid the bride price for their own sons' brides: inter alia, blessed with a surplus of daughters over sons, fathers stood to profit from daughters' bride prices whether received from kin or not. And, we add, while females had kin-lineage rights they lacked rights in property (Rosenfeld, 1960).

Brides received, as an absolutely individual, although varying, share, rather less than half of the bride price, in the form of gold coins, bracelets, ornaments, dresses and other clothing. Brides were expensive. For example, in the 1930s bride prices were in the range of from £30 to £170[3] (Palestine pounds); an additional £15 to £60, also at the expense of the groom's family, went for wedding feasts, gifts to in-laws and other relatives and so on. Taking into consideration yearly (1930) gross agricultural earnings of some £60 (net £40/£45) (Abramovitch and Gelphat, 1944:34–35), and of average yearly (in 1936) wages of £60 for nonagricultural workers (see Horowitz and Hinden, 1938:194–195; Carmi and Rosenfeld, 1974), the outlays required for marriage would represent (let us say, as an extremely arbitrary calculation, by saving one-half of one's income and setting the amount required at £100) savings of some three and one-third years. It would be fair to say, that marriages demanded the combined efforts and contributions of all members of an extended family.

The bride moved into her in-laws' household, and it might be several years before the couple had a separate attached room of their own, similar in standard to that of other married brothers within the family that formed part of the patriarch's courtyard. 'A peasant's house used to consist of one single room. Richer folk had more. . . . When sons married and more room was required, a second "house", i.e. a second room was built immediately adjacent to the other' (Canaan, 1933:7). Ideally, they remained an integral part of the husband's father's household and domestic economy, and only at his death would property (land,

houses, money, work animals, flocks, household goods) be divided equally among the sons

Conditions Underlying the Transition to Proletariat Marriage 'Strategies' and Bride Price

To a great extent, social relations are still organized around extended family, close patrilineal kin and affinals. However, within the Israeli market economy, in which almost all male Arabs are wage workers, and almost entirely so outside their villages, gaining a livelihood demands a more individual perspective (Rosenfeld, 1964, 1972). This is true even though, at one and the same time as he enters the labor market and continues to seek out work opportunities in what, for most, during a laborer's career is a never-ending process that may cover some 40 or more years, each person turns to account whatever kin linkages and non-kin possibilities are available. Without going into detail, most job openings exist outside the village, most often in plants and service branches owned by Jews or operated by the government. Furthermore, wages for workers vary, as does job permanence and, also, to a greater degree today, the skills and training required for some jobs, and the professional character of certain positions. A small, local village middle class of merchants and subcontractors has also developed. Meanwhile, the number of wage-earning jobs or profit-making potentials within the village are few (although certain service opportunities, mainly in the area of household maintenance and installation of appliances and of vehicle repair are beginning to be exploited locally), and the growing mechanization of agriculture (without, with some few exceptions, great intensification or diversification) has not increased them. Moreover, the state's administrative apparatus and military and security forces have thoroughly overwhelmed the sense of local autonomy or, for that matter, of a strictly Arab environment. Therefore, with the complete breakdown of the agrarian economy, and with no local village economic development to speak of to replace it, then the total change in character of the political economy, the conditions of wage labor for villagers, and the growing class differentiation within the Arab village, have become factors for de-emphasis of those aspects of economics that joined persons within their extended families and lineages, and for intensification of economics of more individual character and purpose. In this sense, our subject matter of the changed meaning of bride price, housing, the transition to marriage strategies, and so on, express the contradictions implicit in the growing lack of fit between social and personal relations

on the one hand and economic ones on the other in the process of proletarianization of a peasantry.

Bride prices during the years 1960 to 1971[4] ranged between £3000/£7000 (IL — Israeli pound) to which may be added approximately £2000/£3000 (IL) for engagement and wedding feasts and gifts. Taking into consideration that wages for Arab workers during the first half of this period were between £350/£600 (IL) per month and from £400/£800 (IL) per month during the second half,[5] the sums required appear considerable. Saving half of one's salary, a seemingly impossible feat, but many do just that, it would take approximately two and a half years to raise the money, say £5750 (IL), required. However, since many have been wage workers from age 14–15, and fathers and brothers contribute from their savings to the fund, kin provide loans, employers might lend a hand; and so the sum is not a prohibitive one. Moreover, brother–sister exchange, or the use of the bride price received for one's daughter for the marriage of a son, help cut down expenses; thus, the sister, today as in the past, guarantees her brother's marriage, and early marriage at that.[6]

It is almost impossible, and perhaps not too useful, to compare the bride price and other direct wedding expenses, that is the value of money for the two generations. Probably it was more difficult to raise the sum 30 and 40 years ago than it is today. Weddings are probably more ostentatious today (although celebrations now last only a day or two, while previously they might have continued for a week but, of course, the work regime and the seasons for festivities have changed completely). The couple often goes on a honeymoon to a resort town and there are engagement gifts and engagement rings today; in brief, weddings, in keeping with the times, seem to run into never-ending expenses. And today, the bride often receives more jewelry, gold ornaments, and cosmetics than she received in the past, perhaps to the value of £2000/£2500 (IL); that is, perhaps her 'share' is now half or slightly more, of the total bride price.

Clearly, life styles have altered, and this has had a profound effect on marriages. For example, within the group that is under 45 years of age some men have been workers outside their villages in the Palestinian and/or Israeli economy for some 25 to 30 years. Dress, diet, transport, world view, work habits, and work conditions (including, for some, work benefits, sick leave, paid vacations, organized work places, etc.), and (what we stress for our purposes) housing conditions have changed absolutely. On the whole, new dwellings are much larger, in most instances more attractive ('modern functional') and better furnished and equipped than those of a generation or two ago.

Women enjoy the spin-off from today's changed life style, the housing,

the facilities and appliances. However, women are burdened by their low educational level,[7] the care of numerous children,[8] and arduous household–courtyard duties and, sometimes, agricultural labor; further, in a worker's household, it is rare to find a full complement of labor-saving devices. Most importantly, women are not free to enter the labor market; with the exception of the school teachers and domestics in Jewish households among them, few women work outside the village.[9]

The Reason Why Marriage Strategies are Definitive Today

A dictionary definition of strategy: 'the art of devising or employing plans or strategems toward a goal' barely serves our purpose, and we intend that the discussion and examples which follow will make the distinction between marriage system and marriage strategies clearer. While strategems were definitely a part of marriage negotiations within 'the (marriage) system' under the economic-political conditions that prevailed, implicit in the system was one major goal of marriage, i.e. promoting a viable unit (here lineage branch, faction) by means of the correct marriage as defined by the unit itself. A slightly different way of saying this is that not every marriage need directly express patrilineal descent lines creating political groupings of one dimension or another, but that in the past it was practically impossible to escape the political-factional implications that followed on any marriage, since the bedrock of continuity of political integrity of a descent line, and combined descent lines, remained 'the marriage system'. In other words, an arbitrary (or personally strategic, outside-the-system) marriage nevertheless placed the married couple within an already determined set (namely patrilineal descent line and faction) of relations. Now, in face of growing contradictions between the viable units concerned and novel economic and political relations, the marriage system has become ineffectual as the order and continuity of (what were formerly) specific marriages are relaxed. Even though a semblance of 'system' is preserved, it no longer defines the goal of marriages; at best, the system is accommodated to individual strategies promoting personal or (nuclear) household viability or need.

Clearly today, the dependency of villagers on wage labor outside the village under conditions that include migrancy, lack of job security, little to no urbanization, the peripherality of Arabs in Israeli Jewish urban communities, along with life in underdeveloped villages where agriculture is backward and there is no local industry, are factors which do not provide grounds for a radical change in village social structure

and, hence, of traditional marriage patterns (Rosenfeld, 1968b, 1976). Thus, as we have stated elsewhere, the prestigious qualities of paternal cousin marriage do not disappear. Concomitantly, the high rate of natural increase of village Arabs, the contraction of the rural 'marriage community' in Israel, the continuing utility and viability of the patrilineage in local-level politics, and an alienating social environment for Arabs in Israel, among other things, have actually led to an increase in the rate of endogamous marriage within patrilineal descent groups (Rosenfeld, 1976).

However, the factors which explain the present increased rate of endogamy do not explain the endogamous marriage system itself; the rate and the 'system' are not one and the same and, as some of the examples that follow will show, that rate is now the outcome of marriage strategies. For one, men today do not necessarily wish to exercise their right to take a female patrilateral, patrilineal cousin in marriage. Men are workers outside the village, in general they are more sophisticated than women, better educated, have a wider circle of contacts (Rosenfeld, 1968b:743–746). Although men cannot make free marriage choices, since they cannot approach Arab women openly, they are not, as are women, who are constantly under family and lineage (kin) scrutiny, restricted to home and the village. At one and the same time, however, when a marriageable female goes unrequested, the honor and good name of her family and lineage branch is jeopardized. The situation is alleviated somewhat when men not of the lineage request these women, but it is on the male cousins that pressure is brought to bear; the 'right' of the male (the operative or control mechanism of the marriage system) to marry his female patrilateral cousin is becoming an obligation (Rosenfeld, 1976).

In this context, it is worth pointing out that in one village in 1971, it was mainly in regard to endogamous patrilineal marriages that some Moslem marriages were being contracted, in the villagers' words, 'without bride price'. Here the fathers did forego their share of the bride price, telling the grooms only to purchase the traditional 'wedding outfit' (*kiswi*) (including gold coins, bracelets, and other ornaments) and to 'take' the young woman (*aksi wachud*). We believe that fathers who today forego their share of the bride price for a daughter who marries a paternal cousin are only forerunners[10] in a process that will eventually encompass all Moslem village fathers, no matter to whom the poorly educated, unskilled daughter[11] is married. Pressure on the young man to marry so, phrased in the norm of honour and good name, is thus now coated with the inducement of reduced marriage expenses. That is, a strategy (beyond that of what may well be a duty imposed on men) has

been developed by fathers in order to contain and control the free movement of women in marriage.

Moreover, it comes out of the father's pocket, especially if he has a son to marry, since the bride price the latter will require will not be covered by the sum the sister would have brought in (unless other fathers also say *aksi wachud* and thus balance out the strategy). Or he gets no profit, if he has only daughters to marry. In any case, I wish to say that the father's share of the bride price was never the linchpin of the 'system', and the father's share today, in the context of marriage 'strategies', is certainly redundant; furnishings, appliances, kitchen equipment and other household expenses of the groom today are far above in value what the bride's father might have received had he taken part of the bride price. While his changing share of the bride price throws light on the process of transition, it is 'the bride's share of the bride price', as we shall show, that provides a key to understanding why 'system' and 'strategy' remain linked and, for that matter, exist at all.

Secondly, in regard to the end of 'systems' marriage the increase in the number of village men and women with partial or full secondary school education, and of those who have become school teachers, or more rarely clerks, administrators, professionals, and so on, sharpens the villagers' awareness of the dissonance of interests possible within a 'marriage rights' system that may well specify a partner or a category of partners. Some men leave the country or marry Jewish girls and opt out of the system. The better-off and better-educated can more easily avoid pressures and sanctions, can more easily seek mates of corresponding condition and educational level. Workers cannot achieve this easily, and must operate within the existing (strategic) framework of cousins, affinals, and neighbors. More important, is that some parents do not impose an undesired marriage on their children; some of the young people (men and women) refuse to marry the mate chosen and insist on their own choices. This may mean 'only' that the category is widened, e.g. not marrying the preferred first or second patrilateral cousin, or another 'correct' cousin, but rather one at a more distant degree of patrilineal relationship. Here then, the system also breaks down, even though a semblance of 'system' remains. A father may strategically negotiate for a more suitable candidate for his son, deny an unsuitable suitor for his daughter, while not absolutely alienating all his kinsmen.

Customs that served to prop up the marriage system, such as the 'gift of the father' (*atiyet il ab*, see also, Granqvist's discussion, 1931:23–32) of a newly born daughter in future marriage to another man's son or the marriage of a young, and previously unmarried, woman to a much older, or already married, man, or of a young man to an older woman, and of

child marriage in general, and of avoidance after the engagement, although still practiced, are not easily justified today. Furthermore, the extremely low rate of divorce in the past (Granqvist, 1935:257; Rosenfeld, 1957), (and the shame of divorcing a patrilateral female cousin), without which the orderly continuity and consistency of the marriage system would have been almost logically impossible to uphold, is no longer possible to maintain.[12] And, if in the recent past rare divorce found its resolution in easy justification of polygyny (sonlessness, too few sons, the need to build up the group, etc.), increasingly today divorce is regarded as more commensurable with the present economy and life style than polygyny.[13]

Thus in the past, when all other means had failed, and the son still refused to take a specific cousin in marriage, and pressure on the father by his brothers, cousins, and uncles for the son to do so mounted, the father might tell his son, 'Take her and I will marry you again' (i.e. provide the son a second wife of the latter's choice in the future).[14] It is now difficult to make such a promise, and a promise of future divorce is incongruous with the operation of both 'system' and 'strategies'. Thus, only strategic financial and other material promises to be made by fathers and fathers-in-law are left as a possibility.

Thirdly, the transformation of the Arab village marriage system is expressed in the manner in which coalitions, or factions, are formed today, and the means used to further a political stand with or without the use of traditional groupings. That is, the readiness of lineages, or segments of lineages, or lineages in combination, to assert identity by voting as a block, remains a feature of local village and council elections (Cohen, 1965), but marriages and exchanges of women *between* lineages are no longer the main mechanism for linking them as allies. For example, numerically small lineages do not feel threatened and need not give their women to large lineages in order to gain security. Moreover, today, each lineage feels its prestige enhanced, very often precisely because of job and professional achievements of some of its members. The lineage demands equality of status, and is in a position to attain this, if necessary by means of patrilineal endogamy, i.e. by refusing to give *its* women in marriage to others.

Although the government awards economic benefits to certain lineages and continues to emphasize a lineage prestige hierarchy, through which it hopes to gain political conformity of the lineage as a group, the latter is increasingly difficult to achieve. Class, educational and other differences crosscut the lineages as do political ideology and parties. In other words, while some interlineage marriages are manifestly factional-political, the continuity of exchanges breaks down. Moreover, direct marriage

exchanges, either within the same patrilineage or between families of different patrilineages, for example of a brother and his sister with another man and his sister, seem to be more difficult to arrange today,[15] due to the growing respect for individual preferences and differences, and since such marriages require a double complement of persons.

Moreover, the distinct factional intent behind alliances created through marriages — i.e. to associate a bloc of lineages with the government, its minions, or representative patrons, and to maintain status, or achieve superiority — in relation to local lineages is, at best, latent and, clearly, no longer relevant. It is latent since ongoing village residence fosters structural continuity of the lineages, and since a tradition of in-law exchanges that continues, for whatever reasons, to be adhered to, tends to produce allies. However, more important, rigid alliances are no longer relevant, since each lineage can also tolerate interlineage marriages that are politically random (utilitarian and shifting), or strategically join or leave local coalitions. Representation on a local council still follows mainly lineage lines and backing, but because of political parties, new constellations of youth blocs, friendships made at work, in schools and clubs, differences in wealth, etc., variations and alternatives are possible. Furthermore, objectively, the nature of the problems on which people vote today (no matter the subjective, personal, kin, and other factors that might determine the way they do vote) need have little to do with vertical networks and make obsolete the necessity for enduring links to a fixed group of in-laws; for example, the appropriation and allotment of funds for electric grids, road building, sanitation, etc.

Although today there is a greater degree of individual freedom when choosing a mate, this is not the key to an understanding of the transition 'from marriage system to marriage strategies'; in any case, freedom of choice is at best partial. Nor, on the other hand, as said, does the increased rate of patrilineal endogamy mean a continuity of the 'marriage system'; on the contrary, the factors making for today's continuity of pattern have little to do with those with which the pattern originated, and they are more closely aligned to the appearance of 'marriage strategies'. The mechanics of the 'system' remain. Ideological justifications and rationlizations buttress residual attitudes (mainly in the form of the ongoing inferior status of women as interpreted by men). Thus, every marriage still is negotiated between family heads, and the stages (sending emissaries, deciding on the bride price, engagement feast) leading to the signing of the marriage contract alone denote a recognized marriage. Elopement remains a transgression in the eyes of most villagers, couched as it is as an insult to female (more directly to her family's and lineage's)

honor. In fact, elopement breaches the 'system', since it removes the control over, and direction of, marriages (what negotiating establishes) from the hands of patriarchal authority and from that of lineage determination of 'rights'. As well, the young widow and the divorced woman are returned to the father's or brother's house to be remarried; the rationalization is female honor. In fact, the woman is returned to the marriage system; she is renegotiable. In brief, although 'the system' is no longer present, nevertheless control over women is not haphazard today and therefore 'marriage strategies' are not necessarily random.

To recapitulate by contrasting the structure and function of the 'marriage system' with that of 'marriage strategies': a functional interrelationship existed between peasant economics, local politics, ideology, and marriage. The continuity of this interrelationship expressed itself in a long-established marriage system. The marriage system was structured to overcome potential divisions and contradictions within the patrilineages by means of preferential patrilateral endogamy, and by making allies out of other lineages through consistent marriage exchanges. Thus, the 'end purpose' of the marriage system was the (correct) marriage itself, i.e. to keep the system operative.

On the other hand, the structure and purpose of marriage strategies has little or nothing to do with a systematic, orderly, and continuous means of overcoming internal *hamule* differences, and the creation of allies, so as to firm a political body in the face of competing factions in an insecure economic and political environment. Marriage strategies are structured around conditions of wage work outside the village, often in urban centers within the Israeli social economy, along with residence in and dependence on an economically backward village, the presence, in one form or another, of such features of the peasant social system as lineages, extended families, government shoring up of traditional figurehead images, a rigid code of honor for females to be defended by males, and so on. The 'end purpose' of a marriage strategy is personal well-being; essentially the goal is the economic viability of the individual (nuclear) household, and as we shall see, male house-property ownership is the sole means by which this goal can be achieved. As long as 'system' marriage patterns (patrilineal endogamy, affinal ties within and between patrilineages) do not interfere with such a goal, and may even lend an aura of stability and propriety, there is absolutely no reason to forego them and pressure may be exerted to preserve them.

Peasant 'High' Bride Price and Less Expensive Housing Contrasted with Proletariat (and Self-Employed) 'Low' Bride Price and Expensive Housing

It is to housing and house building that we look in order to grasp the significance of the above transition. The housing of a newly married couple always represented a problem, but under agrarian, peasant conditions when, as said, the nuclear family was submerged within the extended family, its solution might be considered secondary to the need to invest in the marriage of another son or, for that matter, in that of a second wife for the patriarch; and when a new house (room) was built, whether or not it was used by a married son, it was the property of the patriarch. In other words contradictions between private property and joint requirements of the extended family led to conflicts, but the correct lineage marriage and the marriage of each family member held priority over the future economic-household viability of each nuclear unit within the extended family.

In a village in the lower Galilee (see notes 1, 3, and 4, and Epilogue) during the 1930s houses were built of stone and mainly followed (with differences in height, thickness of walls, etc.) two types. Those 'with thick walls and a vaulted stone roof and those with thinner walls and a wooden ceiling' (Canaan, 1933:8). By the mid-1940s, approximately, the vaulted dwellings were no longer being built and reinforced concrete had replaced wooden ceilings. During the 1930s, an average middle-sized vaulted room cost approximately £40/£50 Palestine pounds to build (bigger, double-walled structures might cost twice the amount); an average one room stone house with a wooden ceiling approximately £20/£25 Palestine pounds. (Again, our figures for bride price together with marriage expenses at this time ranged from £45 to £230 Palestine pounds; that is, the total outlays for marriage generally were higher than those for housing.) The rooms of an extended family (and often those of more than one) usually faced into a common courtyard within which there were baking ovens and animals housed. Part of the sparsely furnished dwelling was used to store crops, hay and straw, household provisions (wheat, barley, oil, etc.), and to house animals in the winter.

In sharp contrast to the relation between bride price and the housing of some two, three or four decades ago, today's (up to 1971) housing costs, (not to speak of the shortage of land and its high cost) are usually in the £20,000 (IL) to £100,000 (IL) range (with as said, the bride price being between £5000/£10,000 (IL)). These are two to five room houses, and the large ones with balconies, are often called 'villas'; depending on the presence of piped water (in all villages) and power lines (present in 40%

of the 104 Arab villages in Israel), workers' families often have flush toilets and showers, and most have some of the electrical (or battery operated) appliances: frigidaire, (gas) cooking range, television, washing machine (present more or less in that order). Although the standard varies greatly, at least part of the house is furnished with some beds, some chairs for a sitting room, tables, closets; a few are elegantly furnished. Enclosed courtyards are not being built now, very few people have work animals to shelter, little, if any, fodder is stored, provisions are less of the wheat, barley variety, and so on. Depending on ownership of land and house plots, the home may be close to that of the man's parents; not infrequently, it may be built in another area of the village. The striking feature is that many couples today enter such a house on marriage, many others a year or two after marriage.

Now I do not mean that this holds for every village worker; most do not enter such a house on marriage or a year or two after. But it is the clear goal of all and it is attained by many others over the years following marriage. I believe that it is the standard of the house that a potential groom is building, or his plans and intentions for house building and furnishing, that have become the key issues during marriage negotiations that are ostensibly carried on over bride price only. It is small wonder that some fathers ceremoniously renounce rights to a bride price; after all, the father's share of the bride price is now only a fraction of the real outlays involved. Certainly the father's share of the bride price lacks functional relationship with the (true, strategic) meaning of marriage today. We might even expect a positive correlation between a father's not taking a share of the bride price and the more expensive the house the groom is building. This is, after all, the way the middle class performs. Further, and alternatively, the father who does take a bride price today may present his daughter (some say the couple) a gift of a gas range or frigidaire, the cost of which approximates his share; or for this purpose, he may add out of his own pocket to what he has received. Again, these are relatively small amounts and must be placed in the correct perspective of marriage strategies, the economics of setting up house, the prevailing life style in the village today and, sometimes, the need (through an, as yet uninstitutionalized, dowry) to sweeten the pot for a potential, but reluctant, groom. And this may be an important point for a father. Among his daughter's male cousins, and perhaps other suitors, there are now distinctions to be made in terms of material condition and potential house-building capacity, which may influence a decision. In brief, the father took most of the bride price in the past, now he takes the least or not at all; it is housing that counts: his son will need to build and he wants to get his daughter the best possible housing at her marriage.

Today, then, the social time relations of housing at marriage are something like the following. If at marriage a young man is below the age of 20, we can say that he will be dependent on his father for his bride price and for whatever housing arrangements are provided. An understanding undoubtedly will have been reached by his father and father-in-law that he and his wife will have a room or rooms of their own in his father's courtyard or that he will build rooms or a house elsewhere in the village in the near future. With the rapid disappearance of the agrarian household economy, joint living within and around the patriarchal compound in any case makes less and less economic sense, creates anomalous social situations between brothers, and exacerbates conflicts (Rosenfeld, 1968b). When a young man passes the age of 20, to the degree that he sees his future as a wage laborer (perhaps to become a subcontractor or contractor or, somehow, independent) who will continue to reside in his home village, as do the overwhelming majority of Arab villagers in Israel, and the older he gets the more determined he becomes in the following respect, he himself sets his sights on his own housing; the more immediate the housing and the higher the standard, the better. Over the age of 20, the groom starts saving money, not only for his bride price and other marriage expenses and, I believe, not for them primarily, but also in order to build rooms or a house. He may receive financial aid for these purposes from his father (certainly for the marriage, bride price outlays) and he may try to leave all of this to his father and/or brothers or he may turn to other kin and friends as well. Again, the groom *himself* plans to build, he wants to build. Saving in order to build and building (and with the growing shortage of land, the increasing need to purchase land for building purposes) are an investment in future security. With such savings, or with the foundations laid or with the house built (or, alternatively, with the blueprints only), the range of a man's marriage choices and possibilities widens. And, even if all options are not open to him because of residual survivals such as preferential marriage, lineage pressures and so on, it is definitely men who have something to offer; and, in any case, who could hold an advantaged man to a moribund marriage 'system'.

Potentially, considering wage labor today, prior to his marriage a son could leave the household controlled by his father. He does not do so because he generally requires his father's financial aid for marriage and housing, he cannot negotiate his own marriage, there are moral constraints operating against his leaving, or separating himself financially from his father's household when younger siblings must be provided for and, perhaps most important, his father owns the land on which he is to build his house or rooms in the village. Since it is no longer an agrarian-

based household economy, the occupations of men in any single household vary, as do their incomes, job security, and sometimes the professional status of the job or position. For these and other reasons, most sons who marry during their mid-20s establish their independence by leaving the patriarchically controlled household *at* marriage, and/or at the time they start building those rooms or that house *that is to be their own property*. Further, although there is cooperation, mutual aid and sympathy among brothers, the differences in standard of housing, and of furnishings purchased by them at or after their marriages may be absolute ones.

The Woman's Share of the Bride Price as an Explicit Expression of Her Dependence Under Both Peasant and Existing (Male 'Landed') Property Conditions

The fact of the matter is that women contribute nothing (and, all in all, financially their fathers contribute little or nothing) to the investment that goes into the house they will move into, and they may well move into a very expensive house. The house is built out of the man's earnings, his savings, the financial aid he receives, money he borrows, and so on, and it will remain his property. We believe the central material factor linking the marriage system of the past to the strategies of the present is that women remain propertyless and that they are not wage earners; this gains corroboration in their continuing to receive 'the woman's share' of the bride price. The outcome of this material condition is the dependence of women on men. Historically, the ideological expression of this control was in the protected status of women and in the extreme restrictions placed on them; together, these material conditions on the one hand, and restrictions on the other, continue to guarantee that the marriages of women will be negotiated by men.

Perhaps by offering a hypothetical historical condition (and in the Epilogue some factual present ones), we can elucidate the foregoing. Simply, if women had enjoyed property rights, either through fathers or husbands, then the marriage system would have been less rigid for them. (We are positing, perhaps unfairly, given this hypothetical situation, that the system would nevertheless remain operative.) The supposition could be made that their first marriage would be 'negotiated' into the correct marriage, i.e. into 'the system', since men and women were propertyless (as they often are today in marriage strategies). Although not independent of the system, it would have been most difficult to renegotiate widowed or divorced women back into it, once they had received an

inheritance. Whatever else, a woman with fields and work animals, with her own house to go to, would certainly be in a less beholden position than a woman without basic means. To substantiate this, take the greater elasticity the system provided men: after a first 'system's marriage' a man who came into his inheritance could take a second wife in polygyny, perhaps a woman of his own choice or one who didn't cause a rupture in social relations with those with whom he was involved directly in the system; and, as we have seen, the father often promised the son, reluctant to marry a specific bride, future relief through a polygynous marriage.

Although the meaning of the bride price for the men who negotiate it has changed, the meaning of the share given to women has not. It is a statement of the fact that their dependent, controlled status continues. The woman did not own a room or rooms in the past, in the same manner that she does not own the 'villa' today. The gold coins, jewelry, dresses gave the woman no independence in the past. At best, she could invest them in her husband's attempt to leave his father's extended family (to help him rent or build a room, buy a transport camel or the beginnings of a flock, etc.) in the hope, among other things, that this would strengthen her position in his new household (Rosenfeld, 1958); or invest them in her son's attempt to leave his father, especially when she is the 'unloved' wife in her husband's polygynous household, in the hope that this would guarantee her a room or a corner in her son's household. The jewelry and clothing and (still, usually if the bride has little formal education) gold coins, and some traditional, modern items given today, such as a watch, cosmetics and so on, of more or less similar value relative to the past, are her share of the bride price; or, as we have seen, what now remains of the bride price, if her father foregoes his share. We add, that in direct-exchange marriages (brother–sister, brother–sister, etc.) and where there was/is no payment to the fathers, the brides still received/receive 'the bride's share' (each father supplying his own daughter's *kiswe*).

It is interesting that the villagers insist that they are eliminating bride price (or are on the path to doing so), when it is the man's (father or brother) share alone that is to disappear or already has disappeared; this estimation of what the bride price *is* should be taken in terms of what the villagers say it is. Therefore, we must consider the man's share — *the* bride price in the villagers' terms — as an increment, logical to, and undoubtedly implicit in, a peasant social economy but, as being, and as having been, superfluous to the basic and end purpose of the marriage system, since control over women is sufficient to achieve operation of 'the system'. The bride's share writes large this control, since it marks

her dependent status (whether the father's share or the bride's share was prior in time, or if they have always been linked, or for that matter, if either are necessary conditions for the operation of the marriage system, need not detain us here[16]) with a value (what we shall call her 'value as a dependent'). Meanwhile the woman is used as capital (what we shall call the 'value potential of the woman') within the marriage system (the sister guarantees her brother a bride, the daughter a second wife for her father, either by means of a direct exchange or through use of the bride price received for her; if there is a surplus of daughers over sons, the value potential of the daughters can mean a money increment), e.g. the bride price for her is used to get a bride for her brother. If there is no daughter, the son's marriage must come out of other capital (savings, sale of land, of livestock, etc.). However, the 'value potential of the woman' (the use to which she or her bride price can be put) determines neither 'the system' nor its operation; moreover, now, as an incentive to a potential groom, it often disappears (the bride price disappears) in 'strategies'.

It is logical that the bride's share (of the bride price) has not been done away with and, we believe, will not rapidly disappear. It is the only material means she holds, in a society where money, land and house property are basic. In this kin organized village society her paternal kin will provide her protection and support, but cannot always guarantee kin solutions to the problems which beset her (marriage into a distant village, as an unloved second wife, as a widow who must leave her children behind at remarriage, etc.) that are an outgrowth of the contradictions (her non-property-holding, basically non-wage-earning status) her male kin impose upon her. These are the reasons we have offered elsewhere for the 'minimum payment' provided women in the form of their share of the bride price (Rosenfeld, 1957, 1960, 1974). The 'minimum payment' *is* her 'value as a dependent', *the value which signifies that control over her 'value potential as a woman' does not reside with her, since she cannot negotiate herself, but resides with others.*

Of course, if Moslem Arab village women were free agents in today's labor market (and if house property in the village was no longer consequential), then marriage negotiations between family heads over bride price, and the woman's share, as constituted, would become redundant. (This does not mean that they would disappear, as Western society today is witness.) True, since women are controlled, neither are men free to make marriage choice today. That is the reasons why marriage strategies, which continue to use the cultural idioms of the 'system' during negotiations, appear as if they were direct structural continuities of the 'system'. This is not so; as we have attempted to explain definite structural differences (a peasant social economy on the one hand, wage

labor and residual peasant life on the other) separate the two. But not only do the older men, and perhaps many of the present generation as well, negotiate marriages as if they were maintaining tradition, but also as if they were still manipulating a system; at best, such negotiations sanctify a half-fiction.[17] Now the son establishes his private future as he builds his house on the basis of his wages, his future wage prospects, and ability to repay loans. He requires his father's private plot of land to build on, the last existing link to an agrarian past, the father's contribution to the present strategies in a village of wage-earning sons (and fathers) who, in view of existing circumstances find it impossible to establish residence elsewhere (Rosenfeld, 1976).

Negotiating over the marriage fates of others is only possible when the 'others' concerned are helpless. While Arab village parents would still attempt to negotiate marriages, and the rationalizations of female chastity and household honor could be perpetuated on the basis of upholding traditional values and so on, free agents might be able to negotiate their own futures. Although we need not continue to dwell on hypothetical circumstances, it is within reason to imagine the possibility of 'free agents' in the Arab village deciding their marital futures on the basis of strictly personal strategies. An independent woman would refuse gold coins and bracelets as 'security'. Off the hook of land, house-plot ownership, a working couple might overcome the residual rationalizations of honor and protection and set up house in rented rooms.

The above could well be a future perspective for Moslem Arab village couples (as it increasingly seems to be the present perspective, as we shall see in the Epilogue, for urban Christian couples), given the rate of population growth, smaller plots of land and of building plots to be inherited, possibly of increased demands by fathers for daughters' property rights at marriage and so on. Nevertheless, while politically acute in conceptualizing and stating national claims, and in demanding equal rights (Rosenfeld, 1978), village men have failed to recognize the political context of their subordination of women, and are incapable of taking the steps that will free both sexes. While in many respects, and at different levels, this is a worldwide problem, its material base, and the social organizational and idea justifications that long have been its support, are clear in regard to Arab rural dwellers; in this sense, for the overwhelming majority of Israeli Arabs (and perhaps for most people in the Middle East), the root of the problem is directly recognizable.

The point is this: in the villages land, houses, real property, remain in the hands of men; this is what the stress on patrilineal descent, cousin marriage, male inheritance, females deferring rights to males, honor, and so on — from the archaic marriage 'system' to present day marriage

'strategies' — is all about. Male property owners, unprepared as they are to share rights with their sisters, mothers, wives and daughters (or forego individual property owning), continue to chain themselves, and to make nonowning women a key link in the chain, to the 'system' and the 'strategies' behind a dead and a dying political economy.

An Epilogue: The Conditions of Bride Price, Women and Housing Among Christian Villagers and Christians Who Have Recently Become Urban Dwellers

Christian Arab villagers (those from a specific village, the one mentioned in regard to many Moslem Arab marriages; nevertheless, the process we discuss probably holds for most Christian Greek Orthodox and Greek Catholic Arab villagers in Israel) insist that they do not have bride price and that it is strictly a Moslem custom. True enough, the Christian Arab bride's father does not take a bride price today. In the village where I worked, fathers did take the bride price up until (as far as I can date it) the late 1930s and early 1940s; generally, the bride price up to that time among Christian Arabs had been less (perhaps up to one-third less) than among Moslems and, again, in a process beginning at the end of the 1930s, the father gave some, or most, of his share to his daughter (the bride). In the past Christian Arab women received, in amounts highly similar to those received by Moslem Arab women, what we have called 'the bride's share' of the bride price in jewelry, coins, ornaments and clothing.

Among villagers, then, Christian Arabs as a group were the forerunners in this recent process of fathers' foregoing their share of the bride price. There are reasons for this. Christian Arabs were overwhelmingly urban or town dwellers in Palestine: 75% of the Christian population was urban in 1922, 80% in 1944 (Government Printer, 1946, vol. 1:157–159). Approximately two-thirds are so in Israel today (see note 2); kin networks joined villagers and nonvillagers in the Christian Arab community in Palestine and, from the early and mid-nineteenth century on, so did religious, educational, health and other institutions. During the last three to four generations these institutions have been a factor for the relatively higher educational level of village Christian Arabs (both men and women) and, among other things, for their better training and higher level of skills in mechanics, the crafts, building trades. In combination, these factors — along with a protected minority status during the Ottoman regime that often lessened the onus for them of politicking for authority at the village level, a preferred status for Christians during the

British mandate period, and a somewhat similar status (as opposed to that of Moslem Arabs) as part of Israeli policy — have helped Christian Arab villagers in the wage-labor market. Without going into details, fully 25% of the Christian Arabs from the village we discuss, most of whom are permanently employed, now have residences in (mixed Jewish–Arab or all Arab) cities in Israel, even while almost all maintain homes in the village. Only a few of the Moslem families from this village have become urban dwellers.

Today, at marriage, Christian Arab village women receive gifts from the groom of gold ornaments, jewelry, a watch, bracelets, clothing, cosmetics, and the like (more or less equal in value to what the Moslem woman receives). The Christian Arab women from the village mentioned who have married into the cities, or have themselves grown up in the city (and because of very strong family and kin links, most marry male lineage or other relatives from the village now working–living in the city),[18] also receive similar gifts at marriage, but the value varies. It may be much less — say a watch and/or a ring, clothing — if he is a young working man without resources. However, the situation is elastic. Most Christian urban dwelling men are in their late 20s at marriage and, usually, they will not propose marriage, nor would they be accepted, without being able to guarantee housing either in rented rooms or a purchased apartment, both extremely expensive. Clearly, a man with good housing prospects is in a favoured position as a suitor. However, late marriage for Christian males, the by-passing of eligible Christian females, etc., has created new pressures. The young Christian woman who has grown up in the city may well bring a job and savings to the marriage that can be enlisted into the buying (as joint property) or renting of rooms; the fathers of those Christian women who marry in their late 20s or in their 30s do not make demands for their daughters and there are instances of dowries and other incentives. Further, since more young Christian women go to secondary school, teachers' seminaries, or they work, and because the restrictions that are placed on them are somewhat less stringent than those placed on Moslem women, there is greater opportunity for personal choice in marriage.

We can say, in brief, for those Christian Arabs who are rural dwellers, and more so for those who live temporarily or permanently in towns and cities, that the marriage 'system' has long been inoperative; meanwhile, marriage 'strategies' are operative and, in the matter of choice of partner, follow kinship, while personal qualities, job, earnings, and housing are also factors, with the balance still clearly tipped in the groom's favor. If the value of gifts given to brides now varies greatly, the question then is whether we can call the gifts ('the bride's share') the Christian

Arab woman receives at marriage 'a minimum payment' and 'her value as a dependent'. On the one hand, gifts are a fact, there are still many restrictions placed on the young woman, the marriage is negotiated by the parents, it is formalized in church ceremony, the apartment or rooms they move into are usually the man's investment alone; on the other hand the bride price (the father's share) is no longer present, the young woman may be working for wages, the investment in housing may be funded in part by the bride or her father and, given that there is no (or extremely infrequent) divorce, and young widow remarriage is unnecessary, their living quarters tend to be regarded as jointly owned. The answer, therefore, can only be phrased in terms of a process; the largest majority of Christian women remain dependents; some few others, but perhaps an increasing number, by continuing to work for wages, and through their own refusal to accept a dependent's status, and with help from parents, brothers and husband, are not. Where there is more than token gift exchange between bride and groom, and the gifts are all to the bride, then they continue to represent 'her value as a dependent', or, at least, contemplation of her future dependency.

We have discussed the Christian Arabs for the light their condition projects on the future of the Moslem Arabs in Israel. Both are now deeply involved in the wage-labor market in Israel, and it seems clear enough that the direction first taken by the Christian Arabs in regard to (the father's share of the) bride price is the path that the Moslem Arabs are also following. Speaking in general, this is not so, however, in regard to the status of Moslem village women, as seen in full payment of the bride's share, exaggerated concern over protection of honor, male house-property control. The reasons why a proletariat has not managed to extricate itself from the constraints of a peasant social structure have been stated elsewhere (Rosenfeld,1964, 1968, 1972). Clearly, this residual structure weighs more heavily on the, mainly, rural dwelling Moslems than on the Christian Arabs in Israel. But, in this regard, emphasis must be placed on job security, skills, education, the weakening of restrictions on women which follow in part on their holding jobs, and not on urban life as such, and the above Christians, including Christian Arab women, hold such to a greater degree. The continuity of Moslem female dependent status, and all it entails, is guaranteed as long as almost all remain (propertyless, landless) non-wage earners restricted to backward villages.

Notes

1. Unless otherwise stated the data in this paper relates to a village in the lower Galilee of Israel. For a discussion of the economic occupational history of Arabs from this village, and of the 'type' village, see Rosenfeld, 1964, 1968b, 1976.
2. The total population of Israel in 1972 was 3,138,000 of whom 466,500 were 'non-Jews'. If we do not include 71,500 inhabitants of East Jerusalem, the non-Jewish (mainly Arab) population of Israel was then 395,000. Of the latter number, roughly, 70% are Moslems, 20% Christians, 10% Druzes. According to the 1961 population census (the 1972 census is not available to me at the time of this writing) approximately 83% of the Moslems live in villages, 17% are in towns; Christians — 61.3% are in towns, 38.7% in villages; Druzes — 9.2% are in towns and 90.8% in the villages (Harari, 1972:3, 8).
3. I use data concerning 82 Arab villagers mainly, but not only, from the lower Galilee, living today in Israel and who married during the period 1934–1941.
4. Data on 82 villagers, sons of those who married a generation earlier mentioned in footnote 3.
5. The calculations are based on my own field research.
6. See the discussion in Rosenfeld, 1976.
7. See note 7 in Rosenfeld, 1968b.
8. See the discussion and references on the high rate of natural increase among Moslem Arabs in Rosenfeld, 1976.
9. See the figures in Harari, 1972:26, 70–71.
10. As I point out in the Epilogue, it was undoubtedly among urban Christian Arabs (we are concerned with workers here) that the process (of fathers foregoing a bride price payment) began. As far as I can determine, although there well may be differences depending on different areas in Palestine, the process was continued by village Christian Arabs during the second half of the 1930s.
11. Our discussion concerns Moslem male wage laborers who are the overwhelming majority of earners in the villages. Among the small number of men and women who have three or four years of secondary school, or are professionals, administrators, and so on, fathers forego their share of the bride price, whether or not the marriage is between cousins.
12. The marriage and divorce rates for Arabs in Israel in 1971 were as follows: Moslems 7.4, 0.6; Christians 8.2, 0.1; Druzes and Others 7.4, 0.5 (Harari 1972:18).
13. Although polygyny has been illegal since 1953, according to my figures for one village 4% of the Moslem men are polygynous; that is, approximately half the rate of a generation ago, cf. Rosenfeld, 1957:53.
14. The reverse of this statement was equally true. The father also could say to his son, 'Either thou takest her or thou leavest her but if thou dost not take her thou shalt never marry so long as I live'. Granqvist continues, 'And the son was obliged to bow to his authority, for the father had the money' (1931:58).
15. We may add an economic note here. Not only did fathers reduce their immediate expenses when they arranged a marriage exchange of their children but, as well, if they lost the labor power of a daughter they received it back at once through a daughter-in-law. It is no longer simple to match female labor in the village since many families have no agricultural land, some women have experience as field workers, others have not.

    In one village, two generations ago, one-fourth (26.5%) of all Moslem marriages were arranged through direct exchange (Granqvist 1931:111). In another village a

generation later, the figures were almost exactly the same, 27.3% with only a slight tendency towards a decreased rate for the 18–39 year old age-group among the Moslems; however, among the Christian Arabs within the same village, the number of direct exchanges for their 18–39 age group was 8.3% or a little more than half of their total figure for direct exchanges over four to five generations (Rosenfeld 1957:50–52).

At this writing, I do not have with me the data I gathered on direct exchanges for the period 1954–1969 for this same village. If the rate has not decreased, as I *believe* it has, the reasons for this may well follow those I suggested in an analysis of the increased rate of patrilineal endogamy (1976).

16. In the Middle East, the bride price (the father's share), as a sum, is undoubtedly an ancient extension and concomitant of private property, money, trade, patriarchal control, the peasant-state nexus and so on. The potential of using women profitably, or setting a money value on women, beyond their use for exchange purposes within a marriage system, was thus implicit in such conditions. Among Arabs in Palestine–Israel we see this potential in terms of bride price differentials between categories of women (lineage, village, extravillage marriages), distinctions in bride price sums according to areas (village proximity to towns, etc.), and other contingencies. I do not know whether or not 'the father's share' and 'the bride's share' complemented one another, or if the latter was an outgrowth of the former — the remedy, or recompense for the defect in kin relations already enmeshed in property relations.

    I have discussed 'the woman's share' of the bride price, using the apt term sometimes used by the villagers, *sdaq raqbatha*, calling it 'dowry (?) of her neck' (1957:49) and then simply mentioning a number of meanings for *sdaq*, alm, fee, etc. (1974:156–157). Hopefully this is the last time I shall return to this subject which in 1957 I suggested as a problem for future discusion (*op. cit.*)! A point worth mentioning is that Mauss states that 'Originally the Arabic *sadaka* meant, like the Hebrew *zedaga*, exclusively justice, and it later came to mean alms' (1966:16). 'Justice of her neck' would fit my appreciation of the sum given the dependent woman. In this sense, Goody's term 'indirect dowry' would be eminently suitable (Goody, 1973:2). (See also the data of Weir and Kawar, 1975.)

17. Some fathers do see that their daughters complete secondary school, become teachers; the overall level of education for men and women is improving, and there is greater understanding of the need to provide girls (not necessarily women) with wider opportunities. In the future these will be factors for additional changes in attitudes and behaviour, meanwhile, women are denied property, barely have the opportunity now to enter the labor market, and are enveloped in restrictions, that are really warrants for their good name. We can say that today fathers negotiate their daughters good-kin morals to wage-earning men who are holders of local property.

18. Of course, kin pressure, and the centrality of the patrilineage, for city dwellers, and for those with combined village-city ties and residence, weaken in importance. Many of those now working and living in the city come from small lineages or extended families; others, often due to the situation following the 1948 Arab-Israel War when large numbers of Arab urban population left the country, are the remnants of former kin groupings. (See Rosenfeld, 1976.)

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The Dominant Dyad: Mother-Right and the Iroquois Case

DAN McCALL

Francis L. K. Hsu has achieved a certain notoriety in arguing that the behavioral patterns in any given society will reflect the dominant relationships in the nuclear family: he postulates that certain behavioral imperatives inhere in each of eight 'basic' dyadic relationships (husband/wife; father/son; mother/son; brother/brother; father/daughter; mother/daughter; sister/sister — hereafter abbreviated), and that one of these dyads and its attributes may tend to dominate the others, infusing the kinship system, and thus the wider society in which it functions with its particular psychic flavor.

Kinship is the independent variable and the psychological characteristics the dependent variables; it doesn't matter if kinship, in turn, is dependent on residence rules or economic structure; for once established for whatever reason, the dominance of one dyad will predictably produce, it is claimed, a certain personality type.

Hsu's main exhibits are China, where he finds the Fa/So dyad to be dominant, and the United States, where he gives the Hu/Wi dyad the dominant position. These two societies contrast in ways he relates to what he asserts are the dominant dyads.

Since authority is posited as a principal attribute of the Fa/So dyad, children in Chinese society readily accept authority in the wider public arena as well as at home, and filial piety naturally grows into ancestor worship. At the same time, Hu/Wi relationship in China is affected by the authority of the dominant dyad so that spouses must defer to the guidance of their parents, and especially of the Hu's Fa, not only in choice of partner but in conduct after marriage, with particular reference to suppressing public demonstration of affection for each other.

Conversely, in the USA the affective tie between Hu/Wi being the most valued relation, casual use of pet names and public kissing (that would shock the Chinese) is not only permitted but expected; the

interests of the offspring are not allowed to jeopardize the love match and at maturity the children are pushed out to find their own spouses. The will to follow one's own inclinations, being an attribute of the Hu/Wi dyad, according to Hsu, the parental/children dyads are affected by the dominance of this attribute in the American system, and everyone suspects authority. Since there is consequently no respect for ancestors, history is considered unimportant.

Hsu finds many such correlations in China and the U.S., but his argument is not limited to these societies: similar conditions are expected to occur in other societies where the hierarchial relationship of the familial dyads is similar. The other two cases he develops, Br/Br and Mo/So dominance, are more vaguely correlated with the ethnographic literature, though the former is said to occur in the Middle East and a few African cultures, while the latter is posited for India and many matrilineal societies.

The four dyads explicated are claimed to account for the salient behavior of peoples appearing in the ethnographic literature. Criticism of the Hsu hypothesis have been ample: definition of attributes have been found unclear; doubts have been expressed on the extent of influence kinship dyads can have on each other and on the larger society; also questioned is the adequacy of the dyads, or even the nuclear family, as a relevant unit for research on attitude and personality formation when these exist within household or local groupings of wider extent; and a number of ethnographers expressed reservations about the application of the hypothesis to the peoples they had studied, for it seemed that in some societies no dyad was dominant, while in others two might share the dominance perhaps in an overt or in a covert way, or there might be symmetry or asymmetry in the constellation of dyads, and so on. Most damaging, with reference to the predictability claimed for the hypothesis, it was found that the same dyad dominant in different societies didn't necessarily produce uniform results. Yet scarcely anyone denied the heuristic value of the hypothesis and one distinguished anthropologist explicitly commended it for this purpose.[1]

Despite all the criticism that has been forthcoming, there is one very conspicuous feature of Hsu's presentation that has not as yet, so far as I'm aware, been commented upon. This is the *masculine bias* of Hsu's selection of dyads to discuss: two are exclusively male (Fa/So; Br/Br) and two are mixed (Mo/So; Hu/Wi); no exclusively female dyad (Mo/Da; Si/Si) was discussed by him nor were the remaining mixed dyads (Fa/Da; Br/Si). While it is obvious that the exclusively female dyads are being discounted, the mixed dyads would seem, statistically, to be getting a fair treatment, but the ones included are those significant in

terms of arguments about 'authority'. (In fact, it may be that what Hsu is intent upon exploring is *authority* rather than personality or kin roles.) It is asserted that males everywhere have authority over females, ergo the neglected dyads are supposedly unimportant (i.e. cannot become dominant) and the four dyads 'explained' by Hsu lay out the possible lines of authority in any society.

As Hsu has argued (1971:22) that the world looks different to people reared in societies with different dominant dyads, one wonders if Hsu's personal background in the Fa/So dyad wasn't affecting his perspective on the feasibility of authority existing in a Mo/Da dyad and the possibility of *that* dyad becoming dominant. But it seems that this is a view Hsu shares with most American men — and British and many other males for that matter — the one citation he gives to substantiate his assertion of a male monopoly of authority is that of an American, presumably brought up in the ambiance of the Hu/Wi dyad dominance.

It is easy to compound examples of male anthropologists who likewise assume the inevitability of male authority. Robin Fox in *Kinship and Marriage* (1967:31ff.) makes the assumption one of four principles of kinship organization that 'men usually exercise control' and that this has been so 'for the greater part of human history' because, he is convinced, this is 'rooted in primate nature' and any objections to it are 'somewhat unreal'.

E. R. Leach decided that in all local descent groups 'the core of such groups is composed of the adult *males* of a kin group all resident in one place' (italics his). He posits three main types: (1) patrilineal descent with patrilocal residence in which son succeeds to the authority of the father; (2) matrilineal descent with avunculocal residence in which sister's son succeeds to uncle's authority; and (3) matrilineal descent with matrilocal residence when matrilateral cross-cousin marriage permits son-in-law to succeed to authority of father-in-law (Leach, 1951).[2]

Lionel Tiger imagines a biological basis for men forming male groups which then run society. He expounds that:

> Males dominate females in occupational and political spheres. This is a species specific pattern and is associated with my other proposition: that males bond in a variety of situations involving power, force, crucial or dangerous work . . . They consciously and emotionally *exclude* females from these bonds. (Tiger, 1970:200)

In this new 'social scientific' tradition Steven Goldberg entitled a book, *The Inevitability of Patriarchy*; a reviewer in *Science*, a psychologist, accepted many of his motions (though not his conclusion,

despite the fact that this reviewer is a woman) (Goldberg, 1973).[3] And Marion Levy, commenting upon Hsu's hypothesis, set down his own generalizations, which include (a) families exist in all societies; (b) role differentiation is based on age, generation and sex; (c) early learning and personality formation takes place in the family; (d) 'all known societies and kinship organizations are, ideally speaking, patriarchal rather than matriarchal' (M. Levy, 1971:33–41; also, J. Levy, 1972).

I cannot deal here with all these (and many other) examples of male chauvinism in detail; suffice it to say that Fox bases himself ultimately on primatology (in which he is not a specialist) and, DeVore et al. to the contrary notwithstanding (1963), data from ethological observations of primate behavior do *not* add up to a consistent picture of male dominance. Leach makes a statement supposed to be a universal generalization yet adduces evidence that scarcely goes beyond the Katchin of Burma. Tiger's book, as has been noted, is hardly to be considered a work of social science.

I shall also comment only briefly on the salient reference given by Hsu, namely David Schneider's introduction to *Matrilineal Kinship* which he edited with Kathleen Gough (1962). Though cited by Hsu as if this were validation for his position, Schneider specifically says that his formulation is a deduction from theory and he, in fact, had no array of ethnographic data to substantiate it. The pertinent part of Schneider's theory: 'first, women are responsible for the care of children . . .; second, adult men have authority over women and children . . . (ibid.:5).

However strong or weak one may judge it, that is the gist of the citation on which Hsu bases his allegation of male authority. Schneider, incidentally, is even more cavalier than Hsu about what constitutes authority; he *never* bothers to define that much debated concept.

Interestingly enough, at a Wenner-Gren Conference chaired by Hsu in 1970, Anthony F. C. Wallace contributed a paper on the Iroquois in which he states flatly that prior to the reforms of the Seneca prophet, Handsome Lake, in the early nineteenth century, the Mo/Da dyad was dominant. The male reformer, in fact, exhorted a shift from the Mo/Da dyad dominance to that of the Hu/Wi dyad. Paul Bohannon, at the same conference, used the Iroquois example in contrast with the Tiv and the contemporary United States. Hsu notes this existence of female authority, but it doesn't shake his faith in the inevitability of male dominance.

However, Wallace was more concerned with the reforms of Handsome Lake than with the 'classic' Iroquois society, which gets only a page and a half of description. But I shall here pursue the problem Wallace avoided and inquire into the nature and substance of familial dyads and female authority in the various periods of Iroquois development.

The Mo/Da Dyad: Attributes and the Implications of Dominance

Since neither Hsu nor Wallace has given us a description of the attributes of the Mo/Da dyad, nor explored how the dominance of this dyad would impinge upon other dyads or influence society at large, we shall have to puzzle this out for ourselves.

Attributes of the Mo/Da Dyad

We will begin by sticking close to Hsu's models (i.e. the dyads he explicated). Hsu posited eleven attributes, which he distributed over his four dyads. They overlap 'to a certain extent' so that it is 'the particular combination of attributes, not single attributes, which differentiates one dyad from another' (Hsu, 1971:11). There may be other attributes, especially as we are concerned with dyads Hsu neglected, but we will in this exercise avoid introducing new hypotheses (which is what these attributes are) and will assess the relationships in Hsu's terms.

We may first allow ourselves an observation on this collection of attributes. Three sets of attributes are positive/negative pairs:

1. continuity/discontinuity
2. exclusiveness/inclusiveness
3. sexuality/asexuality

A fourth set is a hierarchical pair:

4. authority/dependence

Two others go together but, instead of being mutually exclusive or hierarchical, are complementary:

5. equality
   rivalry

Then there is one attribute which falls intermediate between one of his positive/negative pairs:

6. sexuality/libidinality/asexuality

Finally, there is left over one lonely attribute that doesn't neatly contrast or balance any other attribute, though it may be contrasted to the pair authority/dependence as a whole, and it may also be expected to reinforce 'sexuality' or 'rivalry'. This is the attribute of

7. volition

The lack of elegance in this scheme does not necessarily mean that it is inadequate for the exploration of the data for which it was designed, but may, rather, have something to do with the unsatisfactory discussion of the nature of any of the attributes — as we shall see — with the exception of the first two pairs, the least significant.[4]

The attributes of the Mo/Da dyad may be expected to have some similarity to those of the Fa/So dyad since structurally the two dyads are isomorphic: both dyads are comprised of individuals of the same sex but of different generations linked by the parent/child bond.

There can be no quibble that Hsu's attribute of 'continuity', if it applies to one, must apply to both. The Mo has been a Da and the Da has, or in due time will, unless barren, become a Mo. And, since there may be more than one Da the attribute of 'inclusiveness' will apply here as well as in the male counterpart dyad.

But with reference to 'authority', we encounter a peculiar situation; Hsu keys his statement on the alleged authority of men over women not to the Hu/Wi dyad but in his discussion of the Fa/So dyad! It seems as though he draws his concept of authority from that of the older generation over the younger, and applies it to what he believes the relations of the sexes *should* be. Since we have rejected any *a priori* claim to a natural differential of authority between the sexes, we are left with no rationale for authority in the Fa/So dyad, but we will assume that it was intended to be based on generation — since Fa and So, being equally males, do not share equally in this authority as we must assume they should, on the basis of Hsu's statement.[5] At any rate, we will posit that some degree of authority will adhere to the Mo in her dealings with her Da and that 'authority' may thus be said, with as much justice as in the Fa/So case, to be an attribute of the dyad.

Finally, 'asexuality' — the condition of having no connection with sex — is given for the Fa/So dyad. Whatever relevance this may have for males (in China or elsewhere),[6] it hardly seems appropriate to the female role in reproduction. The Mo will be concerned with all the activities and conditions which lead up to and culminate in her Da's becoming a Mo. That does not mean merely that she will assist as midwife for the birth of her Da's children; it also implies that she is interested in the health and effectiveness of her Da's love life. 'Asexuality' seems inappropriate for the Mo/Da dyad and the attribute of 'diffused or potential sexuality' which Hsu dubs 'libidinality' and affixes to the Mo/So dyad would be applicable here (though I do not endorse the arguments he gives in support of its relevance).

If, for the sake of argument, we accept this preliminary formulation, we can now ask how does this dyad, when it is dominant, effect the other dyads?

Implications of Mo/Da Dominance on Other Dyads

In keeping with Hsu's dicta that the world varies from the point of view of different dominant dyads, let us begin, in talking about Mo/Da pre-eminence, by using the phraseology that is appropriate to it. It is customary in English, which will be a surprise to no one, to put the male first: Hu/Wi, Br/Si, Fa/Da, etc. and in referring collectively to a mixed group to fall into the use of masculine pronouns. In keeping with the orientation of a Mo/Da dominated world, we will arrange them accordingly: Wi/Hu, Si/Br, Da/Fa, etc. and where the sex of the reference is unclear or general, we will use 'she' or 'her'.[7]

While we can talk of a particular dyad in terms of generalized psychological attributes (for analytical purposes) in a cultural vacuum, it is impossible to avoid Bohannon's criticism that not only residence pattern but household type must affect the relations of the dyads to each other (Bohannon, 1963, 1965, 1971). Therefore, we will discuss the Mo/Da dominance in terms of the classic Iroquois pattern, where the Hu joins his Wi in an established communal household presided over by the Wi's Mo or her Mo's Si or Mo's Mo's Si who 'owns' the house in which the several women related to her by uterine ties live with their Hu's and children.

But, first, we will continue to explore the theoretical case, leaving the Iroquois data until later. What immediately follows, then, is organized on Hsu's sequence of topics (1971:10ff.).

Mo will have influence on the choice of future Hu of her Da (derives from 'authority' attribute) but Da will have great leeway for her affective expression (due to 'libidinality' attribute).

Just as in the Fa/So case, the attribute of 'exclusiveness', intrinsic to the Hu/Wi dyad, is greatly modified in favor of the attribute of 'inclusiveness' characteristic of the Mo/Da dyad. 'Hence married partners in this system can be expected to be aloof (to each other) in public' (i.e. before their — and especially her — Mo) for they should 'place their duties and obligations' toward Mo before those toward each other, but 'libidinality' can not be completely downed: custom will not approve of public displays of intimacy between spouses but ample circumstances of publicly approved type will permit affection and lust to be expressed on other occasions.

In case of a quarrel between Wi's Mo and Da's Hu, the Wi will feel impelled, at least formally, to take the side of her Mo.

Polygyny would have no advantage lineally and would only be feasible in the sororal form which would tend to stimulate the 'rivalry' implicit in the Si/Si dyad and therefore disruptive of the matrilineal matrilocal,

uxorilocal and unilocal household,[8] so it probably would not occur. Polyandry in a matrilineal society, on the other hand, does not necessarily have the advantages, in terms of promoting the reproductive rate of the lineage, that the opposite case of polygyny in a patrilineal society can be said to have. Since the number of childbearers is not increased, the only advantage of polyandry would be to insure adequate chances for fertilization (and pleasure — don't forget the 'libidinality' of the dominant dyad plus the 'sexuality' of the Wi/Hu dyad) but all this could be accomplished by *cicisbeos* with less household friction than polyandry would involve. Therefore, we would not expect any form of polygamy, but recognized lovers (cicisbeos) might supplement husbands.

Attributes of 'continuity' and 'authority' are said to militate against divorce. Since we have decided that 'authority' is an attribute of the Mo/Da dyad and 'continuity' is not in question, then we might expect that it follows that in a Mo/Da dyad dominant society, divorce would be rare. However, 'libidinality,' being volatile and unpredictable, would modify the pressure for continuation of a no longer satisfactory marriage when a more amorous potential spouse is in the offing, and divorce would be easily achieved if sufficiently desired. But if non-sexual advantages adhered to the established marriage and cicisbism provided the outlet for 'libidinality' then the marriages of the society as a whole might tend to be enduring.

Undoubtedly there is more than could be said on the theoretical level about these supposed attributes and the dyads to which they are presumably attached, but we have reached the end of the model with which Hsu conjures. But we may add some insights from structural analysis.

When Mo/Da dyad dominance is combined with a matrilineal descent system, the impact on the Wi/Hu bond will be greater than in the opposite case of Fa/So dyad dominance plus patrilineality. This will be so because Da can be impregnated by lovers and continue the matriline whereas So's are wholly dependent on obtaining a legal Wi to perpetuate the patriline. Thus, while the latter case must either strengthen the marital relation by inhibiting divorce, as in China, or encouraging quick substitution for a departed Wi, as among the Tiv, there is in a Mo/Da dyad dominant society no essential need, save biologically, for the men *at all* so long as the women are economically self-sufficient. Thus whichever solution a patrilineal society adopts (whether 'institutional' or 'moral' in Bohannon's terms (1971)[9] the effect on the marital bond will be less destructive than it can ever become in a matrilineal Mo/Da dyad dominant society.

There remains a possibility that in a Mo/Da dyad dominant society,

the Fa/So bond might develop as an important affective relationship in order to compensate for the peripheral position of males in the society. Fa/So might even achieve a covert subdominance. But it is just as likely that if marriages are easily broken, then a Fa might hardly know who his sons were — scattered as they would be in the several households of their Mo's wherein he had been a 'husband of the moment'.[10]

However, the Mo/So relationship would be important, inevitably, since the Mo's household is So's only real home. He is an interloper, perhaps temporarily, in his Wi's household, and should his marriage break up, he would return to Mo, unless he already had another woman who would take him in as her Hu. Furthermore, as a grown So might represent the lineage in certain interlineage, village or outside relationships, this would require that he remained on good terms with Mo. The relationship might be nearly as close as the Mo/Da relationship.

In a Mo/Da dyad dominant society it would be likely that the Si/Si dyad might be codominant. The Si/Si dyad would have the potential of rivalry that the Br/Br is said to have, but so long as Mo is alive, the rivalry would have to be curtailed. An accepted rule for succession to the authority of a deceased Mo would be necessary to prevent breaking up the communal household every generation.

The Br/Br dyad, like the Fa/So dyad, might offer an opportunity to help sustain a position that was not high status. This would of course apply to Br, own and classificatory, who were brought up in the same household and would not apply to male offspring of his Fa by women of other lineages who would grow up in other households.

The Si/Br dyad, for the man, would have some of the same urgency that the Mo/So relation has, for when his Mo dies his only entry to his natal home is at the behest of his Si. Rivalry doesn't arise because of the different spheres of activities of the sexes. 'Libidinality' might lend a warmth to the regard they had for each other but incest taboos would restrict most overt expression.

The Da/Fa dyad would appear to have little significance structurally, although a man in his declining years might find helpful the hospitality which a Da, despite the fact they would — if clans existed — have different affiliations, could offer. It is more likely, however, that such a man could presume more readily upon a niece (i.e. a Si's Da).

Effect of Mo/Da Dominance on Nonkin Behavior

Hsu confined his discussion under this rubric to 'one cluster of facts [sic]: the problem of authority' (1971:23). Continuing to view his for-

mulation of authority as hypothesis rather than fact, and taking up again (after our structural digression) his model, we can assert that a Mo/Da dyad dominant society would have fewer problems with authority than a Si/Si or Br/Br dyad dominant society. However, we do not expect that rigid authoritarian regulations would be congenial here, as they seem to be in Fa/So dyad dominant societies, for 'libidinality' is 'diffused sexuality' and 'sexuality' would seem to be intimately related to 'volition' ('desiring to follow one's own inclinations'). So, while 'authority' could be tempered, it would not be overturned.

How Does the Theory Fit the Iroquois?

To show that Iroquois society was (at some time, at least, if not throughout its existence) an example of our paradigm of Mo/Da dominance, we need to demonstrate the following:

A. Iroquois family life *was* characterized by —
   1. Mo's authority over Da and So
   2. Wi's authority was greater than Hu's
   3. Either divorce was easy, or cicisebism was prevalent, or there was a balance between the two solutions to a sexually unsatisfactory marriage.

B. Iroquois society as a whole was imbued with
   1. female authority
   2. libidinality.

These do not cover all the points raised above but should suffice here and save the tedium of more extensive argumentation.

Turning from the literature on kinship dyads to that on the Iroquois we encounter three main problems:

1. there was an east-west cultural variation;[11]
2. there has often been a tendency toward a static presentation despite the continual process of change in Iroquois society[12] and
3. most of what has been written has been screened at least once, and sometimes twice, through male perceptions.[13]

In order not to postpone our experiment in measuring the Iroquois family and society against the construct of our theoretical model of Mo/Da dyad dominance, we will juxtapose statements from various sources with the categories set out above, and afterward we will come back to an assessment of the factors of potential distortion in the sources.

The Iroquois Mo/Da Relationship. The Iroquois Da was under the

authority of her Mo for as long as the latter was alive (Perrot, 1968:23). The Mo chose the Hu for her Da 'often even without [the Da's] knowledge (Murdock, 1934:312). Others, however, say that children don't obey parents, and girls are said to be able to refuse approval suitors (Kinietz, 1965:92).[14] European observers expected the Fa to be the authority in the family and since the Iroquois Fa had no rights of regulation over the children (though he had a part in sustaining and guiding them) these statements that children were disobedient to *parents* does not necessarily rest on any reality in regard to the sway of the Mo. Furthermore, such observers often failed to understand the Iroquois system of directives and censures which was less direct and 'authoritarian' than the European methods of child-training.

The Iroquois Hu/Wi Relationship. The Hu had no dominance over the Wi.[15] On the contrary he was a mere guest in her house. He could leave any time he wished, but he could not stay if she decided she didn't want him any longer (Wallace, 1971:369). Divorce affected his residence but not hers.[16] She owned and controlled the family food supplies.[17] The children belonged to her, not to him (Murdock, 1934: 301–302).

Were there Iroquois Cicisbeos? No statement specifically referring to cicisbeos came to my attention though some of the statements of the early writers might have been based on their failure to understand such an arrangement. For example Samuel Champlain wrote, somewhat sourly, that some women 'however much married they be' run about 'after nightfall' and meet men 'who possess them wherever it seem good to them' and 'the husband will do the like to his women neighbors, no jealousy arising among them on that account, and no disgrace or injury being incurred, such being the custom of the country' quoted in Kinietz, 1965:94). While this seemed like simple promiscuity to Champlain, it is likely that it refers to cicisbism.

On the other hand, L. H. Morgan, who brought to our attention the *punaloa* (cicisbeo) of Hawaii does not seem to have discovered an Iroquois word for this relationship. Of course, it is not necessary that a term having that exclusive connotation should exist. Sagard may have pointed to the terminological usage when he noted that a 'good many' men had girls 'on intimate terms, and these they do not call wives, *atenonha* . . . but *asqua*, that is companions . . .' though the context suggests that perhaps Sagard was thinking only of premarital relationships (quoted in Kinietz, 1965:95). Incidentally, Sagard's *asqua* looks very much like Schoolcraft's *equa*, which he gives as 'woman',

distinguished from *equazas*, 'girl' — which argues against Sagard's observation applying only to the young (Schoolcraft, 1847:180). (Schoolcraft, however, gives *wewun*, rather than *atenonha*, for 'wife', which is indicative of the dialectical differences — and possible social variations — involved.)

Cicisbism we would expect to arise mainly as a response to some restraint on divorce. There were at least two such restraints, though they did not make divorce infrequent (Kinietz, 1965:97; Wallace, 1971:369).[18] One obstruction to divorce could be the Wi's Mo, who had picked the Hu and made a bargain with the man's Mo (Underhill, 1953:90; Murdock, 1934:312). The other might be the claim of the children for fatherly affection, instruction and nurturing (Perrot, 1968:23). Modern authors often judge that these restraints on the whole were effective, but some early writers thought that 'la plus grande partie' of the Iroquois married only to separate when 'it seemed good to them' to do so (ibid.).

Female Authority in Iroquois Society

This topic is riddled with confusion, due primarily to the attitudes of European writers toward the subject of female authority. Oswalt, for example, seems ready to go to any lengths to obscure indications of female authority. He affirms that land belongs to those that work it, but doesn't acknowledge until later that it is the women who work the land; this permits him to generalize that 'the land-holding unit was conceived in family, village, and national, as well as in League, terms', thus minimizing the role of women in this ownership (Oswalt, 1973:413–414).

Oswalt has the sachems being 'displaced', as he calls it, or removed from office 'by the sib council of the nation to which the sachem belonged' (ibid.:422). But many other writers, often more familiar with the Iroquois than he, have made it clear that it was the clan mother who took the action (Underhill, 1953:92).

Certain facts need to be emphasized (in addition to the role of women in controlling sachems):

1. a woman could act as 'regent' for a young sachem (Murdock, 1934:306);
2. women could be 'Pine Tree Chiefs' (a position earned by eloquence — not only by military valor) (ibid.:307–308) so obviously —
3. women could and did speak in council;[19]
4. the basis of all politics even of the League — was the clan, and the women made the clan decisions;

5. the influence of war chiefs came late in the history of the Iroquois (though not long after European contact) and these self-made leaders were not removable by women, so that the war chiefs eventually over-shadowed the peace chiefs (sachem), who were the creations of the women, thus reducing the influence and power of the latter (Underhill, 1953:93).

In sum, it seems reasonable to assert that (prior to the Fur Trade Wars) women were the *ultimate* political authority in Iroquois society.

Matrilineality

Though it requires a digression, we must in this context take up an aspect of kinship which is broader than the question of dyadic relationships, but which is a forerunner of Hsu's concept of 'content' in kin structures. Early anthropologists distinguished 'descriptive' systems from 'classificatory' systems of kinship terminology. Kroeber, early in this century, pointed out that all (i.e. even 'descriptive') systems were classifying kin and that the nature of this classification was, on one level at least, psychological (1904:77–84).[20] Some later anthropologists, e.g. Marvin Harris, have preferred to refer to this as ideological rather than as psychological;[21] kin terms convey that some relationships have a greater weight, or value, than others. The differences in the distinctions which various systems of kin terminology make is precisely in the value placed on particular kin relationships. This has usually been discussed in terms of varying emphases on the generational and collateral coordinates, i.e. siblings vis-à-vis cousins and parent's siblings. A parallel emphasis has been on descent rules, i.e. recognition of one or the other parent's kin as being 'closer' than the other, or the two being equivalent. Since descent rules represent how the parent of one sex (and that parent's kin) is valued vis-à-vis the parent of the other sex, we will take the radical step and discuss the kinship terminology of the Iroquois in terms of the question of sexual dominance in that society.

The Iroquois type of kinship terminology is one in which sibling terms are extended to parallel cousins (children of a sibiling of the same sex as the connecting parent = MoSiCh: FaBrCh) but there are separate terms for cross-cousins (children of a sibling of opposite sex of the connecting parent = MoBrCh; FaSiCh).

Shusky lumps the Iroquois system with the Eskimo where all cousin terms are equated and distinguished from siblings, and the Hawaiian, where the sibling terms are extended to all cousins, and he places these three under the rubric of 'bilateral' (Schusky, 1943:20). There is a certain

justification for this but as is immediately obvious, Iroquois — unlike the other two — is not wholly symmetrical though the differentiation between cousins is made in both the maternal and paternal lines. Therefore Iroquois, like Eskimo and Hawaiian, is ideologically distinct from unilineal systems such as Crow (which distinguishes MoSiCh from MoBrCh, the latter being equated with Fa's sibling's children) and Omaha (the mirror image of Crow — separating out, in this instance, FaBrCh from other 'cousins'), Crow is an emphatically matrilineal system though not all matrilineal peoples employ a Crow type terminology; Omaha is an emphatically patrilineal system, again with the same qualification. On the other hand while Iroquois is quasi-bilateral, peoples who practice bilateral descent are more apt to have Eskimo or Hawaiian type terms, and many peoples who practice unilineal descent employ Iroquois terms — some of these cases are patrilineal and some are matrilineal (Schusky, 1953:20; Murdock, 1942:125). Iroquois terminology may represent a transition between bilaterality and unilineality or between one type of unilineality and the other,[22] or there may be some other explanation.

Why did the Iroquois, since they practised matrilineal descent, not have Crow type terms? In a Crow system MoSiCh are part of one's own lineage and are affected most strongly by incest regulations but MoBrCh and any of Fa's siblings' children are designated as less closely related, being outside ego's lineage, and may be permissible, or even preferred, marriage partners. Lineage exogamy is indicated by the Crow system, but the Iroquois system goes beyond the matrilineage and puts the FaBrCh out-of-bounds for marriage. Thus, despite matrilineal descent, there is an emphasis on the paternal relatives — what does this mean? Can it be an indicator of male authority?

We should note that the practice of bilaterality tends to go with foraging societies (generally called hunting/gathering) and also with industrial societies, while unilineal practices tend to correlate with food production and matrilineality has an affinity for horticultural economies (Driver, 1969, map 3, map 32; Spier, 1925). However, while the subsistence pattern is intimately involved with the kinship ideology there is not always an exact fit, as the world ethnographic sample (i.e. those societies which have been described) shows, and one factor in the discrepancies is time-lag in adjustment of terminology after the economic and/or social changes have occurred.

It seems unlikely that we could explain the Iroquois situation by supposing that their ancestors had practiced bilaterality a few generations back and had recently begun to practice matrilineality without having as yet brought their terminology into line with existing

relationships. Two considerations, at least, weigh against this: linguistic relatives of the Iroquois, widely spread throughout the U.S. show a tendency to be horticultural, where conditions permit, and tend to be matrilineal; the archaeological time depth of Iroquois culture shows it to be in situ for about three centuries prior to white contact and to be horticultural though we cannot say on the basis of extant archeological evidence that these communities were practising matrilineality,[23] but the historical context as a whole argues against a recent use of bilateral descent rules.

Did the Iroquois once have a Crow system which began to change because of growing emphasis upon the importance of the father and this probably associated with a shift in residence pattern? A move in the direction of double-descent could give the results we find. We shall see that social changes in Iroquois society during the period of contact with whites had this trend. The initial impact of contact on the Iroquois occurred in the seventeenth century, at which time the Jesuit and other observers were apparently unable to understand the Iroquois kinship system, but by the eighteenth century, Lafitau, a French writer, understood the essentials of the system (Kinietz, 1965:92). This might seem like a quick response of terminology to social change but is perhaps not impossible.

There is, however, another factor which we must consider — the influence of marriage class system and residence pattern on terminology.

Lloyd, who edited a reissue of Morgan's book on the league, asserted that in the early period of the Iroquois there were only two longhouses, or clans, and therefore due to clan exogamy there was a two class marriage system. Let us ask what would be the consequences of a two house marriage system for kin terminology if a Crow system had accompanied horticulture in the formation of Iroquois culture out of an Eastern Woodlands cultural matrix.

In the situation Lloyd posited, the people of one longhouse married the people of the other longhouse, and each longhouse contained a matrilineage (except for the out-marrying adult males). If this kind of a residence had been adopted by people with a Crow system, the young man growing up in his mother's house would find that the females of his generation in the house would be his Si, his MoSiDa and since his FaBr, as well as his Fa, had married into the same house, there being no other, his FaBrDa would also be his house mate. This would create terminologically two categories of girls in the house, those he could not marry, Si and MoSiDa (and possibly MoMoSiDaDa), and those he could marry, FaBrDa except that the latter would also be MoSiDa and therefore tabu. Thus, through the identification of FaBrDa with MoSiDa the tabu would

be extended and an Iroquois type of terminology would become appropriate.



Figure 1. Two house Crow system, from male's point of view.

Thus, a two house system automatically produces an Iroquois type of kinship if it proceeded out of a Crow type.

Iroquois terminology is compatible with matrilineal descent plus exogamous moieties, and this could therefore be the system in use since the formation of Iroquois culture. The western tribes did indeed have an emphasis on moieties which perhaps were originally exogamous, and while the original number of clans may have been, as Lloyd supposes, only two, it had grown to eight, but the Mohawk and the Oneida did not fit this system of Lloyd's. The two eastern tribes had three clans. If we suppose that this may have been a three class marriage system, and if we look at this in the same manner, i.e. assuming an original Crow system, we see that a male ego would find the females of his own generation in his natal house to be his Si, his MoSiDa (called 'sister') and there could be no in-house marriage. In each of the other houses he would find FaSiDa (called cousin), MoBrDa (called cousin) and all the girls of either of these houses would be eligible for him to marry. The three class marriage system would not of itself, then, force Crow terms in the direction of the Iroquois type as the two class system would, but if a circular system existed whereby for example, men of the Bear clan married into the Turtle clan whose males departed to find wives in the Wolf clan where the men married into the Bear clan, the consequences could produce an Iroquois terminology.

In such a case a male of the Bear clan would find that the girls of his generation in his natal house would be his Si and MoSiDa (called Si) and no in-house marriage would be permitted. The house of the Wolf clan would contain his FaSiDa (called Si) and no marriage would be permitted, but the house of the Turtle clan would hold his MoBrDa (called cousin) and thus eligible for marriage. Thus, the Iroquois terminology does not require any element of male authority.



Figure 2. Three class circular marriage system from vantage point of Bear male ego.

Since the Iroquois type terms are as compatible with a three class circular marriage system as it is with the two class marriage system, we cannot be sure which is earlier, the western (two class) or eastern (three class), or whether both developed independently out of the Crow system, but since at least three houses are necessary to maintain a Crow system, we can imagine that a three house Crow system, at some time, had a circular system imposed on it, producing an Iroquois terminology which made a moiety (albeit unbalanced two to one) more feasible than an open marriage (or simple clan exogamy) system; this, in the west, became further modified by development of a moiety balance and thus eliminating the three class system. Significantly, the three clans of the eastern tribes are found among each of the western tribes; the others may have alien origins or be the result of splitting off of one of the three clans which are common to all the Iroquois.

If, then, there is such a permissible argument that a three class circular marriage system may lie at the foundation of Iroquois society, we are brought back to Edmund Leach's assertion of a matrilineal, matrilocal descent and residence pattern providing the basis for a transmittal of authority from Fa-in-law to So-in-law (Leach, 1951). Let us examine this proposition.

A Bear clan male would marry into the Turtle longhouse where he would take up residence with his Wi and her female kin and he would find other Bear clan males also married in who would be Br, MoBr, or MoFaBr and one of these older men, of his clan, would be the Fa of his Wi.

If the house were under male authority, to perpetuate such male authority it would be necessary for the man in charge to pass his

authority on to a younger man, who would be, in a classificatory sense, his So-in-law. Since both would be of the same clan, and Fa-in-law would also be MoBr to So-in-law, such a transmission of authority might be assumed to be smoother than in the Crow system (where only clan exogamy without circularity prevailed) for in that case the in-marrying males would come from each of the other two clans and some interclan rivalry might be expected to operate to the detriment of orderly succession. The three class marriage system (with Iroquois terminology) thus seems an ideal situation for the Leach process to obtain.

Did it?

No.

We can, I think, answer in this categorical way for all the ethnographic evidence, as well as Iroquois traditions, are against it. Whatever exercise of authority a man might have was *not* in the longhouse into which he married but in his natal house. He resided with his wife but he returned to his mother's house to perform his duties if she deigned to designate him with one of the titles that were maintained in that matrilinage, and in his Wi's house, her Br would return, for the occasion, to officiate if he had a title in that matrilineage. There is no basis whatsoever for the in-marrying male to exercise authority in his Wi's longhouse. This does not eliminate avuncular authority but it disposes of the Fa-in-law to So-in-law schema, as far as the Iroquois are concerned. In this instance, at least, Leach's generalization falls flat.

The avuncular authority, which does exist in some societies and is generalized by Schneider to operate wherever matrilineal systems are found, is not any more in accord with the Iroquois data. The MoBr had little to do when he visited his natal longhouse; it belonged to the women, not to him, and the women owned and dispensed the food supplies, and they also decided which of the males in their maternal line would be honored and entrusted (on good behavior) with one of their clan titles. If he received such a title, it authorized him to discuss not longhouse matters so much as inter-longhouse, or village affairs, and inter-village, or tribal affairs, and intertribal, or league affairs, always in the interests of his maternal clan and under the instructions and supervision of the matrons.

So much for avuncular authority among the Iroquois!

Since Hu, Br, and MoBr did not control family, clan and wider affairs, it must fall to the Mo and Si to make such decisions.

Libinality

Let us now consider the final characteristic of the Mo/Da dyad dominance: libidinality. Iroquois are sometimes said to be shy with the other sex.[24] A certain aloofness may result from the sharp divergence in daily activities, in which work groups tended to be of one sex. But more likely what has been called shyness is public deference before elders, particularly matrons,[25] for other descriptions indicate anything but shyness, and the Jesuits and other French writers called the Iroquois 'lascivious'.[26] The communal longhouse did not provide much privacy, though that didn't seem to bother anyone very much; in good weather coition was often performed in the woods, or at night outside the houses (Trigger, 1969:66). Hunting camps and berrying parties offered semi-institutionalized outings for individuals of both sexes; the latter especially were a focus of gossip about the sexual affairs of members of the family and friends (Murdock, 1934:312).

Iroquois girls and women might initiate the sexual approach,[27] and many girls boasted of the number of their lovers.[28] Seventeenth century observers noted that women had the say-so in these affairs and men never attempted to force women to comply (Kinietz, 1965:94).

Nudity was not shocking to them (Wilson, 1959:235).[29] Some dances required the performers to be naked (Kinietz, 1965:10–11). Kinietz, quotes Champlain that Huron women 'are not ashamed to show their body, that is, from the waist up and from mid-thigh down'.

Young people had virtually complete freedom to form sexual liaisons without consequence or disapproval.[30] Sexual intercourse was believed to have curative power and a sick person might request that the longhouse be filled with copulating couples (Kinietz, 1965:77). If a person dreamed of fornicating with another person, the dreamed of person would willingly make the dream come true because it was felt that dreams should not be denied (Wallace, 1969:63). After a certain type of dance, exogamic restrictions were relaxed and on one night of the year one could enjoy sexually a member of one's own clan (Wilson, 1959:235).

All of these culturally approved ways of indulging in extramarital sexuality leave little doubt that sexual expression was not repressed to any substantial degree. This is not to deny that all societies channel sexual behavior in some way but the range of the expression/repression continuum is great, and the Iroquois were well toward the expressive end of the range.

Although it derives largely from considerations beyond the question of dyadic dominance, the position taken here is that the Mo/Da continuity emphasis of matrilineality has, of itself, no concern with any curtailment

of sexual activity. All offspring find their natural place in the Mo's house and 'legitimacy' is a non-existent, or unimportant, concept. Emphasizing a Fa/So continuity, on the other hand, immediately brings forward the problem of legitimacy, which can be treated lightly and sociological fatherhood allowed to obscure biological paternity (if genitor and pator are not in some instances the same) but there is implicit in the system some anxiety about genitorship, and the only way to ensure a reasonable degree of certainty is to restrict the permissibility, and possibility, of a Wi's sexual activity to that with her Hu (or, sometimes by extension, with a male relative of the Hu, or even, under some circumstances, to an influential male outside the Hu's patriline but only with the Hu's permission).

The general tendency, therefore, of patrilineality is restriction of sex, which ultimately may involve not only chaperonage and punishment for lapses, but enculturation of guilt feelings, and even more dire, teachings that threaten supernatural punishment for infraction of the restrictive rules. Such repressive systems seem to achieve but minimal development in matrilineal societies, and then probably due to outside influences.[31]

The association of matrilineality, horticulture, and religious dimensions of fertility suffused sexual activity with a positive feeling. Iroquois beliefs includes such a concept of fertility; the women's childbearing powers were related to the earth's plant-growing capacity. But men could not plant *because the earth would not yield to them.* The earth was the Mother; the moon the Grandmother; the crops, beans, squash and corn, were the Three Sisters (and Our Life Supporters). The Iroquois view of the supernatural as well as their social system certainly supported the quality of libidinality, posited as characteristic of Mo/Da dyad dominance. And libidinality would lead to a high reproductive rate unless some other factor intervened. In the Iroquois case it seems there was such an interference: a system of birth control! Abortion was practiced, and more surprisingly, in addition to abortifacient herbs, there were drugs known to the women that could cause temporary or permanent sterility.[32]

Handsome Lake railed against these practices and cried out against mothers who urged their daughters to abort.[33] This is in keeping with the Iroquois social system. For although women wanted to have children, they did not want to be burdened with a continuous series of pregnancies throughout their childbearing years. They also needed time for the longhouse, clan and village politics which were in their jurisdiction. Of course, a pregnant woman can participate in such politics, as can a woman with one or two small children; but if a woman is pregnant and has a couple of toddlers and some slightly older children to care for, she

will not have much time left for pursuing the fine points in political debate.

Assessment of Fit

On all points reviewed, save perhaps on the question of generalized female authority, the data is compatible with our model of Mo/Da dyad dominance. The sources are equivocal on the subject of female authority, so before considering this question further, let us look at the problem of sources.

The Iroquoianist Literature

As noted above, there were cultural and dialectal differences among the original Five Nations of the League, and we need to determine how these variations have been treated by anthropologists and how their treatment of the differences effect our topic.

L. H. Morgan, resident in Rochester, was neighbor to the Seneca and could easily visit their villages. Though he went to Albany for his other professional concerns and passed through Mohawk territory, the Mohawk had long since departed for Canada and so they were less accessible to him. This greater exposure to the western Iroquois was augmented by the friendship he established with Ely Parker, a Seneca, and by his correspondence with Asher Wright, a missionary among the Seneca. Thus, it has been said, not unfairly, that Morgan saw the Iroquois through Seneca eyes. Since he was the first to present a systematic study of the Iroquois to the world (Schoolcraft's earlier writings were less extensive and had less effect), Morgan's reports have influenced all later Iroquoianist study.

It may be said further that Hale and Fenton, who after Morgan, have been the most knowledgeable and valuable Euro-American interpreters of the Iroquois have also seen them largely through Seneca eyes.[34]

The bias in the sample, exaggerating the western type in the picture of the whole group, would not matter if the variations were merely in dialect and material culture, but there is said to have been a greater instance of patrilocal residence in the west than in the east. This is significant for our discussion. Morgan, looking for the essentials of the system, discounted the cases of patrilocality and occasional polygyny as not aboriginal for the Iroquois, but later ethnographers have often been reluctant to interpret any of their field observations as the result of

innovation or acculturation. Thus, we can find affirmations that patrilocality may always have been a permissible alternative.

Other east-west differences which might be pertinent are emphases on moieties and numbers of clans. In the east, moieties were less important, perhaps only ceremonially, and possibly adopted as late as the formation of the confederacy; in the west moieties were deeply involved in all activities. The two eastern tribes had only three clans while the western ones had eight, grouped in moieties, and this may be the basis for the tendency Fenton noticed for League committees to be composed of either two or three members. This could reflect the preference on the one hand for moiety representation and on the other for clan representation. Dual and tripartite systems may have significance for kinship; they may reflect old marriage class systems and this in turn may be pertinent to arguments about male authority, as we have seen.

Whether the reported tendency to patrilocality in the west goes back to the days before the League or was a response to changing settlement patterns in the late seventeenth, and throughout the eighteenth, centuries, or to other influences in the period since contact, is of extreme importance to our understanding of family dyads among a particular Iroquois people in the east-west continuum.

The tradition of matrilocality was still alive among Morgan's Seneca informants though not necessarily practiced by them. The question is whether the variation was a normal part of the customary pattern or a response to recent events. On the answer to this question depends the reliability of the informants on certain pertinent points. If patrilocality had always been a patterned alternative, a nineteenth century man from a patrilocal family would be an adequate representative of his people, but if it was an innovation no older than a generation or two, then the culture of the men who grew up in that environment would not have been representative of Iroquois traditions. Hence, they would have (consciously or unconsciously) recast their information, and rationalized social phenomena that had their origin in matrilocality in order to square them with their newly acquired point of view.

We must be clear about the periodization of Iroquois culture history, or facts (and statements about facts) that pertain to different periods will be lumped together, as has all too often been done, the result being a *pastiche* of anachronism.

Wallace mentions only two periods in his paper in Hsu's volume: the 'classic' period (seventeenth and eighteenth centuries) and the nineteenth century when Handsome Lake, the Seneca prophet, preached his reforms to his countrymen. There is at least one period on either side of this stretch of time. The present, from which we have to try to perceive the

other periods, and the pre-contact period, for which we have, of course, no written sources.

The periodization is not so much in dispute as the societal distinctions of the different periods. Buell Quain used the term 'imperialistic' for the period Wallace called 'classic'. Quain also warned his colleagues (albeit before the rise of ethnohistory) of the dangers of a static concept; the term 'classic' indicates that this is the period generally considered *standard* and to it has sometimes been attributed data (with more or less sophistication) collected later (Quain, 1937:245).[35]

It is to his 'classic' period that Wallace relegates the Mo/Da dominance. In the subsequent period, Handsome Lake made an assault upon the influence of Mo over Da and urged greater prominence for the Hu/Wi relationship. Beginning in 1799, Handsome Lake had completed his ministry by 1815; he died, nearly a generation before Morgan began his investigations. How much of the patrilocality of Morgan's time was due to conversion to the New Religion of Handsome Lake? And, also, how much was stimulated by white example and preaching, or to other intrusive factors?

Prior even to the numerous revitalization movements that swept through Indian societies throughout the Northeast after the American Revolutionary War, there had been changes introduced into Iroquois society. In his book, *Death and Rebirth of the Seneca* (1969), Wallace insists that the Iroquois, in the 'classic' period, could to a large extent choose or refuse what the whites offered or exemplified. He describes a warrior with textile clothes, instead of skins, steel tomahawk instead of wooden club, gun instead of bow and arrows, and silver ornaments, and claims that all this was accepted because it was in keeping with Iroquois values and didn't significantly modify behavior (Wallace, op. cit.:25). We must demur from accepting Wallace's historical summation.

The French under Frontenac (1695) sacked the very 'capital' of the League, Onondaga, after some Seneca settlements had been destroyed earlier. Seeing the uselessness of palisades against artillery (and their Indian neighbors being already decimated) the Iroquois never rebuilt their fortifications. The settlement pattern began to change about this time and the longhouse gave way gradually to smaller dwellings, not of bark but of logs, with stone fireplaces. These houses tended to hold nuclear families (though sometimes more than one), and matrilineages were divided by residence even if not separated spacialy to any great extent. A patrilocal residence may have become for the first time a permissible alternative to the general matrilocal pattern. By mid-eighteenth century, at any rate, about half the Seneca (and quite a number of Mohawk) lived in the new, smaller, 'cabins'. The groundwork

had been laid for undermining Mo/Da dominance before Handsome Lake was born.

Christian missions were established at both ends of Iroquois territory (Seneca and Mohawk), but not at the center, in the mid-seventeenth century. Converts to Christianity, though still a small percentage of the population, provided a means for propagandizing not merely the worship of a different deity but the value system of a religion from the male dominant societies of Europe and the Middle East.

The significance of trade goods was not that they offered alternate forms of clothing for the ancestral leather garments. Participation in the trade with Europeans required that the Iroquois, whose territory was soon depleted of beaver, had to plunder the furs of their neighbors, seize their territories, and use force wherever necessary to maintain their middleman position. The wars of the Iroquois and the nature of the fur trade at that time make Quain's term 'imperialistic' more appropriate than 'classic'.

Early seventeenth century European observers reported warriors in wooden-slat and corn armor assaulting each other with clubs of hard wood and bone or stone-tipped arrows. Wooden armor soon became obsolete when iron tipped arrows came into use. Then guns multiplied the casualties. Tactics changed to meet the new technology but more importantly the objectives of fighting also changed. Europeans were contemptuous of raids to obtain a scalp or two and perhaps a captive. The French-Dutch rivalry for furs was transmitted to their Indian trading partners and allies; if local cohorts were to be useful to European polities they had to be indoctrinated with military ardor in the manner of the Europeans.

The fact that they had many more guns, due to differences in policy between the French and the Dutch,[36] gave the Iroquois a murderous superiority over their Indian opponents. Incentives to capture the fur trade from the Huron, who dominated it, led in 1649 and subsequent years to the virtual extinction of the Huron as a people, and to the diversion of a high proportion of the furs from the French at Montreal to the Dutch at Albany. But this 'glorious' and profitable victory of the Iroquois did not slake their aroused appetite for conquest; thereafter they became the terror of the tribes between Hudson Bay and Tennessee, and from the Eruopean settlements on the coast to the Mississippi valley.

This modernized warfare (as contrasted with the raiding of the earlier period) modified the structure of Iroquois society. The sachems, or 'peace chiefs', had presided over the affairs of the confederacy at its inception; these were put up by the matrons and could be deposed by them, but war chiefs, earning their status by their accomplishments with

arms, first rivalled and eventually outpaced the peace chiefs. Before the end of the eighteenth century the names of war chiefs predominate in the records of negotiations with whites, and women's names which had sometimes appeared on early treaties had disappeared.

Warfare, then, during the 'classic' or 'imperialistic' period transformed the earlier Iroquois social system.

Wallace, describing his 'classic' period, refers to matriarchy in quotation marks or with the prefix 'quasi-'. By quasi-matriarchy, or 'matriarchy', he indicates that while women had the ownership of the longhouse, the cornfields, and the stored supplies of food, and the matrons put up the sachems, it was the sachems and/or the war chiefs who did most of the talking in council and treatied with the enemy, as well as doing the fighting. There was a reality to the rights and power of women, Wallace admits, but he balances it by a complementary and equivalent set of roles exercised by the men. Women produced the plant food, but men hunted to provide supplies of meat and skins, traded to obtain other goods, and protected the women. Therefore it follows, Wallace implies, that while the Mo/Da dyad was dominant in the family, that did not allot all of the authority in the society to women; a good deal of authority can be seen in the 'classic' period being exercised by men.

There are a number of objections that can be made to Wallace's summation of the historical data. He seems to exaggerate the economic contribution of hunting, and definitely underplays the extent of control the Iroquois system gave to women over the way men could perform their military and diplomatic roles.

Certain observers of the period claimed that hunting was mainly a sport.[37] Hunting was done by some men, not all, and for only a part of one of the four seasons; even then women accompanied the men and helped them. Meat was more apt to come from plump dogs, a favorite ceremonial meal, or fattened bears, raised from cubs in the village on food supplied by the women. Thus providing meat was not a male monopoly; still meat from any source was less frequent in the diet than fish. Fishing was an activity of women as well as men. But even fish was only an occasional supplement. Women collected the wild foods and medicines in the forest, though men helped in 'sugaring' the maples and in berrying. The principal sources of nourishment were the gardens of the women. The women could justifiably say to the 'cornfed' men, we support you. And women could halt plans for a war party by refusing to give them the needed food supplies.

Matrons not only put up the sachems, but they consulted with them continuously, and if dissatisfied with a sachem's performance, they did not hesitate to remove him from office. Women spoke in the councils

when they wished; and they caucused among themselves, taking appropriate steps to implement the policy they had determined upon. Government at the highest levels was but an extension of the longhouse; the matrons ran the longhouse and supervised its legislative extension. The two centuries of the 'imperialistic' period had a considerable impact on the social functions of the women; new dimensions were developed for the male roles. These changes derived principally from two sources: warfare and the other pressures of the European presence.

Booty, and the trade goods obtained with stolen furs, now became more significant economically, 'balancing' the women's provision of food (but most of what was gained in this way went into war material, trinkets and whiskey). More significantly, the war chiefs finally overshadowed the peace chiefs (sachems). War had given the unfranchised men a basis for gaining influence.

Not only did the pursuit of war transform the conventions of the precontact society, but the absorption of strangers, through capture and adoption (to replace the high Iroquois casualties) strained the old system. It had to accomodate to Algonkin, Eastern Siouan and even Europeans, who had not been brought up in the Iroquois manner, and who must have blunted and suffused what had been Iroquois traditional values.

An adopted Seneca male, born a Shawnee (who are patrilineal), married a captured white girl, Mary Jamisen, in the late eighteenth century. Identified as Iroquois, they produced children who were also Iroquois. But was the culture of such 'Iroquois' really equivalent to the original Iroquois? Before the end of the eighteenth century, *captives and the descendants of captives comprised the majority of the Iroquois population* (Underhill, 1953:106).[38] French and English diplomats at Onondaga, while attempting to form or cement League alliances, left a number of progeny; some of the male offspring regarded their father's culture favorably.

The 'classic' period, thus, was one of transformation of the culture of the early confederacy by the use of new trade goods, new goals and methods in fighting, and massive absorption of alien peoples with non-Iroquois attitudes toward women. All of this might be said to represent decisions taken by the Iroquois themselves, given the problems and opportunities of the early contact period, but it can hardly be claimed that the result did not severely modify their traditional behavior.

This was also the period when the intentional onslaught of Western culture[39] began: missionaries were active among the Seneca and the Mohawk in the second half of the seventeenth century, and alliances with European powers gave outsiders a right to lobby with chiefs. The number of white men living in Iroquois villages as representatives of a European

power, was miniscule but they exerted considerable influence quite openly, whereas other captives could exert only a covert, and minor influence. How many of these military officers understood the matripotestel organization of Iroquois society? And how many would have respected it if they did understand it? Either by ignorance or intent, they by-passed the women and magnified the importance of men. (Did white men introduce the 'Iroquois' taunt of calling a warrior a woman?)

Converts to Christianity, though still a small percentage in the 'classic' period, provided a means for propagandizing not merely the worship of a different deity but the value system of a religion from the male dominant societies of Europe and the Middle East.

After the 'classic' period, acculturation, or cultural conquest, accelerated. With Quaker encouragement and Cornplanter's leadership, the Alleghany Seneca were already farming before Handsome Lake advocated it. Oneida men began to farm, without benefit of Handsome Lake's advice, being prodded by white missionaries, and attracted by the availability of new crops, such as wheat (not associated with women), the example of New England Indians who had been pushed west into their lands, and, finally, by being moved to new territory distant from their traditional land (Ricciardelli, 1972; Ritzenthaler, 1950). The Mohawk men held out against farming, preferring fishing in the St. Lawrence, roustabouting, and traveling with Wild West Shows (until in this century came the chance of working in high steel) (Mitchell, 1959; Frelich, 1958, 1970).

Patronymics were generally adopted among the Iroquois, though matrilineal descent continued to be reckoned and was important ceremonially; so that the Iroquois came to have a double descent system.[40] Sooner or later it became necessary, in order to claim membership in the Ontario Oneida band, to substantiate this affiliation patrilineally! (And the Canadian government has pressured more recently for a shift to patrilineality.)

As these changes were occurring, anthropology was emerging as a field of study. Schoolcraft, Morgan, Hale, and Hewitt, obtained their information almost exclusively from Iroquois men, who in that period must have reflected the changes that had occurred and were occurring — and these changes were away from the Mo/Da bond as the basis of society.

Finding that the earlier writers (seventeenth and eighteenth century) were generally quite unsympathetic or even hostile to the Iroquois, the nineteenth-century anthropologist tried to counteract the previous attitude in the interests of a more balanced view. But sometimes they found themselves caught up in admiration for the military and diplomatic

capabilities of the Iroquois, and ended by replacing calumnies by eulogies. Pertinently, it was the Iroquois men who aroused enthusiasm, not the activities of the longhouse matron in her social, economic, political, and religious roles.

It is, of course, true that the Iroquois have sometimes testified for themselves — in the earlier instances by having their actual words recorded (these were usually involved men addressing themselves to war or diplomacy, e.g. Logan), or later, as writers (now inevitably to some extent acculturated, but concerned with broader issues, e.g. A. C. Parker, J. M. B. Hewitt). A close assessment of the statements of these Iroquois men on the power and authority of women in comparison to the interpretations of white scholars would be interesting. While the divergence would not be complete, my impression is that the matripotestal position comes through more clearly from those who write about their own culture.

We also have some published research by (white) women anthropologists: A. Shimony, Grace Kurath, Martha Randle, and Elizabeth Tooker have made important contributions to the general ethnography, but have, on the whole approached the question of the position of women rather cautiously, though the female eminence stands out more sharply than is generally the case in the writings of their male colleagues. There is, however, Cara Richards, who has attacked the idea of women's power in Iroquois society as a 'mistake' in the interpretation of data. We will comment on her argument in due course.

Getting the Skew Out

Now, if we have correctly assessed the literature on which we must depend, we can attempt to account for the differences in the descriptions of Iroquois society (at a given time) and decide which is more accurate.

It is not hard to dispose of some nonspecialists, whose works have nevertheless become widely used, as for example, J. Seaver, the biographer of Mary Jemisen. The actual interview with Jamisen might have been invaluable since she had by that time lived for 70 years among the Seneca, having been captured in 1755 at the age of 12. But with Seaver's editing and interpolations we get statements such as 'a squaw should not walk before her Indian, nor pretend to take the lead in his business' and 'the word of the father . . . is law, and must be obeyed by the whole that are under his authority (Seaver, 1824:172).[41] We have seen that 'business' was generally not his but his mother's or his wife's, and the 'whole' that was under his authority (except in war) was almost nil.

But the idea that a woman walks behind a man and thereby reflects her inferiority is persuasive since this has often been asserted for other parts of the world where women are patently subordinate. However, among the Iroquois this pattern has a different explanation — and one which exemplifies the magico-religious power of women.

Schoolcraft explained that women, whether kin to a man or not, had 'mystic influences over his luck. In consequences of this, the female never walks in the path before him. It is an unpropitious sign. if she crosses his path, when he is about to set out on a hunting or war expedition, his luck is gone' (Schoolcraft, 1847).

This magical power did not derive from the footsteps of the woman, but was an extension of her reproductive powers and the associated beliefs concerning menstrual blood. The women wore short skirts, similar to those worn by men, but whereas the men wore a breechclout under it, women did not (Murdock, 1934:300), so that it could be supposed a drop of menstrual blood might inadvertently fall upon the path. Her whole skirt absorbed the power of the blood and a woman utilized this to protect their crops: at night, after planting she walked naked around the fields dragging her garment on the ground; it was believed that worms and insects would be impeded in attempting to cross the magic circle (Schoolcraft, 1847:180).

An Iroquois woman walked behind a man, not because she was inferior to him but because she had an uncanny power which he dreaded.

Another type of 'precedence' which has been taken, even on occasion by anthropologists, as evidence that men were superordinate, is the practice of the women feeding the men first. But since the women controlled the food, as well as prepared it, convenience dictated that they dole out what they were going to give the men, first, and get them out of the way before the group of household women set to and enjoyed their own repast together.

The work of Cara Richards is not so easily accounted for, since being a woman she is conventionally immune to being charged with antifeminist bias. Richards argues that women's influence broadened as a result of the Iroquois wars due to their (increasing, she says) rights over the disposition of captives for adoption or sacrifice. She based her interpretation on a comparison of literature from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries with the account given by Morgan in mid-nineteenth century, focusing attention on marriage (Richards, 1957). Unfortunately for her case, the literature is not of sufficient quality to support her generalizations. Accepting misunderstandings on the part of white observers, ignoring variations among the tribes, and failing to identify early and extensive acculturative change defeat her efforts. We can rest

assured that Richards has not replaced Morgan — the 'mistake' is Richards'.

What is necessary to make sense out of the disparities in the literature on the Iroquois is a defensible conceptual framework within which to organize the data. Judith K. Brown has done this very nearly (1970:151–168). She has shown that it is not enough for women to be important contributors to the economy to have high status, as R. Thurnwald thought (1931–1935), for they may merely be exploited for that reason, as K. Gough pointed out (Schneider and Gough, 1962). But Brown found a way out of the confused state in which Gough left the subject, for she (Brown) focused on the aspect of control of the economy. Iroquois women had authority because they had *control* over the major economic activities and goods. Brown's demonstration of this is in keeping with Ester Boserup's more general discussion of women's roles in economic development in traditional societies (1970).

The argument that the person who pays the fiddler calls the tune has often been used in the politics of the family. Grace Harris quotes from Aeschylus who has Orestes say 'The man's hard work supports the women who sit at home' (Harris, 1973:152). In Aeschylus' time Greek women had been reduced to a subordinate and restricted position in society (Seltman, 1956). The Lo Wilii people of West Africa have an oral recitation which is comparable; certain passages in the poem ask why girls cannot hoe (among some of the neighbors of the Lo Wilii, women do hoe), but the poem rambles around the issue rather than providing an answer, and arrives at the point where the assertion is made: we (the men) feed you (the women) (Goody, 1972). The Iroquois women were not the fed but the feeders.

If we are persuaded that female power is a possibility, and apparently an Iroquois reality, then we must take, unabashedly, a fresh look at Iroquois culture history.

Edmund Wilson is the only one I've found who suggested that the moving forces behind the formation of the League were not exclusively male. Other accounts concentrate on Hiawatha (Hayowentha) and Daganawidah, both male, while the matron Jeegonsahseh is treated as incidental to the story and unimportant (Wilson, 1959; Parker, 1916; Scott, 1911; Wallace, 1946; Wallace, 1958). Wilson, however, had observed even in the 1950s the continuation among the Iroquois of what he termed 'gynecocracy', and had the insight to wonder if there had not been more to the role of the woman whose name is preserved than appears in the currently available versions of the legend.

While Wilson was content to leave this thought in a merely suggestive form, let us pursue this idea as far as our information permits, which is

to ask — how plausible is this idea in the context of Iroquois culture history?

The ideals of the League, at its founding, according to tradition, were to achieve a universal and everlasting peace. While this is a dream that either men or women might have anywhere, it is much more in keeping with the Iroquois woman's view of the world whereas the Iroquois man's yearning for peace was apt to be alloyed with a temptation to seek 'glory' through violence. The confederation is an extension of the clans, and the matrons ran the clans, so it would be logical that a matron may have conceived the idea of this extension. Daganawidah and Hiawatha were the actors responsible for the persuasion of the tribes but they may have been no more than emissaries of the matron, Jeegonsahseh.

Daganawidah and Hiawatha were members of the first League council of sachems. Sachems are always appointed by matrons, so we may assume that Daganawidah and Hiawatha were appointed by Jeegonsahseh.

The creation of the League, in the search for a return to peace, was a response to the acceleration of violence. Until the time of contact, intergroup aggression was confined to raiding. It is useful to make a distinction between raiding, sometimes inappropriately called warfare, and the mobilization of the human and material resources of a society for long and sustained fighting for the purpose of outright conquest of another people. We reserve the term 'war' for this latter form of conflict.[42]

Prior to the League, and for some time thereafter (i.e., until contact), whatever intertribal fighting occurred could be defined as raiding; the concepts, incentives and war material for conquest came from the Europeans. Matriarchy could not survive warfare intact.

Even if the Iroquois had been left alone, however, there was one consequence of the founding of the League which diminished the presumed equality of the pre-League clans. Not all of the clans were represented in the League councils by their own sachems. The clans which had sachems have been dubbed by some writers 'noble' which is rather an exaggeration, but nonetheless the basis of hierarchial distinctions had been introduced.[43]

Have We Discovered a Matriarchy?

One of the most cherished dogmas of anthropology is that there is no such thing, never has been any such thing, and never can be any such thing as matriarchy.[44] In part the insistent and instantaneous negative

reaction to any mention of matriarchy derives from the old acrimonious debate over L. H. Morgan's hypotheses on stages of social evolution. He had the social recognition of the maternal relation appear early, prior to any emphasis on the paternal relation. There were many faults in this pioneer theorizing on social origins, but modern anthropology came into being in the midst of the turmoil of the controversy over this first extensive and systematic nontheological attempt to discover by logical analysis of ethnographic evidence the essential outlines of the culture history of the human race.

All pioneers are fated to be superseded but the reaction against Morgan was unusually bitter, not matched even by that against Darwin and Freud — though the arena was narrower since the profession of anthropology was hardly visible. In the controversy, rather than in Morgan's writings, the word 'matriarchy' became associated with Morgan, and both were discredited.

Despite the fact that Morgan made considerable use of the Iroquois in his discussion, the position taken here is not based on Morgan's theoretical approach; it is based mainly on data collected since Morgan's time and for the most part since the general repudiation of him by most contemporary anthropologists.

Another element in the antagonism toward any discussion of the possibility of matriarchy is palpably the attitude of a large number of men toward women in contemporary western society; the mere mention of feminine preeminence seems to threaten their crumbling male dominance.

Unless one can find a society where all the men were confined to harems, guarded by amazons, and their voices never heard outside the confines of walled and locked 'men's quarters', there will always be a quibble about the definition of what matriarchy can be said to be. If any choice, freedom or influence is permitted to men, there is an immediate objection that the culture is ipso facto not a matriarchy. Patriarchy, in contrast, is not defined in terms of the absolute denial of autonomy to women; 'patriarchy' is simply a substantial preponderance of authority allocated to men. Simone de Beauvoir, in fact, stated that the woman's strategy in such a society was 'to find the evasions [of male authority] that were [culturally] permitted to her'.[45] If we permit the other side as much latitude, we must suggest that the quotation marks and the prefix 'quasi-' can be dropped and Iroquois society (in its preimperialistic phase at the very least) should be recognized as a matriarchy.

Thus, we can take the description of the early Iroquois society to be the description of a (though not necessarily every) matriarchal society: a society with Mo/Da dyad dominance which also has matrilineal descent,

unilocal, matrilocal, uxorilocal residence in communal households belonging, like the environing fields, to a corporate matrilineage under the authority of a matron. The latter also had control over the religious ritual and decided on the policy of dealing with other matrilineages, naming the person delegated to carry out that policy. In such matriarchal societies, nonkin institutions were nonexistent or unimportant, conflict was limited to small scale raids, and neither trade nor crafts provided a substantial basis for acquiring wealth or power outside the kinship context.

Is Iroquois an Isolated Example?

Claude Lévi-Strauss considers the Iroquois to be an extreme, unusual and unnatural society (1963:71). Yet, if we dealt with the Hopi, the Senufo, or several other peoples as we have the Iroquois, looking beyond acculturating influences that preceed the ethnographer and the screening of data through a Western male perspective, we might decide that they qualify, or once qualified, for inclusion in (and swelling of) the category of matriarchy (McCall and Bay, 1975).

There are implications of our analysis of Iroquois Mo/Da dyad dominance for the culture history of the peoples of the Macro-Siouan language phylum, to which the Iroquois belongs, and in which matriliny, horticulture and multifamily dwellings are widespread. Does a matripotestal society lie at the base from which developed Cherokee, wherein warfare led to one transformation while other Siouans moved out on the Plains and gave up horticulture for bison hunting, leaving the historic Iroquoians closer to the original social type?

Matriarchy may be associated with the beginnings of food production in Mesoamerica; 'rich female burials' and female figurines reported by MacNeish (1971) for an early agricultural phase in Mexico may indicate a matripotestal society (MacNeish, n.d.:153). Later phases had 'priest-kings' and female authority had been overturned. Iroquois society, prior to the Fur Trade Wars, perhaps perpetuated the pristine planting tradition, but the later aggressive Mexican tradition of warlike kings was also spreading, represented by 'Middle Mississippian' cultures that were virtually 'at the heels' of the Iroquois.

The League of Peace may have been organized by the matron Jeegonosahseh to curtail the raiding, so characteristic of Middle Mississippian influenced cultures in the Eastern Woodlands. A. L. Kroeber called this fighting 'insane, unending, continuously attritional' and to it he attributed the low level of population relative to what the

economy could support (1939:148–149). As such violence proliferated through much of the area that had been peaceful and unpalisaded, and given to trade and craftsmanship during Hopewellian times, it is likely that even in the absence of the Europeans and their lust for furs, profit, land and religious conversion, the Iroquois League of Peace would have been eventually submerged in the Mesoamerican-Middle Mississippian expansion of warfare.

America seems to have been analogous to the Old World in its horticultural phases and their replacement by town-centered hierarchial kingships. Kroeber saw the same processes at work in Mesoamerica as in the Old World *oikoumene* (1945). And here is what Jacquetta Hawkes writes concerning Neolithic society in Southwest Asia: 'there is every reason to suppose that under the primary Neolithic way of life mother-right and the clan system were . . . dominant, and land would generally have descended through the female line. Indeed, it is tempting to be convinced that the earliest Neolithic societies throughout their range in time and space gave woman the highest status she has ever known' (Hawkes and Woolley 1963:264).

Should that status be recognized as gynocratic?

Hawkes' survey reveals that women were the cultivators, using hoes, and the crafts of pottery and weaving were monopolized by them, while men cared for livestock and worked wood with axes they had ground (giving the men a better case for complementarity and equivalence of economic roles than in the Iroquois case). The only ritual focus suggests that religion centered on worship of 'the Mother Goddess'.

No doubt a rather elaborate argument could be generated over the exact status of women in any prehistoric society; we will here merely note that there was a strong similarity between the societies of the primary Neolithic in Southwest Asia, the early Mesoamerican horticultural phase and the precontact Iroquois. All yield evidence of gynocracy.

A former matriarchy is indicated in the origin myths of many recent and contemporary peoples. One widespread myth that attributed to women the invention of masks and an original control of religious rituals, resulting in the subordination of men — thereby stimulating a masculine rebellion, seizing of the masks and other ritual objects, and subsequent domination by women — is well known to scholars, but the explanations for the phenomenon have been various (Campbell, 1959:320). But we can with some confidence, attribute them to the persistence of traditions of the demise of mother-right cultures of the primary Neolithic type.

It might even be said that a fully developed matriarchy, in which senior women were priestesses, composed the village councils, were family

heads and mothers, exercised all rights and privileges and had exclusive control of the symbols of power and influence, being a departure from the more egalitarian relations of the previous foraging societies, provided an excuse in the minds of the male rebels for the subsequent inequalities of patriarchy — which far exceeded those of the overthrown matriarchy. To recognize the probable existence of this mother-right phase in our culture history is not to eulogize it, but to assign it to the past — where the lingering remains of patriarchy should be hurried — and to enrich our comprehension of the values of social equality of the sexes.

All of this suggests that roles of decision making, leadership and power for women have not been as rare as we have been led to believe. It would seem prudent for anthropologists and other social scientists to have another look at their theories. And historians ought to reexamine their assumptions about civilization if it derives from a mother-right way of life. It has been all too common to 'predict' the past by description of the present and then to justify the present by this 'past'. Academic arguments purporting to show the inevitability of male dominance are weapons against women, and whatever male allies they may have, in their effort to achieve a sexually egalitarian society.

As Robert Briffault said in his debate with Bronislaw Malinowski on *Marriage: Past and Present*: 'the popular anthropologists of a patriarchal society like . . . Victorian England like to think of established institutions as the "primeval conditions of the human race"' (Montagu, 1956:37). And that might be alright, he observed, so long as women were content to be 'ignorant patriarchal wives' (ibid.). But when they protest and are led to believe by great male intellectuals that they are rebelling fruitlessly and hopelessly against a situation which is 'at the root of all social culture and of the sentiments of civilized humanity' (ibid.) that is quite another matter. We must all avoid being misled by 'an erroneous and tendencious anthropology' (ibid.:38).

Briffault told his audience in 1931 (and it can serve as my closing statement):

> You may perhaps now perceive why the unprejudiced study of anthropology, of the manners and customs of savages — a study which may seem to you idle, boresome, and even repellent — has a most important bearing upon the deepest facts of life. You are all anthropologists, just as you are all prose writers and all metaphysicians. You have definite notions as to what is and what is not part of human nature and of the natural condition of mankind. Only the examination of anthropological facts can show whether those notions are or are not correct. (ibid.)

Notes

1. The concept of the dominant dyad was explicated by F. L. K. Hsu (1965; this was reprinted, with modified vocabulary, along with the other Burg Wartenstein conference papers and an edited version of the discussions in F. L. K. Hsu (1971). Some of the ideas of the 1965 article were foreshadowed in his 'Kinship and ways of life: an exploration' in F. L. K. Hsu (ed.) (1961), in Hsu (1959) and in his writings on Chinese and American ways of life, which has been a major focus in Hsu's publications. Comment and criticism on the hypothesis can be found in Strathern, A. and U., (1966); in the articles and summation of discussion in *Kinship and Culture*, and in reviews of that publication, e.g. *Science* 175, 1450; *Social Studies* 63, 287.
2. Leach's continental contemporary with whom he was so often interacted intellectually, Claude Lévi-Strauss (1963:45), has firmly asserted categorically, 'In human society, it is the men who exchange the women, and not vice versa.'
3. S. Goldberg (1973) is reviewed in *Science* 182 (4111), 469. For two better reviews, see *American Anthropologist* 76, 363, 365.
4. Hsu had an opportunity to rewrite his *American Anthropologist* article for the book on the conference but he merely altered some of his terminology.
5. Part of the confusion comes from the fact that Hsu doesn't make explicit the interaction between the two distinct positions of which each dyad is composed.
6. How 'asexuality' of the Fa/So dyad can be equated with the whole literature on the Oedipus complex has been left unexplained by Hsu. It would probably be more accurate to say that there is a latent sexuality which is largely suppressed. The distinction between suppressed latent sexuality and Hsu's 'diffused sexuality' or 'libidinality' would not be as great as that between 'asexuality' and 'libidinality'.
7. The Iroquois do give the female precedence in verbal references. Edmund Wilson (1959:302) attended a Little Water ceremony and heard two singers sing the song which tells of a woman and a man searching for the magical Little Water: 'the first line of every couplet always applies to the woman — since the woman, among the Iroquois, is always given first place — and the second line to the man:

   She went to the village
   He went to the village'

   This pattern continued while they went to the fields, the spring, etc., and when the animals assemble the same order in gender is maintained — The She-Owl . . . The He-Owl . . . etc.

   If one merely reedited some of the writings on the Iroquois using this principle, things would look quite a bit different — but that would not overcome all of the shortcomings of this ethnography.
8. For a succinct and lucid discussion of residence classification terminology see Bohannon (1963, chapter 'The household'). Matrilineal refers to descent rather than residence but descent systems and residence patterns are interrelated so that we can hardly discuss residence without clarifying descent; matrilineal may also refer to inheritance and succession which may go together but not necessarily so, for three distinct things are involved: membership in a kin group, the disposition of property of a deceased person, and eligibility for office (see, for example, J. A. Barns, 'Kinship', *Encyclopedia Britannica*, 405 d). In the Iroquois case, all three were matrilineal, i.e. in the mother's line. Matrilocal (combined with matrilineal) means that the married couple will live in the environs of the bride's mother; uxorilocal reinforces this by emphasizing that the husband goes to live with his wife, not vice versa, and unilocal means that the newlyweds move into an already established household still occupied

by the ascending generation. Taken together these terms describe a group of women related to each other by maternal ties, living together with their husbands and children; J. M. B. Hewitt dubbed it 'the brood family'.

9. Institutional solutions are culturally prescribed and relatively rigid; moral solutions are ethically prescribed but leave room for evasion.
10. The phrase 'husband of the moment' was used by Wallace, in Hsu (1971:368).
11. Ruth Underhill (1953:86), for example, says the League was a confederation 'speaking five different dialects with a range of different customs'.
12. Attempts to reconstruct 'traditional' Iroquois culture, relating recent ethnographic field work to early writings, often fail to allow for the virtually immediate consequences of contact for culture change.
13. This is not to overlook the research reports of women, but they come rather late, Erminie Smith in this century perhaps being the first, and they remain effectively scarcely more than a half dozen, and few of their publications are readily available except in large libraries so that their work is apt to be known to students or non-specialists, if at all, through the summaries presented in ethnographic readers which have usually been written by men. Furthermore, there is not a single word in print, known to me, coming from an Iroquois woman speaking for herself.
14. Champlain heard the complaint of 'the great chief Quieunonascaron' that his daughter did not follow his advice in marrying, (Kinietz, 1965:96) but as Murdock points out (1934:311), the father had no authority over the children. (I realize that Camplain was referring to the Huron which leaves some question as to its applicability to other Iroquoians.)
15. Whatever rights he might have, they could not by any stretch of the imagination be construed to constitute dominance.
16. None of the sources leave any doubt on this point though some say the husband might take some of the children with him — this is sometimes made more precise by limiting the children who may go with the father to the older males, but these are soon to marry and so the time they could conceivably spend with their father would be fairly short. It might also be that if a man returned to his mother's house he would find a greater welcome for his sons than if he went to live with a new wife.
17. This seems to have been true even of the meat a man brought back from the hunt; once dropped at the doorway of the longhouse it became part of the larder the women supervised.
18. But Bruce Trigger (1969:67) speaks of 'the relative stability of . . . mature marriages'.
19. Follows from above, and cf. Oliver LaForge (1956:47): 'The matrons could propose matters for the council to consider.'
20. For a discussion of the controversy Kroeber aroused, see Dell H. Hymes (1964).
21. Bohannon (1963:133) speaks of 'folk image' of descent.
22. L. A. White (1939):567–570) thought Iroquois terminology probably preceded Crow and Omaha types 'when the clan system is young and weak' but when clans become strong one or the other of the types associated with unilineality would develop, but Murdock (1949:125–126) thought this was backward. Murdock (1949:337) does not see Iroquois, however, deriving from Crow.
23. James Deitz in L. and S. Binford (1968) explains a technique which — under favorable circumstances — may permit a deduction on the residence pattern.
24. Trigger (1969), uses the word 'prudery' in regard to the Huron!
25. Note the deference for Mo's authority predicted in our discussion of the theoretical model of Mo/Da dyad dominance above.

26. Sagard refers to the 'lewdness' of women, in Kinietz (1965:90).
27. And they seem to have had no trouble in stopping unwanted advances from a man.
28. Allowance must be made for exaggeration, but some say as many as twenty.
29. Children generally went about nude; adults, except for the Petun, only in the performance of some dances or certain other ceremonial activities, though when alcohol was available and people caroused, public nudity apparently increased.
30. References in the sources may be related only to the adolescents.
31. Measuring latitudes for sexual behavior would be difficult under the best of circumstances and has not, as far as I'm aware, been attempted in the field; it is obviously impossible in working with old documentary sources. Nevertheless, impressionistically, a reading of both kinds of materials gives me the feeling that matrilineal societies generally are less restrictive in sexual relations than bilateral and certainly than patrilineal ones.
32. Wallace, in Hsu (1971:370), reports that Handsome Lake charged that mothers gave daughters medicine to abort and even 'to prevent forever other children from coming'. One might doubt that Amerindian herbalism was equal to this accomplishment; Norman E. Hines came to that conclusion (1936:12–17), but Virgil J. Vogel (1970:240) affirms that when the search for 'The Pill' was going on, 'Indian herbs were . . . subjected to laboratory tests in the search for an effective oral means of controlling fertility and some of them were found to be effective'. George Devereux (1935:366), has the 'Iroquois of Canada' aborting, in order to avoid the 'trouble of raising children', by use of drugs; his information that the husband was involved probably only refers to those cases of 'illegitimacy' which he also indicates (if that includes adulterine conceptions).
33. Wallace (*loc. cit.*) Handsome Lake considered abortion a crime.
34. Hewitt was a Tuscarora and drew upon his own background but was also substantially dealing with Seneca informants simply because they predominated in New York; most other Iroquois writers have been Seneca, e.g. A. C. Parker and Jesse Cornplanter, though the Mohawk are represented, e.g. Ray Fadden.
35. Quain speaks of 'two static phases'.
36. In West Africa, at the same period, the Dutch took a different attitude toward the sale of firearms.
37. Kinietz (1965:23) on unimportance of hunting; Trigger finds work of clearing the fields a more important contribution of the men.
38. Eleven different nations lived among the Seneca in late eighteenth century.
39. D'Arcy McNickle (1972:76): 'an unremitting effort to make Europeans out of the New World inhabitants in social practices and in value concepts'.
40. The characteristics of this double descent are still not entirely clear to me.
41. Seaver's preface expresses his concern with the 'avid' interest children have in biographies and his effort to distinguish clearly between virtue and vice, which gives us an idea of how willing he was to alter things.
42. A useful typology of aggression is: 1) individual conflict which may result in murder (which is the maximum form that social violence takes among the Eskimo, the Bushman and probably most unacculturated hunters); 2) raids, involving a small party from one community with limited goals against another community (as occurs among the Yanomamo, and New Guinea horticulturists); and 3) war, which is sustained and has the objective of taking away another people's lands, or reducing them to subjection, or both (apparently this doesn't occur except where a political state organization exists).

    When armed conflict between groups results in prisoners being taken as slaves, a

push in the direction of hierarchal stratification may occur. In the Iroquois case, most prisoners who were not killed were adopted, but there is mention of slaves, possibly an idea borrowed from the white. Captured women as slaves in the community would tend to undermine the Iroquois women's position, but since the women controlled the food, all the slave women could provide would be sexual outlets and valet service.

Because the women maintained control of food sources and supplies, the acceleration of war and the acquisition of a few slaves didn't pose as great a threat to their authority (until the war chiefs became dominant) as the introduction of alcohol, given or traded by their white allies. Drunkenness was taken by the Iroquois as an excuse for acts not otherwise tolerated in the community. How much of the drunken violence of men was directed against Mo-in-law, Wi or even own Mo? When Handsome Lake encouraged men to give up drunkenness, it is interesting that he gave vent to witchhunting. The penalty for witchcraft was death; how many of Handsome Lake's victims were women?

43. Underhill, (1953:93) uses the term 'noble' in this way.

44. Marvin Harris, (1971:328) 'men have always been politically and economically dominant over women. (Please note that this is a statement of fact. It does not indicate the writer's satisfaction with this state of affairs nor his prediction about future events.)' The last statement is an unusual rider for this kind of statement. Elsewhere, p.583, he points out that muscle in industrial societies is not as much advantage as formerly and the future may see some equalizing of relations. He should take note of some of the seventeenth century observations that indicate that Iroquoian women could be as rough and tough as its men.

Harris didn't even deign to use the term matriarchy; he is simply denying that there was ever a matrilineal 'stage' in the general evolution of culture, but since anthropologists realize that matrilineality of itself doesn't necessarily give power to women, he must have had matriarchy in mind.

Eleanor Leacock (1972) one of the most empathetic interpreters in the profession of anthropology of Morgan's *Ancient Society* to this generation, is also convinced not only that there was no matrilineal stage in cultural evolution but that matriarchy is purely imaginary! 'It soon became clear [from ethnographic field studies] that matriarchy, in the sense of power held by women over men comparable to that later held by men over women, had never existed.'

45. Simone de Beauvoir, in the Introduction to *La Deuxième Sexe*, expresses this poignantly 'Comment la femme fait-elle l'apprentissage de sa condition, comment l'eprouve-t-elle, dans quel univers se trouve-t-elle enfermée, *quelles évasions lui sont premises* . . .' (emphasis mine). I quoted a somewhat longer section of this on the flyleaf of my thesis, submitted in 1955, because Akan women of West Africa served to support de Beauvoir's aim: de détrôner le mythe de la feminine.

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A Continent Found, A Universe Lost

MORTON H. FRIED

Today, as in the past, the concept of tribe is used as a divisive political device in widely separated world areas, as well as an instrument of invidious differentiation, facilitating exploitative regimes and providing a rationale for the brutal treatment of many peoples. In another range, conventional understanding of the concept of tribe reinforces certain paradigms of state formaton, in my opinion serving to transform the mythology of particular states into false historical concretions. Even widely divergent theories of state origins share an a priori agreement on the inclusion of a prestate tribal stage in a universal process. One consequence of this theoretical bias is the provision of an unwarranted legitimacy to models of human behavior that stress exclusively held living areas and contingent reliance on violence and aggression as the classically acceptable means of securing the relationship between a human population and its habitat.

Following leads provided by others, including Elizabeth Colson (1953) and May Mandelbaum Edel (1965), I advanced a theory that distinguished two developmental structures within the general rubric of tribe: one a loose form of prestate organization, the other a definitely poststate formation (the 'secondary' tribe), which took shape only as a consequence of pressures of various kinds — economic, political, military, demographic, etc. — emanating from already existing state structures (Fried, 1966). Further study of the phenomenon emboldened

Paying homage to Gene Weltfish presents a risky task. Beyond a tight circle of kin and friends, she has never seemed inclined to be sentimental. She is positively famous for her remarkably low tolerance of academic nonsense. A paper in honor of such a scholar is not to be undertaken lightly. It is also appropriate that the topic show some relationship to the work of the recipient of the homage, but this requirement is easily met, because Weltfish has displayed broad ranging interests in her research and teaching. It was through that teaching, as her student in an introductory course long ago, that I first met Gene and soon became better acquainted with my chosen field.

me to go beyond this position, to become more critical of the postulation of prestate tribes (Fried, 1975a:88–105), and finally, in an article in a popular journal (Fried, 1975b), to declare that *all* tribes were formed as the result of reactions to direct or indirect pressure from already functioning states: but no attempt will be made to argue these points here, at least not directly. Let me, instead, note that as I prepared for this paper, I became fascinated by the perhaps minor, but to me highly relevant, question of the usage of the word tribe through history. I now suggest four different periods, each overlapping to some extent with the preceding one. The first period, which runs to the beginning of the seventeenth century, sees no use of 'tribe' and probably no use of 'nation' either. Instead, we read of countries, towns, kingdoms, and peoples. The second period, more or less congruent with the seventeenth century, sees increasing reliance on the word 'nation', supplanting to some degree the previously mentioned words in appropriate contexts. It is only in the third period, which began in the early decades of the eighteenth century and lasted into the nineteenth century, that the word 'tribe' begins to be met in these contexts. Even so, during much of the period the word appears by itself only irregularly, more often it is linked in a single phrase, or by alternation, with the word 'nation'. The fourth period, extending into our own time, begins in the nineteenth century and sees a complete separation of the concepts of tribe and nation; there can be little doubt of the pejorative intentions of that shift.

That is the point. These shifts in verbal usage indicate something of much greater consequence than vagaries of linguistic fashion. Among the things being reflected by such shifts are prior alterations in the balance of relations between the European invaders of the continent and its native inhabitants. Also reflected is growing autonomy and then the establishment of a new nation state, the United States of America. That new country quickly selected a particular set of postures which would characterize its relationships with indigenous peoples. Available at the time was a large repertory representing greater or lesser variation of the different colonies. The set chosen was that which provided the sharpest limitations on the autonomy and sovereignty of all Native American populations, those yet to be contacted as well as those already well along in the process of removal and dissolution.

A transformation was under way, but it did not require the invention of new institutions: the individual instruments of oppression had already been forged. The shift from 'kingdom' to 'nation' to 'nation or tribe' to 'tribe' is reminiscent in feeling of the mid-sixteenth century debate by which Spain framed a new legal and ideological grounding for its brutal treatment of native American populations (see Hanke, 1959). More

narrowly, in the North American case, a basic function of the concept of tribe has been to provide a readily defineable locus of resource holding, and thereby supplying a datum point for ownership alienation and reallocation compatible with the legal requirements of the colonial and post-colonial states. A correlate of this proposition is the tendency to construe tribes as organizations with some degree of hierarchical structure, both of political and economic nature, although the assumption of political hierarchy appears earlier than the assumption of economic stratification.

Having raised the question of the application of the concept of tribe to American Indian social organization, let me, without intending to be remonstrative, slide into a more substantive mood by referring to Gene Weltfish's vivid account of Pawnee Indian life, *The Lost Universe*. Consulting that work in conjunction with the writing of the present paper, my pulse quickened as I read the introductory words in the 'Prologue', which state that '*The Lost Universe* is an account of one year in the life of a 600-year-old American Indian nation . . .' (Weltfish, 1965:vii). But, the thought that Professor Weltfish would preserve the old convention by holding on to the word 'nation' rather than 'tribe' was quickly dispelled. In her opinion, Indians like the Pawnees she worked among were long ago decimated by war and disease and 'memory of their past life was extremely fragmentary'. Indeed, she says, 'Whole tribes that had lived in the region for hundreds of years were wiped out or left in such a fragmentary condition that they joined with other tribes and lost the knowledge of their past identity' (ibid.:3).

Elsewhere in her discussion of the Pawnee, Weltfish alludes to information suggestive of a very early and pre-European formation of tribes (in my sense of the term) in the plains area. There seem to have been contacts with native American states, particularly those in Mexico, indicated in such phenomena as the distribution of the rituals offered to the Morning Star, involving human sacrifice (ibid.:115, 118; Wissler and Spinden, 1916). Without entering into such a technical discussion, let me say only that if a previously more highly integrated political system existed, it no longer was present when the ancestors of the Pawnee known to Weltfish were first encountered by Europeans.

Interesting in that connection is Weltfish's reference to an account of the Caddo-Hasinai (described as 'a related tribe to the Pawnee') written by Fray Francisco Casañas de Jesus Maria, whose missionary activities among the latter spanned the period from 1691 to 1722. The remarks quoted by Weltfish have to do with the political structure of the Caddoans:

These allied tribes do not have one person to govern them . . . They have only a *xinesi*. He usually has a subordinate who gathers together four or five tribes who consent to live together and to form a province or a kingdom, as it might be called — and a very large one too, if all these tribes had one person to rule over them. But such a head they have not, and I, therefore, infer that this province [which] in New Spain is called 'Teijas' (Friend) — which really expresses just what they are because each tribe is a friend to all the others — cannot be called a kingdom. (Weltfish, 1965:7, citing Swanton, 1942:170–171)

Now, the withholding of the designation 'kingdom' by Casañas, in that passage, is an interesting act of political analysis of obvious relevance to the present inquiry. However, what most forcibly struck my attention was the appearance of the word tribe. It seemed an anachronism. I doubted that anyone writing early in the eighteenth century would have used 'tribe' in that context, whether in English or in Spanish. Now, if one compares the above translation with the original Spanish, my view is seen to be correct, at least as far as this particular instance is concerned:

Y asi *Txias* quiere deçir amigos en todas estas naçiones. Todos estos amigos no tienen uno como suele tener un reino que los gobierne que nosotros llamamos rey, solo un *xinesi*, y este suele hauer uno que cogera en su goblierno quatro y cinco naçiones que bendra a ser todas juntas prouincias; reyno se pudiera deçir y mui grande, si todas estes naçiones amigas tubieran una cabeza que las gobernara. A todas, esta no la tienen, y asi infiero que ni reyno se puede nombrar esta prouincia que en la Nueba España llaman *Texias* diçen mui bien que lo son, esto por ser amigos de todos los demans. (Swanton, 1942:250)

Indeed, a comparison of the Spanish text made available by Swanton, and the English translation prepared by Mattie Austin Hatcher (1926–1928) reveals that in most instances where Casañas wrote *naçion* or *naçiones*, Hatcher translated with tribe(s) (cf. Hatcher, 1926–1928:214, and Swanton, 1942:245; Hatcher, op. cit.:215 and Swanton, op. cit.:245; Hatcher, op. cit.:216 and Swanton, op. cit.:246; etc.). In translating in this fashion, Hatcher was simply following a convention that had been in existence for about a century, and which has seen words in French, Dutch, Swedish, and other languages rendered in English translation as *tribe*, when the original was more akin to 'nation', 'people', or 'folk'.

This led me to wonder exactly how the old first contact documents handled this problem. The inquiry revealed the four stages of usage previously outlined. Let me review and illustrate them briefly.

Although the question of contacts between Scandinavians and native

Americans about 500 years prior to the voyages of Columbus remains as controversial as ever, I dipped briefly into the purported records of those encounters. On the basis of secondary Icelandic and Scandinavian historical works it seems likely that some interactions occurred between Norsemen and Eskimos, and with somewhat lower probability, with Indians along the northeastern coast of what was to become the United States. The same accounts encourage one to conclude that there were strong similarities between the first contacts of about A.D. 1000, and those that took place in 1492 and thereafter. There was also at least one major difference. The similarities are revealed in the voyage alleged to have been made to Vinland in A.D. 1008 by Thorfinn Karlsefni:

> Sometimes the aborigines (Skrellings) would assemble around them [Thorfinn's party] in great number. Thorfinn and his men bartered with them for their squirrel-skins and other furs. The Skrellings liked very much the red cloth offered by the foreigners, and gave valuable furs for a small piece of red cloth not broader than a finger's breadth, binding it round their heads like a crown. Thorfinn, also, caused his women to bring out milk-soup. The taste of which the Skrellings greatly relished. They greedily purchased, ate it, and in this manner, 'carried away their bargains in their bellies,' says the old Icelandic chronicler. In fact, this whole traffic of the Northmen with their 'Skrellings' was carried on in much the same manner in which the later Europeans used to barter with the poor Indians; with this difference only, that in modern times they gave them brandy instead of milk. (Kohl, 1869:72–73)

The main difference was in the outcome of these first contacts. We well know what came about in Indian–European relations from the time of Columbus' first voyage. With minor exceptions, the balance of force favored the invaders. Contrast that with the outcome of the Scandinavian effort to colonize westward:

> It was from the young Greenland colony that an attempt was made to establish a new outpost in Vinland, but plans for permanent settlement were given up on account of the hostility of the natives, with whom the settlers felt powerless to grapple. Gunpowder had not yet been invented. (Olson, 1911:98)

There are many puzzles unanswered by that statement, although there is no belittling the tactical and strategic advantages of the European armament achieved by the turn of the sixteenth century. Still, the Norsemen are described as being wary, if not fearful, of the Skrellings and this is difficult to understand, on the one hand because of the dominant military posture of those same Vikings throughout much of western Europe in that very period. And, on the other hand, there is the

likelihood that the 'Skrellings' were (or included) Eskimos, who are not noted for collective military actions. Other puzzles also may be found in the possibly dramatic differences between the penetration of the New World by Europeans in the eleventh century and after the fifteenth century, the answers to which require more detailed study of comparative national state development and patterns of military organization and action in the respective continents. The overall problem is complicated by the extreme variation in complexity among New World societies, a condition that requires separate analysis of the indigenously state organized sections. It is that other part of the forest, the social formations that lacked state level institutions, that interests us here. It is my suggestion that application of the concept of tribe to these formations was an externally derived device developed as a means of controlling, exploiting, expropriating, and generally dealing with social aggregates otherwise so politically formless as to frustrate interaction in terms that the Europeans could understand.

This seems to be the situation that appears in the earliest reasonably documented accounts of contact between the Europeans and the people they found on their arrival in the Western Hemisphere. It is interesting to begin with the letter written by Columbus aboard the Niña on the homeward voyage. A recent English translation of the 1493 Latin version includes a reference to an island called Charis by Columbus and thought to be Puerto Rico, and which he said, was inhabited by 'a tribe . . . that is held by its neighbors to be extremely savage' (Colombo, 1966:15). The original Latin, however, does not include any use of the usual Latin word for 'tribe', which is *tribus*, but instead refers at that juncture to *gens*, best rendered in that context as 'people' (ibid.:4; Columbus, 1968:200). This usage conforms to that which characterizes the only version of the logs and journals of Columbus that have come down to us in the work of Bartolomé de las Casas, as in the entry for November 4, 1492: 'esta gente es muy mansa y muy temerosa, desnuda como dicho tengo, sin armas y sin ley' (Colon, 1968:59).

Columbus' impressions of the Indians seem, if not confused, to contain numerous contradictions. On the first voyage, at least, he encountered no Caribs, but quickly developed fear and antipathy on the basis of what he heard about them. They represented the armed and battlewise savages he feared rather than the peaceful, friendly people he did meet. He described the latter as not knowing what weapons were, since they neither possessed nor used them ('no sepa que sean armas, porque no las tienen ni las usan', ibid.:137). But less than three weeks after the quoted words were entered, the admiral and his men had their first violent encounter when they sought to buy (*comprar*) bows, arrows,

and other weapons from natives who willingly parted with two bows but seem to have been unwilling to part with more (ibid.:148).

Fascinating as the records of Columbus' first contacts may be, I cannot dwell on them here. Let me make my points directly: there is nothing like a concept of 'tribe' in his works referring to the social organization of the local people he encountered. Nor did he refer to them as 'nations'. Mostly he used a general term — 'people'. He also employed a vocabulary indicative of political organization structured in terms that would be familiar to a European of that period. This is manifested in the terminology employed to designate places and also individuals believed by the Europeans to be persons in authority. The former are most commonly referred to as *poblacion*, *poblaciones*, *pueblo*, *pueblos grandes*, and *tierra*, usually translated respectively as village(s), town(s), and country. The last mentioned is clearly rendered in the sense translated in such a passage as occurs in the entry for December 27, 1492: 'el rey de aquella tierra' (ibid.:139). This introduces the matter of Columbus' terminology for those he took to be officials, which is summed up in a passage relating to December 23, 1492, the day on which Columbus first mentioned the word *cacique*:

> Y como las canoas andan mucho de remos fuéronse adelante a hacer saber al cacique, que ellos llamaban alli. Hasta entonces no habia pordido entender el Almirante si lo dicen por Rey o por Gobernador. También dicen otro nombre por grande que llaman Nitayno; no sabia lo decian por hidalgo o gobernador o juez. (ibid.:128) — As the canoes can be rowed fast, they went ahead to give the news to the 'cacique', as they call him there. Up to that time the admiral had not been able to understand whether by this they mean 'king' or 'governor'. They use also another name for a 'grandee', whom they call 'nitayno', he did not know if by this they mean 'hidalgo' or 'governor' or 'judge'. (Columbus, 1968:118)

Be that as it may, Columbus clearly preferred to think of the most distinguished men among his hosts as *reyes*, and he even describes a hierarchy of kings, five lesser *reyes* who were subject (*sujetos*) to one titled *Guacanagari*. This company led Columbus to a house where there was a dais and chairs (*un estradǫ y sillas*), the Admiral was placed there and the paramount king, who like the others was wearing a crown (*corona*) removed his and placed it on Columbus' head (Colon, 1968:141). Of course, Columbus was quite resistant to the idea that he had discovered a new world. He was much more eager to have pioneered a way to China where he expected to meet the *Gran Can* (Great Khan). That is why he thought he was in the Indian Sea, east of Cipango (Japan), perhaps 1500 miles from the coast of Asia. This may well have colored his thinking

about the people he was meeting, since he conceived of them as lying in the shadow of a great, no matter how alien, civilization that had been flamboyantly described by Marco Polo.

This did not prevent him, however, from initiating, whether directly or indirectly, a regime of almost total treachery and brutality in the intercourse between Europeans and those he designated Indians. Virtually from the first day of contact he regarded them as potential slaves, and in the best of circumstances they represented only a source of information concerning the whereabouts of Cathay or the fabled cities of gold. Nothing was thought of luring Indians under false pretenses of friendship and carrying them off, a trait the Europeans would continue to display throughout the period of exploration.

The last thing I would like to note from the Columbus voyages is the characteristic pattern of first contact. As is well known, the Indians were remarkably peaceful and hospitable. Columbus, of course, reported that the Indians perceived his party as divine in origin, though he says that he tried repeatedly to disabuse them of this notion. In most instances of specific first contact as he moved along the coast he was met by thronging Indians of both sexes and he was particularly impressed with their naked good looks and by their generosity, since they gave freely, repeatedly, and with no evident expectation of return. On the other hand, as time wore on incidents of conflict did occur and the outpost he left behind disappeared between the first and second voyages.

Considering the volume of scholarship the topic has produced, let me in the remainder of this essay touch merely on some illustrative highlights in order to show my main points. We may begin with the second voyage of Columbus, noting its termination in the kidnapping of some 1600 Indians from which 550 were selected for transportation back to Spain as slaves. At least 200 of them died on the voyage (Morison, 1963:227). Only the scale was different in the voyages of the Corte Real brothers in 1501 to 1503; they brought back about 50 Indians as slaves to Portugal (Quinn, 1971:51). We add the voyage recounted by Estavão Gomés, a Portuguese pilot in the service of Spain, who transported at least 58 American Indians to that country where, after thirteen died rather quickly, it was said that 'most of the remainder were baptized and given provisional liberty' (ibid.:72,n.7). This was shortly after the voyage in 1521 of Lucas Vásquez de Ayllon, who as a resident official in Santo Domingo went on at least one slave raid only to have the Indians die off 'of sorrow and hunger'. The Spaniards were puzzled that the Indians would not eat the food they gave them and professed amazement, since, they said, the Indians among themselves ate carrion (ibid.:85). And so it went.

As for the remarkably peaceful and trusting way in which the Indians met their destroyers, few accounts are simpler and more to the point than those left of the expeditions of Jacques Cartier, especially the passages relating to the first contacts of 1534. On July 6, 1534, Indians sighted Cartier's ship and came in their canoes to greet it. The French responded by firing two cannon and two 'lanses à feu' which discouraged the greeting party. Not daunted, however, on the next day the Indians returned and managed to convince the valiant explorers of their peaceful intentions and traded furs for knives, iron goods, and a red cap which, says the chronicle, was to give to their captain ('pour donnez alleur cappitaine' Biggar, 1924:51).

Cartier made a particular friend of a man named Donnacona who is introduced in these terms: 'Auprès d'icelluy lieu y a vng peuple dont est seigneur ledict Donnacona' (ibid.:123–24). It is of special pertinence to my paper to note the translation offered by Biggar of these words: 'Near this spot lives a tribe of which this Donnacona is chief' (ibid.:124). The gratuitous 'tribe' appears again and again in the translation, but the original account in French has not a single reference to *tribu*. The most common word found in this context is *peuple*, however, there are uses of the word *pays* (country) as in this description of persons in authority:

> Après lesquelles choses ainsi faictes, fut apporté, par neuf ou dix hommes, le Roy et seigneur du pays, qu'ilz appelent en leur langue *agouhanna*, lequel estoit assiz sus vne grande peau de serf; et le vindrent poser dedans ladicte place, sur lesdictes nattes (au) près du cappitaine, en (nous) faisant signe que c'estoit leur (Roy et) seigneur. Celluy *agouhanna* estoit de l'aige d'envyron cinquante ans, et n'estoit poinct mieulx acoustré que les autres, fors qu'il avoyt, à l'entour de sa teste vne manière de lizière rouge, pour sa couronne, faicte de poil d(e) herissons; et estoit celluy seigneur tout precludz et malade de ses membres. (ibid.:163–164) — The Biggar translation: When this has been done, the ruler and chief of this tribe, whom in their language they call *Agouhanna*, was carried in, seated on a large deer skin, by nine or ten Indians, who came and set him down upon the mats near the captain, making signs to us that this was their ruler and chief. This *Agouhanna*, who was some fifty years of age, was in no way better dressed than the other Indians except that he wore about his head for a crown a sort of red band made of hedgehog's skin. This chief was completely paralyzed and deprived of the use of his limbs. (ibid.)

Cartier was shown scalps and told about hostilities between Donnacona's people and those called Toudamans, living to the south. Because of language difficulties, Cartier could not establish how far away those Toudamans were. The reader of the account, however, detects no tone of fear of raid or ambush although such events are said to

have happened only two years earlier. Certainly the open reception accorded Cartier suggests people more accustomed to peaceful than hostile encounters. Also, in saying good-bye to him on his first voyage, the Indians followed his ship a considerable distance down the St. Lawrence River, apparently anticipating no attack from other inhabitants (ibid.:177–178).

All that remains to be said about Cartier and the Indians is that at the conclusion of his second voyage, he kidnapped his good friend Donnacona in order to display him at the French court. Donnacona died in France less than a year later.

The friendly reception that greeted Cartier in the northern coastal region was matched by that accorded other French explorers along the Florida coast. Entering the estuary of the St. Johns River in 1562, the chronicler of the Jean Ribault expedition

> perceved a good numbre of Indians, inhabytantes there, coming along the sandes and seebanck somewhate nere unto us, withouwt any taken of feare or dowbte, shewing us the easiest landing place, and thereupon we geving them also on our parte tokens of assuraunce and frendelynes, fourthewith one of the best apparance amonges them, brother unto one of there kinges or governours, comaunded one of the Indians . . . to showe us the easiest landing place. (Quinn, 1971:143)

The French penetration of Florida is interesting in several respects considering the point of the present essay. For one thing, it produced additional accounts showing how these explorers eagerly crammed their experiences into what seem to me to be preconceived European political categories of that time. Thus René de Laudonnière, writing in 1565 of his (doomed) colony in northern Florida, explained that

> After they [the Indians] had made very much of us, they shewed us their Paracoussy, that is to say, their king and governour . . . the Paracoussy of the country . . . tooke me by the hand, as if he had desire to make me understand some great secrete, and by signes shewed me very well up within the river the limits of his dominion, & said he was called Satorioura, which is as much as king Satorioura. (ibid.:151–152)

Another thing provided by these French incursions into regions claimed and jealously defended by the Spanish was an example of total warfare waged by the different European populations upon each other. We have interesting glimmers of local Indian reactions to this warfare, for at a very early date each side encouraged Indians to do as much damage as possible to the other Europeans, but on the whole there seems to be no

way of reconstructing a more general picture of Indian communication concerning such events, at least for these very early dates.

Let me conclude this part of my essay by focusing briefly on events in the wider area of New York, which seems fitting in a volume dedicated to a confirmed native of that region. The earliest European travelers in these parts were probably Verazzano and his associates in 1524. Once again, the first contact was entirely hospitable: 'Many of the natives came to the beach, indicating by various friendly signs, that we might trust ourselves on shore' (Asher, 1860:205). The Indians even rescued an Italian sailor who was trapped in the surf. The next day Verazzano sought to kidnap a young woman and a boy. The woman screamed and escaped, but they did make off with the boy (ibid.:207). It is worth noting that the nineteenth-century translator could not resist the critical comment: 'Which are the *savages*?' (ibid.:207–208,n.1). Also of concern is the nineteenth-century translator's gratuitous use of 'tribe', as in the lines, 'This is the finest looking tribe, and the handsomest in their costumes, that we have found in our voyage' (ibid.:212). The Italian says: 'Era questa la più bella gente e la più gentile di costume abbiamo trovata in questa navigazione'. (Also compare page 217 in the same work where the Italian 'altri' is rendered as 'other tribes'.)

The next recorded activity in what is now the metropolitan area of New York is, of course, that which occurred during the third voyage of Henry Hudson. It is said that Hudson himself was at odds with his crew concerning the proper attitude and conduct towards local inhabitants, since he displayed trust and friendship and members of the crew were suspicious and hostile (Asher, 1860:82,n.2). Whatever the truth of this, the records show yet again that the Indians came out to greet the aliens and gave them gifts. For example, at one point the journals note that 'wee anchored, and saw that it was a very good harbour for all windes, and rode all night. The people of the country came aboord of us, making shew of love, and gave us tabacco and Indian wheat, and departed for that night; but we durst not trust them' (ibid.:81–82, also see p.79). Perhaps two weeks later the bloodshed began when the Europeans surprised an Indian aboard the Half Moon making off with a pillow, two shirts and two 'bandeleeres'.

Although the translations of documents relating to Hudson's contacts with the Indians frequently include the use of both 'nation' and 'tribe', neither is to be found in the original English account by master's mate Robert Juet (who perished on the ill-fated fourth voyage) nor in associated materials in Dutch. Thus, the nineteenth-century translation of extracts of the work of John De Laet, *Nieuwe Werelt* (originally published in 1625) includes passages such as:

'I sailed to the shore,' he [Hudson] says, 'in one of their canoes, with an old man, who was the chief of a tribe, consisting of forty men and seventeen women . . .'

but the Dutch original is:

Ick voer (seght hy) met een van haer prauwen aen landt, met een oudt man die daer overste was, van weertich mans ende seventhien vrouwen . . . (Asher, 1860:161).

The word 'nation' was also gratuitously inserted in translation, as in the phrase 'the second river discovered, which was called Manhattes, from the savage nation which dwelt at its mouth' (ibid.:158, but the Dutch text, given on the same page, reads: 'dese tweede rievier, de welcke sy den naem gaven van Manhattes; naer de naem van de Wilden die aen't begin van dese rieviere woonen').

The word 'nation' was, of course, in English usage for at least three centuries before the time of Hudson's voyages. The *Oxford English Dictionary* provides its earliest illustrations from the thirteenth century. Curiously, in giving one of its subsidiary definitions for the term, 'II.5.a. A tribe of American Indians', the earliest example provided of this particular usage dates to 1763 (compact edition, p.1898), which is already within the period when nation and tribe were often coupled in a single phrase. The search for the earliest records of usage of a particular word must be one of the most difficult and tedious jobs in scholarship. In my own all too desultory reading, the earliest direct application of the word nation to American Indian social organization that I have found dates to 1608 and comes from the pen of Captain John Smith. In 'A true relation', although most usually speaking of Indian 'kingdomes' and 'townes', we also find the phrase, 'another King of that nation called Kekataugh' (Tyler, 1907:46). In 1612, the authors of 'The proceedings of the English colonies in Virginia' noted that, 'Our purposes were crossed in the discoverie of the river of Toppahannock, for we had much wrangling with that peevish nation . . .' (ibid.: 50). That remark may be better understood in the light of John Smith's explanation of the same year:

The most of these rivers are inhabited by severall nations, or rather families. Of the name of the rivers. They haue also in every of those places some Gouernour, as their king, which they call *Werowances*. (Arber, 1884:50. Of interest is the appearance of this passage in a recent book. The editors and compilers felt compelled to insert parenthetically the word 'tribes' after the word families above. Wright and Fowler, 1972:60.)

Smith's description of the Chesapeake region is interesting for many reasons, but extensive treatment cannot be attempted here. For our purposes, we note only that he uses the term nation in many places. Also, he makes absolutely clear that he was applying the term to quite tiny population clusters, for he itemized the 'nations' in the region and estimated the number of 'fighting men' in each. In all, he estimated the total native American population within a 60 mile radius of Jamestown at 'some 5000 people . . . but of able men fit for their warres scarse 1500' (Tyler, 1907:65). He named over 30 'nations' among these, some such as the Kecoughtans and Potapaco with as few as 20 warriors, the largest, Pamaunke, with 300. He did, however, report that these units were organized into a larger system:

> The forme of their Common wealth is a monarchicall gouernment. One as Emperour ruleth over many kings or governours. Their chiefe ruler is called *Powhatan*, and taketh his name of the principall place of dwelling called *Powhatan*. But his proper name is *Wahunsonacock*. (ibid.:79)

Smith stated flatly that, 'They all knowe their severall landes, and habitations, and limits to fish, fowle, or hunt in', and he was told that all of them paid tribute to Powhatan (ibid.:81).

By 1634, the use of the term nation was commonplace in contemporary narratives relating to the Indians. For example, Captain Thomas Yong, writing in English about the Indians of the lower Delaware River remarks that he learned from one Indian 'that the people of that River were at warre with a certaine Nation called the Minquaos' (Myers, 1912:38) and the next day another Indian told him, fearfully, that the Minquaos 'were enimies to him, and to his Nation' (ibid.:39). Later the same day Yong permitted some Indians aboard his ship:

> They told us, they were Minquaos, and that one of them was a king, (for soe all the Indians call them who are most eminent among themselves, and they are in nature of Captaynes or Governors of the rest, and have power of life and death, of warre and peace, over their subjects, Some have 1000, some 500, some more, some lesse) and made signes to us, that they were lately come from warre with the other Indians. . . . (ibid.:39)

The use of 'nation' continued in this matter as the Europeans penetrated the eastern seaboard, both north and south. An early exploration of the Carolinas (New Brittaine) in 1650 made inquiries about 'an English woman cast away long since, and was amongst those Nations'; the same account mentions Indian 'Emperours' and 'Kings' (Salley, 1911:8,10). Another narrative relating to the same general area

in 1654 speaks of 'the great emperor of Rhoanoke', 'the emperor of the Tuskarorawes' and 'a great nation called the Newxes', etc. (ibid.:27).

Not all contemporary narratives made such use of the word 'nation'. I believe that it will not be found applied to the Indian aggregations throughout the fairly lengthy *History of Plymouth plantation, 1606–1646* by William Bradford, nor will it be found in significant usage in the diverse accounts that comprise the *Narratives of the Indian Wars 1675–1699* (Lincoln, 1913), although it does appear at the very beginning of the last item included in that volume, which is Cotton Mather's 'Decennium Luctuosum' (1699), in a reference to 'the Nations of the Indians'. It is perhaps more important to note that the word *tribe* is completely absent from all this material.

The transition from nation to tribe seems to have occurred in the early decades of the eighteenth century, that is to say, in this period we first encounter the word tribe with some regularity, although often joined with nation in the phrase 'tribe or nation' or alternating with the latter word to form a specific pattern. As we will see, a transition in usage can be spotted in at least one compilation of contemporary records, that of Robert Livingstone referring to the years 1666 to 1723. Let it be noted first, however, that one of the most extensive continuous sets of records, the Jesuit Relations, 1610–1791, shows no deviation in its usage. One of its last items is a letter of Father Roubard, missionary to the Abenakis, dated 1757. Although the translators once again followed their customs of introducing the word 'tribe' into a variety of contexts, Roubard himself never used the word. A typical passage goes as follows:

> Ce n'était pas une légère consolation pour des Ministres du Seigneur, d'entendre chanter ses louages en autant de langues différentes qu'ils étaient de Peuples assemblés. Tous les jours chaque Nation choisissait un endroit commode où elle campait séparément.' (Thwaites, 1899:102) — The English version: It was no slight consolation to the Ministers of the Lord to hear his praises sung in as many different tongues as there were Tribes assembled. Each day each tribe would choose a suitable place, where it encamped by itself. (ibid:103)

So, the shift to the use of tribe, which we are about to see, was a slow process which seems to have occurred most rapidly in English.

The compiler of the previously mentioned Livingstone Indian records, in addition to founding one of the wealthiest landholding families in New York, created the office of Secretary of Indian Affairs in the same colony (Leder, 1956:8). Robert Livingstone's records include proceedings of the meetings of the Indian Commissioners, reports of what took place in meetings with Indian sachems, and relevant documents, covering the period from 1666 to 1723 and, though kept by

the New York colony, include materials pertaining to New England and Virginia and everything between. The word nation is commonplace in these pages. Its appearance in the records dates from one of the earliest documents included, from 1666 (Leder, 1956:34). The earliest English document in the series, dated June 30, 1677, ends with notice of a gift: 'To each nation a hundred & fifty gilders white Strung wampam, in 3 Pairts, fifty Each' (ibid.:43). Thereafter, as noted, the word 'nation' makes frequent appearances. In many instances it has the special meaning in the area that is associated with the (then) Five Nations; but the term was not always so restricted. In 1687 Thomas Dongan, Governor General of New York, in a formal statement to Seneca and Cayuga representatives, remarked that

> Since I Am Informed y^t hr are a great many nations of Indians y^t are in warr wth you, be not Troubled at y^t. You shal have al y^e help of al our Indians Nations . . . . (ibid.:127)

It may also be remarked in passing that the word nation is also referred on occasion to Europeans, in particular to the English and the French. But most interesting is the final document in the Livingstone records. It consists mainly of a proposition presented in 1723 on behalf of 'his Maj^{es} Govern^t. of the Massachusets Bay to the Sachims of the five Nations (to witt) the Mohoggs, Oneydes, Onnondages, Cayouges & Sinnekes as also to those of Tusquarora' (ibid.:236). The first statement commemorates the long-standing friendship between the Government of Massachusetts Bay 'and your Tribes' and refers to the Indians who visited Boston as 'your Chiefs (being delegates from their Respective Tribes)' (ibid.:237). There is one more reference to tribes in this brief document, which ends ironically with the presentation of 'fifty Keggs with Rum filled . . . which you may carry to your own Castles to drink with the rest of your Sachims' (ibid.:238). This is the earliest direct employment of the word tribe with reference to American Indians that I have been able to find as yet — except for a certain well known but not quite conjoint use.

It was only in the course of compiling the information on which this paper is based that I began to realize that there might be some relationship between the application of the word 'tribe' to American Indians and the history of the word, which is entangled with the biblical expression of the social organization of the ancient Israelites. The link between the two is the remarkable belief, which some anthropologists find so ludicrous as to avoid mentioning, that the native population of the Americas was descended from the so called 'Ten Lost Tribes of Israel'. Although it is widely believed that this theory sprang up almost

simultaneously at first contact in the time of Columbus, Huddleston, the author of a recent treatise on the subject, could not locate either a contemporary explorer or historian who wrote such an opinion down (Huddleston, 1967:33). However, less than a century later, in 1567, such published versions became available, perhaps first in the work of Joannes Fredericus Lumnius, *De Extremo Dei Iudicio et indorum vocatione*, but even so, such volumes seem to have been rare and obscure. By 1607 the theory began to assume greater weight in scholarly circles largely as the result of the publication of Gregorio Garcia's *Origen de los Indios de el nuevo mundo*. However, Huddleston believes that before that time the theory may have had greater currency in lay circles than among scholars. (For a synopsis of the early history of the theory see Huddleston, 1967:33–44.) Until the middle of the seventeenth century, the Lost Tribes theory did rather poorly in northern Europe; although known and discussed, it was usually rejected (ibid.:113–118). Then, in the middle of the seventeenth century, the theory became a major item of discussion in much of western and northern Europe.

The Ten Lost Tribes thesis became almost a popular issue as well as an abstruse scholarly one through the efforts of a rabbi in Amsterdam, Menasseh ben Israel. Too complex to summarize here, the background is available in Huddleston (ibid.:128–134) and Glaser (1973:36–42). An essential element is the convergence of millenial beliefs of Jews and Puritans, hence the sharing of the conviction that the millenium hinged on the total dispersion of the Jews. This, in turn, involved the 'discovery' that the Jews were in fact already much more dispersed than previously imagined, because of their identification with the native population of North and South America. All that remained, it was argued, was the return of the Jews to England, from which country they had been exiled in the thirteenth century. A specific stimulus to this brouhaha was the arrival in Amsterdam in 1644 of a Portugese Jew, Antonio Montesinos, also known as Aahron Levi. He said he had been in various places in the New World where he had encountered 'hidden people' in Nueva Granada, near modern Quito, who had admitted that they were really Jews. Word of this story spread far beyond both Amsterdam and the Jewish community and inquiries poured in about it. Rabbi Menasseh, a polyglot scholar, became the center of the communications web that developed. He also stepped out on his own, petitioning Oliver Cromwell for the right of Jews to return to England, thereby completing the diaspora and bringing the millenium which Cromwell's fundamentalism embraced.

While the Lost Tribes theory had its ups and downs in succeeding eras, what interests me is that, whether pro or con, the arguments presented a

de facto usage of the term 'tribe' in the context of American Indian social organization. (Note: the same applies to Africa, as in these words of Menasseh ben Israel: 'Part of the ten Tribes alfo live in *Ethiopia*, in the *Habyffin* Kingdome . . . *Boterus* in his relations fpeakes the same thing, that two potent Nations doe live near *Nilus*, and that one of them is that of the *Ifraelites* . . .' Menasseh, 1652:34. The conjunctive use of nation and tribe is particularly interesting.) Furthermore, Menasseh's work was widely read. For example, it is mentioned by Cotton Mather, although he did not altogether accept it (Glaser, 1973:44–45). William Penn was a supporter of the theory and did much to propagate it, as in a letter written by him and published for general sale in 1683 in London. In this letter Penn discusses the Indians and remarks that 'for their Original, I am ready to believe them of the Jewish Race, I mean, of the stock of the Ten Tribes . . .' (Myers, 1912:236).

The lore of the Ten Lost Tribes reached a peak of some kind with its enshrinement in the new religion of Mormonism in the late 1820s and early 1830s (Glaser, 1973:60–74), but passed certain milestones along the way. Of particular interest is the remarkable work of John Adair, published in London in 1775, *The History of the American Indians*. Adair's book is divided in two. The first part presents twenty-three arguments 'in proof of the American Indians being defcended from the Jews', of which the very first argument is:

> As the Ifraelites were divided into TRIBES, and had chiefs over them, fo the Indians divide themfelves; each tribe forms a little community within the nation — And as the nation hath its particular fymbol, fo hath each tribe the badge from which it is denominated. (Adair, 1968:15)

It should be obvious that the symbols referred to by Adair are totemic emblems and his use of 'tribe' is congruent with the conception of a large aggregate based on stipulated common descent:

> When the Indians are travelling in their own country, they enquire for a houfe of their own tribe; and if there be any, they go to it, and are kindly received, though they never faw the perfons before . . . (ibid.:17).

If Adair's usage is not already clear, the second part of his book drives the point home. In the latter sections of his work Adair describes and relates the history of the Indians among whom he had lived and traded since 1735. He refers to them as 'the Katahba, Cheerake, Mufkoghe or Creeks, Choktah, and Chikkafah Nations'. Of the Katahba he says: 'About the year 1743, their nation confifted of almoft 400 warriors, of

about twenty different dialects' (ibid.:224). The word 'tribe' appears in the latter half of Adair's work only a few times and one usage that struck my attention was a reference to certain 'reduced, broken tribes' which were 'the remains of feven Indian nations' whose traditions, said Adair, spoke of coming from South America. They were now attached to the Muscogee, whom 'they have helped to multiply . . . to a dangerous degree' (ibid.:267).

Although, as we have already seen, the word 'tribe' was employed by itself at least as early as 1723 (in the Livingstone records), its use appears to have been sporadic at best for most of the remainder of the eighteenth century, whereas 'nation' continued to enjoy great currency. One of the earliest instances I have found of the use of the word 'tribe' in this explicit application to American Indians occurs in the journal of the Indian agent George Crogham. The date is 1751 and the entry conveys a speech addressed by the royal governor of Pennsylvania, James Hamilton, to the Twigtwee Indians, including the words, 'As you are an ancient and renowned Nation', and a few lines further on, 'Mr. George Crogham . . . informs us that some more of your Tribes earnestly requested to become our Allies' (Thwaites, 1904:66). On the basis of readily available, published material, Crogham seems not to have used the word 'tribe' again for more than ten years. In his entry for August 1, 1765, passing the Twigtwee village, he 'was met by the chiefs of that nation' and about a week later he came to the country of the Ottawas, called 'this nation' (ibid.:150, 151). It is not until the entry of August 17, 1765, that the term 'tribe' is met again: 'I arrived at Detroit where I found several small Tribes of Ottawas, Puttewatamies, & Chipwas . . .' (ibid.:153). Although the word 'nation' continues to be used, 'tribe' increases in frequency thereafter. A particularly interesting group of examples occurs in the entry for September 25, 1765, where the word 'tribe' is put in the mouth of 'the Chiefs of the St. Joseph Indians':

> Fathers: you have after all that has happened, received all the several Tribes in this Country for your Children . . . we are no more than Wild Creatures to you Fathers in understanding therefore we request you'l forgive the past follies of our young people & receive us for your Children since you have thrown down our former Father on his back, we have been wandering in the dark like blind people, now you have dispersed all this darkness which humg over the heads of the several Tribes, & have accepted them for your Children . . . (ibid.:164–165)

These lines are part of a speech made to Crogham and Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Campbell, then commandant of Detroit, and are, of course only available in this possibly self-serving rendition by Crogham.

Nonetheless, the tone rings true, as does the shift to the parent-child simile; the early form of relations was invariably that of brethren. By the end of the year, which is also the end of this particular record, the use of tribe predominated and was extended to all, including Mohawks, Oneidas, Onandagas, etc. (ibid.:167–169). In general, however, the preference for nation still hung on.

Another of the mid-eighteenth-century uses of tribe may be found in a poster said to have been published in the Massachusetts Bay colony in 1755. It begins with an excoriation of 'the Indians of *Norridgewock*, *Arresaguntacook*, *Weweenock* and *St. John's* Tribes, and the Indians of the other Tribes inhabiting in the Eastern and Northern Parts of His Majesty's Territories of *New-England*, the *Penobscot* Tribe only excepted . . .' (Vogel, 1974:51), for breaking existing treaties and committing acts of violence. Bounties are offered for the scalps of these Indians and a price list included. Since this is one of the earliest examples that I have been able to find of the use of the word 'tribe' not coupled with the word 'nation' in such a context, it is unfortunate that the source is not the original document, but a facsimile (ibid.:52). Compare that usage with that in the 'Proclamation of 1763', which speaks of 'the several nations or tribes of Indians with whom we are connected, and who live under our protection' and reserves to those Indians all the lands not already ceded to or purchased by the British (Washburn, 1973:2137). Indeed, the only solo appearance of 'tribe' in the critical document, '[United States] Ordinance for the Regulation and Management of Indian Affairs, August 7, 1786', is in the remark

> And whenever they shall have reason to suspect any tribe or tribes of Indians of hostile intentions, they shall communicate the same . . . : (ibid.:2141)

Thereafter, in this ordinance, the word used is 'nation'. But the turning point was near, and might well be marked in the 'Intercourse Act' of 1790, which Congress entitled, 'An Act to Regulate Trade and Intercourse with the Indian Tribes' (ibid.:2151), although the use of the phrase 'tribe or nation' continued until well into the nineteenth century, well beyond Jefferson's instructions to Lewis and Clark and the account by the latter of their expedition.

This tedious review of materials does not constitute proof, but does lay out the argument that the perception of the social and political organization of the American Indians in general and those of certain portions of North America in particular underwent periodic shifts which are manifest in the choice of words used to characterize basic aggregates in Indian society. In part, the developments also reflect changes in social,

economic, and political organization in Europe itself, as there were great alterations in the nature of European state organization and capitalist and colonial economy. But there are also other strands, as the Europeans sought first to get some kind of handle on the populations they immediately set out to exploit. Later, the problems became more subtle, as the interactions steadily threw even the pretense of Indian unit sovereignty into the shadows. The unfolding of this dismal history is worth the effort not merely for antiquarian or ethnographic interests, but because the problems that are involved continue, in different ways, to haunt us today in the rubble of colonialism and in the continued presence of imperialism and neocolonialism. If we are to understand what really happened in history, we must be prepared to look very critically at, and perhaps even discard, some of the mythology that was created to enable colonialism/imperialism to flourish. The concept of 'tribe' is a key building block in that edifice and I like to think that unlikely essays such as this may play a small role in its demolition.

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Encounter in the Field

E. R. SERVICE

'This is Nacho, the man I was telling you about', said the amused young Jesuit missionary. 'Nacho' (Ignacio) was obviously drunk, swaying gravely, a small leathery man of Indian features somewhere in his sixties. I must have looked worried, or unbelieving, for the missionary hastily explained: 'He is in town celebrating his name day. This is the anniversary of San Ignacio de Loyola, in case you didn't know.'

The missionaries had recommended him as a guide for me, but I didn't expect a drunk man. Summer is the rainy season here in the High Sierra of Chihuahua, and the difficult mountain trails become washed out or loosened, and now I was marooned by the rains at the tiny ruined mountain town of Sinforosa. I am an anthropologist by trade and was trying to reach the remote Northern Tepehuán Indians — and it was obviously going to be tough going. The two friendly missionaries were glad to see a stranger — even an infidel *científico* — and had taken me in as a guest while they hunted up the 'trustworthy guide with good horses' that they felt could safely get me to Baborigame, a village centered in the Indian country.

They obviously wanted me to accept Nacho and assured me that he got drunk like this only once a year. Nacho slúrred slowly, with drunken care, in his rustic Spanish, 'There is a greater security. I have no money to get drunk on other days anyway.'

He was obviously a poor man. His pants and shirt had overlapping patches, though they were clean and the sewing was neat. I wondered why he was not better dressed for his name day celebration. Later I found out that he had no other clothing whatsoever.

Well, I accepted Nacho despite strong misgivings. I suppose it was because I liked him even then, drunk. What impressed me was his pleasant, offhand, completely natural dignity. As a city dweller of the frenetic North, I am always disposed to be impressed by calmness and

dignity, however commonly I find it in rural Mexico. My hosts were pleased, for they were fond of him, too. (I believe now that the criteria for a good guide had been subordinated by my kindhearted hosts and that they gave me Nacho because he needed money. They could not possibly have been unaware of his shortcomings; it did not take me long, in fact, to discover that he was nearly blind from cataracts.)

Plans were made. We would leave at dawn and stay overnight at Nacho's house, near the halfway point of the trip. I would ride one of the mission's horses that far, and Nacho would drive his own burro with my duffle packed on it. In some complicated way the horse would be returned later to the mission by someone (I should explain that I speak standard Mexican Spanish quite well, but do not always understand rural people speaking among themselves). For the day after, Nacho would furnish the horses himself. A fee of 28 pesos — a little over two dollars — was agreed upon, and Nacho took an advance of 5 pesos and went away to continue celebrating San Ignacio's Day.

Dawn seemed late because it was a drizzling, dark day. My guide looked shaky and in response to my solicitation he admitted that he hadn't slept and yes, he was *crudo* ('raw' and 'hungover'). We started, though, and he was good humored, even witty, and courteous and uncomplaining the whole miserable twelve hours of that day's trip.

A few things happened, however, which were not meaningful in themselves, isolated, until I began to see a pattern to them later on. The first one occurred only about fifteen minutes out of town at a cattle barrier. Nacho let down the heavy logs, drove the burro through, and then I passed. He stood dreamily for a minute before replacing the logs. It was not until he got them all up that he realized he was on the wrong side. It could happen to anyone, of course, and we both laughed as he climbed over.

Later I saw some huge pink mushrooms in the woods, some as big as motorcycle seats. Nacho picked one to show me at close hand. This he would take to his wife. He carried it nearly all the rest of the day, carefully, so not to break off any of it.

It was awkward to carry the fragile mushroom. He held it in one hand and in the other a stick with which he would beat the burro. Frequently he had to lay down the stick and mushroom in order to hitch up his trousers. He had a belt but it was not passed through the loops and, particularly during steep ascents, the back of the trousers sagged. This did not seem to annoy him but it did cause a lot of trouble. I cannot think of any meaning that could be attached to this. At the time I merely thought 'What a funny fellow . . .'.

Late in the morning one of Nacho's worn-out ***huaraches*** came off.

These are sandals with soles of automobile tire casing held to the foot by a complication of leather thongs. He would keep walking with the foot bare while he tried to fix the sandal, the stick under his arm and the mushroom in one hand. He never did fix it more than temporarily and the last mile to his house was walked on the bare foot. By late afternoon the mushroom became so dilapidated from this handling that Nacho finally threw it away. We passed others but he didn't pick them, apparently having forgotten that he wanted one.

We lost about an hour sometime in the afternoon because Nacho inattentively wandered off the trail and we had to quarter back and forth over extremely broken country to find it. I won't dwell on the incident, but needless to say it was exasperating. I had been weakened by a persistent dysentery and now I was done in and wanted to *arrive* somewhere — anywhere.

About seven o'clock that evening we were moving along a pretty stream in an open valley when Nacho said that his house was just ahead. He had already demonstrated a sense of humor, so I went straight on because I did not think he really meant to stop at the abandoned-looking hut with the thatch roof fallen in the front. But this was Nacho's home. He and his wife (his third) and their three small children lived in the back room, originally the kitchen, which was still somewhat intact.

We were frightfully hungry and Nacho's wife, who was much younger than he and very shy, soon began baking tortillas over an unvented fire in the center of the floor. I found a can of beef in my pack and opened it with my Boy Scout knife. Nacho emptied the meat into a tin pan which he set on the floor until his wife would have room on the fire to warm it. I was at the point of warning Nacho of the starved-looking dog lying in the corner, but I didn't because I felt a stranger and was still refraining from giving the advice I ordinarily offer all too freely. Needless to say, as soon as our attention was elsewhere we heard the loud gulps that bespoke the fate of the meat. Nacho was chagrined, but he chuckled — the joke was on us.

We ate the tortillas — there was nothing else — and afterward I sought the bottle of tequila wrapped in clothing in my sack. I was in pain and wanted a drink, however atrocious the stuff, and assumed that Nacho would be far gone for it. He took a sip, not avidly but as though he were merely being courteous. Then he got up and said he had better round up the animals we would use tomorrow.

I went along because it was dark now, and I thought an extra hand might be needed. A few yards from the back door of the house the stream had unexpectedly meandered, and in the blackness I fell headlong into it, saturating my pantlegs and sleeves and bruising my knee. Was

this *my* stupidity? Shouldn't I have been cautioned? The water was ice-cold, and now so was the air and Nacho insisted that I go back to the fire. I did and soon Nacho returned, saying that all was secure.

The day's incidents had eroded away some of my regard for Nacho, but all was restored during the rest of that evening. He built up the fire and soon my clothes were dry enough for me to be comfortable. We passed the tequila back and forth, and the hovel began to seem almost homelike in the firelight. Nacho was in a talkative mood and I was pleased by his humor and intelligence. I sat on a tiny homemade stool, Nacho sat on a chunk of wood, and the three children lay together in a heap on a deerskin on the other side of the fire. I don't know what happened to the silent wife, but she wasn't there.

After a while Nacho got out a small, homemade violin. When he began to play it seemed to me that he had not tuned it properly. Then he began to sing as he played, resting the fiddle against his chest. The compositions, he said, were his own, based on 'Indian' music and with 'Indian' words. The music soon sounded weird to me rather than bad, and later it seemed interesting and finally quite good.

It was pitch black outside through the open door frame. Inside there was only the light from the dying fire. Suddenly I was aware of faces in the doorway — Indian faces. Nacho ignored them and I thought at first that he might be afraid, but I learned later that they came often in the evening like this. The reason he did not say anything to them was because — strange to city people but very common among primitives — it is a matter of courtesy not to embarrass people by greetings, thanks, aimless joviality, or even to acknowledge the presence of visitors until a sufficient time has passed. 'Sufficient time' seems like a very long time to a Yankee. The firelight was reflected from the Indians' smooth faces, and they looked almost childishly beautiful, unselfconsciously absorbed in the music. The three children now were sound asleep and Nacho covered them with a ragged blanket; it was their bed, that deerskin.

Finally Nacho stopped playing and said something in Tepehuán to the Indians and their spokesman unsmilingly responded. I hoped this meant that now there would be less formality and that they themselves might even sing, but nothing was changed. Nacho went on with his music and I leaned back against a roof post and dozed, ultimately so soundly that I fell off the stool. The Indians had gone and we went to bed on the clay floor.

I was awakened at dawn by the slapping sound of tortillas being shaped by Nacho's ragged, frozen-faced wife. Where had she spent the night? As we ate the tortillas she kept her back to me, which was puzzling as well as embarrassing. When I rolled up my duffle I looked for

something I could give her. There was nothing appropriate so I took the jackknife from my pocket and presented it to her 'for the kitchen'. She struggled with her face but could not restrain a happy smile. It was a very nice smile considering that her mouth contained not a single incisor tooth. Now that her secret had been displayed, we had a friendly chat.

We went out to see if we could help Nacho. The sun was just coming up. It would probably rain later, but now the valley was glorious, the grass and trees still sparkling with moisture and the sky a deep, deep blue. Nacho was preparing to shoe a handsome mule. This job was finally accomplished by all three of us with the aid of several restraining ropes snubbed around two trees. The mule was young and strong-minded, and the work cost us an hour of considerable exertion and excitement. Then I was dismayed to learn that this was to be my mount and that Nacho would walk.

'What happened to the horses you were supposed to furnish?' I asked.

Nacho looked blank and I decided that I must have misunderstood that part of our bargain; in his poverty, he clearly could not be an owner of horses.

I then asked, 'Why couldn't we borrow the Jesuits' horse another day?'

'Not possible' — here Nacho grinned sheepishly — 'because the horse got away in the night and is probably nearly home by now.'

I looked at the wild, quivering mule again and ventured to Nacho that perhaps he should ride and I walk this time. But no: it was preposterous that I, the *patrón*, should consider walking; he would not allow it. As for the mule, it would calm down after a few miles and would give no trouble.

Within the first mile the mule tried to throw me several times, and once he was frightened by a white rock and we nearly went over a cliff. But for about an hour the trail was mostly a steep ascent which, as Nacho had predicted, eventually reduced the fire within this would-be Pegasus. So we went and went, up and down and around the switchbacks, and again I became aching, chafed, miserable. Later, the merciful numbness of exhaustion stole over me, and when we came in the afternoon to the most dangerous and ruined trail of the whole trip I felt no trepidation, almost no interest.

We faced a steep decline down the wall of a canyon that must have been well over a half-mile deep. The trail was very narrow; my right leg (the one I had bruised) scraped and banged against the rising wall as the mule strove to stay away from the crumbling edge of the path. It was now raining and I had donned a large rubber poncho which covered me to the stirrups and draped over the pack behind me and partly over the

mule's lowered neck in front. We plodded along until we carefully began an exceptionally abrupt descent on a stretch of path so narrow that I was at last roused from my stupor. Halfway down it the mule suddenly halted.

I urged him slightly, but stopped when his ears went back. I didn't dare do more, for earlier he had nearly leaped out of his skin when I lightly put a heel to his flank. I couldn't even call out to Nacho for fear of exciting the neurotic beast. Nacho finally looked back and then climbed up to us, cautiously as he neared, and in very slow motion reached for the reins. I held my breath. The mule didn't shy as Nacho took hold. Now there was more security — perhaps. Nacho suggested softly that something might be wrong with the load. I carefully lifted the poncho to look at the saddle. It had moved forward to the very base of the mule's neck, and I could see also that the cinch was loose. I froze.

Talk about stupidity! It is a standard procedure to test cinches at frequent intervals and I've known it for years. I was, of course, very thankful that the mule had had the sense to stop. Would Nacho kindly suggest what to do now?

With the saddle so precariously balanced I would be in grave danger of falling down the nearly vertical slope if I tried to dismount on the left side, and I was jammed against the cliff wall on my right. Nacho and I softly discussed the situation. To slide down over the mule's rump would be suicide because he was a savage kicker. Nothing remained but to go over his neck next to the wall, with Nacho holding the bridle with one hand and trying to ease my descent with the other. I cautiously disencumbered myself of the poncho, laid it behind me, took a deep breath, and began to crawl over the mule's neck. Then, as any fool could have anticipated, the mule exploded.

It was most confusing. I think he must have bucked first, which threw me forward but not high because I was out over his neck. Then he must have reared immediately afterward — part two of the old one-two. This is the only way I can reconstruct the causes of the half-loop I flew which landed me on my head several feet down the trail. I rose after a dizzy moment. The mule was standing ludicrously festooned with equipment, the poncho draped over his hindquarters and the saddle and duffle bag dangling on one side against his foreleg, and the bridle pulled half off. Nacho was not in sight.

It turned out that he had tumbled about ten feet over the cliff side before fetching up against a large outcrop. Characteristically, he inquired about my condition before I could ask about his. We both claimed to be all right. Luckily he was only skin and bones, and I was able to hoist him up by extending my belt to him. I could have been

angry, with Nacho as well as myself, but I wasn't. When we finally stood on the path we hung on to each other for an instant.

Nacho obviously had some badly skinned and bruised places, but he made no complaint. He calmed the mule and rearranged the saddle enough to lead him to a wider place in the trail in order to saddle up properly. In that short distance Nacho limped badly and I persuaded him to let me examine his foot, which I found was skinned and the ankle already swelling. I made him ride the mule now by dramatizing my newly-increased fear of it. It took some argument: Nacho felt very strongly about the impropriety of me, a *caballero*, afoot while he (my Sancho Panza) rode. We went on our way, with me much relieved to be off the mule.

About dusk we came out of a pine forest to overlook a spectacular valley with the sorry mud huts of Baborigame jumbled together near the center of it. Here Nacho was adamant: he must walk into the village and I must ride, but we made our triumphant *entrada* in view of nobody but dogs and burros.

I presented a letter of 'recommendation' from the Jesuits to a friend of theirs here, who took us in and gave us some tortillas and beans for supper. Our host was most gracious and the letter obviously created a good feeling in him, although I found out a few days later that he could not read and did not know who we were nor even whom the letter was from until he had steered the conversation in such a way that he could guess.

I spent the night on a bed of planks over sawhorses, and Nacho was given a blanket and a place on the floor at my feet. My sleeping bag had become infested with fleas at Nacho's house, and no doubt I acquired a pound or so more of them here. I itched all over and my head ached and my bowels cramped so much that despite my exhaustion I was half-awake most of the night. I made a few attempts to think about my wife and home, and about a good bed, food, and so on, but my mind always returned to Nacho.

My 'thoughts' were mostly dreams, I suppose, yet I seem to remember them perfectly to this day. Nacho, I now saw, was a jumble of paradoxes, and that is what had confused me. He was a mixture in equal parts of intelligence and idiocy, ideals and malpractice, charm and incompetence. These disjointed traits seemed sharper in him than any other of the several lovable lame ducks that I had collected as friends and colleagues over the years, but perhaps not uniquely so. I began to compile a list of saints, artists, and scholars who combined similar personality traits. Suddenly, triumphantly, I thought of sweet old Don Quixote and of his inability to articulate himself with the material

universe. Is not Don Quixote a classic character precisely because he is a beautifully described particular example of what is really a widespread *type*?

Ah then: there *are* these people and they are so remarkably like each other and so distinct from other humans that perhaps they are a separate species! What if I were to dissect the brains of a representative sample and prove it; would I become famous?

First, though, what about taxonomy? I was brilliant that night: all I needed to do was pose questions, doze a bit, and the answers would arrive. After a brief irrelevant dream I suddenly remembered the expression 'holy stupidity'. A literary critic had used it to characterize the mundane dopiness that he felt was a necessary correlate of a creative, other-wordly imagination. Not just plain stupidity, for that is the affliction of some other, entirely different, friends and relatives, saints, artists, and scholars. Holy Stupidity . . .

Here was a brilliant anthropological discovery, a new human species, and the species should be named *Homo stupidens diviniensis* — Holy Stupid Man. I chuckled into my bag of fleas. Now Nacho was not an incomprehensible individual; he was merely one instance of a general class of phenomena and thus understandable.

I remember those thoughts so well, I think, because my discovery of Holy Stupid Man has since helped me immeasurably to comprehend the otherwise puzzling actions of a great many people; now that I know the laws of motion of that class of being, merely to identify a person as one of them is to understand him better than before. I understood Nacho best of all, of course, because he was my type-specimen.

Nevertheless, I had difficulties with him in the morning. I waited for him to say something about his pay, but he spoke only some deferential words of goodbye and apologies for the accident. I decided that he did not want to talk business publicly, so after he had mounted the mule I walked alongside until we were out of the village.

The mule seemed tractable under Nacho, and I remarked, 'Nacho, I don't charge money for work when it is my pleasure, but I think you should at least thank me for it — for having educated your mule.'

Nacho laughed at this with undue heartiness. It was apparent that he was not at ease with me right then. We stopped and I took out my wallet.

Nacho, seeing this, tried to joke: 'Are you going to try to buy this now-valuable beast?'

'No', I said, seriously, 'I don't want any mules today, but have you forgotten your own wage?'

Nacho looked away, hesitating to speak. Finally he said, 'I try to be a man of honor, therefore I cannot accept your money. I am not a good

guide. I have not given you decent food and accommodation or furnished horses according to the agreement. I endangered your life. I would rather be your respected friend than take any money.'

'No, no', I argued. 'The accident could have happened to anybody and you suffered an injury while helping me. I should give you more, not less, than the agreement. I want to give you thirty-five pesos, at the least.'

Nacho was firm and I was firm, as successful bargainers must appear to be. I progressively lowered the offer, bartering cannily, but Nacho would not accept any money at all, even though I reached a frustrated state of near-anger. During all this he had not looked at me. Finally he ended the argument by leaning over and clasping my hand in farewell.

I was wearing a faded old blue poplin skijacket which I now removed. 'Would you accept this as a remembrance from me, from a friend?' Nacho didn't move and I hurriedly tried some lies: 'I've got another one in my bag, I don't need this one. This one is so worn that I don't want it any more. Furthermore, the weather here in the valley will be too warm for a jacket.'

I finally won when I suggested that it was too big for him but perhaps he could give it to someone in need. At this he dismounted and laid the jacket on the saddle, and gave me a full, two-armed, tight embrace. When we stepped apart his old, cataract-clouded eyes brimmed so that he had to turn away again. Then he rode up the valley, waving twice from a distance.

That was the last I ever saw of the saintly Ignacio, whose vow was poverty. The next year I sent him a present and card for July 31, San Ignacio's Day. I never heard from him, but I had written the Jesuits at Christmas, and the following year I received from them a reply which, among other news, mentioned that they had seen Nacho celebrating his name day the past summer, happily staggering around in my blue jacket. Although all this happened years ago, I still treasure that picture.

The Periodization of World History According to Karl Marx

LAWRENCE KRADER

The History of the Problem

During the period from 1879 to 1882 Karl Marx studied intensively and at length the works of five writers of his time: L. H. Morgan, H. S. Maine, J. B. Phear, John Lubbock, and M. M. Kovalevsky;[1] these men, without exception, were evolutionists who treated the social and cultural life of the primitive peoples, believing that they could demonstrate thereby the progress of humanity to the civilized condition, holding that the culture of bourgeois civilization of Europe in the nineteenth century was the apex of the evolution of humanity. With one exception they accepted the bourgeois notion of property without question, Lewis Henry Morgan alone of their number having adopted a critical attitude in this matter, for which reason he was classified together with the utopian socialist Charles Fourier by Friedrich Engels, and transformed directly into a utopian by Eduard Bernstein (Engels, 1894; Bernstein, 1900). This is an inaccuracy, however, for Morgan had little in common with the utopian socialists, being a political liberal, and, in his economic life, an advocate of the conservative, railroad interests. Marx, in a draft of his correspondence with the Russian revolutionary, Vera Zasulic, correctly characterized Morgan as '. . . an American who is not at all suspect of having revolutionary tendencies . . .'.

We will now turn to the first of the publications mentioned, *The Ethnological Notebooks of Karl Marx*, and afterward *The Asiatic Mode of Production*, which will be treated in direct conjunction with the third book, *Dialectic of Civil Society*.

The existence of these notes made by Marx has been known for over 50 years, but only in the 1970s have the full texts of excerpt notebooks been

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made available to the public, and in this connection the relation of Marx to the evolutionary theory and thought, and to the revolutionary movement, has now begun to be discussed.

A number of questions arise directly out of the ethnological studies made by Marx and regarding them, of which we will deal with two: (1) Of the various currents of thought in the nineteenth century, regarding the study of the primitive peoples, he chose to concentrate his attention on the evolutionary school. What is Marx the revolutionary doing among the evolutionists? (2) What is the relation between his evolutionary studies and his theory of history?

The first question touches on the problem of Marx the scientist, his relation to the scientific theory of his time, and, by implication, the problem of the relation between the doctrine of evolution and the revolutionary praxis. All those who came into contact with Marx during his lifetime were aware of his learning, which he kept current in the sciences and the arts. Among the sciences, the newly founded science of evolution according to Charles Darwin, occupied his attention; too much has been made of the doctrine of Herbert Spencer, to which Marx gave but a passing glance. John Lubbock was directly in Darwin's camp and the remaining authors indirectly connected to it too. The studies of the nonevolutionary ethnologists of that time, such as Adolph Bastian, were known to Marx, but he set them aside. Substantively, the question of the revolutionary overturn of the existing society has a direct bearing on the evolutionary doctrine, for the latter comprises not only a method for the study of mankind, but beyond that method, a matter of perspective. For the study of human evolution has for its object the treatment of the prehistory and history of humanity over many thousands of years, and the perspective gained thereby has a bearing not only upon the entire course of development of humanity but also on the particular social-economic and political questions of a given point in time in the history of a people. Implied here is the premise that the scientific study of contemporary questions can only be undertaken if the immediate and the very long term factors are both introduced, for they are equally relevant. Thus if we take up the question of the relation of the means of production to the forms of ownership of those means, we will see that this is not only a matter of the process of expropriation of the expropriators, which is the immediate question, but more than that, the relation between the private versus communal and collective property is raised. When Marx speaks of a revival in a superior form of an archaic type of society as the new system toward which modern society tends, he has in mind the contemporary social crisis which can end only by its return to the 'archaic' type of communal property, and does not allow

himself to be frightened by the word 'archaic' (Marx-Engels *Werke*, vol. 19:386). Further to the implicit assumptions underlying the studies of the evolutionary school of ethnology undertaken by Marx is the consideration that if the people are to sacrifice their lives in the struggle against the present ruling class, they must have broader goals to seek than the mere negation of the present conditions of social life. Otherwise, the violence which is undertaken only for the sake of violence is a negativism without meaning. Moreover, these broader goals are not to be found in the airy realm of philosophical speculation, of which Marx was profoundly sceptical, but are to be sought instead in the study of the human material and mental culture, such as is afforded in the writings of the evolutionists. These men were nevertheless slippery allies, unwillingly enrolled in the revolutionary struggle by Marx, who denounced the most prominent among them, Sir Henry Maine, for having hypocritically defended the British regime in its destruction of the communes in India, while proclaiming that these had been wrecked by the spontaneous force of the laws of economics.

The relation between evolution and revolution is both positive and negative. Marx literally tore the evolutionary perspective away from its protagonists, for the purpose of his revolutionary intent. This may be perhaps better understood if we take up the second of the questions relative to Marx's evolutionary studies, that have been posed above. Marx was engaged in the struggle against the doctrine of eternal laws in economics, in philosophy, and in society. All is subject to change, history is the universal solvent. This argument, which was undertaken in *The German Ideology*, in *The Communist Manifesto*, and in *Capital*, is further propounded in his ethnological notebooks, where it is proposed that nothing is immutable, evolution is the extension of history. Evolution is at the same time the negation of history.

All history is divided into two parts, the history we make and the history we do not make. The history we do not make is the natural history, the evolution of the world of nature, including the human nature, or the human species, biologically considered. The history we make, on the other hand, is our own, human history, the social history of the human kind. The dividing line between the two kinds of history, again, is not fixed and eternal, but is movable, for the history we make embraces pieces of the world of nature and transposes them into the human world, whereby they become a part of human culture. The dividing line between the two histories, moreover, is not a barrier but a means of communication between the two histories, moreover, it is not a barrier but a means of communication between the two sides, the natural and the human spheres, for materially there is a continuity between man

and nature, as there is in the biological history of all living matter, or its evolution. At the same time there is a discontinuity between the history of humanity and the history of nature, as between the history we make and the history we do not make (Marx, 1976:493, n.4).[2] The history we do not make is the history of things we do not manipulate, and in this sense, things which we do not control. Hence we are as human beings the passive subjects of the movements of these things, for we can only stand by and patiently watch as the stars move in their courses. The distinction between the history we make and do not make can be made clear by an example drawn from the history of socialism. Before the war of 1914, there were two chief camps of Marxism, the evolutionary doctrine of socialism and the revolutionary doctrine. The evolutionary socialists considered that socialism would triumph through the quiet metamorphosis of the forces long at work in capitalist society, without any further effort on the part of the proletariat, who are the historical actors, to extend or accelerate them; these forces act as the factors of the history we do not make. Both in theory and in practice these evolutionary socialists subordinated the laws of the history we make to the laws of the history we do not make. The revolutionary socialists on the contrary distinguished between the two histories, whereby they brought out the theory and practice of social revolution as the motive force of the history we make. The revolutionary process is a dialectic: thus, the unity of bourgeois society is constituted of a mass of contradictory forms whose contradictory character is not to be exploded by quiet metamorphosis. On the other hand, if we did not find in the society as it is at present, hidden in the bourgeois stage, the material conditions of production, together with the exchange relations corresponding to them, such as are necessary for the classless society, all attempts at explosion would be mere quixotism (Marx, 1953:77). The last thought is an evolutionary expression, the last but one revolutionary. Historically, each expression calls for the other.

The question of Marx's relation to the classical works of Engels, is one of practice and of theory. In their practice, Marx and Engels acted as one, e.g. in 1848, and later, in the work of the International Working-Men's Association. In their theory, their respective services are unequal, and this Engels freely granted (Krader, 1976:11ff.). We will see that not only were they unequal, but albeit in fundamental agreement, on theoretical issues, their answers were somewhat different. The theory of the state was taken up by Marx in the comments on the work of Maine: the forms of the state are to be distinguished from the substance; in its form the state is manifold, whereas in its substance one. The state in its substance is an *excrescence of society*. The existence of the state is an

appearance, which comes forth at a certain stage of social development, and disappears when the society attains a stage which it has not yet reached. The supreme independent existence of the state is mere show; the state is in no way the prime factor in history (Krader, 1974:329). We do not look for the motor of history in the origin of the state, which is a secondary factor in history. The factor of property belongs to the superstructure of society and of history, and is likewise therefore a secondary phenomenon, for property relations are but the juridical expression of the existing relations of production (Marx-Engels *Werke*, vol. 13:9).

In the process of formation of civil and bourgeois society, the ancient gentes, clans, village communities, and other forms of the collective life are not immediately broken up; on the contrary, they survive into the period of class society and the state, sometimes for thousands of years. Here again we must distinguish between the form and the substance of the process of survival. In substance, the ancient communities, kin groups, and collectivities are transformed; communal labor is revolutionized, and transforms itself into social labor, whereby whole societies are divided, the social classes are formed, and the opposition between them is generated. The socialization of labor, however, in the early stages of the history of civil society, does not eliminate its communal form; on the contrary, at first there is an inner contradiction between the form of labor and the substance. Thus in the early history of the Asiatic mode of production, village labor is still communally organized; the property is the means of production, the cultivated land above all, is still communally owned, while at the same time, the social classes have been formed, and with them the joint processes of exchange and of the production of the social surplus have been developed. With the development of exchange, exchange value is developed; with the production of the social surplus, surplus value is developed, and with it the antagonism of the social classes and the state. We have spoken of the Asiatic mode of production, or the economic formation of society in the orient, but this is a mere accident of history, and is but the result of the jargon of our discipline; for the historical processes which we have been discussing were first identified in reference to the history of China, India, and the neighboring countries. Setting this epiphenomenon aside, we observe that the transformation of communal into social labor, the formation and opposition between the social classes, the development of exchange, social production and surplus value, proceeds historically while the form of village labor and of property in land is still communal. This contradiction between social substance and social form is detected in the early formation of civil society, or class society and the state, not

only in the Orient, but also in ancient Africa, both to the south and to the north of the Sahara, in the ancient Americas, and in ancient Europe.

Much has been written to the effect that private property is but weakly expressed in the Asiatic mode of production. In the first place, a protest should be made that in this case too much emphasis has been placed on the factor of property, which, as we have already noted, does not belong to the base but to the superstructure of society, as a juridical form. Having entered this protest, we may nevertheless consider the question of property.

At the beginnings of the history of the Asiatic mode of production, property is communal. The state, through its concrete agencies, the monarchy, the ministries and temples, is the great landowner; the state is in this case the great, the overarching community, personified in the monarch; but neither the monarch nor the monarchy is private property owner; they are respectively, either the community magnified or its personification. Thus the question of private property in the Asiatic mode of production, or its caricature, Oriental despotism, is a classical case of an ethnocentrism: the history of society is thus viewed from the standpoint of the history and the categories of history of modern bourgeois society and its property rules and regulations. On the contrary, the individual in the ancient Orient is important neither in the base nor in the superstructure of society, private property is likewise unimportant in that social formation (Marx, 1953:379ff.; Krader, 1974:241, 414; Krader, 1975, part I, chapter 7[3]). The land was then collectively owned, whether by the community or by the state.

The question of the Asiatic mode of production raises in turn the problem of the mode of production, what it is, what it is not. A mode of production is not a social formation, nor is it a form of society; a mode of production is an economic formation of society, of which Marx identified four: the Asiatic, the antique, the feudal, and the modern bourgeois. These are at the same time a means for the periodization of our history, the modes of production are ranged according to the order of their historical appearance. Sometimes these are classified as precapitalist and capitalist, and this classification brings out their most important feature, one which is as close as we can get to the prime motor of history. The movement of history in question is the transformation of social labor from the unfree to the free condition, all the precapitalist modes of production being the condition of unfree social labor, the capitalist mode the free condition. Social labor in the Asiatic mode of production is predominantly, through most of its history, in the state of communal, collective bondage, which, however comfortable and comforting it might be, is yet an unfree state; labor in classical antiquity

was, at the apex of that historical period, slave labor; labor in the feudal period of European history was service labor bound to the soil. Only in the capitalist period of history is labor freed from the communal and servile bonds. Yet social labor in the modern bourgeois mode of production in capitalist society is free only as wage labor is free, that is, it is free pro forma, in its substance it is bound.

In the preceding pages the term civil society has been used. This is not a mere terminological device, the ruse of pedantry. On the contrary, the term is proposed for the purpose of historical classification of the epochs, the periodization and the orientation to our history. The history of civil society is the history of the formation of social labor, and its transformation from the unfree to the free social condition. By the distinction between the form and the substance of freedom, we pose the radical want (*Bedürfnis, bisogno*) of the substance of freedom in modern society. The history of civil society is the history of the Oriental, slave, servile, and modern bourgeois societies, and is formed out of a series of oppositions between abstract and concrete social formations. Just as modern bourgeois society is an abstraction formed out of the particular histories of Italian, English, German, etc. peoples, so civil society is an abstraction formed out of the particular histories of bourgeois society, feudal society, etc.; Oriental society is an abstraction formed out of the particular histories of ancient Egypt, China, India, Mexico, Oyo. The different modes of production have a corresponding formation of society; the entirety of the listed modes of production are formed by the relations of social labor, the entirety of the corresponding social formations are comprised of the abstraction, civil society. The dialectic of civil society is constituted of the opposition between the abstract social form and its concretion at the present time, bourgeois society, or the society dominated by the production of capital and the freedom pro forma of social labor.

Of the four modes of production listed above, two are limited and two are worldwide in their historical scope. The two that are limited are the Graeco-Roman and the medieval-feudal modes of production, or the slave and servile modes respectively, arising as they do out of the conditions of ancient and medieval European production processes. If these historical categories are exported to other parts of the world, it is only by the elaboration of a Eurocentric historical viewpoint. Of the remaining two, the Asiatic is a misnomer, as we have seen, for this mode of production, and the corresponding formation of society, are the dual historical conditions under which humanity has passed from the primitive to the civilized status, from equality to inequality, class antagonism and exploitation. The formation of civil society did not take

place once, but occurred repeatedly, as the relations of production and exchange, which have governed this primary social revolution, have repeated themselves in the various eras on the various continents. Because the formation of civil society and the state is a broad social movement, which is determined primarily by the internal factors of production and the relations of exchange between the ancient communities, the 'Asiatic' society is a worldwide phenomenon, not an Oriental one alone. Moreover, it was not developed by means of conquest or usurpation; that is, the Asiatic, or Afro-Asiatic, mode of production was not imposed through coercion by one people upon another, as a general rule.

In order to comprehend this process, whereby the Asiatic mode of production, and the early form of civil society were formed by internal developments of the economy and society, let us examine the opposite process, whereby the modern bourgeois mode of production not only came to world-domination, but also spread throughout the world. The bourgeois society and mode of production were in origin a European phenomenon, which replaced the feudal mode of production and social formation at the beginning of the modern period of history, in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries in parts of southern and western Europe, notably northern Italy, southern England, the Low Countries, the Rhineland, etc. The system of capitalism then quickly spread to the countries limitrophe, thence by colonialist conquest to all parts of the world, so that by the early twentieth century not a single territory was left outside either the capitalist mode of production, or political dependence on it. Thus, the modern bourgeois mode of production differs from the Asiatic in that it was an intrinsic development in one time and place, and an extrinsic development elsewhere sustained by noneconomic methods, whereas the Asiatic mode of production was in general an intrinsic development of the peoples among whom it was found. Moreover, it is becoming increasingly clear that the slave society of ancient Greece succeeded an older form of civil society and the state which had been developed by speakers of an ancient form of Greek on the same territory of the later Greek-speaking peoples. The Greeks of Mycenae and Pylos had developed a form of the Asiatic mode of production and the Oriental society a millennium before Athens made its historical appearance, in the form in which Aristotle wrote about it.

For the theory of history, and interpretation of and orientation toward history, the Asiatic mode of production holds a central place, for it provides the basis for the comprehension of modern civil society, the social classes, the opposition between the form and substance of history, and therewith, the nature of the motor of history. Moreover, the

theoretical questions of the origin of property in general, private property in particular, and the state, are put in the perspective necessary for practical political action.[4]

Systematics of the Periodization Problem

1. The historical problem of periodization is a double one: it raises the problem of the historical categories applied in the classification of the periods. It raises the problem of the motor of history.

2. The historical category of civil society is the central one for the solution of the periodization question. On the one side, civil society is opposed to primitive society, which is the society based on equalitarian principles, classless society, communal in form and substance, without the production and alienation of surplus value.

3. Civil society is society divided into the social-economic classes, on one side the class of social labor, or the working class, on the other the ruling class, or the social class maintained by the surplus which social labor produces. Civil society is the society divided by the opposed interests of the two classes; it is at the same time the society with the state. Civil society is society divided by the opposition between the public and the private spheres and the corresponding interests; it is out of the public sphere that the state is generated. (It is impossible to develop in theory the formation and the existence of the state out of the conflict between the social classes alone; for this it is necessary to take into account that which is already historically present, the public sphere and its interest, as opposed to the private.)

4. Civil society is the society in which the successive modes of production, Asiatic, ancient, feudal, and capitalist, make their historical appearance. The different modes of production are not themselves societies, they are the economic formations of societies. The societies themselves, or the successive periods of the history of civil society, are: the Oriental (including the ancient African and the ancient American), the classical European, the medieval European, and the modern bourgeois, or the society in which the production of capital predominates.

5. Important as the historical categories of primitive and civil society are, they are not in themselves the motive force of history, they only seem to be. The relations of labor in production, reproduction, exchange, distribution and consumption are the motor of history. The different historical periods, and the succession from one to the other, are determined by the changes in the organization and the relations of labor.

6. Labor in the primitive social condition, during the period immediately prior to the formation of civil society, is communal in its organization, and its relations of production are collective in the clans, sibs, gentes, village communities and associations (*Genossenschaften*). The means of production, the land for cultivation above all, is communally owned and collectively controlled in this period.

7. In the transition from primitive to civil society, exchange relations are developed, exchange value as opposed to use value is thus developed, commodity relations of exchange and of production are developed, and a social surplus is produced, which is alienated from its immediate producers in the form of surplus value. The communal labor of primitive society is transformed into social labor, and by this transformation, the laws of value, exchange value and surplus value are brought into force, whereby civil society is formed.

8. Social labor once formed is immediately put into bondage. It is unfree because it is caught in a fateful contradiction. On the one side, social labor at first retains its communal organization in the history of civil society, for it is organized at that time in the village communities, while it is at once subordinated economically, politically, and socially to the ruling class. The entire history of civil society is the history of the inequality of social labor, in general. In particular, labor is unequal and therefore unfree in its substance in the Asiatic mode of production because it is socially inferior to the ruling class, while in its form the equality and liberty of the ancient gentes, village communities, and clans are perpetuated in the early Egyptian, Chinese, Persian, Indian, Ashanti, Yoruban, Inca, and Aztec history.

9. The history of civil society in Europe is at first the history of the transformation of social labor from the communal bondage of the Asiatic mode of production to a servile condition of bondage. In ancient Greece and Rome the servile condition of social labor was one in which a personal bondage between slave and slave master obtained. This is a form of bondage of the slave to the person of the master, by the person and between persons (client and patron, and bondage by precarious tenure of land, *durch den prekären Grundbesitz*).

10. The relation of personal bondage of social labor, which predominated in the history of ancient Europe, was replaced by the relation of bondage to the soil, or praedial bondage, *die Adskription*, in the history of medieval Europe.

11. The revolts of the serfs and the peasant wars during the fourteenth, fifteenth, and sixteenth centuries resulted in the overthrow of feudal tenures, feudal bondage, in England, Bohemia, and Germany, as well as other parts of Europe. Social labor was thereby freed from its

servile condition. The class consciousness of social labor was developed radically in the course of these historical occurrences.

12. Social labor in the ensuing and resulting relations of production is freed, being no longer bound to the soil, but is legally able to move freely from the countryside to the town, which it had not been able to do before the capitalist period. At the same time, social labor is bound by a mass of rules and practices in the towns by the organization of the guilds, which governed the apprentices who were held for many years in personal bondage to the master. In the colonies during the early history of capitalism, slavery and the indenturing (*Unfreiheit durch Vertrag*) of social labor predominated.

13. During the florescence of capitalism as a world system in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries urban production and the freedom of labor to contract for the selling and buying of its labor power came to predominate in the relations in society, economy, and the law. The form of social labor is now wage labor, which, while it is not the invention of capitalist society, is developed within it, and has become the predominant form of labor throughout the world at the present time.

14. The new relation of social labor is free in its form, that is social labor is free to choose between working for this employer or that one. But it is not free in its substance, for social labor must work for some employer, whereby the surplus value which it produces is alienated from it.

15. The history of civil society is determined by the relations of social labor, hence the prime mover of history is the relation of labor in society. This relation is predominant throughout the world, wherever capital is produced at the present time, for wage labor is the predominant form of living labor today, whereas capital is the predominant form of past, dead labor, or labor in crystallized form.

16. Civil society and the state. Civil society is nothing other than bourgeois society in ancient Roman dress; it is divided into ancient and modern civil society, modern civil society being the form of civil society in the capitalist mode of production and the form of the same society in the Soviet mode of production. The ancient form of civil society is divided into the social form which is associated with the Asiatic mode of production on the one hand and the classical-antique mode of production on the other. Feudal society is from this standpoint the transition from the ancient to the modern forms of society civil and bourgeois. Civil society is a part of class society, but is not the whole of it; there are historically attested forms of class society without the development of civil society. Thus, the ancient Mongols and the ancient Ibos had developed the opposition between the social classes, but had not

formed civil society. Civil society is the part of class society in which the state is formed. In addition to the formation and opposition between the social classes, a number of other factors are developed in the formation of civil society, in order that the state come into being. In the society divided into social classes, a surplus is socially produced and alienated from its immediate producers by an exploiting class. But a surplus is produced in primitive conditions as well. The surplus produced is transformed into a social surplus by the force of ceremonials, rituals, and lay traditions, among others, through which the surplus produce is extracted. Those who have alienated the surplus product then concentrate the social power into their own hands; that social power had been dispersed through the folk or people until then. The factor of exploitation in the formation of class society is then added to the historical moment of concentration of the social powers, transforming the exploiting class into the ruling class in society, the class which applies the agencies of government in its own interest, as opposed to the interest of the class of immediate producers, and as opposed to the interest of the social whole. The state, however, is not yet formed. The transformation of the exploiting class into the ruling class is the primary condition for the formation of civil society within the historical matrix of class society. That transformation is then formalized, and is acknowledged both within the society and internationally. It is given legal sanction within the social whole, and it is given the sanction of international law. The first legal sanction is known as *jus civile*, civil law; the second is known as *jus gentium*. These are the formal attributes of class society, such as they are combined in the formation of civil society. Historically, the state is the product, or, in Marx's word, the excrescence, of class society indirectly, and of civil society directly, of class society in general, of civil society in particular.[5]

Notes

1. The notes by Marx from the works of these authors have been published in two books: (a) Krader, 1974. The works which Marx excerpted are: Lewis Henry Morgan. *Ancient Society*. New York, 1877. Sir Henry Sumner Maine. *Lectures on the Early History of Institutions*. London, 1875. Sir John Budd Phear. *The Aryan Village in India and Ceylon*. London, 1880. Sir John Lubbock (Lord Avebury). *The Origin of Civilisation and the Primitive Condition of Man*. London, 1870. And (b) Krader 1975. Part II of this work contains the excerpts made by Marx from: M. M. Kovalevsky. *Obščinnoe Zemlevladenie*. Pričiny, Khod i Posledstvija ego Razloženija. Moscow 1879. See also, Krader, 1977.
2. Here Marx refers to Giambattista Vico, who proposed this distinction in the eighteenth century, when it was not comprehended. It was only in the light of the researches of Charles Darwin, on evolution, a century later, that this distinction was fully grasped.

3. For the further elaboration of the theory of the Asiatic mode of production, I am indebted to a group of specialists in the prehistory of Mexico, under the direction of Angel Palerm, at the Centro de Investigaciones Superiores, INAH, Mexico. For the African materials, I am indebted to Ikenna Nzimiro, and to a group of specialists assembled by him at the University of Nigeria, Nsukka, to Meyer Fortes, and to A. Barbeitos, of the University of Lubango, Angola.
4. The theory of the Asiatic mode of production is set forth in the *Grundrisse* by Marx, and in his *Critique of Political Economy*, both composed in the period from 1857 to 1859; it is adumbrated in his writings for the *New York Daily Tribune* in 1853. Further, this body of theory is presupposed in *Capital*, vol. I, for without the orientation to this theory, and provided by it, Marx's relation to the works of James Murray, Mark Wilks, Thomas Raffles, and G. de Cuvier would remain an illegible cypher. We will go so far as to say that without this theory, it is impossible to comprehend the matters raised in chapters 12 and 14 of *Capital*, vol. I, wherein the division of labor and the relative and absolute surplus value are taken up. These questions are of interest not only to the Marxologists. For the history of the development of the theory, see Krader, 1975, part I, chapters 2 and 3. The further elaboration of this theory in the excerpts and comments made by Marx on the works of Kovalevsky, Phear, and Maine, in the period from 1879 to 1881, are set out in the same source, chapters 4 and 5. All three of these authors treated the history of India in the works mentioned, and Marx critically treated their treatment in his notebooks. The historical and theoretical implications of Marx's criticisms are taken up in Krader, 1977, Introduction and chapter 1.
5. The term *civil society* derives from the Latin, *civitas*, the Roman state; the term *bourgeois* derives from the Germanic form of the same. Were we to speak Greek, we would say *political society*; of late, however, political, which derives from polis, referring to the ancient Greek city state, has come to signify one of the functions of the state, which is the political. However, the factor of law or right, to mention only one other function, is thereby excluded; therefore we have eschewed the usage, *political*, as it is applied usually in this context. On the relation between the social classes and the state, it is necessary to begin with the *Communist Manifesto* of 1848, by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. Engels (*Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State* 1884) contented himself with the direct derivation of the state from class oppositions. The first modern thinker on the subject of the state was Machiavelli, who, in the *Discourses on the First Ten Books of Titus Livius*, begins his history of Rome with the transformation of social power from a dispersed form to the concentration of that power in the hands of the ruling few. The state as the organ of concentrated power in the interests of the ruling class in society, which has formally defined its status as such, is discussed in: Krader, 1977, chapter I; and Krader, forthcoming. For the state as excrescence, see 1974:329.

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Theory, Practice, and Poetry in Vico

STANLEY DIAMOND

In accepting an invitation to participate in a recent celebration of Vico, I had originally suggested that I read a paper on the relationship of his work to the foundations of critical anthropology. This would have been a relatively simple (if anything about Vico can be said to be simple) and safe effort. By safe, I mean that I would have more or less gone along with the assumption, implicit in my own suggested topic, that Vico was, in certain determinate ways, an ancestor of the critical perspective in anthropology. However, in preparing for the event, I began asking myself a different, though related, sort of question. But before I deal with this question, I will briefly define what I mean by the tradition of critical anthropology and Vico's relation to it.

By critical anthropology, I mean the comparative, historical, and revolutionary perspective on contemporary Western civilization, impelled by certain conditions that have become acute under industrial monopoly capitalism. These are: socioeconomic alienation and exploitation; imperialism, colonialism, and neocolonialism; the hypertrophy of state power, of bureaucratic and technocratic organization; the isolation and atomization of the person (and the concomitant growth of the 'masses'); the degradation of the symbolic dimension of human experience; the loss of cultures and languages, the qualitative and quantitative shift in the character of war — all in all, what Vico might have recognized as a new barbarism. The positive task of critical anthropology is to help generate an alternate sense of human possibilities based on concrete cultural-historical inquiry, while interpreting and, where justified, supporting the multiplex reactions against these phenomena in our own society. Its method is dialectical, that is, it denies the Cartesian breach between subject and object, refuses to acknowledge the privileged position of the observer, understands the distortion involved in the gap between theory and practice (and is therefore political),

rejects all mechanistic or reductionist explanations of sociocultural process, and focuses on the contradictions in our society as a source of intentional revolutionary energy.

I would have traced the evolution of critical anthropology through the paradigmatic (not exclusive) figures of Montaigne, Rousseau, and Marx, identifying Rousseau, who was profoundly influenced by Montaigne and who profoundly influenced Marx in turn, as the mediator.

I would have noted that in 1874 in *Anti-Duhring*, a work with which Marx was fully acquainted, and on which he was a partial collaborator, Engels wrote:

> Already in Rousseau, therefore, we find not only a sequence of ideas which corresponds exactly with the sequence developed in Marx's *Capital*, but that the correspondence extends also to details, Rousseau using a whole series of the same dialectical developments as Marx: processes which in their nature are antagonistic, contain a contradiction, are the transformation on one extreme into its opposite and finally as the kernel of the whole process, the negation of the negation. And though in 1754 Rousseau was not yet able to use the Hegelian jargon, he was certainly twenty-three years before Hegel was born deeply [involved] in the dialectics of contradition. (1929:153–154)

I might also have cited the recent book *From Rousseau to Lenin* by the Italian Marxist, Colletti (a student of Gramasci), in which he ignores Vico and elaborates the connection between Rousseau and Marx, but takes Marx to task for not once acknowledging it. This, of course, is not the case, not only with reference to Engels' observation, but also because Marx, in opposition to Hegel, consciously grounded himself in the French revolutionary tradition right through 1870 and the Commune. In the latter context, I would have referred to both the relatively early *The German Ideology*, and the final *Ethnological Notebooks*, broken off at Marx's death, in order to explicate his understanding of the breach between state and stateless societies, his notions of class, the division of labor, distinctions between primitives and peasants, definitions of exploitation, among other matters — all major sources for the anthropological critique of Western civilization, a perspective Marx shared with Rousseau.

Rousseau, I would have recalled, specifically acknowledges the influence of Montaigne throughout his work (he refers to Montaigne as his master) — beginning with the *First Discourse* in which he attacks the corrupt and elitist structure of the increasingly specialized arts and sciences, but not technology as such, and not the perpetually renewable, ancient forms of the common arts and dramas of humanity. Rousseau's

references to Montaigne are maintained through the *Second Discourse*, the *Social Contract*, and *Emile*, to the *Confessions*, and *La Nouvelle Heloise*. But for at least one commentator (Dreano, 1952:336ff.), the influence of Montaigne on Rousseau is so pervasive that it could hardly be acknowledged in full, for as Engels said of Marx's relation to Rousseau, the very sequence of ideas in work after work had already been anticipated in the *Essays*.

In turning to Montaigne, I would have considered him, in the words of Donald Frame (1963:vl) as seeking 'Mankind in himself', or in Montaigne's own words, 'Each man bears the entire form of Man's estate'. Obviously, I would have interpreted the essay on cannibals as an early, elaborate and systematic critique of civilization in a comparative historical, that is, anthropological, perspective. But influence does not mean assimilation in the history of ideas, and, as Vico might instruct us, the history of ideas is not merely a logical academic sequence, but a reflection mediated by institutions. Thus I would have defined Montaigne as developing a vast anthropology of the self, which dovetails with his empathic effort to understand primitive society. For Montaigne, the man of the French Renaissance, all of human life is called into question. He regards himself dispassionately as a creature about which nothing can be taken for granted, as if he had just encountered himself in the Brazilian forest, or more to the point, on an island in the Caribbean.

As an aside, I might have mentioned the ramifying influence of that essay *On Cannibals* in particular — on Shakespeare, for example. As the Cuban poet and essayist, Roberto Fernandez Retamar tells us (and he is only one among many such non-European interpreters of *The Tempest*), Caliban was Shakespeare's anagram for cannibal, in turn related to Carib; and *The Tempest* was, on one level, a microcosm of the colonial experience, the critical human confrontation, with all the actors represented. We are informed that one such character, Gonzalo, 'who incarnates the Renaissance humanist, at one point, closely glosses entire lines from Florio's Montaigne' — originating in *On Cannibals*. And 'Florio was not only a close personal friend of Shakespeare's but the copy of the translation that Shakespeare owned and annotated is still preserved' (1974:14). Our symbol, says Retamar, is Caliban, and Céssaire has written an adaptation of *The Tempest* for the Black Theatre, on the same theme. Shakespeare was a consummate realist, but there is no doubt about where his sympathies lie, as the English author John Wain had already concluded in *The Living World of Shakespeare* (1974:22).

Nonetheless, Montaigne does not socially contextualize his conclusions; if he examines the question of man, and even puts man into

question, he has not systematically questioned history. But Montaigne's impersonal engagement becomes Rousseau's passion for humanity; Montaigne's communications become Rousseau's confessions. And Rousseau socially interprets his sense of civilizational crisis; man in question is always society in question. Hence his *Second Discourse* is the first effort at a general anthropology which can be called modern, and inevitably it is a critique. But Rousseau never abandons his self-examination which he, and we, can relate to the times. Whereas Vico writes about man as subject and object of the historical process, Rousseau, following Montaigne, *reveals* himself as both.

If Rousseau is, as Robespierre called him, the father of the French Revolution, he has already seen beyond it at the moment of bourgeois consolidation. That is where the real thrust of his criticism points — and it extends over the whole range of socioeconomic phenomena. He defines the need for field work (missing in Vico), but only as a way of deepening the critical reflection on the crisis of civilization, and he sees the function of anthropology as the revolutionary scrutiny of his own society. And this would have brought me back to Marx's work, which of course coincides with the consolidation of modern imperialism, and the transition between mercantile and industrial capitalism. Even critical social contextualization of the question of man is no longer sufficient; critical observation is transformed into critical theory and revolutionary praxis. Marx ranges over the whole gamut of emerging disciplines, thinks anthropologically, in short, in order to document and discover the actual socioeconomic mechanisms of exploitation.

Marx is explicitly dialectical; the ironic paradoxes of Montaigne and the paradoxical arguments of Rousseau are now transformed, via Hegel, into a more formal systematics; but the breach between theory and practice is closed. Alienation is examined as a mass phenomenon; deformation is universal, and politics, not confession, is the issue. For Marx, biographies have become irrelevant; the only imperative is the reconstruction of society, the conscious creation of history and hence the actual *reinvention* of the human being.

I would then have reexamined briefly the schism between the academic and critical traditions in anthropology (Marx and Rousseau were, of course, not academicians), and turned to Vico, who himself had no high regard for the conventional academy. I would have made certain predictable observations that *The New Science* is an anthropology in subject and range, and in many of the processes it decodes or anticipates, and that it is 'critical' in its historical, self-reflexive examination of civilization. But there being no determinate sequence mediated by a paradigmatic scholar, and moreover, there being no transformations of

the type just traced linking Vico to the contemporary *critical* anthropological enterprise as such, I would consider him unrelated to its foundations. He emerges as a parallel, isolated, and remarkable instance of a similar (by no means identical) civilization consciousness, and this is perhaps not generic to Vico's work. For, he has hardly been used and transformed by others in the 'social sciences' (maybe as I shall intimate later on, he cannot be). Where he has been, as in 'aesthetics', through the determinate, conscious mediation of Coleridge, and through Coleridge to contemporary critics of the stature of Whalley and Bloom, he is alive and central to our concerns. Nonetheless, I would have drawn certain parallels between Rousseau and Vico (e.g. the latter's twin conceits of states and scholars), and Marx and Vico. And I could have compared unfavorably whatever is mechanical and reductive in Engels' *Dialectics of Nature* to Vico's principle that men can understand what men create, which *excludes* nature. Against Engels, I may even have quoted Marx's single published reference to Vico (in *Capital*) which refers to Vico's famous principle and consequently gives priority to the study of historical rather than 'natural technology' because the former reveals social relations and 'the mental conceptions that flow from them'. What the *latter* reveals, Marx does not say. But I still would have concluded that Vico's contribution to critical anthropology is marginal — with perhaps one complex exception: his unprecedented understanding of the primitive character of poetic language ultimately in conflict with the 'higher' development of civilization, which Vico himself considered his single, most struggled-for achievement.

Who, then, is Vico?

As one reflects on the more recent commentaries on Vico's work available in English, their contradictory, yet *uniformly reverential* character stands out, and perhaps justifies a commentary of its own. I am not overlooking here the fact that Rousseau and Marx, among many major figures in the history of ideas, have elicited conflicting interpretations, but these have largely arisen from a clearly *pro* or *contra* position: to be severely antagonistic to an author is to define one's own counter-tradition. Yet the differences to which I refer do not seem to be artificial counters in a scholar's game (a pastime which Vico deplored); they are neither frivolous nor reflexive, in the sense that one position mechanically determines the other. They represent, rather, impressive, sometimes passionate differences of opinion and, of course, the relative newness of the subject may have something to do with the response that it excites. But there is more to it than that. Some of Vico's commentators try to lose themselves in his immensity; others try to weave him into the texture of their lives, that is, into their ultimate epistemological and ontological positions.

Perhaps there is a parallel with Rousseau here — if one recalls Boswell's fierce argument with the skeptical Johnson. Nor do the responses to Marx and Freud prefigure the kind (not to speak of the dimensions) of reaction I have in mind. Both Marx and Freud were involved in praxis, and their doctrines were fated to become ideologies. This was not the case with Vico, who constructed a general theory of history as human praxis, but not a concrete theory of political, or even therapeutic, action. There is no way that we can put Vico into practice; he neither commands any given action, nor seriously implies any resolution — one can, with Vico, reflect endlessly on the crises of civilization, but one is not impelled to act, or even to adapt a specific position.

This is not to say that Vico is a cult figure, but rather that he has certain qualities to which specialized academics, and positivistically conditioned (even if against their better instincts) scholars may turn in relief, no matter how they interpret, or better, *misinterpret* him, in the decisive sense of the latter term (that is, in Paul de Man's sense) that I shall be adopting. Vico, in short, remains a presence; the work and the man are one, although the man himself, as I shall argue, is divided, and so, therefore, is the work. Vico presents us with a certain kind of vision — in the 'guise' of scholarship — using the term 'guise' as he does — as a 'modification' of the human mind appropriate to the time. And we are freed to read him — as we would the clouds in the sky, or the entrails of birds — while searching for a cosmology, even a cosmography in which to ground ourselves in this disenchanted century.

But before pursuing this matter further, it will be useful to review some of the contradictions to which I have already referred. Professor Bidney, for example, allies Vico with what he takes to be Rousseau's notion of the fall of man in civilization (1969:271ff.); Professor Wells argues that Vico viewed human beings in a state of nature as 'brutal egoists', there being no trace in Vico of Herder's or Rousseau's ideas on the primitive (1969:94); Professor Paci refers sympathetically to Vico's notion of secondary primitivism as Rousseauan; 'For him [Rousseau] the primitive is the original and positive man who is reborn in us in spite of the corruption of civilization'; Professor Cotroneo is equally adamant in arguing the opposite; for Vico, presumably following the French Renaissance legal scholar Jean Bodin more closely than he has acknowledged, 'primitive life is without virtue'; and Professor Leach relates Vicoto Rousseau on the one hand, and Hobbes on the other (1969:309ff.): Vico 'shares Rousseau's ideas about the imaginative capacities of natural man', but is with Hobbes on the role of institutions in 'curbing the aggressive acquisitiveness of human individuals'.

Each of these interpretations, which differ subtly in their assessment of Rousseau or Hobbes, even when the commentators otherwise broadly agree, is sufficiently documented from *The New Science* or through an acknowledged exegete.

Turning now to a broader series of characterizations, one finds that the implications of Vico's anti-Cartesianism[1] make it possible for Professor Edie to claim him as an existentialist (1969:483ff.); Professor Paci as a precursor of structuralist phenomenology (a linkage which Lévi-Strauss has declared impermissible) (1969:497); and Professor Leach as a structuralist in the comprehensive mode of Lévi-Strauss, that is, as one who conceives a common structure in external nature, the nature of man, and in culture, the data of which are defined as a nature-mediating and socially-controlling language (1969:317). Vico's famous statement about the modifications of the human mind reflecting the principles of civilization is also deployed here as a protostructuralist argument.

But, according to Pompa (1975:156ff.), among others, these modifications of the human mind cannot represent a cultural replication, or transformation of natural forms. Vico is referring to *human* history and *human* nature, to differential human natures in each succeeding historical phase and, finally, to the identity between man as historical agent and as historian. As Pompa puts it (1975:169): 'The modifications to which Vico refers include both the formal conditions of human development, together with the basic facts about humanity contained, on the one hand, in the related theories of fallen man and absolute common sense, and, on the other, in Vico's genetic thesis '. . . history is made possible by the exercise of self-reflection'. That self-reflection can only be by and of man as a historical subject; it is not *supposed to be* a metaphysical or deductive process. Vico's basic anthropological principle that humanity knows only what it creates, and thus can know history, but not nature assumes (see Berlin, 1969:371, inter alia), a radical discontinuity between nature and culture, our potential knowledge of each, and perhaps, between our potential capacity to master one rather than the other. This is, of course, the opposite of the continuity inherent in the character of ultimate reality generic to comprehensive structuralism, which assumes an isomorphic reduction of cultural to historical, and historical to natural process, while postulating a merely formal truth behind what it describes as the illusion of human meaning. Vico's opposition to Spinozan determinism is also pertinent here; almost in response to the actual words of Spinoza, he writes (1968:349):

> Now, as geometry [Vico understood mathematics as a human creation and not as a reflection of ultimate reality] when it constructs the world of reality out of its elements, or contemplates that world, is creating it for itself, just so does our science create for itself the world of nations, but with a reality greater by just so much as the institutions having to do with human affairs are more real than points, lines, surfaces, and figures are.

To Vico, the structuralist penchant for mathematizing the human equation would have to reflect an inferior order of reality.[2]

These typical internal and external contradictions in conceptualizing Vico are, as I have noted, readily compounded. Vico is said, to one degree or another, through one line of reasoning or another, to prefigure Hegel, Kant, Comte, Durkheim, Marx, and Cassirer, among others. (I have not yet found the psychoanalytic prototype, but I am sure the point can be easily made on the level of mythological analysis. The modifications of the human mind can also be incarnated in Oedipal complexes and archetypes.)

Yet there is one perspective which clarifies the occasion for these contradictions, even, in a certain sense, integrates them, namely, *The New Science* understood as an epic poem,[3] or *almost* an epic poem, *whose subject is the birth, death, and rebirth of culture.* The armature of this cycle is the struggle between philosophical reason (or conceptual universals) and poetic language (or perceptual cognition), between poetry and prose, between humaity in its 'origins', and humanity in its 'maturity', between the two sides of the historical self. 'Imagination', writes Vico, 'is more robust in proportion as reasoning power is weak.' The Plato of the *Republic*, with its parallel distinction between the rational and the poetic, comes to mind at once. And it is just here that Vico's lifelong insistence on his Platonism is most understandable. Vico is explicit:

> By the very nature of poetry it is impossible for anyone to be at the same time a sublime poet and a sublime metaphysician for metaphysics abstracts the mind from the senses, and the poetic faculty must submerge the whole mind in the senses. Metaphysics *moves up* to the universals, and the poetic faculty must *plunge deep* into particulars.[4] (1968:821)

But the *Republic* can be read as a systematic effort to enthrone philosophical reason; it is immobile, final, the social structure and culture of reason itself; it is a Utopia[5] projected out of Plato's version of the Greek cycle of civilizational development. In that structure (which is an ideal reflection of archaic society) the universal is opposed to the particular, knowledge to consciousness, the rational to the imaginative;

each set represents a paired opposition in the class structure of the *Republic*, class in both the socioeconomic and conceptual-categorial sense of the term. Thus Plato seems to have achieved what Vico assumes, just as Vico has achieved in his exploration of poetic cognition what Plato implies. In fact, Vico (1968:217) is willing to credit all of the 'useful', 'necessary', 'convenient', and most of the 'pleasurable' arts to the poetic centuries before the philosophers 'those old men of the nations came, and founded the world of the sciences thereby making humanity complete' (1968:498). He thus implies a distinction between the sciences and 'mere' technology which is of the same order as that between the universal and the particular, knowledge and certainty,[6] and quite remarkably, between the rational and the poetic. For the useful arts, he tells us, are 'nothing but imitators of Nature', and in a certain way, 'real' poems (made not of words but of things, the bracketed editoral comment affirms). *A real poem is, then, a particular, determined, created object.* This is a very beautiful way to conceive it, but Vico is nowhere more Platonic than he is here, or more a philosopher prepared 'to live in the Republic' (1968:131). For Plato relegates the majority of men to living among, imitating and, only in that sense, *creating* without true knowledge (Vico's *Scienza*), their particular reflections of universal forms as useful objects. The poets, however, must either be put in their place, or exiled, because, among other shortcomings, they merely imitate the imitators. They are creators of words, not even of things, and are, therefore, three times removed from the truth accessible to philosophical reason.

Would the *Republic*, then, have represented Vico's implicit idea of a society released from the civilizational cycle, because it crystallizes the hierarchical interpretation of human nature that he shares with Plato? There is striking evidence for this in the 'Practic of the New Science'[7] in which Vico had originally intended to supplement his conclusions to that work, and later suppressed.

In the 'Practic', Vico refers to the whole of *The New Science* as a *contemplative* effort, promising 'no help to preventing the ruin of nations in decay'.[8] But he is now to conclude on an 'active' note (1976:1495). That 'action' consists in 'wise men and princes of the commonwealths' contemplating the 'course the nations run', and recalling people to 'their perfect state'[9] (1976:1496) by teaching the young 'how to descend from the world of God and of minds into the world of nature (and) . . . the world of nations' (1976:1497). Further, 'the men who have neither counsel nor virtue of their own are the matter which is the body of the world of nations, in respect of matter's property of being formless' (1976:1409). But, 'on the other hand, those who are

the form and mind of the world of nations, in respect of form's property of bringing perfection are the men who can *counsel* and defend themselves and others [Plato's guardians and auxilaries — S.D.], and these are the wise and the strong' (1976:1410). These are also considered by Vico the 'active', 'diligent', 'grave', and 'luminous', but above all 'indivisible', men who 'in every profession are engaged . . . with all propriety' — in [their] own crafts — those (who have achieved) 'the property of being itself' (and) '. . . each one fulfilling the duties of his own order cooperate toward the harmony and beauty of the commonwealths'. This civilized division of labor is, of course, Plato's definition of justice, which Vico also agrees must be secured by moderation, relition, law, and force of arms. That, he says, is the history of nations and 'the spirit of this entire work' (1976:1419). And he concludes the 'Practic' by stating that the youths must be taught the providential law, on which *The New Science* is based, namely, that 'the nations are secure and flourish in felicity so long as the body in them serves and the mind commands'.

Is Vico's notion, then, that man can understand what he makes nuanced in a direction rather different from what we might prefer to assume? Does he mean, ultimately, that any man can become a poet of words and things (primitive man is said to be a poet *by nature*, and the language of the vulgar, the peasants, for example, still reflects the original poetic nature), but only a few men can understand what men make?[10]

In Plato, of course, that is to be achieved by individuals of special endowment after arduous training, who eventually come to understand the relationship between the conceptualized universal forms and their particular manifestations. This seems central to what Vico means by science, or knowledge, perhaps even by causal analysis. He has, after all, written: 'the heroic language is a language of similies, images, and comparisons born of the lack of *genera* and *species* which are necessary for the definition of things' (1968:832). Can this be taken to mean that if one classifies a thing properly one comprehends it as a reflection of a divine form which is also its cause? (1968:1008). But I shall be returning to this point.

Elsewhere, Vico tells us (1968:219) '. . . poetic sentences are formed by feelings of passion and emotion, whereas philosophic sentences are formed by reflection and reason. The more the latter rise toward universals,[11] the closer they approach truth; the more the former descend to particulars, the more certain [that is, more contingent and particular — S.D.] they become'. And (1968:793) '. . . the minds of the first men of the gentile world took things one at a time, being in this respect little better than the minds of beasts, for which each new sensation cancels out

the last one (which is the cause of their being unable to compare and reason discursively)'. He continues (1968:9704) 'abstract sentences are the work of philosophers, because they contain universals'. And he concludes that sentence with a stunning and accurate phrase: 'and reflections on the passions are the work of false and frigid poets (repeated in 825 — *pace* Wordsworth)'.

Is Vico referring to himself here, demanding that a poet be a poet and nothing else? Certainly few Western scholars have reflected so comprehensively on the language of poetry, which Vico repeatedly defines as the language of the passions. At the same time, he reminds us (1968:708) that 'that heroism of virtue which realizes its highest idea belongs to philosophy and not to poetry'. Moreover, 'maxims of life — as being general (are) the sentences of philosophers'. And is not this whole higher-lower polarity a sanction for the governance of most men by a few? And is this what Vico means, at least in part, when he states in his conclusion (1968:1105): 'the world is always governed by those who are naturally fittest'.

Correlatively, it is possible to understand Vico's double demystification of Homer, as a philosopher (1968:828, 831) and as a particular historical figure (1968:810ff.), his identification of Homer as the Greek people[12] themselves, singing their history as it appeared to them, in their corrupt heroic age, through their blind impoverished *rhapsodes* (who were vulgar men — 1968:849) as a further sanction of the position of ordinary people in Plato's *Republic*. 'There is a complete absence of philosophy in Homer, says Vico (1968:806), beginning his argument, '. . . he may have been quite simply a man of the people'. If Homer is dangerous, the people are dangers: 'Homer is no stupid founder of Greek civility', but hastens the natural course of human institutions to its inevitably corrupt climax (1968:879). Homer (1969:889) 'made men of Gods and Gods of men' [which is precisely why Plato will not tolerate him in the *Republic* — S.D.]. Of course, Vico's praise of Homer, the 'most sublime' of poets, is virtually a hymn to the Greek people, but it should be remembered that Plato also bowed down before the poets before exiling them.[13] Paradoxically, Vico regards poetry itself as a sign of the *poverty* of language, but it is a paradox that should now be clear.

Is Vico, then, debating his own nature, that modification of his mind which reflects what we can now call the eternal struggle in the ideal eternal history? And is *The New Science* not the dynamic, historical complement of the *Republic*, a hidden tribute by Vico to his 'divine Plato', whose influence he continuously acknowledges, but about which he is reticent in detail? The notion of complementarity seems appropriate when we recall that Vico does what Plato does not; he explores the lives

of ordinary people, their language, myths, poetry, histories, families, useful objects, their particular and contingent character. In the *Republic*, of course, the social imperatives and modes of cognition of the guardians serve as the organizing principle. But Vico does not say this; he is silent on Plato's specific estimation of and program for the humanity that has been politically divided between philosophy and poetry. But he does maintain (is it a dynamic Vichian version of the parable of the cave?) that 'it is true that men have themselves made the world of nations (and we took this as the first incontestable principle of ourscience . . .) but this world without doubt has issued from a mind often diverse, at times quite contrary, and always superior to the particular ends that men had proposed to themselves; which narrow ends, made means to serve wider ends, it has always employed to preserve the human race upon this earth'.

This is not to claim that Vico was a Platonist — no thinker of consequence is ever lost in the shadow of another. Indeed, it is to ameliorate the anxiety of influence — to adopt Mr Harold Bloom's phrase with reference to the ancestral relationship of poets — that a certain silence may intervene between an earlier and later thinker. Be that as it may, I have brought up the tension between Plato and Vico because it seems to be a source of the poetic energy of the work, reinforcing the tension between philosophic and poetic language, a tension which is not merely abstract, but which is felt by Vico himself, and also serves as an aspect of his historical method: the capacity of reflective human beings in an age of reason to explore the modifications of the human mind, to identify with the other.

Pursuing this paradox further, a number of observations can be made about the poetic character of *The New Science*, or Metaphysic, as Vico refers to it, apart from its major preoccupation with the nature of poetic language itself. (Vico designates ancient Roman law as a 'serious poem', indicating that, in his own judgment, a prosaic work can be interpreted as a poem because its language is that of 'poetic wisdom'.) In Vico's view, all primitive people are natural, or sublime poets (reflected also in the language of the vulgar, including the peasants); conversely, it is fair for us to assume that all strong poets have a substantially primitive nature;[14] the primacy of poetry is both ontogenetic and phylogenetic. The origins of language — its metaphorical, connotative, associative, and yet concrete character, are in poetry. Myths are imaginative, not abstract, universals, the poetic personification of the history of primitive and archaic humanity. The myths are, in fact, their history, honestly told, under the stimulus of fear and because reflection which can lead to lying is absent, but limited by the supposed primitive incapacity to ab-

stract principles from a projected, imagined reality. The childhood of the species is analagous to the childhood of the person (hence the principle of the modification of the mind — S.D.). Vico sums this up as follows (1969:378):

> But the nature of our civilized minds is so detached from the senses, even in the vulgar, by abstractions corresponding to all the abstract terms our languages abound in, and so refined by the art of writing and, as it were, spiritualized by the use of numbers, because even the vulgar know how to reckon, that it is naturally beyond our power to form the vast image of this mistress called 'sympathetic nature'. Men shape the phrase with their lips but have nothing in their minds, for what they have in mind is falsehood, which is nothing; and their imagination no longer avails to form a vast, false image. It is equally beyond our power to enter into the vast imagination of these men, whose minds were not in the least abstract, refined or spiritual,[15] because they were entirely immersed in the senses, buffeted by the passions, buried in the body . . . we can scarcely understand, still less imagine, how these first men thought who founded gentile humanity. [But is this not the major claim of *The New Science*? — S.D.]

Now this is a remarkable, if overstated, insight, overstated because Vico insists on pejoratively assimilating all real abstractions to Platonic abstractions[16] (see Diamond, 1974:162–165) while flirting with the notion of primitive incapacity, although it could be argued that all he means here is that the 'order of ideas follow the order of institutions'. Nonetheless, the passage quoted deserves comparison with Boas' conclusion (1938:216ff.) that:

> Primitive man, when conversing with his fellow man, is not in the habit of discussing abstract ideas . . . Discourses on qualities without connection with the object to which the qualities belong, or of activities or states disconnected from the idea of the actor of the subject behind in a certain state, will hardly occur in primitive speech. Thus the Indian will not speak of goodness as such, although he may very well speak of the goodness of a person. He will not refer to the power of seeing without designating an individual who has such power. Thus it happens that in languages in which the idea of possession is expressed by elements subordinated to nouns, all abstract terms appear always with possessive elements, and thus reach abstract forms strictly corresponding to the abstract forms of our modern languages . . . (and further) if we want to form a correct judgment we ought to bear in mind that our European languages have been moulded to a great extent by the abstract thought of philosophers. Terms like 'essence, substance, existence, idea, reality,' many of which are now commonly used, are of origin artificial devices for expressing the results of abstract thought. In this way, they would resemble the artificial, unidiomatic abstract terms that may be found in primitive languages.

Paul Radin, among many others, has made similar 'Vichian' observations, and my own field experiences (1974:148) help confirm the point. For example,

'the Anaguta of the High Nigerian Plateau, never count in the abstract . . . only with reference to concrete things or people; the numerals change form according to the classes of objects being counted [Vico has actually implied this — 1968:431], but are not grammatically concordant with them. Yet the Anaguta are fully capable of grasping numbers unrelated to particular objects. But they do not deify or reify number; there is no occasion for doing so in their society, and the idea seems meaningless to them . . . similarly, in explaining the meaning of a proverb, a concrete context is always presented, for the abstract idea is regarded as inconclusive.'

Vico's equation of the primitive and the poetic is confirmed in other aspects, by Professor Jeff Opland, on the basis of his influential field studies among the Xhosa-speaking Bantu of South Africa. In an article in the *Journal of the Modern Language Association* (1975:185ff.), Opland begins his argument by quoting Archie Mafeje, 'one of the best of the contemporary tribal poets', to the effect that 'social anthropologists as shown by Schapera's recent publication on *Praise Poems of Tswana Chiefs* do not seem to have yet grasped fully the significance of the institution of bards both in tradition and modern society'. Opland focuses on the '*Imbongi*', who composes his poetry when he is singing it, '. . . giving spontaneous vent to his feelings in an inspired *izibongo*, hair raising in its emotional impact . . . he struck dramatic poses . . . gone was the mild bespectacled butcher . . . he was completely transformed . . . the bare words alone cannot capture the total impression' (compare with Vico's references to the original language, or poetry, of the body, that is, the dance — S.D.).

Opland epitomizes his findings as follows:

The free ability to improvise is demonstrated also in song . . . But for our present purposes we must note the general capacity to improvise poetry that provides a foundation upon which the future *Imbongi* — builds. Only a few men will go on to become *Imbongi* — and when they do their craft will develop the art of their poetry, but the connection between the lay poet and *Imbongi* is clear: *the Imbongi is, in essence, merely a tribesman particularly gifted in spontaneous poetic expression . . . (but) every man is a (poetic) improvisor.*

Vico's insights in this area are formidable; he is more than justified in his claims to a major achievement. But it is equally important to note that Vico's ambivalence about poetic language is reflected in the text of

The New Science itself. It may be said to be 'poetic', as does Professor Cambon (1968:17ff.) who refers to Vico's 'charged prose', 'vivid axiomatic insights', 'corollaries of rushing eloquence', 'all things seen and actions felt which stand to their generating axioms as the movements of a Beethoven symphony stand to the initial sharp statement of their themes. Vico, like Dante, thinks in concrete terms — and the *physical world is never far from his focus* [a certain sign of primitiveness, according to Vico — S.D.]. Vico does not talk about the origin, development, and crisis of civilization; he makes us see the crucial scenes (through his "keen powers of sensuous perception"[17]) — and imaginatively participate in the choral action, even while taking his bearings in the vastest perspective he can afford'.

So that is Vico's language. More properly, it may be regarded as more rhetorical than poetic. But, in any case, it is at variance with his definition of *The New Science* as a metaphysics, and himself, therefore, as a metaphysician reasoning in an orderly, clear, and dispassionate manner, which he defines as the sine qua non of philosophical discourse. Moreover, there is, as Professor Fisch has noted, a paucity of empirical argument in the work, despite Vico's tributes to Francis Bacon, one of Vico's 'four authors'. Vico's argument is, rather, *axiomatic, interpretive*, depending upon his aesthetic capacity to visualize and penetrate what Baudelaire was to call the 'forest of symbols', on the one hand, and the 'common experience of humanity' on the other. Indeed, the common principles of humanity in which *The New Science* is rooted are religion, marriage, and burial. Since these institutions exist everywhere, in one guise or another, and since 'both vulgar and philosophic wisdom make them the rule of social life', they must represent 'the bounds of human reason'. 'And let him who would trespass them beware, less he transgress all humanity', concludes Vico (1968:217). This is an argument, and a very good one, but it is circular, and not at all analytic. It is this circularity which Vico implicitly denies throughout his work, in his efforts to place himself essentially beyond challenge.

For above all, it is Vico's vision which welds *The New Science* into a certain kind of poem. This vision is 'poetic' because it is final, and perfect so far as the author is concerned, despite possible lack of evidence, or specific historical deviation. It is analogous to the vision of reality that a poet creates for himself, it inheres in his language; he *knows* it is true. For Vico, the work has the form and force of a revelation, the particular and the universal, the *verum* and the *certum* fuse. But Vico denies the reality of the creative synthesis, wherein the particular becomes, so to speak, its own universal.

Like the Christian and the primitive, Vico is fascinated by the infinite metaphor and endless cycle of birth, death, and rebirth, the occasion for the plurifunctional ritual dramas of humanity. This cycle has little to do with Spencerian spirals, Hegelian or Marxist dialectics, Tonybean or Spenglerian cycles of civilizational decline (except as each of these, in its own way, may be traceable to the same elemental rhythm). But there is no Spenglerian despair in Vico; no faith in any Hegelian, illimitable catalysis of reason, no Marxist theory or imperative of action. There is only certainty about the character of the universal, recurrent historical drama.[18]

Vico's three basic institutions — marriage, burial, and religion — are readily translatable into the cycle of birth, death, and rebirth. This personal-social cycle finds its analogy in the course every nation must run as it develops, matures, declines, and falls (1968:349), and is extended to the ideal eternal history which would be repeated 'even if infinite worlds were born from time to time through eternity' (1968:348). Vico treats us to a series of parallel, triadic developments: from the age of gods, through the age of heroes, to the age of reason; from the primitive through the heroic to the rational nature; from divine law (and custom) through the heroic law of force, to human law dictated by reason; and so on (1968:916ff.). Similarly, the order of institutions begins in the forest, and ends in the academies, as humanity moves from felt necessity to madness and dissolution. This dissolution is also defined as a 'barbarism of reflection', more inhuman than the original barbarism of the senses, in the time of the birth of language. The latter was a 'generous savagery', but the former is base. Under providence, we are finally assured, a revolutionary barbarism sets in, literally a return to 'the primitive simplicity of the first world of peoples' and humanity is again religious, truthful, and faithful.[19] Croce, for one, has tried to invest this return with the familiar Marxist dialectical meaning, but I would interpret it as more akin to the rise of the monastic movement in North Africa as a fall out from Imperial Rome.

History, then, for Vico is a metaphor for death and resurrection; all history seems to become sacred history. In the ascription of Professor Fisch (following Schiller) — 'the history of the world is the last judgment'. In this sense, history is meaningless for Vico; all time is contemporary, or rather, temporality is an illusion.

But there is more to be said. Vico's argument is, at the same time, almost 'poetic' in method, if theological in character. It deals with the dynamics of ambivalent relationships (in the banal form of unintended consequences) — so that (1968:1108) 'Men mean to gratify their bestial lust and abandon their offspring, and they inaugurate the chastity of

marriage from which the families arise. The fathers mean to exercise without restraint their paternal power over their clients, and they subject them to the civil powers from which the cities arise. The reigning orders of nobles mean to abuse their lordly freedom over the plebians, and they are obliged to submit to the laws that establish popular liberties. The monarchs mean to strengthen their own positions by debasing their subjects . . . and they dispose them to endure slavery at the hands of stronger nations.' And so on, until 'the remnants flee from safety to the wilderness . . . (and) . . . like the *phoenix* rise again'.

Thus divine intention ('this world without doubt has issued from a mind . . . always superior to the particular ends that men had proposed to themselves') and human result are assimilated to a unity that only 'providence' comprehends and generates. Yet men are said by Vico to be free; what they do they do by intelligence, 'by choice, not by chance': for choice is distinguished from chance on the basis of the results of their acting being 'perpetually the same' (1968:1108). It is hard to determine what Vico means here except that men make their histories over and over again, in an endless diversity of forms, or 'modes', with comparable functions, or 'substances' in accordance with a providential impulse that they can never *fully* understand (although philosophic reason may approximate an understanding at the apex of a civilizational cycle). The movement of the cycle itself is clarified further, according to Pompa (1975:124), who interprets Vico's argument to mean that 'as soon as man has acquired the power to understand the nature of things', that is, the power of reason, the object of understanding is demystified, including the belief in a 'provident deity', and civilization, which is alien to man's fallen nature, begins to collapse; history ends because reason can never be a condition of history.

Thus reason is at the summit of the historical experience which is a succession of human natures, and also the signal of its decline, leading to the primitive, irrational revival. Reason and poetry are differentiated but inseparably united in the eternal cycle; they are irreconcilable, perpetually destroying each other, perpetually rejoined. This sort of dialectic does not sensibly recall either Hegel or Marx, but suggests a Chinese subtlety, while it moves in the direction of Yeats and Blake without achieving what each understood: that poetic language is an *unanalyzable* unity of contrarieties. To quote from Shakespeare's *Phoenix and the Turtle*, perhaps the most intense expression of this ambivalence in English:

Property was thus appalled
That the self was not the same;
Single nature's double name
Neither two nor one was called.

Reason in itself confounded,
Saw division grow together
To themselves yet either neither
Simple were so well compounded

That it cried "How true a twain
Seemeth this concordant one!
Love hath reason, reason none,
If what parts can so remain."

If this *New Science* has the characteristics of a poem, it is, nevertheless, a failed poem because it betrays its own nature in the service of a demystifying rationality, which it accepts as superior to itself, and fails to honor, or linguistically sustain, its own ambivalence. I refer here not to the ambivalence about poetic language, but the ambivalence *of* poetic language. Vico contaminates his magnificent concern with the lives of ordinary people — their languages, myths, histories, families, useful objects, and their particular and contingent character in the name of a universal science, that is, a hierarchical metaphysics. Because *The New Science* remains divided between poetry and science, and denies the integrity of poetic ambivalence, it may have generated, to use Harold Bloom's conceit, a 'massive map of misreading' but it has not generated a single, strong, unified interpretation, or better, misinterpretation. Therefore, Vico may be adopted as an ancestor but he has no natural heirs.

Notes

1. That is, his grasp of the radically metaphorical nature of language, understanding of the self as both subject and object of history, and so on.
2. For a fuller comparison of the connection between Lévi-Strauss and Spinoza, see Diamond (1974:322).
3. I have discovered in the course of writing this paper that Professor Cambon has made a similar statement in his essay on Vico and Dante (15ff:68), but our interpretations are quite different.
4. For a discussion of the distinction between philosophic (Platonic) and poetic language, see Diamond (1974:92ff.).
5. The opposite of where Blake said the poet lives: 'the poet lives in a place where contrarities are equally true'.
6. Plato's contrast between knowledge and opinion, if we interpret opinion as merely

naive opinion about apparent 'facts' of immediate experience, is precisely parallel.

7. This document — the first English translation, which appears in the just published Tagliacozzo-Verene edited volume on Vico — was called to my attention after I had written the first draft of this paper.
8. See the interpretation of praxis in Vico, above, page 9.
9. Via the academies, it should be noted, and the 'sects of philosophers', based on the three principles of *The New Science*.
10. Contrast with Sartre: 'Poetry creates the myth, while the prose-writer draws its portrait. The former uses words as things, not as signs which can be penetrated'. As Valery claimed, no one can understand a word to its very bottom. Here the poet would be denying the *philosophic pretensions* of *The New Science*.
11. Contrast with Yeats: 'High on some mountain shelf huddle the pitiless abstractions bald about the necks'.
12. In a platonic mood, Vico had written (Practic: 1976:1409): 'In respect of disorder and confusion, it is the man who, by reason of all these properties of matter, would, as far as in them lies, reduce the world of nations to the chaos of the theological poets, which we have found to signify the confusion of human seed. . . .'
13. Compare this with T. S. Eliot's view: The poet is the point of maximum consciousness in a close-knit society, 'the expression of the mind of a whole people'.
14. T. S. Eliot had argued that primitive modes of cognition 'persist in civilized men, but become available only through the poet'.
15. But it should be borne in mind that these terms are used in specific ways by Vico: abstract refers to conceptual universals; refined is always used ambiguously and borders on dissolute, delicate, or over-refined; spiritualized implies the formation of numbers, which Vico views problematically, and other universals. The undercurrent of ambivalence in this passage should be noted.
16. I have also summarized this distinction elsewhere (1974:93–194) as follows: 'the Platonic definition of the abstract has become so entrenched in Western thought that the frequently encountered attitude toward primitives, that they are incapable of or deficient in this capacity, as a manifestation of it. Conversely, the attempt to prove that primitives are capable of abstracting too often centers on the types of abstraction emerging out of the history of Western culture, which would seem quite irrelevant. While it is true that no primitive group is made up of Platonists in the technical sense of that term (for primitives tend to live, as Radin has put it, 'in a blaze of reality') and the various politicoconceptual divisions generic to the state have not yet been established, this does not mean that they do not think abstractly. In the basic sense, every linguistic system is a system of abstractions; each sorting out of experience and conclusion from it is an abstract endeavour; every tool is a symbol of abstract thinking. Indeed, all cultural convention, all custom, is testimony to the generic human capacity for abstracting. But such abstractions are indissolubly wedded to the concrete. They are nourished by the concrete, and they are, I believe, ultimately induced, not deduced. They are not, in short, specifically Platonic abstractions, and they do not have the politicized psychological connotations of the latter.
17. But T. S. Eliot had argued: 'Poetry is not the assertion that something is true, it is the creation of a sensuous embodiment'.
18. In contrast, Marx had explicitly denied that he had worked out 'a historico-philosophical theory that every people is fated to tread' (see his well-known letter to Mikhalovsky). And he had defined the abstract as a moment in the movement from the concrete to 'the reproduction of the concrete in the movement of thought'. Marx also refers to the *ascent* from the abstract to the concrete, the opposite of Vico's

contention. Further, as he put it (in *The Holy Family*), he was not interested in the abstract pear of the philosophers, but in the concrete piece of fruit, with its various attributes, the sole reality he was willing to recognize. Although, it deserves to be re-emphasized, Vico may have constructed a theory of history as human praxis, he did not develop a theory of political, or even therapeutic action.

19. More fully this simplicity is that of 'the few survivors in the midst of an abundance of things necessary for life' who naturally become sociable '. . . thus providence brings back among them the piety, faith, and truth which are the natural foundations of justice as well as the graces and beauties of the eternal beauty of God' (1968:1106).

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Boas on the Kwakiutl: The Ethnographic Tradition

IRVING GOLDMAN

Anthropology alone among all the disciplines studying mankind has the special responsibility for recording a vanishing subject matter. Only the anthropologist may experience, with some desperation, the knowledge that the societies he writes about may have ceased to exist in the form known to him within his own professional lifetime. If he has a professional conscience at all, he must be haunted by the dread that his reports may be the sole evidence on the character of an entire cultural universe represented by the way of life of any tribal society. His omissions, his errors, not to mention the misconceptions introduced by his professional training and the theoretical fancies of his time and place, may go down the ages as tarnished truths, casting, he fears, a permanent shadow upon theory, and blighting, perhaps, for all time the prospects for a true science of humanity. Even when errors, omissions, and misunderstandings are corrected, as is often the case, an authentic image of a vanishing tribal culture may never again be fully restored. Since each culture is unique when viewed as a total system, and each dying culture is unique at each moment of its demise no field study can ever be ultimately exhaustive, or adequately replicated. Some vital bit of information is inevitably lost with the passage of almost any time interval. In Boas' time, anthropology had been thought of as a 'burning house'. What was not salvaged at once would be lost forever.

Strictly speaking, all the human disciplines labor with the difficulty of an elusive and intrinsically nonrepetitive subject matter. For anthropology the difficulties are more acute. The mortality rate among tribal or primitive cultural traditions may, in fact, now be no greater than that among the life styles of enlightened middle-class populations; but the tribal traditions encompass entire peoples, and are far more esoteric and thus less comprehensible. Each is a small and special entity, in a real sense, a complete and vital segment of the totality of the entire

preindustrial, precommercial, and preliterate mode of existence. Perhaps, by some broad humanistic standards, one fairly rendered primitive society may be allowed to stand for all of what was once the early state of mankind. By scientific standards, which recognize the absolute importance of human variability as a guide to the capabilities of human nature, anything short of a relatively complete record is an unacceptable impediment to proper understanding. Because of high variability the loss of a single unrecorded example of tribal cultures leaves an irrecoverable lacuna. The inclusion of a subject that had been badly described and misrepresented leaves behind a record that may be permanently mischievous.

Thus the quality of the ethnographic record has for anthropology a meaning that sets its data collecting apart from that of its sister disciplines. The others may luxuriate in the pleasures and vices of theory building and theory destruction. Anthropology was from its beginnings burdened with the urgent obligation to salvage. Granting even that theory is indeed the intelligent instrument for serious ethnography, the danger of loss of data is greater than the loss of refinement in gathering data. As a matter of fact, relatively unsophisticated theoreticians have often produced more permanently useful records of primitive societies than we are now getting from many scholars whose central preoccupation is with methodology or doctrine. The ethnographic intelligence flowing from other traditions, from the natural sciences, from literature, from history, among others, has been quite equal from the beginnings to the task of primary collecting; and this is evidenced in the works of Spencer and Gillen, Henri Junod, Ralph Barton, to name only a few of the most gifted ethnographers of the early period. The true aim of ethnography is the faithful rendition of the subject. If the ethnographer errs, it is mainly on the side of omission or of exuberant subjectivity. Even unprofessionally trained observers, if with a background in the natural sciences or with the dedication and long experience of the missionary, the native agent, or school teacher have produced lasting, because they were authentically detailed, studies.

Since a passion for detail guides the ethnographer's labors, sophisticated theory may prove his undoing. While theory is by nature sharp and selective, the best ethnographies are diffuse and blunt. Sophisticated theory, by an excess of categorizing and focusing, drives home its messages, at the cost, however, of blotting out other or alternative understandings. By excluding what is 'irrelevant' it insists upon its own standards of relevance. In the language of economics, which is not inappropriate for an anthropology that lives on scarce means, the ethnographic records represent the raw materials, the basic resources; the

ethnological theories are the equivalent of the manufactured goods, the tools, and the consumer products. The raw materials are the primary economic wealth. Pursuing this analogy a bit further, we may add the self-evident observation that an anthropology that is deficient in its holdings of basic data would be in the unenviable position of technologically sophisticated societies that have run out of raw materials. Like other analogies, this, too, serves only a limited purpose, in this instance, of illustrating an ultimate primacy. Ethnography is not, after all, simply a resource for theory building. Authentic description of a natural form is also an end in itself, as a partial portrait of the natural world. Such a portrait has aesthetic value, it has moral value, and it has scientific value as a reconstruction that seeks to be faithful to real events.

To return to the economic analogy it would have been in the best interests of rational planning of the long-range future of anthropology if the early decades had been dedicated primarily to the ethnographic investigation, and if theory had been directed fully to the improvement of the ethnographic models and of methods of enhancing their authenticity. The fact that many anthropologists today grow impatient with ethnography as so much idle stamp collecting, or as boring obsession with details, and want to get on with the important tasks of explaining and restructuring the human world, should not obscure for us the very different sense of urgency that seminal scientists such as Franz Boas felt in their time for bringing to light cultural worlds never before known.

The present-day impatience with collecting data, or with simple description for its own sake, or with dense description, is, in fact, premature. Even among rapidly changing societies, there are still rich veins of knowledge about the past that must be tapped before the flow stops. The opportunities for ethnographic research are not as rich as they were a century or so ago, but they are far from exhausted even among relatively traditional tribal societies. The objective urgency for sheer salvage is greater now than ever. But our aims have changed. Scholars who may wish to do 'straight ethnography' must often disguise their aims when writing up grant proposals for field research, so as to emphasize problem solving.

Curiously, the shift in interest from solid description to methodological and theoretical innovation and refinement has also undermined the value of the older and densely descriptive ethnographies. In its full maturity, a developing anthropology, we would suppose, would turn back to a very close study of its early source materials as an empirical foundation for new theory. Yet even some of the outstanding graduate departments of the major American universities undervalue, if

they do not simply ignore, the bulk of this earlier ethnographic literature. The effect of such a new education is to turn students, and ultimately the entire field, away from the ethnographic enterprise. If the ethnographic tradition should suffer a premature demise, that is by dying before its subject matter has expired, then our intellectual position will surely be precarious in the near future. And if it should happen that the earlier ethnographic tradition has not measured up to its responsibilities for producing authentic description, our intellectual situation is already nearly hopeless.

The place of Boas among the immortals of anthropology is secured by the merits of his ethnographic achievements above all. While not the founder of the ethnographic tradition in America, Boas brought that tradition to a scientific level that has not yet been surpassed. Far more readable and comprehensible ethnographies have been written, but none matches the epically proportioned Kwakiutl ethnography for sheer verisimilitude, and for the deep access it offers to the Kwakiutl mind before it had been altered by Christianity, commerce, and finance. Yet the very authenticity of the Kwakiutl ethnographic materials has proved a formidable barrier to accessibility. Kwakiutl perceptions, their theoretical constructs, and their modes of expression in speech or in graphics are so distinct from, if not radically alien to, those of the western tradition, that they are easily falsified by inept translation. As a matter of simple caution, we should assume that if the mode of thought of primitive peoples, as revealed by the ethnographic records, sounds all too familiar notes of recognition in the western academic mind, something is seriously wrong with the rendition. The persistent and really profound misunderstanding of the Kwakiutl culture, of which Boas was also guilty, cannot be laid to defects in the Kwakiutl ethnography, but rather to an impatient, hasty, and, finally, a tendentious reading of it. This ethnography, unlike many other descriptive works that read loud and clear, can reward only those who are minded to study it very closely.

The value of the Kwakiutl ethnography has been acknowledged by all serious scholars, even by so extravagant a critic of Boas as the late Leslie White (1963:65). Swanton called one collection of Kwakiutl texts 'an inexhaustible source of reliable information regarding the thought life of the people from whom they were obtained' (1907:743–744). Sapir, reviewing still another collection added, '. . . it is safe to say that there is now a larger body of native text available for the intimate study of Kwakiutl mythology, ritual and other aspects of culture than for any other American tribe' (1912:193–198). Sapir saw great linguistic value in the Kwakiutl texts because, as he said, they make possible a 'true psychology of language' (ibid.:193). In apparent answer to some

grumblings about the quantity of texts, Sapir observed, '. . . future students of language and culture will complain of a paucity rather than of a superabundance of Kwakiutl texts, just as students of earlier cultures find what seems at first sight a vast source of source material all too scanty for the satisfactory treatment of many a problem' (ibid.:194). By Codere's tabulation (1959:61), Boas' principal published works on Kwakiutl exceed 5000 printed pages, not a paucity of data by contemporary standards, and were the result of some 50 years of collection.

Quantity in itself need not be awe-inspiring; but the special value of all of Boas' field data is that they were collected in Kwakiutl text, for the most part by George Hunt, his Indian informant and ethnographic assistant. Hunt was only part Indian, the son of a Tlingit mother, but raised in Fort Rupert among the Kwakiutl to whose language and culture he became assimilated. Boas taught Hunt to write in Kwakiutl, and in 1893 Hunt began to record texts with a close-to-literal interlinear translation. White acknowledges that Boas was the first to record ethnographic data in the native language and used this technique of recording more systematically than anyone else (1963:22). This rendering of almost all phases of Kwakiutl culture in the native idiom by a field worker whose knowledge of the people, of the culture, and of the language was so intimate, all but abolished the usual barriers between investigator and informant. The results are as close to authenticity as field work can get.

This approach to field study in which a native worker was collaborator and principal investigator for most of the field effort is nothing less than a revolutionary innovation. Had it been fully utilized and improved upon; had ethnography in its fertile period produced, let us say, even 100 field studies of this caliber and density, anthropology would now have a treasure of source material on what Gene Weltfish has called lost or dying universes. By drawing upon native talent as Boas did, the discipline would have created a corps of indigenous scholars whose task it would be to preserve the records of their own past. From an ethical standpoint alone, Boas' approach to field work was revolutionary in leading the way out of the quasi-colonial relationship that often defines the informant's role. Field work that appears in the natural idiom of the native creates a permanent monument. While fashions in theory and methodology are ephemeral, suited to their age and its private preoccupations, ethnography on the Kwakiutl model lasts forever.

In the special sense that the Kwakiutl texts were not organized by Boas in conformity with traditional anthropological schedules, they may be regarded as 'raw data'. From the special standpoint of conventional categorization, each of the published volumes of text materials seems to

have been assembled at random. For the most part, each text around a subject stands within the corpus of the entire work unconnected, unannotated, and uninterpreted for the reader. Only in that very early and quite extraordinary work, *The Social Organization and the Secret Societies of the Kwakiutl Indians*, does the reader receive any professional guidance through the labyrinthine corridors of Kwakiutl imagery and meanings. And that aid is as modest and frugal as the guidance Boas gave his students who might be lost in the swampland of constructing a grammar from an informant's texts.

Elsewhere in Boas' publications, the reader has before him only the mysterious associations of the Kwakiutl mind. But as authentic examples of this mind each of the texts is neither random nor raw. From the Kwakiutl standpoint, each is usually as specific and detailed as a case record in a law book. The Kwakiutl Indian more than matched in his respect for concreteness the proverbial chariness of Boas with the grand generalization. The Indian's manner of being informative was, in the finest ethnographic tradition, to tell what happened to particular people, on a particular occasion, at a particular time. Since all potential generalizations from this material are embedded in real narrative about real events, they are not readily accessible. Social anthropologists who seek crisp taxonomies are bound to be disappointed at the discovery that the texts are far from decisive on such crucial social issues as patriliny, matriliny, ambilaterality, exogamy, endogamy, or on whether the descent groups are clans, gentes, septs, or lineages. But then there is nothing unusual in the fact that when the data are rich, the categories blur. Ethnography, as Boas practiced the art, is in approximate relationship to ethnological theory as the apparent chaos of nature is to the categorizations and the process delineation of the natural scientist. Should the ethnographer produce a ready-made order for the theorist to work on, he would negate the scientific enterprise; thin and slanted ethnographies create illusory bases for the elaboration of illusory theories.

This inexorable relationship between ethnography and ethnology needs emphasizing because it used to be said that Boas, by producing so unfathomable a work as the Kwakiutl ethnography, and by demanding adherence to ethnographic reality, had held back the development of anthropological theory for decades (cf. Ray, 1955). The fact is, of course, that it is lack of anthropological imagination and doctrinaire rigidity that holds back the development of anthropological theory. Thus, it has been the apparent unwillingness of specialists on the area to treat the Indians' religious and cosmological ideas with scientific seriousness that has led to a substantial falsification in descriptions of

Kwakiutl culture. The Kwakiutl ethnography contains all the necessary data for a theory that would unify religion–cosmology with social structure and the potlatch complex. Hence it is not Boas who held back the development of anthropological theory, but, as is always the case, inadequate theory.

In writing my book on Kwakiutl religious thought (Goldman, 1975) I read all the Kwakiutl texts rather closely, and I can appreciate the difficulties of reducing them to an order faithful to Kwakiutl concepts. This can be done, I now believe, providing one is willing to go along with Kwakiutl reasoning. While it might prove difficult to fit concepts of descent, of lineage, of transmission of rights, of names and titles, and of marriage and kinship relations into current sociological theory, the effort to do so must, of course, be made. My studies in the texts led me to a view of Kwakiutl social structure as inextricably enmeshed with cosmological-religious ideas. Undoubtedly other constructions can be made from the texts. I call attention to social structure, because students of the Kwakiutl ethnography, most notably Murdock (1949:xiv), have complained, with cause, that abundant as the materials are, in this area, at least, they are markedly deficient. In fact, Boas' general writings on social organization (cf. especially 1920) are penetrating and lucid and true to the Kwakiutl model, if not to that of standard social theory. Rich data on what Kwakiutl think about social relationships are found in the hundreds of pages of family histories, as well as in texts on myth and ritual.

Basically, it seems to me, the 'communications gap' between Boas and the profession arose from divergent notions on the goals of anthropological research. For Boas, the aim was to understand the human mind as an historical product. As a result, the mental life of a particular people is seen as a separate, though not necessarily insular, cultural universe. The profession, under the driving influence of sociological theory, turned rather to the systematic and general study of social systems. Boas himself did not take too serious a view of sociological theory. Most of the profession, even as it admired the epic proportions of the Kwakiutl ethnography did not, for its part, recognize the substantial pertinence of its data for social theory. Consequently, not many scholars have taken the trouble to study its thousands of pages and fewer still have studied the linguistic texts.

The opposition between Boas and certain other anthropologists has often been described as that between particularists and generalists. While this facile distinction is convenient, it does not do justice to the theoretical interests of Boas in seeking to uncover native intellectual processes. It is meaningless to label Boas a 'particularist', for he saw

particulars as components of an intellectual structure which if not he then others might eventually put together.

The analytic problems posed by the Kwakiutl texts may be difficult, but hardly exceptional. One works with the details until a coherent concept of an overall structure takes shape and serves as a guide to the further understanding of details. In the presence of so much information, it has seemed to some, presumably Boas himself, that an overall understanding was out of reach. Such pessimism may seem justified. But the impediment to a synthesized account of Kwakiutl from the ethnography is not, as Codere thought, a defect in the quality of the texts (1959:61). They reveal major themes, powerful and persistent images, and recurrent patterns of social and ritual relationships, provided one is looking for reflections of the Kwakiutl imagination, and not merely for reflections of the western psychological and sociological imagination. Benedict saw Kwakiutl patterns through both modes of imagination at once, thus creating a fascinating but improbable cultural hybrid.

The Kwakiutl that are known to the general public, largely from *Patterns of Culture* (Benedict, 1934), and the Kwakiutl of extravagant potlatches and feverish status rivalry of the textbooks are all hybrid structures built up from odds and ends taken originally from the texts and grafted incongruously upon social and psychological models taken directly from western society. That such an incongruity could be taken seriously by many of the profession adds weight to the principle of historical relativism, a principle that Boas well understood. The texts Boas brought out serve precisely the purpose of drawing the reader deeply into the cultural milieu of the Kwakiutl and out of his own. It is up to the reader to accept the challenge of strange and difficult ideas, and to abandon the complacency of converting all that is novel into the clichés of the familiar.

To understand a strange cultural world, however, it is first necessary to accept a concept of strange cultural worlds. Thus, insofar as anthropology had moved in the direction of seeking broad and general principles, it was at once out of touch with the aims of the Kwakiutl ethnography. For the more extreme generalists, the details of the texts were but cumbersome obstacles in the way of airy clarity. But for Boas, who believed in the future, the way for anthropology was the slow and plodding march from understanding one culture and its culture area to broader-ranging comparisons. Such comparisons would have to take account of contextual uniqueness before resolving it within a more comprehensive pattern. Boas, as we know, did not actually anticipate any resolution that might yield significant general laws; nor for that matter did he expect to find full systematic coherence in any one culture.

It is hard to imagine how any scholar would pursue context as assiduously as Boas did, while he held, at the same time, to the hope that he himself would discover the system that contained all the complex facts. Yet the data in the ethnography are by no means random and unsystematic. To discover the Kwakiutl train of thought, Boas had to allow George Hunt substantial leeway; and to allow for the unknown and the unexpected to reveal itself he had to introduce randomness in data collecting — all calculated strategies consistent with the original intent, the exploration of the *terra incognita* of the Kwakiutl mind.

Boas' texts follow a plan for achieving high yield of data on the nature of Kwakiutl thought. Even the notorious 'recipes' that cover some 300 pages of Part 1 of the 35th Annual Report of the Bureau of American Ethnology follow that aim. Mrs. Hunt, who dictated this material, describes rather thoroughly the detail pertinent to her as a Kwakiutl housewife, the events associated with seemingly every foodstuff consumed in a household. She tells how she handles the food, how she preserves it and prepares it, how she serves it; often how it is consumed, how the eaters clean themselves after the repast, and how food wastes are handled. This section is not a Fanny Farmer cookbook, but an ethnography of eating. When the anthropological imagination has broadened somewhat, these data will be incorporated in theory. They should now be especially appetizing, if not precisely digestible, for structuralists who might wish to follow Lévi-Strauss into culinary areas.

Mythology occupies a most prominent place in Boas' ethnographic scheme. The Tsimshian of the Nass and Skeena Rivers are presented almost entirely through a massive collection of tales. If one includes the family traditions, which incorporate mythological narrative, and the rituals of the Great Winter Ceremonial, as well as the narratives of shamanism which are also coextensive with their mythological background, it may be said that the greater part of the Kwakiutl ethnography is on the same order. Four volumes are devoted to 'straight' myth collections, and a fifth, in effect a comprehensive index to these, presents an unusual view of Kwakiutl culture as reflected in mythology (Boas, 1935b). This slender volume and the massive work on Tsimshian mythology (collected by James Teit) demonstrate that Boas thought of myth as an explicit guide, and not merely an esoteric one to the central values and themes of the culture. It is as an adjunct to authentic ethnographic description that he sought completeness of the collection and its literal rendering in the native language. Of course, Boas knew well enough that mythology did not substitute for other dimensions of ethnographic description. But myth, along with family histories and religious texts, had for him the special meaning and merit of being a true

statement of the native mind. This index to mythological themes is, in effect, the most comprehensive summation of Kwakiutl culture Boas produced.

Because it is in the Kwakiutl language, and because it is associated with detailed information on cognate aspects of Kwakiutl culture, this mythology will always be of great value to students of the mind. There is hardly a more inviting body of data for 'structural' or symbolic analysis than this collection. Boas, however, ultimately rejected such analyses. Reviewing Locher's pioneer attempt at discovering the system of thought underlying Kwakiutl mythology (1933) he wrote:

> Dr. Locher seeks a systematic interpretation of mythology without asking himself whether there is such a thing as a mythological system. His method of proving this point, as that of other investigators who work toward a similar goal, appears to me as follows: Myths are not what they appear to be. They hide a deeper significance which we must discover. The investigation is based upon a comparison of the stories which are grouped around the different mythological figures, upon an examination of their names, attributes, actions and associations with other figures. It is hoped in this way to recognize their 'true' significance which is unknown to the living native himself, in part, I presume, because it is taken for granted that the real 'system' is just as little known to him as the grammatical system of his language.
>
> It seems to me that such attempts to discover the 'true' essence of myths are analogous to the primitive way of thinking as assumed by the same investigators. As myths to the student of mythology are not what they seem, so to the primitives sun, moon, stars, lightning, clouds are supposed to hide a deeper meaning. They are conceived as a system, as a form of life endowed with great powers. The logic in both cases appears to me the same. (1933:447)

The well known Boasian skepticism is more than matched by modern-day critics of structural analysis, who asked whether the structures that have been brought out came from the mind of the native, or from the mind of the analyst. While Boas was not personally impressed by discoveries of unconscious streams of thought, his ethnographies, because of their density, were intended to supply source material for equally exciting discoveries about the conscious mind. The scholarly criterion, as he describes it in the same review article, is that symbols arise from the subject matter. In his own words, '. . . the attempt to find in the stories a symbolic significance which is not immanent will rarely lead to acceptable conclusions' (ibid.:450). The wealth of detail, and the repetition of themes, plots, and characters in multiple contexts throughout the ethnography makes it entirely possible to establish a symbolic significance that meets the requirement of 'immanence'. The

data serve all schools of thought. Thus a collection of 68 dreams (Boas, 1925) is grist for the psychoanalytic mill, as well as for studies of congruence between dream content and other aspects of culture such as mythology.

Not to leave a possible misleading impression that Boas slighted other matters of ethnographic interest, I shall mention at this point subjects upon which he requested and got specific information: industries, hunting, fishing and food gathering, property and inheritance, succession, the life cycle of males and females, marriage, songs and recitatives, omens, signs, prayers, death, sweat baths, the position of women, swear words, emblems, paintings, house dishes, names, dog hair, spirits, tributes to chiefs, blood revenge, wars, domestic quarrels, village organization, kinship and descent group organization, chiefship and rank.

Boas has been charged with slanting his ethnography toward the aristocracy of chiefs. There is in fact much information on slaves and commoners (see Boas and Hunt, 1921:1093–1113) whom the Kwakiutl (not Boas) regarded as unimportant. In addition to the raw data texts, Boas compiled summaries and wrote several general articles to clarify particular features of Kwakiutl social organization. *The Social Organization and the Secret Societies of the Kwakiutl Indians*, published early in his career (1897), is not an orthodox ethnography, but nonetheless, an unforgettably vivid introduction to the special world of the Kwakiutl. It establishes the areal and historical provenience of the Kwakiutl. It summarizes the material bases and social features and then, quickly, gets into its main subject matter, the Great Winter Ceremonial (secret societies). For richness and scrupulosity of detail that portrays Kwakiutl from within, this early monograph is one of the grand works of ethnographic literature. His book on religion (Boas, 1930) supplements this study. It is accompanied in the body of his work by more pointed writings on aspects of religious thought (see 1895, 1927, 1932), on geographical names (1934), on social organization (1920), on art (1951), and on language (1911, 1947).

To come now to the interesting, though not really crucial matter of Boas' own understanding of the Kwakiutl. The matter is not crucial because Boas having set forth the primary data, considered his task as essentially done, leaving the analysis, the theorizing, and the synthesizing to the future. It was thought by those who knew him well at Columbia that he was working upon a comprehensive presentation that would finally explain Kwakiutl. But the posthumous *Kwakiutl Ethnography* (1966) adds little to what he had already published, and is in some respects a dilution (the discussion of the Winter Ceremonial, for

example) of earlier ethnographic materials. Moreover, it does not correct his original and rather serious misconception of the nature of the potlatch. Thus, if he contemplated a synthesis that would bring his thinking on Kwakiutl up to date, he did not set down any new ideas in writing.

Compared with the radical nature of the ethnography, which is a true thrust into the future, and his advanced intentions of achieving an understanding of a culture entirely from within, Boas' didactic writings on Kwakiutl are rather conventional. He drew upon his very extensive personal knowledge of the entire Northwest Coast to illuminate the history of specific Kwakiutl institutions, tracing the descent group organization back to earlier village communities, deriving bilateral descent from marriage with matrilineal neighbors, and establishing the relative period when myth and ritual elements were introduced. He derived Winter Ceremonial rituals from warfare. Boas ventured even more deeply into processes of historical transformation, professing to see in hereditary ownership of family crests a special Kwakiutl reformulation of the more ancient and more personal guardian spirit quest. And finally, some 25 years after he had begun work with Kwakiutl, he wrote a brief but trenchant description of the special nature of the lineage, which he felt was unique enough to render with the native term *numaym* — 'those of one kind' (1940:356–359).

Except for his determination to set down concisely the nature of the *numaym*, Boas seems not to have taken any of his general observations on Kwakiutl with full seriousness. Even an admirer of Boas must agree with White's estimation of Boas' historical reconstructions as unsystematic (1966:34–43). Boas does, indeed, make categorical assertions about historical processes, but it seems rather that he is relying more upon his general knowledge of the area, than upon close analysis of all relevant data. If the historical investigation was, however, only tentative, the theoretical reasoning behind it was still close to Boas' basic convictions about the volatility of cultures (Boas, 1933). A full understanding of the historical process, he asserted, was the essential precursor to an intelligent discussion of culture or of mythology as 'system' (ibid.).

On the nature of the Kwakiutl system, such as it may be, unified behind key ideas, or an assemblage of diverse and contradictory traits, Boas, had rather little to say. His reluctance to synthesize the data is in keeping with his own criteria of cultural analysis. In what were literally his last words, for he died on the occasion of giving this address, Boas said:

> One of the serious difficulties that has never been adequately dealt with is the lack of a precise understanding of the concepts with which alien cultures are operating. These must be obtained from a detailed study of the semantics of the language of the people whose culture we wish to study and this can be obtained only when we have the fullest data that allows us to determine the meaning of the expression used. (1943:314)

Hence Boas brought anthropological scholarship up to, but not into the realization of the intellectual treasures contained within the Kwakiutl ethnography. Scholarship gladly acknowledges the division of labor. The ethnographer need not be the theoretician. The labor of assembly of the data covered two generations. It may take an equally long time to extract from them the meanings the present generation of theoreticians are seeking. But then, only ethnography is short; theorizing is endless.

I cannot conclude without remarking on an ironic twist that sooner or later bedevils all serious scholarship. On precisely the matter of Boas' ultimate concern — 'a precise understanding of the concepts with which alien cultures are operating' — he had not come to terms with his own principles. Unwittingly, to be sure, he introduced what came to be a serious misunderstanding of the Kwakiutl and their culture. What Boas wrote casually, covering the subjects in no more than a few paragraphs, about the 'potlatch', about rank, about a society seemingly obsessed with the desire to outdo, even to humiliate a rival (1897:341–343), became the source of the great outpouring of popular and theoretical writings that finally made Kwakiutl a household word. I have dealt elsewhere (Goldman, 1975) with what I consider to be the misconceptions behind Boas' early portrayal of Kwakiutl culture. Others may see Kwakiutl differently. What cannot be denied is that Boas chose to comment on ritual exchange, upon rank, chiefship, rivalry, and property without setting forth their meanings according to Kwakiutl semantics.

Misunderstanding is, of course, part of the warp and woof of theoretical reasoning. What matters is that Boas and Hunt have provided the permanent source materials for continuing revision, for exposure of error, and for new insights into the landscape of both the Kwakiutl mind, and that of the western observer.

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Anthropology Begins at Home: Reflections of a Daughter

ANN L. MARGETSON

The year is 1934 or 1935. A small girl named Ann is about to become an anthropology student, a status that will last for her teacher's lifetime. The 'teacher' is her mother. I am the 'student', and have not always been a willing one.

On my bookshelf, among fairy tales and 'Mother Goose', were books about Stone Age men, Navajos, Pueblos, other Indians, and dinosaurs. I had already seen my first movie — 'The Wedding of Palo' — which was about Eskimos; and had a Pawnee name that I was able to say in both Pawnee and English. My 'education' began, consciously, with the need to answer other people's questions, 'What do your parents do?', 'They're anthropologists'. 'WHAT'S THAT?'. I think the first version of my definition was, 'Anthropology is the study of Man'. Later definitions were more lengthy and more sophisticated. I did know something *about* anthropologists; they talked a lot together wherever they met, over 'drinks', coffee, tea or Chinese food; they all had, or were working for Ph.D.s and writing theses which were a lot of trouble; many had offices that smelled alike, of books and dust; they all liked *old* things, baskets, pots, even bones; Franz Boas was everyone's 'grandfather'. I wondered why anthropology was so important.

My mother-teacher's name is Gene Weltfish. Her way of teaching was and is rooted in deep respect for her students and for all people, and she has therefore always been able to learn while teaching. I was included in that respect from the time of my earliest memories. We studied together, she and I, not just anthropology but politics and 'life' as well. We read the 'funnies'. These too, provided valuable lessons with fun — we laughed *and* studied!

During my childhood I met and grew to know philosophers, mathematicians, housekeepers, landlords, writers, storekeepers, professors, students and workers; Indians, Africans, and more. From

my mother-teacher I learned not only to say, but to feel and to know, that all these people were equal in human terms.

When I saw injustice, I learned from my mother that it was not inevitable; each of us could put something of ourselves into the account against injustice to be spent when the collective amount was large enough to be effective.

By inference, I understood that most things are worth attempting, both large and small. I understood much later, that during my 'studies' I had absorbed the concept — her concept — of placing one's personal troubles within the larger context of the 'world'. What was happening to anthropology, for instance, was more important than her own problems. From this I have come to believe, as she does, that each person deserves to feel part of something beyond themselves; a tribe, a cause, an art, a sport, a science. . . . She thought and still thinks ideas, everyone's ideas, are beautiful. Communicating ideas is fun, is important, from anyone to anyone. Sometimes she would say, 'The "soul" of a person is in the space between that person and another one'.

For my mother-teacher, anthropology has remained a living, changing, growing science, and she has accepted the responsibility to communicate its exciting possibilities to her students. It was by her standard and example that I knew how to choose a teacher, how highly to value the gift of a great one. I thank her indirectly, for all my other great teachers in different fields.

The little girl grew up to become an artist-painter-picture-maker. As an art student, though loving the arts of many times and peoples, I felt I had definitely escaped *anthropology*! Then, at college, I met my art 'Gene Weltfish'. It was David Smith, the sculptor and my teacher, who in his way, gave to each of his students a lifetime of art energy. One day he told us that he had learned most about art from anthropology, from Boas! He could not have known that for me this meant the beginning of the end of my adolescent intellectual rebellion; art versus anthropology. I no longer had a satisfying place to hide from my informal, inevitable, lifetime study with my mother. These two, the sculptor and the anthropologist, did meet and work briefly together. It was a fine collaboration for both.

Growing up in this country, in the mid-twentieth century, and deciding to be a picture-maker-artist meant choosing a confusing, uncertain path. The work process becomes, after student days, almost exclusively self-motivated, self-judged, and carried out alone; facing one's own angels and devils over and over again. Then too, one is working without the moral or financial support of a society which thinks of artists as romantic, decorative, fun, often crazy, sometimes 'pets', but never as

necessary workers. What kind of armor is needed for this Quixotic struggle?

For wanting and needing to go on working, the time spent with David Smith, many spirits from the past of art and some working now, serves well.

To comprehend by understanding beyond this immediate society, the absolutely essential place of art in human evolution one must go to prehistoric anthropology.

When I speak to groups of children about art, I want to share the wonder and magic of making pictures of one's own. More importantly, I want them to know what marvels they perform with just one small drawing; how many thousands of years of human struggle had to pass before any 'drawing' — the same kinds of drawing they learn to take for granted at eight or nine years old or even younger. I want them to know that these first artists were not childlike, they were real people, learning and using skills to survive against overwhelming odds; art must have seemed necessary to them. This story comes from my mother's book, *The Origins of Art*, a book about art and anthropology (the artwork for this book was done entirely by the anthropologist author).

My mother-teacher had answered two big 'life' questions for me. First for the child, 'Where did I come from?'; and later, for the artist, 'Where did art come from?'.

Returning to the past, before Columbia, before anthropology, before me, I commemorate my mother's very first 'teacher' role; big sister-teacher to her younger sister, Florrie; she must have been a good one even then. Florence Goldin was a pioneer in her own right and they remained close, good friends and mutual 'cheerfng squads' until Florrie's death in 1970.

Anthropology continued at home. When I married, mother-teacher became mother-in-law-teacher. Desmond Margetson became son-in-law-student and co-thinker. As an engineer, musician, and athlete he brought many new dimensions to the Weltfish-Margetson seminars that filled our kitchen. Then, Gene Weltfish became grandmother-teacher, the ultimate fun and glory. With luck one sees the future in one's grandchildren. Neil and Evan are surely fulfilling that 'luck' as thinkers, friends, people and music-makers for the future. She has said she has had a chance to grow up three times, first with herself, then 'with you Annie and again with my grandsons'.

Looking back, I can see what a marvellous time that must have been, at and around Columbia University in the twenties, thirties and forties. It was for the sciences and social sciences the kind of 'moveable feast' that Paris had been for art and writing. Everyone could have 'great masters'

for teachers and for talk; valuable interfield exchanges happened every day. My mother-teacher has continued to function in the spirit of those times, enriching her anthropology from every other area of thought, able to become a student of anything when necessary and a teacher to anyone when it seemed relevant; thereby enriching other fields and other teachers. I know my mother did not see herself as a teacher but as a scientist who also taught. Having to teach more than she really wanted became an economic necessity. Yet I watched her prepare every class anew, no matter how many times she had taught that same one. Many teachers are content to pass on what they already know or what is known about their subject. For my mother-teacher, Gene Weltfish, this has never been enough. At home as at school, she has tried and continues to try by teaching and example, to use her science to point the way through the past and present to a better future. Teaching, for her, has become a creative way to help people help themselves grow and to build new kinds of anthropology. Her teaching has become as creative as any 'pure' science.

All thanks to my teacher-mother who often felt harrassed by teaching because she set for herself the limitless task of the artist.

Some Salient Events in the Professional Life of Gene Weltfish

High School
West Orange, New Jersey; Wadleigh High School, New York City concomittently: Eastman Gaines Business School and Wadleigh Evening High School. Graduated 1919, then commercial jobs.

College
Columbia Extension: Hunter Evening College; Cornell (1921); Barnard College, 1923, *B.A. Feb. 1925.* Job: Teacher Clerk in the New York City School System, simultaneously with evening college.

Graduate School
Columbia Graduate Anthropology Feb. 1925 under Boas. Graduate Assistant at Barnard College. *Ph.D. May 1929* (passing of general and thesis exams with confirming letter from Dean Woodbridge as to her completion of all requirements for the Ph.D.). Her Sheepskin awaited publication of thesis according to then current regulations. It would have cost $4000 which she did not have. (Thesis: 'Art and Technology', illustrated.) Final extrication from this situation when Columbia rescinded the publication requirement and accepted mimeographed copies instead: arranged by W. Duncan Strong in 1950. For fellowship application and for all other purposes, her Ph.D. was in effect granted in May 1929, including the title.

May 1929
Left for the field (Oklahoma) with a National Research Council Fellowship to work on Pawnee language at the instance of Boas, since there was no representative grammar of the languages of the Caddoan stock; obtained comparative material from the Arikara in North Dakota, and the Caddo in Shawnee, Oklahoma. Published a volume of Pawnee texts and grammatical sketch, 1937.

1929–1930–1931
Social Science Research Council Fellowship. Work in New Mexico and Arizona among Cochiti, Rio Grande Pueblos, Hopi Pueblos on art and technology, the problem of motor habits in art and industry, indigenous methods of teaching; also among three Apache tribes: San Carlos, Jicarilla, Mescalero. Detailed photographic records of production techniques.
Records made and exhibits set up for:
Museum of Science and Industry, Waldemar Kaempfert, Chicago Museum; American Museum of Natural History, New York; University Museum, Philadelphia, with photographs and specimens illustrating processes of manufacture.

Cognate research in museums throughout the country: California, Washington, Oregon, Colorado, Arizona, New Mexico, Chicago, Philadelphia and Cambridge.

1933
In Oklahoma, to study Pawnee culture as an outgrowth of the linguistic project.

1934
In Louisiana, to study art and technology among the Chitimacha Indians; report and photographic record.

1935
Invited to join the Graduate Faculty at Columbia by Boas. Pioneered and/or established several courses including 'The Development of Technology and Invention in Human Culture'.
Other courses taught: 'Prehistory of the Old World' (archeology of Europe, Africa, Asia, — paleolithic, mesolithic, neolithic and metal ages).
'Applied and Theoretical Linguistics'; 'Phonetics'; 'African Anthropology'; 'Race Problems'; 'Anthropology and Contemporary Problems'; 'Time Perspective in Anthropology'; 'American Archeology'.

1935–1953
G.W. was the central figure in Anthropology in the School of General Studies. Within the Graduate Department, she was assigned to give one-third of her time to the development of the School and develop a program of suitable courses. This was both an adult program and an enlargement of courses available to the graduate students; the adult

students could take any of the graduate courses. Many such students entered the Graduate Department in Anthropology without having had any previous training in the subject. They frequently came to Columbia, from other academic fields and had other types of professional connections. In order to introduce them to the subject, G.W. offered a course called General Anthropology, which had been instituted by Boas and which she was now assigned to teach.

Similar courses were offered by the major professors of Psychology (Woodworth) and Sociology (Giddings). In addition to the General Course, G.W. added: 'Ethnology of the American Indian'; 'Peoples of Africa', 'of Asia', 'of Oceania'; and a seminar in 'African Colonial Problems', to extend the scope of world areas, for entering students as well as adult students. Some of the students were accepted transitionally, and temporarily, in this division, while their admission to full graduate status was in process. These classes, particularly the General Course, became very large and a rather special idiom was needed to address the students; an idiom later adopted in her contribution to the Public Affairs Pamphlet 'The Races of Mankind' in 1943, coauthored with Ruth Benedict, G.W. being the senior author.

In the early years, the School of General Studies which became a full-fledged college of the University, had been known as University Extension. It grew as a special function of the general university structure. For example, a group of people would petititon for a course in, say, Armenian, and the University Administration would then initiate it, with all the qualifications involved in the regular university curriculum, obtaining the necessary instruction and linking it to the appropriate department. A request of this kind could be made by a minimum of five people who shared a common interest.

Over a period of 40 years this structure proliferated greatly, as the Graduate departments added new courses, and it became desirable to regularize the adult division. G.W. participated in the preliminary research, consulting 40 years of interviews with students from records made by their advisors, and also catalogues of colleges throughout the country. The summary of this material was presented to the Board of Trustees with the additional observation that one-third of the population of the United States lived within commuting distance of New York City.

It was not long before the School of General Studies became a formal component of the Professional and Graduate Schools of the University, and was authorized to grant a B.S. degree. The concept of General Studies was derived from the 40-year survey; the adult students expressed the need to get a more generalized overview of the fields of knowledge, as they had already been professionally and occupationally specialized, and

had returned to college to reassess their personal and vocational goals. The curriculum of the school was organized to meet this need.

Considering G.W.'s own educational history, she was obviously deeply involved in this approach to education.

1938–1943

Consultant on Race and Anthropology, Division of Science Teaching, Teachers College, Columbia University. (Summer 1938) seminars at Sarah Lawrence College and establishment of the program. Participants included: J. D. Bernal, Physics; John Pillley, Chemistry; Bentley Glass, Biology; Paul Sears, Botany and Ecology.

World War II. 1943

Mass hegira of social scientists to Washington as recruits and volunteers in the struggle against nazism. G.W.'s consultation with members of the federal administration resulted in her decision to 'stay out of government' because of inevitable accomodation to policy requirements. Interview with a psychologist, Tryon, working in one of the government divisions, made this clear. Her resulting determination was to give major attention to 'The Race Problem' as a public service beyond university teaching. She established a Community Council along with other active personalities in the Neighborhood. First focus was on racial conflict between Morningside Avenue (part of the black ghetto) and Morningside Heights (the locale of the University).

Establishment of an after-school Community Center in Public School 43, Manhattan, on 129th Street and Amsterdam Avenue, where a recreational and community class program was in operation under the Board of Education. A community center feature was developed there with full cooperation of the Board and many active residents of the area.

As sole faculty member on hand in the Graduate Department at Columbia, G.W. made an extensive tour of the country lecturing on race and racial conflict at the request of churches, clubs, museums, schools — from Texas to Toronto. She presented as many as 300 public lectures of one kind or another in a single year.

Late 1940s–1953

Intensification of political repression. Arrival of McCarthy Era in full force. Professional and personal ostracism. Termination of her post at Columbia. Various efforts at financial self-support.

1954

Invitation by John Champe, who had studied with G.W. at Columbia, to

work in his Laboratory of Anthropology at the University of Nebraska, Lincoln, on Pawnee materials. Intensive cooperation from Champe and other members of the Laboratory, Historical Society and other research divisions of the University and the community. Research and writing on the Pawnee of the Plains based on fieldwork — later published in '*The Lost Universe*', and intensive contact through Champe, and colleagues of the Smithsonian Institution, with relevant archaeology and history.

1958

Return to New York. Invitation to contribute to the Radin Festschrift in which she was able to summarize fundamental theoretical interests in the cultural variability of the perception of materiality. Fellowship from the Bollingen Foundation, through the initiative of Paul Radin, who was then instrumental in their anthropology program, 'Project: The Mathematical Plotting of Whole Cultures in Terms of Their Integrative Functions' (a reaction to the static assumptions, and concept, of patterns of culture).

1961

Assistant Professorship, Fairleigh Dickinson University, Madison, New Jersey — undergraduate teaching of anthropology.

1964

Fairleigh Dickinson, Associate Professor.

1968

Professor

Currently

Professor Emeritus (Fairleigh Dickinson); Visiting Professor: Graduate Anthropology, New School for Social Research, New York (invited by Stanley Diamond, from 1972 onwards); Visiting Professor: Academic Program, Manhattan School of Musik, New York.

While at Fairleigh Dickinson University: Interdisciplinary projects, always with community involvement, had included: 'The Biology of the Arts'; 'New Vistas on Work and Leisure', in American Civilization Institute of Morristown, for research by high school and college students, a project for Employment Training of Youth, coordinating the high school students and students in the college in a local history and archaeology program, emphasizing the development of diverse skills toward career goals. Full cooperation of the Morristown Community.

In Patterson, New Jersey: Project on social and physical mobility of the inner city population. As part of the project, G.W. helped numerous

ethnic groups reenact their history in relationship to its contribution to the growth of Patterson. Abandoned the project with the belief that it is necessary for ethnic groups to do their own ethnography.

In Madison, New Jersey: Development of a Senior Center in the town. Program on aging in the University.

Participation in International Gerontological congresses at home and abroad, most recently in 1972 in Kiev.

Development of the Gerontological Society of New Jersey.

1972 to present

While at the New School: further inquiry into the anthropology of work and education in the U.S., England and Sweden.

Exploration of the question of job-design and training for black and minority youth, directed toward long-term career goals. Continuing theory and practice regarding the question of aging and lifespan, the arts and work.

Primary organizer, and a Director, of the Metropolitan (New York) Medical Anthropological Society.

Participant in Conference on Space Materials, Princeton.

Return to the Pawnee: Interviews with former informants.

As Gene Weltfish puts it: 'All these questions and resultant activities are germaine to the problem and deformed dynamics of *Racism*, as is everything in Anthropology that I explore. Human hatred and group self-destruction must be the basis of our work, for those committed rather than merely professionalized.'

Selected Bibliography of Gene Weltfish

Books and Monographs

1936 *Caddoan Texts. Part 1: Pawnee South Bend Dialect.* Publications of the American Ethnological Society, vol. 17. (Reprinted AMS Press: New York, 1974.)

1953 *The Origins of Art.* Bobbs-Merrill: Indianapolis.

1965 *The Lost Universe.* New York: Basic Books. (Reprinted New York: Ballantine Books, 1971, paperback.)

1974 *Work, an Anthropological View.* Saratoga Springs: Empire State College, State University of New York.

i.p. *Aesthetics, the Dimension of Beauty in the Human Being: An Anthropological View.* Saratoga Springs: Empire State College, State University of New York.

Contributions to Books

1932 In *Social Anthropology*, ed. by Paul Rodin (prepared 1927, published 1932): Ch.5, Iroquois social organization; Ch.11, Law of the Banks Islanders; Chs 16, 17, 29, 21, 23, Organization of economic and industrial life.

1930 Coiled gambling baskets of the Pawnee and other Plains tribes. In *Indian Notes and Monographs* vol. 7, 277–295. New York: New York City Museum of the American Indian, Heye Foundation.

1939 Maps illustrating human origins and human migrations. In *You and Heredity*, ed. by Amram Scheinfeld, Ch.38, 335–355. New York: Frederick A. Stokes & Co.

1949 Racialism, colonialism and world peace. In *Speaking of Peace*, ed. by Daniel S. Gillmore. An edited report of the Cultural and

Scientific Conference for World Peace, New York, March 25, 26 and 27, 1949, under the auspices of the National Council of the Arts, Sciences and Professions.

1952 The study of American Indian crafts and its implications for art theory. *Proceedings of the 29th International Congress of Americanists* vol. 3.

1960 The anthropologist and the question of the fifth dimension (an interpretation of the study of material culture as unified field of epistemological and ethnohistorical approaches to anthropology). In *Culture in History*, ed. by Stanley Diamond. New York: Columbia University Press.

1960 The ethnic dimension of human history: pattern or patterns of culture? *Selected Papers of the Vth International Congress of Anthropological and Ethnological Sciences*, ed. by Anthony F. C. Wallace, 207–218. Philadelphia, Pa.: University of Pennsylvania Press.

1971 The Plains Indians: their continuity in history and their Indian identity. In *North American Indians in Historical Perspective*, ed. by Eleanor Burke Leacock and Nancy Oestreich Lurie, 200–227. New York: Random House.

1979 Boas: the academic response. In *Anthropology: Ancestors and Heirs*, ed. by Stanley Diamond. The Hague: Mouton Publishers.

1979 The anthropology of work. In *Toward a Marxist Anthropology*, ed. by Stanley Diamond. The Hague: Mouton Publishers.

Journal Articles

1930 Revision and completion (with A. Lesser) of index. *Journal of American Folklore* vols 1–40: Memoirs, American Folklore Society, no. 14.

1930 Prehistoric North American basketry techniques and modern distributions. *American Anthropologist* 32:435–495.

1931 Pottery implements of the ancient basket-makers. *American Anthropologist* 32:263.

1931 White-on-red pottery from Cochiti Pueblo. *American Anthropologist* 33:263–264.

1932 Preliminary classification of Prehistoric southwestern basketry. *Smithsonian Miscellaneous Collections* 87 (no. 7), publication 3169.

1932 Composition of the Caddoaw linguistic stock (with A. Lesser) *Smithsonian Miscellaneous Collections* 87 (no.6), publication 41.

1936 The vision of Fox Boy, a south Band Pawnee text, with translation and grammatical analysis. *International Journal of American Linguistics* 9 (no. 1).
1944 Jack Crazy Horse considers business on the reservation. *American Indian* 1(no.2).
1944 When the Indian comes to the city. *American Indian* 2 (no. 1).
1945 Science and prejudice. *The Scientific Monthly* September.
1945 Racial and religious prejudice in everyday living. *Journal of Social Issues* February/May (guest editor).
1956 The perspective for fundamental research in anthropology. *The Philosophy of Science* 23(no.1):63–73.
1957 Some stories about Major North's Pawnee scouts, as reported to Gene Weltfish by Mark Evaits at Pawnee, Oklahoma (manuscript).
1958 Review: *Lehrbuch der Völkerkunde*. Leonhard Adam, Herman Trimhorn et al. Stuttgart: Ferdinand Enka Verlag.
1958 The linguistic study of material culture. *International Journal of American Linguistics* 24(no.4):301–311.
1959 The question of ethnic identity, an ethnological approach. *Ethnohistory* 6(no.4):321–346.
1962 Some main trends in American anthropology in 1961. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* Philadelphia, 339:171–176.
1962 The art of self-decoration in ancient times and distant places. *University Women* 1(no.2):24–25. Madison, New York: Fairleigh Dickinson University.
1968 The aims of anthropology: an American perspective. In response to: The aims of anthropology: a Scandinavian point of view, by Alse Hultkrantz. *Current Anthropology* 9:305–306.
1973 A world without obesity. *Weight Watchers Magazine* no.8:68–69.
1975 Pioneers of plenty, new themes for a new society. *Business Review* Fairleigh Dickinson University (special issue celebrating the school's 15th anniversay) 15(no.1):19–28.
1979 Grace Chapella at 104. *Socioeconomic Institute Journal*, White Plains, N.Y.

Pamphlets

1940 *Cave Dweller Twill Plated Basketry* (appendix to: 'Report on Archeology of Southern Chihuahua', ed. by Robert M. Zingy). University of Denver Contributions III, Centre of Latin American Studies I.

1943 *The Races of Mankind* (with Ruth Benedict). Public Affairs Committee.

1944 *In Henry's Backyard* (with Violet Edwards). New York: Henry Schumon.

1944 *Meet Your Relatives* (with Alice Nirenberg). Public Affairs Committee.

1967 Project: *New Vistas on Work and Leisure: Statement of Purpose*, April. American Civilization Institute of Morristown, ACIM publication, vol.1, no.2.

1968 Project: *New Vistas on Work and Leisure: Progress Report — 1968.* American Civilization Institute of Morristown, ACIM publication, vol.1, no.3.

1970 *New Vistas on Work and Leisure.* An innovative program for relevant education of school and community. Gene Weltfish and Harry Wenner, New Jersey: American Civilization Institute of Morristown.

1971 *Poverty and Transportation as a Factor in the City of Paterson, A Study in Mobility, Social and Physical.* Gene Weltfish (Project Director) and Fairleigh Dickinson faculty associates. Paterson, New Jersey, Free Public Library and other N.J. libraries. This project was formally known as 'The study of transportation as a factor in the lives of low-income individuals and families'. Carried out under a grant from Title I Higher Education Act of 1965, Community Service and Continuing Education Programs. Under the auspices of the State of New Jersey, Department of Community Affairs, Trenton, administered through the office of Special Projects, Madison, New Jersey: Fairleigh Dickinson University.

1972 *Paterson People in the March of Time.* Gene Weltfish, Fairleigh Dickinson University. Issued by the Paterson Free Public Library. (Designed to accompany an exhibit cosponsored by the library and the Paterson Bicentennial Committee as the first of its Bicentennial projects.)

Research Proposals

1957 Research proposal to the National Science Foundation, Washington D.C. *The Ethnic Identity of the Pawnee Indians of Nebraska, A.D. 1876–1900, and the Implications of this Study for the General Question of the Identity of Peoples.* Gene Weltfish, Principal Investigator, and John L. Champe, Chairman and

Director, Laboratory of Anthropology, University of Nebraska, Lincoln. (Not granted.)

1958 *The Question of Ethnic Identity — an Ethnohistorical Approach* (manuscript). Laboratory of Anthropology, University of Nebraska, Lincoln, August.

1958 Proposal for a study of: *The Basketry and Matting of Spiro Mound and its Cultural Connections*. (Correlations with field material on Chitimacha of Louisiana.) May.

1959 Proposal to the Bollingen Foundation: *Mathematical Plotting of Whole Cultures in Terms of Their Integrative Functions.* (Granted 1959.) The purpose of the project was to discover the authentic reasons for 'patterns of culture' (and their appropriate depiction) in terms of the largest and most basic undertakings that a group shares historically.

1964 Proposal to the National Science Foundation by the Institute for Research on the Biology of the Arts, Dance and Dramatics (IRBAD), Madison, New Jersey: *Studies in the Origins and Evolution of Affective Expression and Communication in Social Behavior.*

Representative Media Events

1943 'The Anthropologist Looks at Race'. The WABC Womens Program, November 2. (Nabors-at-Work Series, World Neighborhood.)

1943 'An Anthropologist Looks at the Race Question'. WEVD Freedom House, November 17.

1945 'Science and the Race Problem' May 3. Sent to Mr B. S. Abernathy, Director, Commission on the Church and Minority Peoples. Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America.

1949 'Science and the Race Problem'. WGY Science Forum Program, Schenectady N.Y., June 28.

1950 Discussions on race and related issues at meetings and on radio. Oak Lane Country Day, School of Temple University, March.

1959 'The Varieties of Mankind in the Plains'. Meeting of the 16th Plains Conference, November 28, in the auditorium of the Nebraska Historical Society.

1961 Participant in a colloquium on racial integration: 'The Contributions of Five Social Scientific Disciplines' (anthropology, history, sociology, psychology, economics). Presented for High

School Honors Societies, by the Social Science Faculty, Fairleigh Dickinson University, October 19.

1969 'The American Indian'. The World of Susan Bond Broadcast WMTR, June 27, Madison, New Jersey.

1972 'A Thousand Years of Toil and Strife Touch Us'. Interview published in the *Daily Record* p.98, Morristown, New Jersey, September 29.